

RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES  
INSTITUTE FOR AFRICAN STUDIES

# AFRICAN STUDIES IN RUSSIA

**Yearbook  
2003–2007**

*Editorial Board .*

A.M. VASILIEV (Editor-in-Chief)  
I.O. ABRAMOVA , D.M. BONDARENKO,  
An.N. IVANOV, N.A. KSENOFONTOVA,  
V.G. SHUBIN, G.M. SIDOROVA

*Translation from Russian*

MOSCOW  
2009

ISBN 978–5–91298–047–3

© Институт Африки РАН, 2009  
© Коллектив авторов, 2009.

## CONTENTS

### SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS

<b>Yury Potyomkin.</b> Nepad, a Project of Hope? .....	<b>5</b>
<b>Boris Runov.</b> Intellectual Foundations for Development: Agenda for Sub-Saharan Africa .....	<b>22</b>
<b>Yury Skubko.</b> South African Science after Apartheid Modern Scientific and Technological Potential of the RSA .....	<b>35</b>
<b>Veronika Usacheva.</b> Mass Media in Policonfessional Tanzania .....	<b>44</b>

### ECONOMICS

<b>Leonid Fituni.</b> The Ranking of States by Success of Their Socio-Economic Development .....	<b>60</b>
<b>Vladimir Baskin.</b> Africa in World Trade .....	<b>80</b>
<b>Vladimir Kukushkin.</b> Mineral Resources: a Threat to Security or an Economic Modernization Reserve (Algeria's Experience) .....	<b>85</b>

### AFRICA IN THE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

<b>Irina Abramova.</b> African Migration: a Regional Issue or a Global Problem?.....	<b>97</b>
<b>Alexei Vassiliev.</b> The "North-South" Relations in the Context of the G8 Activity .....	<b>115</b>
<b>Yevgeny Korendyasov, Vladimir Shubin.</b> The African Union and Russia .....	<b>125</b>
<b>Tatyana Deich.</b> Politics as a Factor of Image of Russia in Africa .....	<b>134</b>
<b>Vladimir Lopatov.</b> Russia's Image in Africa: Economic Aspects .....	<b>145</b>
<b>Galina Sidorova.</b> Foreign Policy of Russia and Russian-Congolese Relations .....	<b>158</b>
<b>Mikhail Vishnevsky.</b> The Development of Militaristic Tendencies in US Policy in Africa.....	<b>162</b>

### HISTORY, CULTURE, ETHNOGRAPHY, LINGUISTICS

<b>Vassily Solodovnikov.</b> At the 15th Session of the UN General Assembly in 1960 .....	<b>173</b>
--	------------

<b>Anatoly Savateyev.</b> African Civilization in the Modern World .....	<b>182</b>
<b>Natalia Ksenofontova.</b> Gender and Power .....	<b>190</b>
<b>Dmitri Bondarenko.</b> Visiting the <i>Oba</i> of Benin .....	<b>203</b>
<b>Natalia Krylova.</b> Russian Women and the Sharia: Drama in Women's Quarters .....	<b>209</b>
<b>Svetlana Prozhogina.</b> Difficulties of Cultural Boundaries: "Break-Up", "Border" or Inevitable "Transition"? Literary French Language of the Arab World .....	<b>222</b>
<b>Nelli Gromova.</b> The Ethno-Linguistic Situation in Tanzania .....	<b>235</b>
<b>Valentin Vydrin.</b> Tonal systems of the Mande language: a survey .....	<b>243</b>

### CONFERENCE REPORT

<b>Anastasia Banshchikova, Oleg Kavykin.</b> Fourth International Conference "Hierarchy and Power in the History of Civilizations" (Moscow, June 13–16, 2006) .....	<b>264</b>
---	------------

### SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON AFRICAN STUDIES PUBLISHED RUSSIA IN 2003–2007

(compiled by <b>Anatoli Ivanov</b> ) .....	<b>271</b>
--	------------

## SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS

### NEPAD, A PROJECT OF HOPE?\*

**Yury Potyomkin,**

D.Sc.(Econ), Head of the Centre  
for Sociological and Political Studies,  
Institute for African Studies

*The opening years of the 21st century have been marked by the formation of a new pan-continental institution, the African Union (AU), which superseded the Organization of African Unity. The AU founders regard it as an instrument of comprehensive, sustainable development of its member countries, and their political, social, and economic integration for the common purpose of overcoming backwardness. This strategic mainstream acquired the shape of along-term program. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which is designed to give the region a sustainable economic growth by drawing upon its own forces and opportunities and an expanded effective assistance of North countries. Above anything else, NEPAD has identified a significant major conceptual turnaround among African leaders in their approaches to development problems. It has been a turnaround toward the recognition, in the first place, of their primary **own** responsibility for the results and promises of Africa's development. Secondly, toward their inability, which actually everybody was silent about in the past, to stop independently persistent marginalization of a majority of the continent's countries in the globalizing world economy. Meanwhile, in the real circumstances, the original euphoria among the African political class attending the birth of the AU-NEPAD rapidly gave way to a more conservative assessment of their opportunities and prospects. This article looks at some of the basic components of the situation that preceded the adoption of the "new partnership" and that in which NEPAD has found itself at the end of its fifth year of existence.*

#### The Poverty Trap

Africa is known to be diverse economically. A majority of its countries lies in the least developed part of the continent southerly of the Sahara Desert (Sub-Saharan Africa, SSA). In the south, this part abuts the Republic of South Africa (RSA), the most advanced country on the continent. The northern, Arab-populated subregion of Africa, is relatively affluent. The socioeconomic positions of these three parts of Africa are given below (Table 1).

\* First published in *Vostok (Oriens)*, 2006, No. 2, pp. 79-82.

Table 1

Basic Development Figures of Africa in 2002

	Population, millions	GDP, \$ million	GDP per capita, \$	Ratio to the mean African GDP per capita, %
All Africa	831.8	553,502	650	—
%	100	100		
North Africa	142.6	237,340	1,644	252.9
%	17.1	42.9		
Sub-Saharan Africa (less the RSA)	643.9	216,344	307	47.2
%	77.4	39.1		
RSA	45.3	104,242	2,600	400.0
%	5.4	18.8		

Source: *African Development Indicators...*, 2004, Tables 1-1 and 2-5.

In socioeconomic term, Sub-Saharan Africa has over three-quarters of the continent's population and less than 40% of GDP against respectively 17% and 43% in North Africa, and 5% and 19% in the RSA. An average income per capita in Tropical Africa is more than five times smaller than in North Africa, and 8.5 times in the RSA. To translate into dollar terms, the majority of Africans have to manage on less than one dollar a day per head, far below the so-called poverty line, and the region's population as a whole survives on less than two dollars a day. Considering social inequality, the life of an overwhelming majority of the African population appears in still darker light.

Averages do not, of course, smooth out differences between countries that, at times, may be vast. And yet, the general picture stands out in a fairly clear outline. How has it changed over the last few decades in comparison with other regions of the South? According to UN figures (*Human Development...*, 2001, p. 10), in the last quarter of the past century, the gross product per capita grew at an average annual rate of (–) 1% in Sub-Saharan Africa, 0.3% in Arab countries, 0.7% in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2.3% in South Asia, and 6% in East Asia and the Pacific Region. Thus an income per capita dropped in SSA while it grew in other developing countries. This pattern has held in the new century as well. In 2001 merely 16 out of 39 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa showed a scanty growth of income per capita, while it stagnated or declined in the others. The greatest retreat was registered in Congo (Kinshasa), Angola, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, the Comoros, Burundi, and Togo [*Marchüs tropicaux*, 2004,

No. 3038, p. 194]. In 2002, 29 out of 36 worst performers according to the human development index (HDI) drawn up by the UN every year on the basis of life expectancy, adult literacy, education systems characteristics, and GDP per capita, were in Africa.

It is appropriate to remember here that the Millennium Declaration passed by the UN in 2000 named the reducing to half the number of people living on less than one dollar a day and by two-thirds the number of children who die before the age of five years among the chief objectives of the international community by 2015. Applied to Africa, these objectives figure prominently in the AU-NEPAD documents. As the situation is developing at present, these objectives can be more or less achieved in the continent's Northern region and in some countries of the Southern region only. The reverse is happening in Sub-Saharan Africa. The number of people living on less than one dollar a day had grown between 1981 and 2001 from 164 million (42% of the population) to 314 million (49%); poverty had been made still worse by the AIDS pandemic (70% of all HIV-infected in the world), and a wide spread of several other diseases, including malaria and tuberculosis.

It is practically impossible to turn these trends around within a conceivably short time. In UN estimates, the target set in the Millennium Declaration and accepted by the AU-NEPAD as a goal cannot be accomplished before sometime in 2147 in respect of Africa's absolute poor, and has to wait till at least 2165 as regards infant mortality [*Marchüs tropicaux*, 2004, No. 3038, p. 194; 2004, No. 3051, p. 971]. It is not only a matter of the depth of the social crisis and low elasticity of the internal economic, sociocultural, and political factors which caused and maintain this crisis. More or less dynamic socioeconomic development is impeded by objective circumstances such as deterioration of the environment, narrow scope of the markets due again to the poverty of the population and small size of many countries, the existing structure of their economies that determine the kind of their external economic ties and these countries' fundamental dependence on them as a result.

This dependence is most visible in commerce. The fast growth of international trade flows in the past several decades appears to have shunned Africa, making it still more marginalized. Between 1980 and 2002, the continent's share of world export of goods slipped from 6% to 2%, and that of import decreased to less than half, from 4.6% to 2.1%. One of the reasons of such a decline lies in the structure of African export: 60% of it are formed by farming produce subject to little or no processing, and minerals of very little added value (in contrast to 30% for developing countries in general). Lack of focus on processing makes African export revenues heavily dependent on two factors beyond their control – the weather and the play of market forces. Prices instability and terms of trade worsening (with the exception of oil priced in significant degree by the cartel deals of

OPEC) inflict enormous damage on Africa. According to World Bank estimates, between 1970 and 1997, export revenues per capita in Africa plunged, while increasing by a factor of 3.6 in South Asia, 8.7 in East Asia, and 2.9 in Latin America. The African countries' total losses through worsening trade terms in that period ran up to nearly 120% of their aggregate GDP [*Can Africa ...*, 2002, pp. 8 and 21]. The UNCTAD report for 2004 gives a characteristic reason – with the worsening of trade terms, maintaining their export revenues at the 1997 level in 2001 would require African countries to double the export of their basic products [*Marchüs tropicaux*, 2004, No. 3043, p. 491].

The only way to reduce the share of farming produce and minerals in African export is to diversify it by manufacturing products of high added value or large labor inputs. Only such an approach has enabled many developing countries to get remarkable results. It has not realized however in a majority of African countries for many reasons, but mostly because of the shortage of own funds and irrational utilization of considerable borrowings. The poverty trap has seriously restricted saving of some of the national income and, consequently, lowered the accumulation rate.<sup>1</sup> Meanwhile, the foreign debt stranglehold tightened, and debt servicing had the same effect.

Table 2

#### Africa's Foreign Debt, 1970-2002

	Debt variations averaged by periods			
	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-1999	2000-2002
(millions of dollars)				
Total debt	39,270	180,456	303,232	292,561
Overdue payments	648	9,102	34,284	61,129
Payments in due course (ratio,%)	3,347	18,591	25,800	23,706
Total debt/export of goods and services	91.0	195.2	234.3	168.6
Overdue payments/export of goods and services	1.5	9.8	26.5	15.1
Payments in due course/export of goods and services	7.8	20.1	19.9	13.7
Total debt/GDP	24.2	51.7	65.3	54.6
Overdue payments/GDP	0.4	2.6	7.4	4.9
Payments in due course /GDP	2.1	5.3	5.6	4.4

Source: Computed by the UNCTAD Secretariat on the basis of World Bank data [*Economic Development in Africa...*, 2004]

## Debt Noose

African countries' external borrowings have been swelling over the last three decades of the past century, building up to the most cruel crisis, which forced their Western creditors to adopt, in the mid-1990s, a mechanism to alleviate the African debt burden. Unlike debts accumulated by countries at the middle development level through bank credits, low-income African countries relied on OECD States and international financial institutions as the principal sources of external borrowing. Their debt that was just a little above \$11 billion in 1970 soared to \$120 billion by the early 1980s. During the period of structural adaptation, it shot up to almost \$340 billion in 1995 (Table 2). Over this time, the debt owed to international financial institutions rose by a factor of five, and tripled under bilateral interstate agreements. The fact, commented UNCTAD, that structural adaptation programs failed to bring about the growth and development promised by their initiators meant that many African countries continued to sink further into debt [*Economic Development in Africa...*, 2004, p. 8].

The existing situation was extraordinary because overdue payments were continually piling up as an indication of the borrowing country's inability to meet its debt obligations on time. In 1995, nearly all unmet debt obligations in excess of \$41 billion accrued in countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, amounting to a fifth of their total debt. More significant yet, overdue payments to official (governmental and international) creditors were growing faster than any others, as a reflection of three sources of funds received in the 1970s through 2002 – OECD States (around \$200 billion, or 62.5% of all borrowings); international financial institutions (about \$80 billion, or 25%); and private creditors (\$40 billion, or 12.5%).

As is clear from above, the worsening debt crisis followed a pattern that combined accumulation of overdue payments, fast growth of debt over the borrowing countries' export revenues, and rapid growth of the ratio of debt to their GDP (from one-quarter in the 1970s to two-thirds in the 1990s). The beginning of the 2000s was marked by an insignificant reversal of these proportions as a result of measures undertaken by official creditors. This in no way means, however, that the crisis is past its peak – it is still very much in evidence and cannot be resolved without the creditors taking further steps to ease Africa's debt burden,

In general, Africa's debt profile for the years between 1970 and 2002 looks as follows (in millions of dollars) [*Economic Development in Africa...*, 2004, p. 10]:

	Africa	Including:	
		Sub-Saharan Africa	North Africa
Sums received	539,456	294,010	245,446
Actual debt servicing	549,135	268,302	280,833
Remaining debt	295,461	210,685	84,776

Therefore, the borrowings actually repaid (with a vengeance) do not lift the heavy debt burden off Africa's shoulders, particularly its poorest Sub-Saharan region. Servicing the outstanding debt, including the interest being charged on overdue payments, could give a major boost to the flow of resources, already in reverse (from poor to rich countries). The huge debt and other international business imbalances prevented the accumulation of savings and investments, these two primary conditions for development, poverty reduction, and real advance to other "millennium goals."

Against this background, the business and political circles in countries of the North and officials of international organizations are gradually agreeing on the need to prevent Africa from further plunging to the bottom of the world economy. "It is a common view today," the UNCTAD report says, "that the continent needs to at least double its economic growth rates, bringing them up to 7% or 8%." This goal is also set in the NEPAD documents. Providing debt relief to low-income countries by deferring the debt repayment deadlines (mostly, without reducing the debt) and/or writing off debts on bilateral loans within the framework of the Official Assistance for Development (OAD), or making loans on softer terms was proposed as the core of assistance to such countries. In the period of 1975 to 1998, members of the Paris Club of lending states repeatedly talked about the possibility of reducing the debts owed by "the poorest and most debt-burdened countries," but things have not moved further than talks.

In December 1996, the Paris Club finally made up its mind to reduce, on certain conditions, the debt obligations of the world's poorest countries by 80% (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative), and also announced the possibility of reduction of their debt to multilateral institutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and regional development banks. Debt relief is only to apply, under the Initiative terms, to the poorest countries, a majority of them in Africa. Those countries were selected according to the following criteria: first, a 2- to 2.5-fold excess of government (or government-guaranteed) debt over receipts from the export of goods and non-factor services. Second, a debtor country was to be put on the "elite" list only if its payments to service its debt amounted to at least 20% to 25% of its export receipts. The exact criteria for each country to qualify were estab-

lished in relation to its economic performance indicators, the principal of which were its GDP per capita and the worth of its exports.

After three years of the Initiative in operation, it had not rescued the beneficiary countries from the recurring debt restructuring, nor had it provided them with the resources to begin reducing poverty in real earnest. Even though there was a relatively small number of such countries, the generally insignificant debt relief was provided far too slowly. Debt service payments exceeded significantly the debtor countries' expenditure on health care and education. All of that created a critical atmosphere around the Initiative, forcing the creditors, including the IMF and the World Bank, in November 1999 to raise the proportion of write-offs to 90%, or even more, if the debt was to be lowered to the debt sustainability level. The principal purpose of this move was, according to official announcements, to reinforce the connection between "a deeper, wider, and faster" debt relief and the policy seeking to reduce poverty in accordance with country-specific conditions. Qualification thresholds were also lowered for countries striving to secure the debt relief preferences which were raised, under the expanded Initiative, from \$12.5 billion in 1998 to \$39.4 billion in 2002 [*Economic Development in Africa...*, 2004, p. 15].

Foreign debt is a problem with a basically African "colouration" because 34 of the 42 developing countries weighed down by the heavy debt burden are in Africa. At the end of February 2004, 23 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were covered by the "HIPC Initiative." Its general results are assessed in restrain tones. According to the UN economic and social survey for 2004, they were inadequate for reducing foreign debt to a level that could be managed by the beneficiary countries [*World Economic...*, 2004, p. 21]. Measures undertaken within the Initiative context eased the situation somewhat, of course, but were less than enough to provide a solution such as a much wider reduction of the debts, right up, in the Africans' view, to their complete write-off.<sup>2</sup> It was against this background that the G8 countries meeting for their summit in the U.S. in June 2004, resolved to keep the Initiative on until the end of 2006 [*Marchüs tropicaux*, 2004, No. 3058, p. 1379]. Africans put their special hopes into the next G8 leaders' summit in the United Kingdom in July 2005, at which assistance to African countries was to become a key issue on the agenda.

### Aims and ways

The many-sided poverty problem, the debt burden, the overall socio-economic backwardness, and the need to break out of it are the backdrop against which the NEPAD program emerged. Below, we recapitulate, if only briefly, its principal goals and methods by which they are to be achieved, set out in general outline without a precise time frame in this long-term document.

NEPAD (or New Partnership for Africa's Development) consists of two components – political and socioeconomic. The first component suggests the maintenance of security, restraint of conflicts between neighbors, practice of democracy at all levels, and high quality and transparency of public assets management as essential conditions for sustainable development. The second component focuses on the deployment of resources (accumulation of savings, access to capital markets, growth in foreign aid in domestic and private foreign investments), and highlights the following development priorities – infrastructure, information technologies and communications, education, health care, agriculture, diversification of production and exports attached to conditions improvement of the penetration into foreign markets, environmental protection, and power engineering. Particular projects in all these priority areas are to be drawn up and implemented as the continent's countries are integrated politically, economically, socially, and culturally. The embodiment of such an integration is the African Union, which is, in turn, based on existing real integrated subregional groups.

In contrast to all previous pan-African documents on development options, including the 1991 treaty of the African Economic Community, which all vested the pivotal role in the state, the NEPAD strategy gives priority to the investment activity of private capital, which is to rest upon the state's organizational, economic, and legal support. The opportunities and general conditions of private investment will be dealt with below, here we will only say that the Official Assistance for Development from OECD States and international financial institutions will be, as we said above, the principal source of financial injections into Africa. The OECD countries are to provide about two-thirds of OAD, with financial institutions contributing the remainder. In the 1990s, the net annual OAD to Africa averaged \$20.4 billion, of which \$16.2 billion went to countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (less the RSA). It had a special importance to the SSA recipient countries, having reached the net (after the deduction of payments made to service the earlier loans within the OAD framework) 9% of their GDP (compared to 4.9% for all of Africa) and a half of gross investments (compared to 24%, respectively) [*African Development Indicators...*, 2004, Tables 12-1, 12-2, 12-4, 12-9, and 12-12].

NEPAD developers initially estimated annual inputs within the Partnership framework from foreign sources at \$60 to \$64 billion. Soon, however, this estimate was recognized to be a bit overblown, just as was the projected 7% growth rate of GDP. And yet, implementation of the program would probably require foreign aid to be increased significantly. This is admitted by OAD donors as well, although the target level of 0.7% of GDP, recommended by the UN back in the 1970s and echoed repeatedly in international documents adopted since that time, has not been achieved in a majority of OECD countries. What is more, net OAD to Africa had been decreasing in quantum and, even more important, per capita. Between 1992

and 2001, OAD was trimmed by more than a third overall (from \$24.9 billion to \$16.2 billion), or, in per capita terms, it was halved, from \$40 to \$20 [*World Economic...*, 2004, pp. 285 and 299].

A turning point in this situation came in March 2002 when the U.S. and the European Union announced their intention to allocate more funds for aid. In 2003, OAD contributed by OECD member countries of the Development Aid Committee averaged 0.41% of their GDP, a considerable increase on the 0.33% average in 2000. Significantly, four countries only (Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, and Sweden) of the 21 Committee members met or exceeded the 0.7% target [*World Economic...*, 2004, p. 57]. The U.S. was the least generous contributor (with 0.14% of its GDP), and, unlike major European countries,<sup>3</sup> it never again, following its turning point announcement, “said a word about achieving 0.7% at any time during this century” [*The New York Times*, April 25, 2005].

Promises to increase aid were invariably accompanied by references to the need for African leaders and government institutions to assume more responsibility for creating adequate conditions for comprehensive development, for otherwise aid might be of no use. In particular, the “laudatory” resolution passed by the European Parliament on NEPAD and the African Union in January 2004 calls for clear-cut rules to be laid down in respect of responsibility, transparency, good management, and “participatory” democracy. The resolution places accent on curbing corruption, in particular, on the need to hasten ratification of the African Union’s convention adopted on corruption in 2003 [*Marchés tropicaux*, 2004, No. 3037].

In the light of promises made by developed countries, the possibility of increasing aid to Africa more or less significantly looked real enough, as was confirmed in the G8 leaders’ decisions in July 2005. In the first place, it was decided to write off completely the HIPC countries’ outstanding debt. Second, OAD donors raised their commitments, with the likelihood of annual “official assistance for development” to Africa going up by \$25 billion by 2010, or double the amount compared with 2004. Moreover, the G8 decisions contain promises to “contribute to the establishment of an efficient and flexible public management,” in particular, to give more transparency to public finances in African countries, in the fight against corruption, and so on [*ITAR TASS*, July 14, 2005; *Compass*, No. 28, 2005, pp. 8-9].

Falling short of what the African side of NEPAD expected, the planned increase in foreign aid is still a major breakthrough in this area. It is hard to perceive similar breakthroughs in the other channel of assistance to the “new partnership,” in particular, foreign direct investments (FDI) and invigoration of local private capital. NEPAD projects, in fact, even give more importance to this channel than they do to OAD.

Meanwhile, optimism about FDI appears to be rather excessive, to say the least. There are, of course, several factors that can stir foreign capital’s

interest toward the region. They are: stable demand for African resources that has held in recent years, declared policies to encourage local private business in manufacturing, and the trend toward a gradual changeover of African currencies from fixed to floating exchange rates, which, if continued, would encourage regional commercial, economic, and financial integration and improve the local climate for foreign capital. All these factors, however, make Africa more attractive mostly for portfolio investments that can, upon the slightest downturn, withdraw from the stock market just as quickly as they came in. The FDI case is a little different.

According to UNCTAD data, the flow of foreign direct investments to Africa between 1992 and 2003 was in the following pattern (in billions of dollars):

	1992-1997 annual average	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
To Africa in general including SSA	5.9	9.1	11.6	8.7	19.6	11.8	15.0
	4.0	6.2	8.6	5.8	14.1	8.1	9.2

Source: [*Economic Development in Africa...*, 2004, Table 2].

With reference to the above table, FDIs were growing during this period here much faster than in other Southern regions, making up, however, only a very modest proportion of the overall investments in developing countries (8.7% in 2003). Whatever the case, the share of investments in foreign funds provided to Africa continued to grow. While in 1990, FDIs (\$2.5 billion) were far behind total “official assistance for development,” in 2002 they took a 46% share of all foreign resources received by Africa.

In principle, Africa offers enormous investment opportunities for private capital, and the returns it promises are rated among the highest in the world.<sup>4</sup> Many barriers are put, however, in the way of foreign and local investors in a majority of the region’s countries.

## Barriers

As a general rule, foreign direct investments flow to developing countries (or their regions) that offer a set of conditions essential for investment companies’ successful, that is, profitable involvement. The set includes rich natural resources, particularly those in high demand worldwide; relatively developed infrastructure; an adequate market in the region where the investments are made; sufficiently trained manpower; social, political, and legal stability; and a low level of corruption in local management bodies.<sup>5</sup>

Such countries are few and far between in Africa. In the absence of the last five factors, or if they are not convincing enough, FDIs are mostly drawn to the first factor. Accordingly, most of them are put into mining, particularly oil production.

In 2003, for example, most new foreign investments were made in oil exploration and production in Algeria, Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Nigeria, and Sudan. Of the ten biggest FDI recipients, seven were oil-producing countries [*Africa Renewal*, 2004, p. 20]. But production of oil and other minerals in countries with a generally weak manufacturing does little to stimulate growth in other industries, does not give enough incentives to overall economic development. Private capital is frequently held back from flowing to agriculture, manufacturing, and services by the tedious bureaucratic process that investment projects are to go through before approval.

Widespread corruption and poor management are a serious problem affecting the economic atmosphere in a direct way. World Bank experts, who surveyed the investment climate for over 3,000 companies in eight African countries during 2001 to 2003, named corruption as the greatest hindrance to economic growth. Over a half of the companies surveyed said they were not certain of their property rights being upheld in court, if they were involved in litigation. Transparency International, a nongovernmental organization, gave from 3.6 points (Botswana) to 8.4 points (Nigeria) on a 10-point scale it used in one of its latest surveys to assess the level of corruption in 20 African countries. Its survey results showed the average score of 6.79. In 2003, 11 out of 25 countries having a high or very high level of corruption were in Africa. "Certainly," says a Senegalese tax inspector quoted in *Africa Renewal* published by the UN, "if legal rules can be changed at any time, if government institutions abuse their powers, or if court decisions are made slowly and are unrelated to the case in point, FDI cannot be attracted into the country. Where corruption is behind all this, foreign investors would turn to other horizons" [*Africa Renewal*, 2004, p. 21]. Overregulation is so great, writes *The Economist* of London, that the majority of African governments speak of their desire to simplify it. In many countries, though, regulation rules are "hydra-headed creatures", and cutting out the most onerous and corruptive of them would induce the lawmakers to invent new ones [*The Economist*, 2004, p. 13].

Africa is certainly not the only place on earth riddled with corruption. What makes it an exception to the general rule is that, according to many Africa-watchers, it is almost institutional in nature. It is impossible to change things here within a short space of time, even though we hear African leaders speak repeatedly, in a sort of ritual in all discussions of NEPAD problems, about the need to weed out this evil.

Overregulation and at the same time instability of the economic framework as sources of corruption combine to build roadblocks preventing any

kind of capital – foreign or local – from spreading to manufacturing and other non-mining sectors. The difference is, however, that local capital in a majority of the continent's countries is too weak to go into manufacturing and is essentially commercial capital that can hardly be converted into productive one. Africa's native capital in manufacturing is locked up mostly in weak small businesses and, to a very insignificant extent, is employed in medium-sized businesses. This despite the real possibility that medium-sized businesses could become the bedrock of more or less significant manufacturing. Operating in a predictably more profitable sector that is technologically far more simple and helps turn the assets over fast, local merchants, even those of a large caliber, are loath to "start changing things from what they are." From the perspective of economy diversification and, more broadly, the NEPAD objectives, this creates certainly the concern shared by African leaders who have initiated the "new partnership" and now want to see it in action.

Barriers in this sphere are built up not only in the natural economic mentality of foreign and local entrepreneurs and in government quarters as well. Implementation of NEPAD (and simultaneously African integration and solidification of the African Union) cannot shut out direct or indirect influence of worldwide and internal African factors. Worldwide factors include, above all, economic **globalization** that actually broadens, rather than narrows, the gap separating the marginalized extrovert economies from the rest of the world; rapid **progress in science and technology** that accentuates the rift between its centres and peripheries; and the **WTO policy** working against the African countries' interests to dismantle asymmetric trade preferences. Internal African factors are, in particular, meager opportunities to expand intra-African trade that is still somewhere about 10% of Africa's total international commercial ties; surviving political conflict-prone situations in some areas of the continent, contrary to the recent trend to ease them; fragile relations and serious differences between individual countries (over the use of the Nile water, territorial dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon, and so on); and suspicions in which the smaller countries of the continent hold the "power centres" such as the RSA, Nigeria, and Egypt.

These factors, and many more, are the real barriers to a "new partnership." Resolving them would require quite enormous efforts on the part of Africa itself and its northern neighbors. This may not happen any time soon.

### The Pluses?

For the real significance and relevance of NEPAD to be assessed, it is worthwhile to survey, along with poverty and the debt crisis, the recent years' economic conjuncture on the continent that is largely determined by outside factors. At the start of the new century, the annual GDP growth



rates varied insignificantly around 3%. They were expected to rise during 2003 to 2005 from 3.3% to 4.7% for Africa as a whole, and from 2.8% to 5.5% for Sub-Saharan Africa (less Nigeria and the RSA) [*World Economic...*, 2004, p. 142]. Expectations were based on a slight increase in farming and manufacturing output, consumer spending, investments, including a new influx of FDI into several countries, and on the trend of rise in demand for export goods and the easing of armed conflicts that were in recent years destabilizing severely several regions across the continent.

In North Africa, economic growth is sustained by rising oil revenues (in the case of Algeria, Egypt, and Libya) and, consequently, by expanding private and public consumption, withdrawal of international sanctions against Libya, and revenues from tourism (in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco). In Nigeria, the biggest country south of the Sahara, economic expectations are kept alive by the growth of oil prices and the launch, in March 2004, of the national strategy for economic resurgence and development aimed at abolishing poverty and stimulating employment. The growth of oil prices on the world market helped improve the overall situation in other oil-exporting countries as well, including newcomers to the oil market (Chad and Equatorial Guinea). In the RSA, economic performance largely depended on the rising exchange rate of its rand that led, on the one hand, to stagnation in the mining and manufacturing industries, with their invariably high unemployment rate (28% in 2003), and, on the other hand, checked and turned back inflation (from nearly 13% in 2002 to 1% in 2003).

The current situation in the African region, therefore, shows some signs of improvement but cannot, for this reason alone, eliminate the significant differences between various countries in the nature of economic trends. Possibilities for “generalizing” their positive development experience depend, to a considerable extent, on international economic, specifically commercial, relations that are immensely important for virtually all African countries. This is where profound differences between the North and the South inhibit establishment of international trade of the kind that could encourage reduction of the gap between rich and poor countries. These differences, in fact, led to the breakup of the Fifth Ministerial Conference of WTO member countries in Cancun, Mexico, in September 2003. Subsequently, the talks resumed, but it is still early to speak of significant reconciliation of the positions taken by the two groups of countries.

Essentially, the differences are believed to lie in the basically different approaches to issues such as, first, access of developing countries’ exports to the markets of developed nations, and, second, the developed countries’ efforts to keep their farming products competitive. More specifically in respect of the first approach, the North actually maintains various tariff<sup>6</sup> and nontariff barriers that limit imports of Southern goods. Simultaneously, they are seeking, in the name of international trade liberalization, to achieve

more openness of developing countries for their exports, closing eyes to these countries’ similar needs.<sup>7</sup> The second approach lies in lavish subsidies developed countries give to their farmers that allow their farming produce to remain competitive against cheaper products from South countries that restrains the latter’s export,<sup>8</sup> resulting, at times, in quite a significant “short-fall” in export revenues,<sup>9</sup> with inescapable consequences for weak economies.

The economic trends discussed above may, probably, be related, in one way or another, to NEPAD (an orientation favoring private investors), but certainly have not been set off by it. What, in fact, is the positive side of this ambitious development program?

In the first place, it is the reduction in the number of open conflicts. At the turn of the century, 25 countries were engaged in armed clashes or serious social and political turmoil. By 2005, their number had dropped to six, mostly by the efforts of UN peacekeeping forces, which numbered 48,000 troops in Africa in August 2004 (more than anywhere else on the globe), but also through the coordinated measures of the African Peace and Security Council set up within the African Union–NEPAD framework [*Africa Renewal*, 2004, pp. 15 and 17]. In other declared aims (extension of democratic principles in society, greater efficiency, transparency, and accountability of government, independence of courts, improvements in education and health care, higher productive potential, and so on), *Africa Renewal* wrote, “limited progress” only was made. The survey prepared by the UN special counselor’s service in Africa in June 2004 noted growing efforts to involve civil organizations and the private sector in efforts to implement NEPAD. The “nature and scale of such involvement differ greatly” from country to country, and this program “is still little known or understood in many parts of Africa.” Some leaders, writes *Africa Renewal*, “attending continental or regional summits devoted to NEPAD are unable to tell about them to their own citizens. ... Few African parliaments discuss the plan in detail.”

NEPAD has been received differently by the business community. The poll conducted by an international consulting firm among 250 company managers in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda in 2004 showed that 38% of the respondents only were positive about the “new partnership’s” prospects. Nearly a third of them believed that it would hardly succeed, and the remainder could not give a definite reply. A majority of the managers polled held that inefficient and corrupt political leadership, wars, and trade barriers were the greatest obstacles to NEPAD. The comments on the poll results noted that the private sector “recognizes NEPAD’s potential benefits, but more efforts have to be applied to explain its purpose.”

Some governments, on their part, actually appear to be noncommittal in their attitudes to their cooperation with the private sector. As A. Tukur, the presiding chairman at the African business roundtable in June 2004, noted,

they “recognize the important role of the local private sector in words only,” and he called for a policy in accord with these statements [*Africa Renewal*, 2004, pp. 15 and 17]. Private business is, however, frequently assessed as inconsistent, mismanaged, and controversial by itself.

Against this background, regional integration based on the operation of subregional groups appears to have slightly more weight. These groups are regarded as building blocks of the African Economic Community (AEC), the purposes of which are reinforced by the “new partnership.” In the estimates of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), based on the performance of eight sectors – trade, transportation, agriculture, and manufacturing among them – integration links expanded annually by 4.5% on average during the period from 1994 when the AEC agreement went into force to 1999 (the last year for which verifiable statistics are available). In different subregional groups, however, cooperation between countries meets with varied success. The best performance has so far been shown by the Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC) group and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

The presence of over ten regional integration building blocks, however, makes integration harder to achieve because a majority of AEC countries have concurrent membership of several integration groups simultaneously. Six of the 53 AEC countries belong to one group only, and the remaining ones are members of two or three groups. This overlap has a negative effect on cooperation because of the fragmentation of human and financial resources, scanty as they already are.

Generally, NEPAD may be said to be making headway, if only insignificant. “The problem with NEPAD,” said Abdulai Wad, President of Senegal, one of NEPAD architects, in July 2005, “is that it has so far achieved nothing to speak of” [*ITAR-TASS*, August 2, 2005, AF – 2]. Africa’s moves within the “partnership” framework have been largely confined to organizational routine and formation of some institutions – the Peace and Security Council, a mechanism to verify compliance with “good conduct” standards (African Peer Review Mechanism, or APRM), a NEPAD executive committee of the heads of 20 states, and a few more. Summits are a regular feature that draws top-echelon representatives of far from all African countries,<sup>10</sup> who issue repeated calls for an immediate start of the NEPAD program in full and... restate differences between African countries.

Acceleration of economic growth and development is basically related to expectations of increased foreign assistance. Time will show whether these expectations are fulfilled or not. The situation now is that foreign cooperation depends on how real internal changes are in Africa, with many questions still hanging over them. Absence or inadequacy of such changes would not encourage foreign support. The latter’s an increase should leave

few hopes for an economic breakthrough in the continent’s countries, i.e. for an optimal implementation of NEPAD, the African project of hope.

## Bibliography

- ИТАР-ТАСС/ 22 апреля; 14 июля; 12 августа 2005 г.* [*ITAR-TASS*, Moscow, April 22, 2005; July 14, 2005, and August 2, 2005.]
- Компас, № 28, 2005 г.* [*Compass*, Moscow, No. 28, 2005.]
- Africa Renewal*, UN, New York, 2004, Vol. 18, No. 4.
- African Development Indicators 2004*, Washington, World Bank, 2004.
- Afrique contemporaine* (Paris), No. 204, 2002.
- Can Africa Claim 21st Century?* Washington, World Bank, 2002.
- Economic Development in Africa. Debt Sustainability: Oasis or Mirage?* UNCTAD, New York-Geneva, 2004.
- The Economist* (London), January 17, 2004.
- Human Development Report 2001*, New York, UNDP, 2001.
- Marchés tropicaux* (Paris), 2004, No. 3038; 3051.
- The New York Times* (New York)
- World Economic and Social Survey 2004*, New York, UN, 2004.

## Notes:

1. It may appear paradoxical at first sight that up to 40% of African savings, by various estimates, is invested beyond the continent [*Marchés tropicaux*, 2004, No. 3030, p. 2499]. Out of “every dollar lent ... to Africa from 1970 to 1996, 80 cent was stashed away forthwith in Swiss bank accounts or went to purchase mansions on the Côte d’Azur. Today Africans are still paying for the profligacy of their former leaders” [Retranslated from *The Economist*, 2004, p. 12].

2. Some Western economists hold, with reason, that debt cancellation in full cannot offer an optimal solution to countries having rich natural resources, such as Congo (Kinshasa), that have a vast development potential, which is wastefully mismanaged. It would be wiser for such debtors to have their loans, as an option, converted into assets put into the hands of international investment companies. Conversion on this pattern would foreclose, for example, “crazy privatizations,” give them access to foreign capital markets, and gradually create conditions for domestic savings to be channeled into economic development projects [*Marchés tropicaux*, 2004, No. 3030, p. 2499].

3. Shortly before the latest G8 summit in July 2005, the leaders of Britain, France, and Germany spoke about their intention to raise their countries’ aid to 0.7% of their GDP sometime between 2012 and 2014. The most conspicuous among them was British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who set up a commission in 2004 to develop recommendations on aid to African countries. In March 2005, the commission released a voluminous report that was used as a basis for the British position at the talks of the eight countries’ leaders.

4. In the estimates of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the average returns on FDI are four times as high as they are in seven major developed countries, and double those earned in Asia [*The Economist*, 2004, p. 11].

5. “The private foreign sector, very realistic ... invests only if it believes that the probability of deriving profit is very high, and the risks are relatively low. Whatever does not fit in is illusion,” writes P. Moussa, a prominent French economist [*Afrique contemporaine*, 2002, No. 204, p. 39].

6. Customs tariffs on African goods imported into OECD countries are about ten times as high as those used in trade between these countries [*The Economist*, 2004, p. 13].

7. This is at a time when, according to a UN survey, “developing countries need for greater opportunities for export **before** (emphasis mine – *Yu.P.*) they can lower the level of protection (for domestic markets – *Yu.P.*). It is increasingly obvious that low protection levels do not lead automatically to wider export opportunities and a stronger association accelerating fast economic growth between export sectors and domestic economic activity” [*World Economic ...*, 2004, p. 21].

8. “The rich countries subsidize their farmers to the tune of \$320 billion, a sum little different from Africa’s GDP. Combined with high tariffs and small quotas on some kinds of farming produce, this makes its export to rich countries discouragingly hard” [*The Economist*, 2004, p. 13].

9. For example, the revenue shortages experienced by African cotton producers as an after-effect of farming subsidies in developed countries in 2002 ran, by some estimates, to almost \$300 million [*Marchés tropicaux*, 2004, No. 3043, p. 491].

10. The latest summit held in Cairo (Egypt), was attended by ten presidents, one vice president, three prime ministers, 14 ministers, and one ambassador, who represented 29 countries out of 53 members of the African Union [*ITAR-TASS*, April 22, 2005, AF – 4.5].

## INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT: AN AGENDA FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\*

**Boris Runov,**

Ph.D.(Econ.), Leading Research Fellow,  
Institute for African Studies, RAS

The arrival of the age of globalization and information revolution, and the transition of the industrial part of the world to a postindustrial development stage have added new backwardness indicators to the existing criteria that have been used to evaluate the extent to which the South has fallen behind the North, or given a new dimension to them. These are, above all, the areas of comparative development level of human activity that are today considered the key elements of the emerging global economy, its development mainstream, its effectiveness, and its highest possible productivity today and in the short term.

The “human factor” is placed today at the centre of the new system of values (as also of the new economic development paradigm). It is naturally built into the system of market relations and modifies the structure and motivation of economic activity significantly. The content of the “human factor” itself is expanded considerably to an extent that it is now defined as “human capital” or “human potential,” which now includes non-economic areas such as education, health care, culture, social security, the government and corporate management system, and much else. The goals pursued by economic activity acquire a strategic, long-term dimension, and replace the customary criteria guiding profit maximization right now.

Investments in education and other elements of the “human potential” have come to be regarded as investments (capital inputs) that eventually pay off economically and bring enormous returns in the long term. Simultaneously, priorities of socioeconomic development are shifting toward creating a balanced human habitat (environment), expanding human knowledge and information about the surroundings, improving an individual’s health and welfare, raising people’s purchasing power (in terms of quantity and especially quality), and so on.

New criteria have also emerged to assess development, in particular, the extent of intellectualization of social production and consumption; closing of the digital gap; diversification of economic and social relations; expansion of social services; involvement of developing economies in worldwide production networks; socioeconomic stability and security of society, and so on.

---

\* First published in *Asia and Africa Today*, 2007, No. 11, pp. 36-41.

All these changes in the understanding of the laws governing the operation of the modern global (and also local) socioeconomic system are recorded in the UN Millennium Development Targets for the world at large and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) for African countries, both rated among the most important documents of this day and age. In particular, NEPAD, a strategic document adopted in Abuja (Nigeria), in 2001 and covering 15 years ahead, has gained the significance of a conceptual plan for the newly created African Union by exerting a major influence on the formulation of present-day strategies for socioeconomic development of the continent's countries and on the mentality of their political leaders and intellectual elites.

### **The Need to Reform the Higher School**

In these circumstances, a leading role is played by reform of the educational system (or, in a broader context, the national educational, scientific, and learning complex) among the essential reforms required for stimulating socioeconomic development of African countries south of the Sahara. Specifically, reform of the educational system will advance modern-age knowledge and its application in the interests of African countries' development, provide training to professionals at various levels to cope with the tasks facing their countries, and, finally, raise significantly the social prestige of education and knowledge, and the status of people employed in education, and also halt the heavy brain drain from the region's countries.

Maximum possible access to education (and, at its primary stage, its universality and free and mandatory character, to be achieved by 2015, in accordance with NEPAD goals) becomes a critical condition of development today. Undeniable evidence of the growing role of knowledge, information, and professionals in the world economy suggests that higher education no longer takes second place to secondary and primary education as has recently been the case in most Sub-Saharan countries. Attempts are being made to assess the influence of higher education on economic development.

An interesting study on the subject was prepared, on commission from the World Bank (WB), by Harvard University researchers who made an attempt, based on Africa-related materials, to quantify the relationship between higher school development and economic growth. According to their findings, a one-year increase in higher education in the total number of years in all stages of formal education can increase existing GDP per capita by 12.2%<sup>1</sup> (or it will rise to 5.6% with GDP growing by 5% per annum). Furthermore, investments in higher education facilitate diffusion of technological innovations and, therefore, promote technological advance. These expectations are best illustrated by what Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-General, said about higher education: "University would be the primary tool for African development in the new age."<sup>2</sup>

Evolution of higher education in Africa over the last few decades, however, has been very haphazard and sporadic. While at independence, there were only a few universities and university colleges in the whole of Africa, today it is hard to name a country (except small insular states) that does not have institutions of higher learning of its own. Higher school student enrollment rose 11-fold over this period, and the number of graduates soared up nearly 60-fold. In 1983, the total number of higher school graduates in countries of Tropical Africa reached almost 70,000.<sup>3</sup>

The economic crisis that broke out in the late 1970s and continued right into the 1990s caused a serious damage to the higher education system, as is now evidenced by the growing mismatch between the number of available professionals and the rising need for intellectualization of social production and learning of new knowledge.

Large-scale shortages of skilled labor extend across many industries of national economies. The press writes about the critical scarcity of managers at many firms (in the RSA), school and university teachers (in Nigeria and Kenya), medical personnel (in all countries of the region), and so on. The worst, in our view, is the shortage of certified professionals in government. In Mozambique, for example, a mere 3% of national public administration staff had a higher education in 2003.<sup>4</sup> Cuts in foreign aid and government financing to universities in the years of the crisis resulted in many of them actually going out of business.

As was noted in an overview of the proceedings of the regional conference devoted to personnel training problems (Accra, 2003), the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, "lay practically in ruin" in the 1980s and 1990s: the teachers' meager salaries; the library collection neglected for years; outdated equipment; frequent student unrest over inadequate teaching and living conditions on the campus, and so on. In 1990, the university was shut down for much of the academic year.<sup>5</sup> At the turn of the century only it succeeded in redeeming its former high reputation. Similar problems are experienced by the universities of Ibadan (Nigeria), Makerere (Uganda), and in many other places.

Unlike any other region, the shortage of professionals trained in some fields during the crisis in Africa coexisted with the surplus of professionals in other fields, mostly in the humanities, which were a dominant tradition in higher education (with 60% of all students to 40% in natural sciences and engineering in the 1960s through 1980s). Because of structural imbalances in the higher education system, it could not, regardless of a significant increase in the number of graduates, meet demand from key industries for national professionals in science, engineering, and vocational training, in particular, in the educational system itself, healthcare, R&D, government and corporate management, and in several industries turning out physical products.

It was not quantity, though, but quality that was in short supply. According to many business executives (in particular, in Nigeria), there has

been a considerable decline in academic standards of professional training, and a university degree is no longer a guarantee of its owner's high qualifications and competence in engineering.<sup>6</sup> The need to recruit foreigners, for example, raises significantly the costs of all kinds of building jobs, including road building that is three times as expensive in Sub-Saharan countries as it is in medium-income countries, and costs virtually as much as it does in OECD countries.<sup>7</sup>

African countries south of the Sahara have no choice but to use the services of nearly 150,000 foreign professionals at a cost of around \$4 billion in yearly salaries and fees. This amounted in the 1990s to over a third of all Official Development Aid (ODA) to the region's countries.<sup>8</sup>

At the other extreme, the economic crisis led to an enormous growth in unemployment among higher school graduates. A severe slump in output in Côte d'Ivoire in the 1980s, for example, pushed unemployment among them to almost 40% in Abidjan, and to 50% in the country's other cities.

University graduates in Uganda, Kenya, Mali, Guinea, and elsewhere in the region spent one year to three years in search of jobs upon graduation.<sup>9</sup> Not surprisingly, the brain drain from Africa intensified dramatically in that period.

The chief reasons behind the worsening employment climate, however, were probably the same structural imbalances of the higher education systems, their inadequate attention to the specific needs of their economies, and the poor quality of professional training.

Africa's Sub-Saharan countries rank last in the world for the provision of higher education to age-specific population groups, even though it rose from an average 1% to 5% over 40 years of independence, from 1965 to 2005. Today, higher education coverage is 17% in the developing world in general, far below the level of more than 60% in the developed countries. The 5% provision of education on average does not, however, reveal the vast differentials between countries (in 2005, it was 3% in Rwanda and Uganda, 2% in Sierra Leone, 1% in Tanzania, and so on).<sup>10</sup>

This is the overall situation in national education. It calls for priority to be given to the reforms in the higher school system as one of the development goals in Sub-Saharan Africa. It was announced at the regional personnel training conference referred to above that "on the understanding of the immense importance of higher education in stimulating development in the new conditions, the majority of African countries began, during the 1990s and thereafter, taking measures to radically reform their higher school systems as regards both the content of teaching material and management."<sup>11</sup>

### Reform Priorities

The objectives of reforms in higher education were identified in the basic NEPAD document that urged "immediate improvement in the university

system" in all African countries, including the establishment of specialized universities and, particularly, support to technological institutes; generation of critical mass of technological competence in chosen areas promising a high growth potential, primarily in biology and natural sciences; orientation to the practical needs of national economies, etc.<sup>12</sup>

In UNESCO estimates, Africa will experience an immense growth in the need for higher education in the next five to 15 years (this forecast was made in 2002). In the case of Uganda, for example, the forecast was given for a threefold enrollment in universities, from 60,000 in 2001-2002 to 180,000 in 2008. Similar forecasts adopted as national plans are being put into action in Lesotho (with university and college enrollment increasing from 3,500 in 2001 to 10,000 in 2007). In Ethiopia, four new universities have been launched since 2000, in addition to two existing ones.<sup>13</sup> In all, Sub-Saharan Africa had 195 universities, 175 of them public institutions and 20 private ones, in 2002. Of the 47 countries surveyed in the region, six had no higher education institutions (including Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, and the Seychelles).<sup>14</sup>

Some countries are attempting to reform their higher education systems to give more weight to natural sciences and engineering and to reduce the traditional predominance of humanities. Uganda, for example, plans to achieve a fourfold increase in the share of scientific and engineering education, from 15% in the 2000-2001 academic year to 60% in 2010.<sup>15</sup> Changes in the higher school's orientation to the development needs in the African conditions can be judged more specifically by, among other things, UNESCO aid going into research in science and engineering and training of professionals in these areas. These areas include, in the first place:

- *Biotechnologies* – financing of research and personnel training for research to be conducted in genetic diseases, methods for improving drought resistance of food crops, and other studies in the Republic of South Africa (RSA); programs to intensify AIDS control campaigns in Cameroon, Uganda, and Burundi, as examples;

- *Use of solar and other renewable energy sources* – setting up university departments to study these subjects in Togo and Niger; building a "solar village" in Madagascar (supplying electric power generated by solar sources to public buildings and training the work force in this area), etc.; and

- *Environment* – conducting research and personnel training in hydrology and water resources; establishing biosphere preserves, stations to monitor pollution of the environment and water sources, etc. (the program covers seven African countries – Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, Guinea, Benin, and Senegal).

In addition to these programs, UNESCO provides funds to 20 natural science departments at African universities, which train engineers in renewable energy sources in Zimbabwe; chemical technologies in Angola and Zimbabwe; environmental protection in Benin, and so on.<sup>16</sup>

Other training and research areas specific to African countries, which are given greater emphasis in the higher education system, include travel and tourism, endogenous African cultures, international relations, and conflict settlement. Mandatory computer courses are set up for all university students.<sup>17</sup>

Training in science and technology in Rwanda may be cited as an example of positive results in this area. In 1997, the country had 50 engineers only. In that year, an Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) was opened in the country's capital city, Kigali. In 2006, it started turning out over 200 engineers a year.<sup>18</sup>

Enhancing learning opportunities for women by reducing qualifying grades and raising enrollment quotas for them at universities and colleges is an element of higher education reform. To give an example, the share of women in the student body at the University of Dar es Salaam rose from 19.5% to 27% during 1997 to 2000. Preparatory courses for young girls finishing high school were set up at the university.<sup>19</sup>

### **New Organizational Forms**

No account of reorganization in the higher education system in countries of Sub-Saharan Africa will be complete without a mention of the role of new forms of higher school organization. It is best to start with the Nelson Mandela Institution (NMI) established with funds contributed by sponsors such as the World Bank, several international organizations, and foreign-based communities of African scholars and engineers in 2004, as an independent organizational centre to carry out a plan to set up a network of private educational institutions on world standards. The NMI has its headquarters in Washington, D.C. In the concept of its masterminds, the NMI is to act as a stimulator and sponsor to finance efforts to modernize higher education, and use scientific knowledge and technologies for development needs of African countries south of the Sahara, including NEPAD objectives to reduce the region's lag from the rest of the world in this area.

To achieve these objectives, an African Institute of Science and Technology (AIST) was set up with the purpose of opening branches and deploying a network of educational institutions in different countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. These include four regional science research and education centres – Western, Central, Southern, and Eastern, the sites for which are proposed by Kenya, Nigeria, and several other countries. It was first projected that the network would be operational in 2007. Among the AIST's initial projects were establishment of a Water Management and Environment Institute in Burkina Faso, the ground for which was broken in Ouagadougou in 2006, and development of a university campus in Abuja (Nigeria), within the boundaries of a free economic zone, combined with a cluster of leading science research institutes and high-tech companies. Accord-

ing to original plans, Abuja University of Technology will be fitted out with advanced equipment, including information and communications facilities, and given the status of a world-class educational and research centre.<sup>20</sup>

As we said above, Africa remains in last place in terms of higher education coverage of age-specific population groups, which was 5% in 2005. Judging by the demographic growth trend of the 18- to 23-year-old group and rising demand for professionals to be employed in their economies, many African countries must, in World Bank estimates, at least double the access to higher education by 2010. In the words of W. Seint, a leading higher education expert at the WB, "inadequate growth of high school enrolment in Africa is a time bomb,"<sup>21</sup> in the sense of possible socioeconomic degradation of Sub-Saharan countries because of shortages of skilled professionals.

The shortage of school and university teachers and insufficiency of traditional forms of full-time education have led to what amounts to an explosion of interest in new forms of education unknown in Africa, such as distance and open education (DEOL). In the estimates of the working group on distance and open education set up within the framework of the Association of Development of Education in Africa (ADEA) and operating from its headquarters in Mauritius, African countries south of the Sahara had in 2002 over 140 institutions providing services in this area (both higher and secondary education).<sup>22</sup>

Distance education (a form of extramural education) has enabled Zimbabwe and Tanzania to raise the number of teachers in classes to an extent that would have been unattainable by relying on classical forms at teacher training colleges. Distance education is used widely in the RSA, in the first place, and also in Mauritius, Nigeria, Kenya, and several other African countries.

A good example of this education form, the African Virtual University (AVU) established on the World Bank's initiative and based in Nairobi (Kenya), has set up 25 training centres in 15 Sub-Saharan countries and achieved enrollment of over 25,000 students.<sup>23</sup>

Open education relying on the Internet (open universities) is close to meeting the practical needs of African economies. This form of education offers a free choice of content, methodologies, and subjects of training and skill improvement to suit individual needs, as a rule, dictated by the learners' current or future employment, frequently on their employers' (firms') initiative. The employers have a vested interest in raising their employees' competences to the levels needed in accordance with their qualifications and job requirements at their firms, and at times approach educational institutions with requests for training programs to be supplemented or made more specific. Over the last few years, open universities have been launched in Tanzania, with 10,000 students, and Zimbabwe, 18,000 students. Plans have also been drawn up to open similar educational institutions in Ghana and Ethiopia.<sup>24</sup>

Large-scale modernization of educational institutions' equipment is a task of great magnitude for the reform in the higher school system to be completed. Modernization will mean, above all, introduction of information and communication technologies (ICT) in higher education. In a world undergoing an information revolution, African universities find it hard to operate at capacity without using the Internet and other ICT varieties enabling them to be connected to the global "information mainstream" carrying enormous amounts of scientific and educational information. On their part, distance and open education cannot survive without reliance on these technologies. As an illustration, the African Virtual University operates through the Internet and satellite-based communication facilities. The AVU's services include online video broadcasts of lecture courses, dissemination of learning materials on CDs and DVDs, contacts with teachers during chat sessions, and much else. In the World Bank's assessment, one of the purposes fulfilled by this form of learning is that of leaping over the "paper stage" of education, maximizing the number of learners from different countries, and, just as important, guiding them through to degrees, diplomas, and certificates.<sup>25</sup> True, the World Bank's World Development Report 2007 noted common hurdles confronting dissemination of these technologies. In particular, because of infrastructure deficiencies, African universities have to pay 100 times as much as educational institutions in North America do for Internet services. Students have to break through linguistic barriers in order to make use of the Internet. In 2007, 72% of Internet pages displayed on the Internet were in English, 7% in German, 6% in Japanese, 3% in French, and so on.<sup>26</sup>

Because of these circumstances and a serious shortage of funds, the ADEA found that of the 143 higher education institutions it surveyed in 2002 in countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, 39 (or 27% of the total) effectively used the Internet, another 20 (14%) were linked to satellite communication facilities, a further 46 (32%) conducted audio conferencing sessions, etc.<sup>27</sup> In 2005, the number of Internet users in the region was 29 per 1,000, compared to 89 in East Asia, and 156 in Latin America (the RSA, however, has 109 Internet users, without much effect on the overall picture). Personal computers were used at the time by 15 out of 1,000 people, compared to 38 in East Asia, and 88 in Latin America.<sup>28</sup>

Averages tend to conceal enormous differences from country to country. For example, polls conducted in the age group of 15 to 24 years showed that only 1% of the young respondents used the Internet in Ethiopia, and as much as 13% in Ghana. There has, however, been a turn for the better in recent years in the region with a significant growth in the use of various ICT elements. In particular, during 2000 to 2006, the number of Internet users was growing at an annual rate of 32%, that of cellular phones showed an annual growth rate of 42%, and that of personal computers went up by 11% annually.<sup>29</sup>

The objectives of reform in higher education include developing university science, integrating it closely into the educational process, and teaching students to learn and use global knowledge in science and engineering. The Action Plan for Africa developed by the World Bank for the period 2006 to 2008 emphasized specifically the need for universities to generate new knowledge and information by expanding their own research and orienting it to the establishment of links with the productive sectors of their countries' economies.

So far, however, the output of scientific products at universities of Sub-Saharan Africa remains very low. In the late 20th century, the region published only 5,800 academic papers a year, in comparison with over 16,000 papers put out in South Asia and 14,400 papers in Latin America and the Caribbean.<sup>30</sup> In the rankings according to the Knowledge Economy Index (KEI), which measures the role of knowledge in development, a majority of African countries are at the bottom of the list, with the RSA, Botswana, and Mauritius being near the middle of the rankings table.<sup>31</sup> The index covers economic and institutional conditions available for promoting knowledge, developing an educational system, and creating conditions for innovation and use of information and communication technologies. In the words of Professor M. Siamviza of Zambia University, "universities combining the functions of teaching, conducting science research, and providing public commercial services are the most important institutions formed by African governments since independence."<sup>32</sup> Commercial services are just as important as anything else because commercialization of research products is a major source of financing science and higher education, and it also helps economic and social activities and management to assimilate scientific and engineering innovations.

What makes this approach to higher school organization so relevant is that, according to UNESCO figures, countries of Sub-Saharan Africa have only one scholar or engineer per 10,000 of their populations, while European countries, the U.S., and Japan have 200 to 500.

There is a desperate need for certified teachers to train skilled professionals. The Education Ministry of Uganda, to give an example, believes that the country will have to train around 1,000 masters and 250 doctors in science and engineering within the shortest possible time.<sup>33</sup>

Abuja University already discussed above is a good example of an educational institution that will combine education and science research. It is to have three structural clusters (or schools), in particular, a school of science research, an engineer training school, and a school of humanities and management. Aside from bachelor and master level training focused on applied research with a solid scientific background, three- or four-year doctorate courses are to be launched at the university, with accent on fundamental re-

search in mathematics, physics, biology, biotechnologies, ecology, and chemistry.

The Nelson Mandela Institution also plans to set up skill improvement centres (or “centres of excellence” in its terminology), in addition to those already in operation in various African countries to handpick university graduates for continued training as science researchers to conduct research related directly to the needs of their respective countries. These measures will help loosen the monopoly of Western universities on training Africans to become high-class researchers.

Radical improvement in education, science, and knowledge in the region’s countries is, however, held back by chronic shortages of funds. Underfunding is one of the most painful and critical development problems of their economies. By some estimates, African countries must allocate 1% to 2% of their GDP on science and engineering to achieve substantial improvement in science and education and accelerate development.<sup>34</sup> During the 1970s and 1990s, however, the allocations on science and education in Africa declined on average from 0.57% to 0.47% of GDP, while in East Asian countries it rose from 0.33% to 1.27%. In the number of scholars per 1 million, Africa has so far failed to meet the UN target of 200 set far back in the 1960s. The best that countries of Sub-Saharan Africa can show for themselves today is an average of 83, which compares poorly with the 514 average for the developing world and 1,102 in developed countries. In the words of Nobel laureate A. Salam, “the weak science infrastructure is a critical factor that puts up impenetrable barriers to progress in developing countries.”<sup>35</sup>

Insufficient allocations on higher education from local budgets force African universities to look for much (all, in many cases) of their funding to outside sources. For example, the budget of Dar es Salaam University has 40% of its revenues contributed by foreign donors, most of which are organizations in countries of Northern Europe. Much of the official development aid that has grown considerably in recent years<sup>36</sup> is also intended for funding educational projects. The use of a significant proportion of savings to cover the needs of education, science, and learning is one of many conditions for African countries’ debts to be written off.

An important point to be made here is that developed countries have stepped up their efforts significantly in recent years to help African countries. Evidence of this is seen in the initiatives advanced at G8 summits. In particular, the Action Plan for Africa<sup>37</sup> passed at the G8 Summit in Kananaskis (Canada), in 2002 makes a special note that “investment in education is a critical factor for economic and social development in Africa.”<sup>38</sup> Similar ideas were voiced at the G8 Summit in St. Petersburg (Russia), in 2006. At a more recent summit in Germany in June 2007, the participating countries committed themselves to provide \$60 billion in aid to Africa.

It is clear, though, that these funds cannot be spent and, in general, the high school, science, and engineering cannot be reformed without the interested states’ close involvement and support. The state certainly plays the key role in creating favorable conditions for infrastructure development, building of a legal framework for reform, giving support in innovative areas in the economy, organizing cross-border scientific and engineering exchanges, and so on. Realization of these needs by African countries is evident, in particular, from the NEPAD plan.

\* \* \*

Sub-Saharan Africa is today going through an unquestionably critical period of its history. As drastic changes are taking place in the world under the impact of processes such as globalization, revolution in science and engineering, and arrival of a postindustrial age, it has to find a worthy place for itself in the emerging new world order. To continue and accelerate its progressive advance in the mainstream of reforms initiated successfully in several countries in the region, Africa has, with assistance from the world community, to multiply efforts to lay the foundations for development. These measures, sometimes called cumulatively “capacity building,” mean cumulatively, in the definition of Professor S. Riley of West Sidney University, who is head of the University Centre for Research in Sub-Saharan Africa’s Problems, “a capacity of individuals, groups, institutions, and organizations to identify and solve development problems as they arise.”<sup>39</sup>

Development of the educational, research, and learning sector of the economy in this process, with the ultimate aim of accumulating a critical mass of human intellectual potential, certainly plays a leading role. Failure in the pursuit of this aim would mean for many of the region’s countries disintegration of the social fabric and falling by the wayside of modern civilization evolving in accordance with current global trends and fundamental values.

---

#### Notes:

1. Bloom, D., Canning, D., Chan, K., “Higher Education and Economic Development in Africa,” February 2006, p. 1. [www.worldbank.org/afr/teja/higher\\_education.econ.dev](http://www.worldbank.org/afr/teja/higher_education.econ.dev).
2. *Ibid*.
3. “Education in Sub-Saharan Africa. Policies for Adjustment, Revitalization and Expansion,” World Bank, Washington, 1988, p. 82.
4. Bloom, D., et al., *Op. cit.*, p. 5.
5. Ballog, B., “Improving Tertiary Education in Sub-Saharan Africa,” April 2004, p. 1. [www.siteresources.org](http://www.siteresources.org).
6. *West Africa*, April 23-29, 2001, p. 17.
7. Bloom, D., et al., *Op. cit.*, p. 7.



8. IDRC Reports. "Brain Drain and Capacity Building in Africa." [www.idrc.ca/en/ev.71249-201-1-do](http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev.71249-201-1-do).

9. Рунов Б. Африка: трудный путь к прогрессу (наука и техника в социально-экономическом развитии). М., 1992. С. 67–68. [Runov, B., "Africa: A Difficult Road toward Progress (Science and Engineering in Socioeconomic Development)," Moscow, 1992, pp. 67-68.]

10. "World Development Indicators 2006," World Bank, Washington, 2006, p. 90.

11. Ballog, B., *Op. cit.*, p. 1.

12. "New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)." Attachment to the book of Маценко И.Б. От Лагосского плана действий до НЕПАД. М., 2005. С. 85, 94–101. [Matsenko, I.B., "From the Lagos Plan of Action to NEPAD" (Translated into Russian by A.V. Pritvorov), Moscow, 2005, pp. 85 and 94-101.]

13. Riley, S., "Africa on a Global Stage," 2003, p. 2. [www.bal/afsaap/conferences/proceedings/riley](http://www.bal/afsaap/conferences/proceedings/riley).

14. "Science-led Development in Africa. Science, Technology and Sustainable Development," UNESCO, Paris, 2002, p. 9.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 6 and 7.

17. Riley, S., *Op. cit.*, p. 13.

18. Ballog, B., *Op. cit.*, p. 1.

19. Bloom, D., et al., *Op. cit.*, pp. 11-13.

20. Nelson Mandela Institution. [www.nmescience.org/home](http://www.nmescience.org/home); African Institute of Science and Technology. [www.nmescience.org/who](http://www.nmescience.org/who).

21. "Distance Education and Open Learning in Sub-Saharan Africa," February 2002, p. 36. [www.adeanet.org/wgdeaol](http://www.adeanet.org/wgdeaol).

22. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

23. World Development Report 2007. "Development and the New Generation," World Bank, Moscow, 2007, p. 234 (*in Russian*).

24. Bloom, D., et al., *Op. cit.*, p. 13.

25. World Development Report ..., p. 234.

26. *Ibid.*

27. "Distance Education ...," p. 104.

28. "World Development Indicators 2007." The World Bank, Washington, 2007, p. 306.

29. World Development Report ..., pp. 230 and 231.

30. Bloom, D., et al., *Op. cit.*, p. 4.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

32. "The Impact of Globalization on Science and Technology in Sub-Saharan Africa," February 2002, p. 5.

33. Riley, S., *Op. cit.*, pp. 1-2.

34. Mkinga, J., "Scientist Tells African Governments to Boost Science Kitties," 2005. [www.gmoafrica.org/2005/06](http://www.gmoafrica.org/2005/06).

35. *Vanguard Online*, November 4, 2006. [www.vanguardugz.com](http://www.vanguardugz.com).

36. "World Development Indicators 2007." The World Bank, Washington, 2007, p. 352. During 2000 to 2005, official development aid (ODA) to countries south of the Sahara rose from \$15 billion to \$24 billion, and from \$20 to \$44 per capita (putting these countries in first place in the world among ODA recipients). Over the same period, the share of ODA in their gross national income increased from 4.1% to 5.5%, and from 21.6% to 29.5% in investments.

37. This summit was, in a sense, a turning point in the advanced countries' relations with Africa. All successive G8 summits had aid for Africa invariably on their agendas.

38. "G8 Africa Action Plan." [www.g-8.gc.ca/can-doks/afraction](http://www.g-8.gc.ca/can-doks/afraction).

39. Riley, S., *Op. cit.*, p. 2.

[Figure:] Technological progress is gradually making its way into African countries.

## **SOUTH AFRICAN SCIENCE AFTER APARTHEID MODERN SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL POTENTIAL OF THE RSA\***

**Yury Skubko,**  
Ph.D.(Econ.), Ph.D.(Arts),  
Senior Research Fellow,  
Institute for African Studies, RAS

*Science in South Africa (RSA) is today developing on the basis of a significant economic potential built up by the country's population and used mostly, until recently, in the interests of its white minority. The country's scientific potential, or its capacity to develop and apply scientific and technological knowledge, depends on the scale and structure of expenditure allocated on scientific research and development (R&D), the numerical strength of the research and auxiliary staff, logistical support for science, patents issued for inventions and discoveries, and many other factors, not least on the quality of the country's educational and training system responsible for the growth of society's potential or "human capital," which is a key factor of productivity.*

According to UNESCO's World Science Report published in 2005, RSA spent in 2002 90% of the funds allocated in Africa south of the Sahara on R&D (\$3.1 billion, or 0.7% of the country's GDP). The country's scientific and technological potential is rated as undoubtedly the biggest on the continent (international experts name Egypt, which spent \$400 million on R&D in 2002, as the second biggest investor in research and development in Africa, far behind South Africa), with the greatest headway made in astrophysical research, medicine, chemistry, mining and metallurgy, and agriculture (*UNSECO Science Report...*, 2005).

Though inheriting an observatory, a university, and several science and engineering societies from Britain's Cape colony, the Union of South Africa, as RSA was initially called, paid little attention to science in its early years. It was only demand from its mining companies that stimulated research in mineral mining and processing. Some headway was made in living nature studies and research in agrobiolology.

World War I that severed the country's economic links with the rest of the world stimulated development of import-substituting industries and related research (chemical industry and beginnings of mechanical engineering).

An office was set up in 1918 to subsidize research, and a South African board for research in education and social sciences (subsequently reformed into the Human Sciences Research Council) was established in 1934. Instituted in 1920, the Association of Scientific and Technological societies of South Africa incorporated over 300 organizations numbering thousands of members (some societies admitted upper-grade university students as well) during the 20th century.

With the end of World War II, R&D continued as the government's research policy was given a boost and South Africa was turning into an independent industrial country. Formation of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) in 1945 was a highly significant event. CSIR oversaw the rise of a science research complex, the biggest in the country and on the continent, which comprised numerous research institutes and laboratories, with branches in all of the country's provinces and a staff of more than 3,000 researchers and auxiliaries.

Even though South Africa has a relatively small body of researchers (over the last 30 years, there have been 22 to 24 researchers per 10,000 of the country's work force), South African scientists have attained good results in medicine (doctor Christian Barnard performed the world's first heart transplants in 1967 and 1968, and the country's biophysicist Alan Cormack was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1979 for his breakthroughs in computer tomography), veterinary, agrobiolology and chemistry, power generation, geo- and astrophysics, metal fabrication, mining and mechanical engineering, and many other areas of fundamental and applied research.

The last few decades of the apartheid regime were highlighted by substantial militarization of science (development of many types of weapons, including nuclear arms), and considerable forces and resources were devoted to achieving the country's self-sufficiency (by improving technologies for producing liquid fuel from coal and building nuclear power plants). Military R&D projects contributed significantly to the high-tech areas of manufacturing industry (like electronics), technological progress, and high quality standards in the economy as a whole, and growth in science-related export.

Although the share of inputs in science and R&D in RSA declined from 1.1% in 1990 to 0.68% of GDP in 1997, that is, fell below the level of 20 years ago (0.7% in 1977/1978), the country's scientific and technological potential is still relatively high. The decline recorded in the country was caused, in particular, by a considerable reduction in military research and R&D in power generation (internal and external military confrontation eased, and the need to seek self-sufficiency in energy no longer existed because of the lifting of international sanctions).

In recent years, the concern the country's new leadership was showing over the prospect of its technological lag and realization of the need to beef up its defense potential have led to reactivation of the government's science

---

\* First published in *Vostok (Oriens)*, 2007, No. 3, pp. 119-125.

policy and its additional funding, with the result that the share of R&D in GDP has resumed growth, reaching 0.81% in 2003/2004 and 0.87% in 2004/2005 (12 billion rand in physical units) [*South African Survey...*, 2005 and 2007].

Although the South African science research potential has started to fall behind, if only insignificantly, from developed countries, it is still unrivaled in Africa, with 60% of the investments in science and 28% of the work force employed in R&D on the continent at the end of the 20th century [*Centre for International Higher Education*, 2000].

In the last 10 to 15 years of white minority rule, when military, primarily, nuclear, research was conducted in secret (several nuclear bombs were produced in the RSA in the 1980s, and later dismantled), the share of R&D was approaching 2% of GDP, a percentage typical of developed countries (for more details, see: Skubko, 1985, pp. 34-36). Today, the RSA is in 39th place in the world in expenditure on these purposes, level with Poland and ahead of Argentina (0.41%), slightly behind China (1.22%) and Russia (1.28%), and yet trailing far behind the OECD countries (with 2.5% to 3% of GDP) [*National Survey of R&D...*, 2005].

Fully aware that less attention to science blunts the country's competitive edge in world markets, its new leadership is planning, in accordance with the National R&D Strategy, to push up the share of expenses on science in GDP back to the 1% level by 2008, that is, practically return to the expenditure level that had been reached under the apartheid rule [*Engineering News*, March 23, 2006]. Interestingly, similar problems arise before the leaders of post-Communist Russia, which had dropped to the level of developing countries in the share of science costs in GDP.

The independent Department of Science and Technology set up in accordance with the new science strategy and given the status of a government ministry (previously, science, culture, and the arts were managed from a single department) coordinates a wide range of public sector scientific institutions (including eight science research centres, or "councils:" CSIR, Africa's biggest research centre; councils on humanities, medical, and agricultural research, and so on); higher education institutions (clustered around the six leading universities of Cape Town, Natal, Pretoria, Stellenbosch, the Orange Free State, and Witwatersrand), businesses, and nonprofit organizations. In all, an amount of around 3 billion rand is allocated from the government budget every year to cover the costs of all science research projects and experimental development projects at the science councils and universities. The national R&D strategy, aimed at "improving national competitive power in a fast-changing international environment that gives increasingly more attention to knowledge, improvement of life quality, particularly by reducing poverty," gives priority place to the development of "human capital," information and communication facilities, biotechnologies, raw mineral processing, and astronomical research, which has recently culminated

in the building of a Greater South African telescope, the most powerful optical telescope in the Southern Hemisphere. In biotechnologies, effective improvements have been made in gasoline production from coal, already long in commercial operation. Elsewhere, production of ethanol has been commercialized from corn and another inexpensive farming crop. Addition of up to 20% ethanol to gasoline will make engine fuel significantly cheaper and the car exhaust release much less toxic.

In the last two years, university science (concentrated in very few leading universities) has served to set up seven government-funded "high excellence centres" to oversee the most promising areas of research. Steps are being taken to modernize the fast-depreciating and deteriorating science infrastructure. A Centre of High Computer Technologies, built in the same mainstream, is designed to provide services to a broad spectrum of research [*South African National Research...*, 2002].

In 2004, the Cabinet of Ministers commissioned the Department of Science and Technology to put more efforts, through the system of public and university laboratories, into promoting scientific and technological progress in the following future-oriented areas: space research (CSIR Satellite Communications Centre), nanotechnologies, and hydrogen fuel. Recently, the Department's initiative was behind the creation of a foundation in charge of patents and licenses with the purpose of encouraging "productive output" of research, which remains low so far. The Science and Technology Department joined hands with the Education Department, and the tandem was expected to begin, starting in 2005, developing and approving a three-year National Plan of R&D outlays. Barriers between the various authorities continue, however, to hinder R&D coordination between public and semi-public institutions; to give an illustration, the CSIR Board is appointed by the Commerce and Industry Department that, for its part, is carrying out a successful R&D program, Human Resources and Technology for Manufacturing,\* and was reluctant to wed its policy to that of the Science and Technology Department.

Dynamics of some key factors in R&D developed in the country in the current decade are given in the following Table:

Table

Years	2001/2002	2003/2004
Costs of R&D (billions of rand)	7,488	10,083
Same in % of GDP,	0.76	0.81
Including the civilian sector	0.71	0.72
Total number of work force in R&D (including postgraduates)	26,913	30,703

\* In 1995-2001, overall public and private costs of this program, which started out with 16 million rand, ran up to 257 million rand, and the number of research projects swelled from 78 to 268 eventually.

Same in full employment	21,195	25,185
Including researchers	14,182	14,129
Number of scholars per 1,000 in employment	3.1	2.2
Share of women among researchers	36.0	38.0

Source: [*South African Survey of Research...* 2005, p. 7].

The above “key figures” point to a substantial growth, in absolute and relative figures (of GDP), in R&D in the current decade, even if at the expense of growth in inputs in military research, showing the overall growth in the share of R&D from 0.76% (subsequently corrected to 0.73%) to 0.81% of GDP, although the share of inputs in civilian areas remained almost the same (edging slightly up from 0.71% to 0.72%). Significantly, the RSA is the biggest producer and exporter of high-tech military equipment, including self-propelled howitzers, volley fire systems, a variety of laser and optical sights, and much else. In historical terms, this could largely be explained by the considerable efforts of the white minority regime to build up its own military and technological potential in the face of international boycotts. Arms production was in the charge of the ARMSCOR Armaments Corporation, and then its spin-off, Denel Company (ARMSCOR was left with procurements); military nuclear research was in the hands of the Atomic Energy Commission, whose annual budget was around 1 billion rand in the second half of the 1980s. Having reached the peak of 1.8 billion rand in 1987/1988, the total military R&D dropped to 0.5 billion rand during the transfer of power to the black majority in 1994/1995 [*African Security Review*, 1996, No. 5].

After the “cave-in” of the 1990s, attention to military technologies (and, accordingly, the funding their require) resurged yet again as the RSA got involved in international peacekeeping operations and felt the need to maintain regional security and protect its mineral resources against potential threats.

Because of the continuing shortage of skilled professionals, no changes occurred in the number of researchers (14,000 research staff or 2.2 per total employment in the industry), although the overall payroll rose to nearly 31,000 from 27,000 previously by the inclusion of auxiliaries, engineers, and technicians from non-white ethnic groups (giving them a share of 30% of the R&D staff total). Experts provide evidence of the R&D being modernized slowly in science and the technical staff putting in a relatively slow performance. There is a noticeable ageing of the research staff, with the share of research publications by scholars over 50 years having increased from 18% to 45% from 1990 to 1998. Scientists under 40 years only managed 15% of the publications in 2001. During 1994 to 2001, over

17,000 researchers and technical staff in R&D, most of them whites, left the country (primarily moved to five countries – the United Kingdom, Canada, the U.S.A., Australia, and New Zealand) [www.scidev.net/News/02/02/2007].

The shortage of white high ranking professionals could not be made up by an influx of members of previously discriminated ethnic groups (a majority of them being graduates of second-rate institutions holding degrees of bachelors or, at best, masters). Even if the “color barrier” is lifted completely, decades would come and go before the costs of a long age of discriminations are recovered, a cultural and educational environment is created for a sizable slice of intellectual class of African and other non-white population. Formal transfer of managerial positions to inadequately trained members of previously discriminated ethnic groups offers no solution to the problem and, at times, makes things still worse. As the Russian researcher L.A. Dyomkina writes, “an overwhelming majority of the African part of South African society being unprepared for a wholesome participation and involvement in modern society (economy, politics, and social services) because of the long preceding racialist colonial order, this leads, in our view, to a situation that can be called “slippage” into the condition of a developing country. This is seen in the growth of the sector of the so-called informal economy, growth of unemployment and related criminalization of social life” [Dyomkina, 2006, p. 140].

In the last few years, the South African government has been doing much to put behind it the legacy of apartheid in education. It spends at least 20% (around 60 billion rand) of its budget on education, at a rate growing by 8-9% a year, faster than the growth rate of the country’s GDP. Over 1 million students study at 21 universities, 15 technical colleges (*technicons* in the local jargon), and numerous colleges in the country. Although the country’s 28,000 schools provide primary and secondary education to nearly 12 million students, the 30% threshold of illiteracy among the population over 15 (applying exclusively to Africans) has not been cleared for years. In addition, six to eight million adults in the country are functionally illiterate. Among the white residents over 20 years, 65% have finished school (receiving complete secondary education) or have a higher education; among the Indians (whose ancestors came from India) this education standard equals 40%, “colored” are nearer bottom, with 17%, and black Africans have the lowest rankings, 14%. At the transfer of power to the black majority, 90% of scientists and engineers in the country were whites. Since the transfer, the situation has changed, if at all, in number rather than in quality. In 1990 and 2001, the share of scientific publications from black, colored, and Indian scholars rose jointly from 3.5% to 8% of the total number, still remaining negligibly small, less than ten percent of the total [*South Africa’s National Research ...*, 2002].

There has been continued growth, as in previous years, from 36% to 38%, during the years 2001/2002 to 2003/2004 in the share, already signifi-

cant by international standards, of writing from the socially active segment of South African women in the academic category.

The government's input into R&D (21.9% of it goes directly into the public sector and 28.1% is spent to fund R&D, as was, for example, in 2003/2004, which is equal to the average of 28.9% allocated on science in developed OECD countries), and below what had been spent under the apartheid rule, taking second place to private business (55.5% in sales and 58% in funding; approximately a fifth of the funding is absorbed in the financial sector of education, 10% of the science funds is received from other countries) because, in particular, of the privatization of major government-controlled corporations, such as the SACOL coal mining and chemical processing company and ISCOR steel company, and also the termination of military nuclear research. Although public inputs in the final period of white rule showed a downtrend, as is supported by a citation from a book of the time, "Beginning with the period between the two world wars, R&D in the RSA has had a high share of government involvement, although in the 1930s through 1940s science was heavily influenced by major mining companies. In the 1960s and 1970s, the RSA government funded over a half of the R&D budget (65% of the costs in 1969/1970, and 52% in 1977/1978), but with the beginning of the 1980s its share dropped to 43%, a proportion approximately equal to that in developed capitalist countries. But more important is the fact that laboratories use up nearly a half of fund allocations on science (in the late 1960s the figure rose to nearly 60%), which puts the country (along with Canada and Australia) among developed capitalist countries. In a measure, this government control over science is a prop for the immature private monopoly sector of RSA, and the appreciation by the ruling quarters of industrialization and the revolution in science and technology. In the 1970s, when the country's leading monopolies reached a high level of excellence and financial independence, and even made to the club of world-class capital exporters, there was, even if minor, a rollback of government share in favor of business. Similar changes were also taking place in Canada, where during 1960 to 1978, the share of the government in funding R&D fell from 64% to 48%, and spending from 54% to 31%, while the share of private capital rose to take up the proportionate part of the slag [Skubko, 1985, 35-36].

The share of fundamental research in R&D costs in RSA rose from 15% in 1977/1978 to 25% in 2003/2004, which is considered a good showing by international standard and an evidence of the attention given to basic science (above all, to its university sector). This is in the long-term economic interests, as it lays the ground for shifting production to new organizational and engineering principles. Focus on basic science notwithstanding, the share of applied research and experimentation also rose in the same period from 28% to 38%, a sign of improved links between science and manufacturing as the role of private business was rising in funding and carrying out

R&D directly. Scientists, however, voice concerns over the prospects of fundamental science and research in humanities being practically knocked out of the science mainstream because of pressure put on the universities of late to have them turn out "commercial market" output.

The RSA is the engine of inter-African scientific and technological cooperation within the framework of the NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's Development) Program. In November 2003, Johannesburg, RSA, hosted an inter-African conference on science and technology that was attended by delegates from 53 counties of the continent. In the Action Program adopted at the conference it was resolved to raise outlays on R&D in the participating countries to at least 1% of their respective GDP by 2010. Agreement was also reached on scientific and technological cooperation in areas such as poverty control, liquidation of illiteracy, training of professionals, health care (with a special accent on problems related to the spread of the HIV infection), aerospace research, and much else.

The conference in Cape Town was timed for the opening of the Inter-African Mathematical Institute and the African Laser Institute. A regional Council of Ministers of Science and Technology has been set up (within the framework of SADC – South African Development Community). It is also planned soon to set up a South African Aerospace Agency that will, among other missions, launch satellites together with other African countries (countries of the region, Nigeria, Algeria, and so on) with technical assistance from NASA, Russian Aerospace Agency, and the European Space Agency. Apart from broadly cooperating with the RSA in science and engineering, the European Space Agency lavishly finances South African science; largely owing to the European Union, foreign funds reached, as we said above, 10% of the total outlay on R&D in 2003/2004 (compared to practically zero in 1994, when the apartheid regime was dismantled). Much attention is also given to scientific and technological ties with Brazil and India, which South Africa considers its strategic partners. In the wake of the recent visits by Russian President Putin and Premier Fradkov, there has been significant invigoration between the two countries in science and technology, particularly, in such areas as space exploration, nuclear research, and the mining and processing of minerals.

To conclude this article, the RSA deserves high praise for having maintained the relatively high scientific and technological potential built up in the years of white minority rule. And yet, experts of international renown note [Sunil Mani, 2001, Abstract] that attempts undertaken in recent years by the South African government to build it further (by lavish public funding of several innovation projects, offering tax concessions to companies investing in R&D, and so on) have produced few returns, mainly because of the shortage of trained professionals in South African science, absence of the required "critical mass" of highly skilled professionals in science, engineering, and technology.

## Bibliography

Демкина Л.А. Некоторые аспекты социально-политического развития южноафриканского общества после 1994 г. М., 2006 г. [Dyomkina, L.A., "Certain Aspects of Sociopolitical Development of South African Society after 1994," Moscow, 2006.]

Скубко Ю.С. Новые явления в экономике ЮАР. М., 1985. [Skubko, Yu.A., "New Developments in the Economy of RSA." Moscow, 1985.]

*African Security Review*. London, 1996, No. 5.

Centre for International Higher Education. Boston: Boston College, Spring 2000.

*Engineering News*. Johannesburg, March 23, 2006.

"Resources for Research and Development 1977/78." Office of the Scientific Advisor to the Prime Minister, Pretoria, 1979.

"South Africa's National Research and Strategy." Government of the Republic of South Africa. Pretoria, 2002.

"South African Survey of Research and Development (R&D) in 2003/2004." Human Sciences Research Council on Behalf of the Department of Science and Technology, Pretoria, 2005.

"South African Survey of Research and Development (R&D) in 2004/2005." Department of Science and Technology, Pretoria, 2007.

Sunil Muni, "Government and Innovation Policy. An Analysis of the South African Experience since 1994," UN University, Maastricht, 2001.

UNESCO Science Report 2005, Paris, 2005.

## MASS MEDIA IN POLYCONFESSIONAL TANZANIA\*

*Veronika Usacheva,*

D.Sc., Senior Research Fellow,  
Institute for African Studies, RAS

Political and economic liberalization has become a test for the national identities which have been created in African countries, Tanzania included, for the past 30 to 40 years.

As a rule, these states are distinguished by the actualization of the so-called prenatal identities – religious, ethnic and regional.

For a long time Tanzania has been looked upon as an island of political, economic and social stability on the African continent, despite the presence of various groups of the population, differing in ethnic composition and religious affiliation.

Liberal transformations and political and economic reforms should have brought to the fore the problems, which inevitably exist in any multicultural society. The religious division between the population of the island part of the country, which is largely Muslim, and that inhabiting continental Tanzania, where over half of the people are Christians, tension in the relations between the African majority and the Asian minorities, and the use of various regional and ethnic interests by political figures during the election campaigns of 1995 and 2000 have emerged in Tanzanian society from the beginning of political and economic transformations.<sup>1</sup>

Politicians and scholars have been saying that although direct violence in Tanzania is hardly possible at present, nevertheless, the processes of the social and political fragmentation of Tanzanian society will, most probably, use the ethnic and confessional foundation for division. This can pose a direct threat to peace and stability in the country.

In the early 1990s the Danish scholar L. Rasmussen specializing in the history of religion, carried out a comparative study of the Islamic-Christian relations in Tanzania and northern Nigeria.<sup>2</sup> It showed that the ethnic character often manipulates with various political problems.

One of the tasks of the Russian anthropological expedition was to ascertain the role of the mass media in multicultural and multiconfessional society. The main source of the study was the materials of the expedition obtained with the help of questionnaires and interviews. Journalists, editors, mass media managers and officials, as well as Tanzanian scholars worked as experts. They analyzed the situation in society, and especially in the mass media after liberalization, talked about their understanding of the in-

---

\* First published in the monograph "The Christian-Moslem Relations in Contemporary Tanzania". Moscow, 2005, pp. 167-188.

terests and role of the mass media, government and society in the sphere of communications in the conditions of a multicultural society, and assessed the prospects of inter-religious relations in Tanzania.

Before switching over to the results of the analysis carried out by the expedition, it would be necessary to dwell on the changes which have taken place in the Tanzanian mass media over the past decade.

The liberalization of the press in Tanzania, as compared with the previous state monopoly on it, has opened a new epoch of the development of the mass media and freedom of speech. But at the same time the process of liberalization has given rise to dramatic changes in society. What used to be controlled by the government which had a "monopoly on images", for example, the "image of national unity", has now become a matter of discussion. The questions of religion, race and ethnic problems began to be publicly discussed in the Tanzanian press and society, and, as P.J. Kaiser writes, "government newspapers reiterated the mantra about national unity, and the opposition press wrote about the rights of individual groups more frequently."<sup>3</sup>

Prior to 1992, most Tanzanian mass media were under state control. There were Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam, Sauti Ya Tanzania,<sup>4</sup> the radio and TV of Zanzibar, the newspapers *Daily News* and *Sunday News* controlled by the state. Apart from government control, the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (the Party of Revolution) had its own newspapers *Uhuru* and *Mzalendo*. The circulation of the former ran into 120,000 copies daily,<sup>5</sup> which was a fantastic figure for East Africa.

The activity of the mass media was strictly regimented legally, and many questions of public interest were concealed from the mass media by the state bureaucracy.<sup>6</sup>

According to the data of the study of the late 1960s, radio was the main source of information about local events for 34 percent of the Tanzanian population. And the local leaders of TANU provided information for 36 percent of the country's inhabitants. Thus, TANU had an excellent opportunity to pursue its own line and publicize its own assessments of current events.

About 77 percent of the people polled called radio to be the main source of information about events in the country, and about 37 percent named newspapers as their main source.<sup>7</sup> In these conditions it was fairly easy to control the flows of information and preclude any manifestations of religious or ethnic intolerance threatening unity and peace in the country.

Transfer to a multiparty system and the liberalization of the mass media radically changed the situation. Private broadcasting corporations and publishing houses numbered so many that it became difficult to control them.

In 1993 the Tanzanian parliament adopted a law which permitted to organize private broadcasting media. After that many private commercial radio stations emerged, the first of which (*Radio One*) was opened in January

1994. A month later the *Radio Tumaini* came into being. It belonged to the Catholic church.

By 2003, according to official data, 409 newspapers, magazines and other periodicals, 26 broadcasting stations and 15 TV channels were registered. It should be noted that quite a few newspapers and other publications emerged and disappeared without registration.

Despite the tumultuous growth of the number of broadcasting stations, they cover no more than a quarter of the country's territory and have their centres in five regions of Tanzania. *Radio One*, *Radio Clouds Entertainment* and *Radio Free Africa* have also space satellite facilities for broadcasting.

The overwhelming majority of the mass media organs belong to private owners. It is the electronic mass media that attract private investors. Besides, religious communities, the ruling party and universities also own broadcasting stations.

As to TV centres in Tanzania, they came into being at first as commercial, and then as public, in contrast to many other countries. But they appeared in Tanzania later than in most countries of the African continent.

The first TV station was organized in 1994 and it was private. Six more private TV stations were opened before the end of 2000 when public TV (TVT) was organized, which began to work in March 2001. Public television is part of the *Tanzania Broadcasting Services*, which was founded as a public agency in 2002. According to officially announced plans, the TVT has to cover the entire territory of the country during the first three years of its existence.

Since the early 1990s cable television has been developing steadily in Tanzania. By 2003 it worked in 12 cities of the country, and all stations belong to private owners.

Despite such short history of the TV existence, up to 80 percent of all TV programmes are locally produced, which is a matter of pride for Tanzanian journalists and authorities.<sup>9</sup>

Meanwhile, the experts polled assessed the quality of information products quite differently. One of them, for example, notes that "...our own programmes are soap operas, but they do reflect real life situations in Africa. Whether one likes them or not, they are true to the realities of African life."<sup>10</sup> Another, on the contrary, is concerned by the fact that "we can see, especially on TV, many programmes made outside Tanzania, in the United States, Europe and the South African Republic. This is why the influence of other cultures on us through the mass media is great."<sup>11</sup>

The development of the mass media during the period of liberalization was tumultuous and uncontrolled. Many new organs of the mass media were unable to withstand market competition and died "natural death". Despite this, all experts noted the increase of the number of periodicals as a positive factor and even as a matter of pride not only because it was an in-

dication of the growth of industry in Southern Africa, but also due to the fact that this process contributed to the creation of new jobs. The new mass media gave jobs to more than 3,000 people engaged directly in their production, and over 6,000 were given work as newspaper sellers.<sup>12</sup>

To date there are three successfully operating media groups in Tanzania. The biggest is *Guardian Group*, which is a unit of the *IPP Corporation*. This group owns ten newspapers and controls radio and TV stations. Another group is *Habari Corporation*, which owns five newspapers (two weeklies and one English-language tabloid). The third group, *Business Times*, owns the main daily newspaper in Swahili, the main business weekly, and one evening tabloid with two satirical supplements – daily and weekly.

Each group is distinguished by its political and economic orientation and editorial policy. For instance, the *Habari Corporation*, which belongs to the ruling CCM party, has a critical approach to political developments. The *Business Times* has a reputation of an independent, free and market-oriented media group. The most popular newspaper of this group is the tabloid *Majira*, an influential daily paper sympathizing with the opposition. Meanwhile, the newspapers belonging to the *Guardian* group are reserved and cautious in their criticism of the government.

Some experts emphasized that in many cases sympathies toward the opposition were based not so much on political convictions, but on the desire to sell as many copies of their publications as possible, for which it was necessary to publish critical and even scandalous materials.

Expert evaluations make it possible to draw the conclusion that the relations between the government and the mass media in Tanzania are well-balanced, even positive, and conflicts between them are very rare.

For example, in 1995 the *Majira* disclosed financial machinations of the Central Bank with part of the gold reserves allocated for purchasing a radar for the country's armed forces. The government made an attempt to close down the newspaper, but later abandoned the idea.

Dar es Salaam TV (*DTV*), an independent TV station, caused displeasure of the authorities in October 1995, when it announced the results of the presidential elections in Zanzibar, without waiting for the official announcement of the National Electoral Commission. The *DTV* reported the victory of the opposition party of the Civil United Front (*CUF*), whereas the Commission announced the defeat of the opposition with a minimal number of votes. The TV station was fined for unethical conduct by 1,200 dollars.

During the past decade of the development of the Tanzanian mass media there have been no major conflicts between the authorities and the *Habari Corporation* or *Guardian*, although news of a scandalous nature appeared in these publications, as well as in the government daily *Daily News*.

The international organization "Reporters Without Borders" has noted in its annual report that beginning from 2000 Tanzania has displayed grow-

ing respect for the freedom of the press. There were fewer cases of violations of the freedom of the press, and journalists enjoyed more freedom in their work, including in Zanzibar, where cases of the persecution of journalists were more frequent.<sup>13</sup>

Experts emphasize the close connections between the media community and politicians. The political environment determines the activity of the mass media. It predetermines the subjects dealt with by the newspapers, radio and TV.

However, as one of the experts noted, the point is not only the existence of direct pressure of the government circles, but the degree of political culture of Tanzanian society. "Political culture was such that it did not allow the press and people to think and adhere to a position differing from the general line..."<sup>14</sup> A journalist from a popular English-language newspaper echoed it by saying that there was a tradition of long standing to heed the official point of view and pay more attention to what was said by the prime minister or the vice president.<sup>15</sup>

It is more difficult to express society's opinion through the press. The main reason lies in the fact that the independent mass media are weak economically and need financial assistance and investments. As a result, the number of copies of the main newspapers does not exceed one hundred thousand, and only few of them are distributed in rural areas. The lack of financing retards the development of journalism as a profession and its quality.

Due to this reason the mass media give little space and time to representatives of the public for general national debates on the questions vital for society. Besides, inasmuch as a number of government officials of Tanzania own parts of the mass media, they can control news reporting and influence the publishing policy of their media organizations.

Many printed and electronic publications are not a product of the independent work of journalists and professionals. Some news printed or broadcast is often a result of orders given by the owners of the mass media, or requests on the part of their friends close to the authorities. This is not necessarily a political order. Big business has come to the mass media and is now dictating its interests. Private owners are mainly interested in obtaining profit and income. Advertisements are more important for them than public interests.<sup>16</sup>

However, far from all assess the situation so simply. Practically all experts employed in the sphere of the mass media named readers, listeners and viewers as the main customers for whom they work and whose interests they express.<sup>17</sup> For example, the editor of an influential English-language newspaper said that he had whole groups representing business community, scholars, researchers, intellectuals, diplomats, etc, for whom his newspaper works, expressing their interests. And although he gets very little in return, he orients to them because he feels it his duty...<sup>18</sup>



A journalist from the newspaper *Guardian* named some other interested persons determining the “agenda” for the Tanzanian mass media. He mentioned European countries, the United States, and especially Scandinavian countries, which invest big money in some projects – educational or in water reserves and hydropower facilities, and want their activity to be widely reported by the mass media. Besides, there are quite a few non-governmental public organizations of various types which also wish that their activity and projects be described at length.<sup>19</sup>

After the beginning of liberalization Tanzania has faces the problem of the concentration of the mass media and monopoly on information, which influence the freedom of expression and the quality of journalistic work. There is the view among Tanzanian journalists that the monopolization of the mass media can threaten the freedom of speech. True, this is a widespread view among journalists in all countries. The media giants everywhere are striving to control the flows of information and dictate what should (or should not) be published or shown. Under these circumstances it is very difficult for the mass media to perform their main liberal function – to be the “watch dog” of democracy and control the activity of the government in the interests of society.

Nevertheless, a majority of those polled believe that thanks to the new mass media in Tanzanian society there is now a forum for discussion, exchange of views and criticism of the government and other state institutions. Apart from that, the Tanzanian mass media have become a means helping raise the educational level of people. For many of them the mass media are a source of new knowledge about the state structure and about the way of developing a stable socio-economic system in their country.

Although there are rather well developed mass media in Tanzania, it cannot be said that society has broad access to them. Ninety percent of the newspapers are distributed in the cities, embracing not more than 17 percent of the population. Fifty percent of all publications are distributed only in Dar es Salaam.

The results of polling in Dar es Salaam show that about 71 percent of all respondents read the press regularly, and 75 percent listen to the radio and watch TV. The latter figure shows mostly listeners to the radio because TV sets are inaccessible for most Tanzanians. One of the experts cited the data of a sociological survey which showed that less than five percent of Tanzanians have TV sets, most of them living in Dar es Salaam. They say that in Dar es Salaam there are those who can watch TV, others look out of the window to see or learn anything.<sup>20</sup>

The correlation between the financial position of respondents and their reading the press is as follows:

		Do you read the press regularly?	
		No	Yes
Financial position	Bad	5%	23%
	Average	7%	34%
	Good	5%	21%
	Very good	1%	4%
Total		19%	81%

The situation with electronic mass media is as follows:

		Do you listen to the radio and watch TV regularly?	
		No	Yes
Financial position	Bad	5%	22%
	Average	5%	36%
	Good	6%	21%
	Very good	1%	4%
Total		17%	83%

As to Christians and Moslems among those polled, the press is read regularly by 81% and 80% respectively, and for the electronic mass media the figures are 86% and 80% respectively. The most popular broadcasts among the respondents are *Taarifa ya habari* (41%), *ITV – Independent Television* (23%) and the *BBC* (12%).

The most popular newspapers are those in Swahili, which have the biggest circulation: *Uhuru*, *Majira*, *Nipashe*, *Mtanzania*.<sup>21</sup> Only two English-language newspapers can vie with them: the government *Daily News* and *Guardian* belonging to the *IPP Corporation*. Among the Moslems the most popular is the newspaper *Al Nuur*, which experts characterize as radical and even extremist.<sup>22</sup>

The main problem facing the Tanzanian mass media is the absence of a sufficient number of professionals in all spheres. Another problem is a shortage of the modern instruments of production and economic means, and the weak development of the commercial base. All this was the cause of the collapse of a considerable number of new publications.

The rapid expansion of the mass media has led to the enormous growth of the number of journalists. For example, in the printed and electronic mass media it grew from 230 in 1991 to more than 2,000 in 2002, which also meant the lower level of professionalism. Practically all experts<sup>23</sup> noted the generally low professional level of the Tanzanian journalistic community. The editor of one of the newspapers said on this score: “We criticize frantically and research badly when we write on a definite subject. Someone said something, a journalist heard it somewhere, and started to write there and then, without any verification and confirmation.”<sup>24</sup>

It is because of the absence of professionalism that the western mass media serve as the main source of information for Tanzanian journalists, and consequently, they write and report of developments in other countries, western culture, etc. more extensively. Here is how the situation is described by a reader not working in the mass media: "We take a newspaper, look at it and see: the United States, Germany, Italy... Where's Tanzania? Here it is, somewhere in the corner there are five lines reporting a catastrophe, accident or a major cultural event... Well, you may write anything about Germany or China, but let it be something original written by a Tanzanian journalist..."<sup>25</sup>

Answering the question about the main functions and tasks facing the mass media in Tanzanian society, all experts named the educational function, apart from the traditional information and entertainment ones. One official dealing with the sphere of regulating the mass media described them in the following way: "It is necessary to see and demonstrate today's democracy in the country and show its advantages."<sup>26</sup> And he actually identified the task of the mass media with the function of management. Many experts spoke with regret that the mass media are engaged in entertaining people rather than in informing or educating them. And they saw the reason for it in the private ownership of the mass media. One young journalist said, for example, that inasmuch as most media institutions in Tanzania are private, their owners only want money and entertain people. The latter is easy, one does not have to work too much for doing this. He also mentioned the fact that there is too much yellow press, the so-called hack writers. Yet, the situation was not too hopeless, the serious press also develops in the country.<sup>27</sup>

One of the major results of the liberalization in the sphere of the mass media in any country should be their opportunity and ability to criticize the government and control it. The journalists and editors of the Tanzanian press think that they are only learning to fulfil the function of control over the government. But the role of the mass media should not be confined to criticizing the government. The latter may do something well, something not well enough, but the mass media should welcome whatever is good.<sup>28</sup>

Evaluating the role of the mass media in a multicultural society, many experts agreed that as long as the mass media cope with their role, there should be no discriminatory policy toward individual groups of the population, ethnic or confessional. True, experts interpret this as a heritage of the Nyerere epoch, the vestiges of the Ujamaa ideology rather than the merit of the present-day mass media. In the view of the editor of the newspaper *Uhuru*, which is published in Tanzania since the proclamation of independence, the country is distinguished by the peaceful coexistence of different ethnic groups and races. "The mass media made a contribution to it because we always avoided mentioning the ethnic origin of anyone or anything or the place of birth or residence. What we did mention was that the person in

question was Tanzanian. Thus we did not identify his or her ethnic group and thus there was no mention of such division."<sup>29</sup>

The further progress of liberalization, when more attention is inevitably paid to the rights of different groups of the population, can violate harmony which has taken shape. A political analyst, for example, spoke about the images of national unity, the ideology of statehood, civil sentiments and the quality of justice which remained at the same Ujamaa level. Everything has been reflected in the mass media so far. But he said: "I am afraid that this will not last long, because we now have capitalism, that is, everybody thinks and does what suits him."<sup>30</sup> These thoughts have been expressed by quite mature people who remember the Ujamaa epoch and could compare it with the present situation. Similar question put to a young Tanzanian journalist was difficult for him to answer. "I cannot say that we make many programmes about the culture of Tanzanians of different origins, and about various aspects of culture. But we do not make distinctions between one and another culture."<sup>31</sup>

There was only one respondent who firmly answered that "all of us have only one culture – Tanzanian. I think this is a sign of underdevelopment (the presence of many ethnoses and cultures, tribalism... – *V.U.*). I think that at present influence on man by his ethnic group is becoming weaker. Belonging to one, Tanzanian, culture makes his life easier. The Swahili language is known to everyone. And it is an instrument of the development of Tanzanian culture and the country."<sup>32</sup> Other experts spoke about the uniform Tanzanian culture being in the process of formation. "We are moving in the direction of feeling as Tanzanians and being able to answer the question 'Where are you from?' without mentioning the region or district from where we have arrived or where our relatives live."<sup>33</sup> One expert said that his family is so mixed both ethnically and religiously that his children would have no choice other than to say that they are Tanzanians.<sup>34</sup>

In the view of experts, there are manifestations of race or ethnic intolerance at everyday level, but the mass media do not report them. The reasons for such intolerance are rather economic and it is expressed in an ethnic form.<sup>35</sup>

The director of the Tanzanian branch of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation said that one could talk of an incorrect portrayal of one or another group of the population in Tanzania, rather than of some group which is not represented in the mass media. For instance, he asserts, the Masai have become a brand of Tanzania. "Many people think that this is so. But it is not so. In actual fact, Masai is only one of Tanzanian cultures. But it is used as an expression of a bright image. A Masai soldier, or a Masai man with a mobile phone is an exotic sight..."<sup>36</sup>

The example cited here is the only one in which experts could name the concrete group of the population which the mass media show in a wrong light. True, all experts spoke of the fact that the Tanzanian mass media inadequately show rural inhabitants and women of the country.

As to the interreligious relations, the situation is more complex. The results of surveys show the following: about 27 percent of those polled maintain that their confessional groups are not represented in the Tanzanian mass media, and 59 percent hold the opposite view. The Christians who consider that their religion is represented in the mass media comprise 79 percent of the population, and the Moslems – 56 percent.

The question as to whether the mass media present confessions objectively was answered positively by 52 percent of respondents.

More detailed results are presented in the table below. It should be noted that some respondents did not declare their real faith, but only mentioned confession – Moslem, Christian, etc.

Confession <sup>37</sup>	Do you think your confession is not represented in the mass media?		Total
	No	Yes	
Orthodox Christians	1.1%	0.8%	1.9%
Catholics	20%	6%	26%
Pentacostals	1.8%	2%	3.8%
Anglicans	4.4%	1.1%	5.5%
Lutherans	10.8%	1.7%	12.5%
Sunnies	11.4%	10%	21.4%
Ismailies	3.4%	1.6%	5%
Christians	2.3%	0	2.3%
Adventists	1.5%	0.4%	1.9%
Qadiries	1.3%	1.3%	2.6%
Moslems	5%	3%	8%
Total	69%	31%	100%

The question “Is your confession presented by the mass media objectively?” the respondents answered as follows:

Confession	Is your confession presented by the mass media objectively?		Total
	No	Yes	
Orthodox Christians	0.6%	1%	1.6%
Catholics	10%	17%	27%
Pentacostals	1.7%	1.5%	3.2%
Anglicans	2%	4%	6%
Lutherans	3.3%	9.7%	13%
Sunnies	8%	13%	21%
Ismailies	1.6%	3.4%	5%
Christians	0.2%	2%	2.2%

Adventists	0.7%	1.3%	2%
Qadiries	1%	2%	3%
Moslems	2%	7%	9%
Total	34%	66%	100%

The data of survey carried out in Dar es Salaam show that among those watching TV or listening to the radio regularly there are more people who positively assess the interreligious relations in Tanzania than among those who do not use the electronic mass media:

		Do you think that the relations between Moslems and Christians in Tanzania are good?	
		No	Yes
Do you watch TV or listen to the radio regularly?	No	47%	52%
	Yes	26%	74%

From the table below it follows that judging by the answers of respondents, the electronic mass media contribute to confessional tolerance and positive attitude to representatives of other confessions:

		What is your attitude to other religions and their representatives?				
		Completely negative	Mainly negative	Indifferent	Mainly positive	Fully positive
Do you watch TV or listen to the radio regularly?	No	14%	15%	30%	27%	14%
	Yes	9%	12%	29%	32%	18%

The answers of Moslem respondents show that about 50 percent of those polled in Dar es Salaam have a positive attitude to another religion (18% are fully positive and 32% mainly positive.) Thirty-four percent of them are indifferent to other religions and their representatives.

The answers of Christian respondents do not differ much: 18 percent of them have a completely positive attitude to another religion, 34 percent are mainly positive and 26 percent are indifferent. It should be noted that among those who regularly use the electronic mass media the number of people without a negative attitude to representatives of other religions is bigger.

The situation is different when paganism is concerned. The attitude to it is mainly negative.

Interesting data have been obtained from respondents in answer to the question "What are the main qualities of representatives of other religions?" Those who do not use the electronic mass media give a typical representative of another religion mainly negative traits (53% against 42% who do not). Answers of respondents who regularly watch TV and listen to the radio are as follows: 50% give representatives of another religion mainly positive traits, and 40% think the opposite.

Characterizing interreligious relations in Tanzania one could cite the words of a foreigner who lived in the country for seven years and could judge the role of the Tanzanian mass media. "The main task for everybody is to preserve the beautiful 'mixed' country which took shape under President Nyerere, which should continue to exist. You must have heard about him. I could add a few words. It is really fantastic! To shaping a union of many various tribes without great problems. To maintain peace and equality between Christians and Moslems has never been easy. Because both these religions are orthodox, irreconcilable and intolerant, especially Catholics and Moslems, especially when they wish to introduce their own order in education, for instance. They want to have docile conformists. It is very difficult to give shape to an ethnically and religiously mixed society. This is the first country where representatives of different confessions, even pagans, live in one family. Catholics can become Moslems and Moslems can become Catholics. This is a wonderful flexibility in which the past does not predetermine the future. There is a wonderful freedom of choice!"<sup>38</sup>

Despite these emotional words, they correctly reflect the main tendencies of interreligious relations, which have been noted by other experts, too, at the family level and at other levels. Tanzanians demonstrate a high level of tolerance in everyday life, opposition and confrontation between adherents of different religions are not felt too strongly,<sup>39</sup> and conflicts have mainly a political background. Many experts spoke of the absence of clashes between Christians and Moslems in the mass media. "There can rather be a conflict between Moslems and the police. The mass media may describe Moslems as stupid people. But there is no mention of a dividing line between Moslems and Christians."<sup>40</sup> These words belong to a Catholic.

Nevertheless, all experts mention the *feeling* of a certain confrontation. "Debates constantly go on, especially between political leaders. Now it is believed that Christians have more privileges. This is because the President of the country is Christian. If the next president is Moslem, debates will continue in reverse. Politicians argue all the time about who has done more for Tanzania..."<sup>41</sup> I think that the government tries to balance the situation somehow."<sup>42</sup>

Indeed, the authorities are trying, as before, to pursue a policy of maintaining unity, seeing the duty of the mass media to strengthen unity and not disunite people, and also to create the image of national unity.<sup>43</sup>

The views of the experts that confrontation takes place only in words instil optimism. One of them says that "there are no people who want an armed struggle and are ready to shoot. I believe that there is respect for another man and his choice of religion."<sup>44</sup> Although the interreligious relations in Tanzania are a kind of a "sleeping volcano", real religious harmony in the country does exist as before.<sup>45</sup>

Some experts claim that "in actual fact not a single politician wants to be regarded as a religious person. For instance, the *CCM* is the ruling party, and its members would feel awkward if their party were called religious. The *CUF* (*Civil United Front*) is the opposition party and it is presented as an Islamic, Moslem party. But its members assert that it is not religious."<sup>46</sup>

All interviews given by experts have indicated that interconfessional contradictions have intensified since the period of liberalization. "Besides, I see that people are not ready to serve their country and its development and make sacrifices for its sake, as in the past. Each is concerned with his own success, without paying attention to what's going on nearby. Thus, I see four main problems facing the country: poverty, illiteracy, disease, and people's unwillingness to contribute to the cohesion and unity of the country."<sup>47</sup>

It was the process of liberalization that has buried the policy of "tanzaniaization", which was criticized for its disregard of the rights of the various groups of the population. In accordance with the concept of liberalization, the state withdraws from the spheres of social and general education and health protection, which, along with the mass media, contributed to peaceful coexistence. Taking into account the fact that Tanzania is on the list of the poorest countries of the world, and the state refuses to fulfil social guarantees, social inequality and social tension may grow, which, in turn, can result in various forms of ethnic, racial and religious intolerance. "In such a situation even minor religious problems suddenly become immense. A common man in the street looks around and sees that *izugu* (Europeans) live in better houses, their children study at better schools and they can visit better doctors. This common man begins to feel envy and hatred. These simple property relations can be called socio-economic and class ones, causing social problems."<sup>48</sup>

In this situation the mass media should be especially cautious in dealing with religious matters.

The mass media of Tanzania, the country's leadership and society as a whole should observe a balance between the interests of all groups of the population and preserve the image of national unity equalizing all Tanzanians, irrespective of their religious or ethnic affiliation. In the terms used by the well-known political analyst and scholar of culture B. Anderson, popular in the West, the Tanzanian mass media should create and support the image of a "community", demonstrating its unity and multicultural, multi-confessional and mosaic character.

## Statistical Commentary

Descriptive and analytical statistics is a valuable instrument for studying society. Descriptive statistics (the establishment of frequency distribution of traits, that is, the percentage of cases with one or another indication) helps overcome distortions of the perception of social processes emerging under the influence of stereotypes, false theories, or the habit of human consciousness to simplify the surrounding world, presenting it in black and white. Analytical statistics makes it possible to verify hypotheses about the presence or absence of connections between different social phenomena.

Correlative analysis is the most widely used method of analytical statistics. Correlation is a systematic and related connection between two indices. Correlation is usually characterized by four parameters: strength of connection ( $\rho$ ,  $r$ ,  $\tau$ - $b$ ,  $\gamma$ , etc.), its direction and importance ( $a$ ) and the number of cases ( $N$ ).

To calculate the strength of connection between the indices the Pearson correlation coefficient is used most frequently (depending on the type of data), which is denoted by  $r$ , and the Spearman's rank correlation coefficient denoted by the Greek letter  $\rho$ . Such coefficients have the magnitude from  $-1.0$  to  $+1.0$ .

The magnitude  $+1.0$  means full ("functional") positive connection between features. In this case the increase of the value A is accompanied by a definite increase of the value B. The magnitude  $-1.0$  means complete ("functional") negative connection between indications. In this case the increase of the value A is accompanied by a definite decrease of the value B.

In the "world of people" the laws described by functional dependencies are extremely rare. Practically all socio-anthropological laws are manifested in the form of correlations with the strength of from  $0.1$  to  $0.8$ . The square of the coefficient of the strength of correlation between definite indices shows the percentage of their connection.

As a rule, correlation in mathematical statistics is considered strong if it is characterized by the coefficient of more than  $0.7$ , average – with the coefficient between  $0.5$  and  $0.7$ , and weak if it is less than  $0.5$ . Such classification has a meaning in certain fields of the use of mathematical statistics, for example, in biology or economics. But for socio-anthropological research it would be better to examine correlations with the coefficient of more than  $0.5$  as superstrong, from  $0.3$  to  $0.5$  as strong, from  $0.15$  to  $0.3$  as average, and only those lower than  $0.15$  as weak.

### Notes:

1. Kaiser, P.J., From "Imagined Community to Multicultural Mosaic": "The Politics of Differences in Tanzania // *African Journal of Political Sciences*. 2000. Vol. 6, No. 1. P. 90.

2. Rasmussen, L., "Christian-Muslim Relations in Africa: The Cases of Northern Nigeria and Tanzania Compared." London, 1993.

3. Kaiser, P.J., Op.cit. P. 94.

4. The state radio in Tanzania was organized by the British colonial administration in 1951, and it was called *Sauti ya Dar es Salaam*, and after its broadcasting service covered the greater part of the country it was renamed *Sauti ya Tanganyika* (The Voice of Tanganyika).

5. The archives of the expedition. Interview E MM 7.28.04.2003.

6. Kasanga, M., Obstacles and Challenges Facing the Media in Tanzania // *Africa media review* 2002. No. 3. Pp. 27-32.

7. Neher, W.W., Condon, J.C. "The Mass Media and Nation Building in Kenya and Tanzania" // *The Search for National Integration in Africa*. 1976. Pp. 220-239.

8. Interview E MM 7. 25.04. 2003.

9. Interview E MM 5. 25.04. 2003. See also: [www.tanzanian.go.tz](http://www.tanzanian.go.tz)

10. Interview E MM 2. 15.04.2003.

11. Interview E MM 1. 14.04.2003.

12. Interview E MM 5. 25.04.2003.

13. Tanzania – 2003 Annual Report. *Reporters Without Borders*. 2.05.2003.

14. Interview E MM 3. 15.04.2003.

15. Interview E MM 19. 2.05.2003.

16. Interview E MM 2. 15.04.2003.

17. See, for example, Interview E MM 5,6,7,8,11.

18. Interview E MM 6. 26.04.2003.

19. Interview E MM 19. 2.05.2003.

20. Interview E MM 19. 2.05.2003.

21. Interview E MM 7. 28.04.2003.

22. See, for example, Interview E MM 3,4,7,12.

23. Except Interview E MM 5,8, 10,11.

24. Interview E MM 7. 28.04.2003.

25. Interview E MM 3. 15.04.2003.

26. Interview E MM 5. 25.04.2003.

27. Interview E MM 14. 30.04.2003.

28. Interview E MM 6. 26.04.2003.

29. Interview E MM 7. 28.04.2003.

30. Interview E MM 4. 22.04.2003.

31. Interview E MM 14. 30.04.2003.

32. Interview E MM 1. 14.04.2003.

33. Interview E MM 2. 15.04.2003.

34. Interview E MM 7. 28.04.2003.

35. For example, in Interview E MM 7. 28.04.2003: If a businessman is of Asian Indian origin, he is described as a cunning person capable of doing things as Asians do, etc. See also Interview E MM 3.

36. Interview E MM 16. 30.04.2003.

37. We excluded from our table the categories where the number of respondents was less than 1.5%.

38. Interview E MM 18. 2.05. 2003.

39. "Moslems can say that Christianity is not a real religion, and that Christ is not God. People can drive anything in a bus or elsewhere..." Interview E MM 1. 14.04.2003.

40. Interview E MM 2. 15.04.2003.

41. A vivid example of such an argument is provided by Interview E MM 16. 30.04.2003. "Historically, we are more Christian than Islamic. Yes, Arabs were the first to have come here. They organized trade, built towns, developed Swahili as the foundation of trade and understanding, and along with that brought Islam. Besides, they were also engaged in slave trade. We remember this. Then came Germans and began to build schools and preach Christianity. Britain did the same. Many Moslem parents sent their children to Christian schools, because there were no other schools. Children were introduced to Christian culture and values there. After finishing school one could hope for getting a job. In other words, a system emerged which Arabs were unable to create. If we look at our ruling elite we shall see that a greater part of it is Christian. One can get a better job if one has an education of Christian pattern. This also concerns receiving a doctor's degree, etc." See also Interview E MM 12. 29.04.2003.

42. Interview E MM 14. 30.04.2003.

43. Interview E MM 5. 25.04.2003.

44. Interview E MM 1. 14.04.2003.

45. Interview E MM 4. 26.04.2003.

46. Interview E MM 4. 22.04.2003.

47. Interview E MM 9. 28.04.2003.

48. Interview E MM 3. 15.04.2003.

## ECONOMICS

### THE RANKING OF STATES BY SUCCESS OF THEIR SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT<sup>1\*</sup>

*Leonid Fituni*, D.Sc.(Econ.),  
Head of the Centre for Global  
and Strategic Studies,  
Institute for African Studies, RAS

The states and their citizens are wont to compare their achievements to those of other countries. Such international comparisons have a great practical value. They are used for the objective study of the levels, structure and trends of the economic and social development of various countries, making it possible to see the reserves of economic growth, its greater efficiency, the improvement of public relations, and the further development as a whole.

Such international economic juxtapositions include a complex of economic and statistical methods aimed at comparing the economic (natural and cost) indices of various countries, the characteristics of social development and a scientific analysis organically connected with it.

In recent years, the specific technology of international comparisons, namely, **the ranking of states by various objective, and sometimes even far-fetched characteristics, or indices**, has become quite widespread. A special type of international comparisons has taken shape for a dual purpose. On the one hand, there are the same comparisons of definite indices of different countries, and on the other, a combination of these indices in such a way as to lend the latter the necessary international political (economic or ideological) trend and meaning by placing the achievements of individual states in a definite order: by the degree of importance, success/lack of it, or correspondence to certain patterns.

Thus, the product of research is not simply a technical result of economic analysis, which is an auxiliary instrument of evaluation and, possibly, correction of the economic and social policy pursued by a state, but an important instrument of foreign policy and international propaganda for achieving the geopolitical aims of a state and solving its geoeconomic tasks.

---

\* First delivered at the conference of the Section of World Economy and International Relations of the Department of Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences, October 11, 2007.

In contrast to a purely economic-statistical aspect, the latter aspect has not been studied well enough, although it is quite urgent, because Russia is constantly in the centre of manipulations with various international ratings, which seriously influence its international image and positions in the world economy and the foreign political scene. In the epoch of globalization the stigmatization of a foreign political rival has acquired a new quality. Its significance as a preparatory stage for hostile practical, sometimes forcible, aggressive actions, compared to prewar times or the epoch of the cold war, has grown considerably. In our day the world community demands argumentation of a moral, or at least “scientific”, character for the growing confrontation or some actions in the international arena. International ratings are called upon to play this role.

Hence, the task facing researchers: on the one hand, to assess the adequacy of the instruments of rating widely used in the world, and on the other, to resolve the problem of using these instruments in national interests – economic, social and ideological, which should include the working out of one’s own indices and ratings, that would contribute to the accomplishment of geopolitical and geoeconomic tasks of Russia in its interests.

For the first time in the history of international relations countries were officially ranked by their importance at the Chaumont peace conference on February 26 (March 10) 1814. The Treaty of Chaumont declared that the allies in the war against Napoleon’s France pledge not to conclude either peace or truce with the enemy without common accord. The secret articles of the treaty determined the postwar structure of Europe. Its countries were divided into “great powers”, which included Austria (Austro-Hungary from 1867), Britain, Prussia (later Germany), Russia and France, “big powers” (Portugal, Spain and Sweden, which took part in discussing certain questions), “medium powers” (Hannover, Bavaria and Wuerttemberg – they were invited to discuss the German question), and small states. Later, another category – “micro-states” was added.

The composition of the group of great powers changed along with time. More successful countries (the United States, Italy and Japan) were added to their ranks. In 1900 the first meeting of the Eight (five old great powers and three new ones) took place. The role of Russia and Austro-Hungary diminished notably by the end of World War I.

The tendencies of the polarization of the countries of the world manifested themselves especially clearly in the beginning of the last quarter of the 20th century. This can be illustrated by the long-term dynamics of the average figures of the GDP calculated by the prices of the basic year by the purchasing power parity (PPP), as one of the most objective indices used for comparisons between countries (Table 1).

**Dynamics of GDP by PPP per capita in prices of 2000, \$000**

Groups of countries /years	1900	1913	1929	1938	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2005
Entire world	1.7	2.1	2.5	2.6	3.0	4.0	5.2	6.2	6.9	7.8	8.6
Developed countries	4.4	5.5	7.0	7.1	8.2	0.9	16.1	20.0	24.8	28.7	30.5
Western Europe	4.2	5.0	5.8	6.6	6.5	9.3	13.9	17.4	21.5	24.9	26.4
Developing countries	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.3	1.6	2.2	2.8	3.9	4.2
Latin America	1.4	1.7	2.0	2.4	3.1	3.9	4.6	6.8	6.4	6.9	7.3
Asia (without Middle East)	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.2	2.2	3.6	4.0
North Africa, Middle East	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.8	3.1	4.8	7.0	6.3	7.1	7.5
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.0	0.9	1.0
East Europe	2.2	2.2	2.5	2.6	5.1	8.9	11.8	13.4	13.9	15.2	18.2
Soviet Union*	1.7	2.1	2.2	2.6	4.1	7.9	10.3	12.3	11.5	6.0	8.8
Correlation of indices for developed and developing countries	6.3	6.9	7.8	7.9	8.2	8.4	10.1	9.1	8.9	7.4	7.3

\* 1900, 1913 – Russian Empire without Poland and Finland; 1929, 1950, 1980, 1990 – USSR; 2000 – former USSR (CIS and Baltic countries).

Source: Calculated on the basis of World Economic Outlook Database ([www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org)) for corresponding periods and “World Economy: Global Tendencies for 100 Years”. M., Yurist Publishers, 2003, pp. 511-512.

From the beginning of the century the correlation of the average GDP of developed and developing countries equaling 6.3 has begun to grow gradually. The crisis phenomena of the period between the two wars slowed down the economic growth rates of the leading countries of the world, but the favourable postwar decades resulted in that this index reached its

maximum by the 1970s – there was an over tenfold gap between the developed and developing countries.

The European countries weakened by World War II proved unable to keep their colonies and semi-colonies in bondage. During the period between 1956 and 1973 fifty-seven sovereign states emerged in place of former colonies; in 1960 alone 17 African countries gained independence.

The complex problems of the macroeconomic regulation of the backward economic systems, which retained strong economic dependence on the former metropolitan countries, have greatly concerned African countries. The demographic explosion in most countries of the continent has resulted in the fact that increment rates of the GDP often lagged behind the growth rates of the population and, for instance in the Sub-Saharan states of Africa, the per capita GDP began to drop (Table 1). Similar situation was observed in a number of Asian countries.

The 1970s were marked by a sharp rise in the liabilities of developing countries. Their foreign debts increased ten times between 1970 and 1982. While preserving the agrarian and raw materials' character of export specialization, the developing countries experienced the exacerbation of the problem of their deficit balances of payment due to the lowering world prices of the commodities they exported. The worsening conditions of the trade of the countries of the "South" were largely due to the policy of liberalization of world trade, combined with new forms of protectionism on the part of developed countries.

The world community was now faced with the acute need to work out a set of theoretical models and practical recommendations aimed at bridging the gap between the developed and developing states, which was termed "new economic order" and reflected in the Report to the Rome Club compiled under the supervision of Jan Tinbergen. Taking into account the fact that the "purely" market relations based on the neo-classical paradigm can successfully be carried out only between the equal economic subjects, the recommendations were oriented to changing the mechanisms of the redistribution of incomes and resources between countries, and also to improving the institutions of interstate regulation.<sup>2</sup> The recommendations gave special place to reforming the developing countries, improving the currency-financial relations, solving the debt problem, and implementing a programme of rapid industrialization.

It should be noted that the countries of the "North" interested in the growing rates of the economic growth of the developing countries were guided by the benefits of a more efficient use of the resources of the periphery of the world economy and the progress of foreign economic ties, rather than by the officially proclaimed considerations of a humanistic character. In the conditions of the confrontation of the two world socio-economic systems, the countries of capitalism and socialism were striving to spread their political and military influence on the developing states.

Their economic assistance and expanding military-technical cooperation were frequently connected with the loyalty of the government of a developing country to one of the superpowers.

By the end of the 20th century the gap between the developed and developing countries reduced somewhat, the greatest progress in economic modernization having been observed in a number of Asian and Latin American countries. However, some countries of these regions and the overwhelming majority of African states proved unable to carry out the structural reforms of their economies and achieve a tangible progress in improving their political systems. Such countries belonging to the group of the least developed ones are on the very periphery of the world economy.

The rapid economic growth as such is not a panacea of all misfortunes or a "pass" to a happy and prosperous life. The form of connections and interaction dictated for the developing countries by the global financial-ideological groups (FIGs)<sup>3</sup> not only fails to correspond to the development level of their economies, but distorts this development, causing profound disproportions of their economic growth. One of the manifestations of such transformation and growing disproportions is the problems connected with the manpower resources of the developing countries and, in a more general aspect, the population problems as a whole.

The demographic explosion in the countries of the world periphery has given rise to such difficulties and problems which in no way correspond to the current indices of economic growth, inasmuch as they have risen to a higher level.

The acceleration of economic growth as such does not lead to adequate social changes and does not transform the social essence of a given economic system. Hence, the need for a more thorough analysis (using historical-economic aspects) not only of economic growth as such, but also the crisis of social structures and its consequences engendered by this growth. This is also important because it is precisely here that the main contradiction of the social evolution of "unlucky states" is concentrated, namely, the tearing away of the process of economic growth from the social evolution of the vast periphery of these countries.

The ranking of states by their geopolitical significance, both in those years and at present, is based on such criteria as the scope of the economy and its development level, the size of the population, military might, international activity and prestige. Small countries and micro-states come out as the antipode of great powers in world affairs. Small countries can be highly-developed (like Luxemburg) and developing (like Uruguay with its population of three millions, or Paraguay with the five million population). The micro-states are those in which the population does not exceed 1.5 million, but there are countries with a high per capita income among them (Iceland, Cyprus, Brunei and Qatar) not included in their number.

Although the size of territory and the number of population do not determine successful development or failure of a state, the objective opportu-



nities of the above-mentioned countries are somewhat narrower. In our day China, India and Brazil claim the rights of great powers; for them the size of territory and the number of population mean much.

Thus, the object of our examination is not simply a technical result of economic analysis, which is an auxiliary method of assessment and correction of the economic and social policy pursued by a state, but it is also an important instrument of foreign policy and international propaganda and the achievement by the state of its geopolitical aims and an accomplishment of its geoeconomic tasks.

In contrast to the purely economic-statistical aspect, the international component has not been studied well enough. Meanwhile, it is quite important because Russia has always been in the centre of manipulations with all and sundry international ratings, which considerably influence its international image and positions in the world economy and the international political scene. In the epoch of globalization the stigmatization of a foreign political rival has acquired a new quality. Just remember the famous "Evil Empire" – the words first pronounced by President Reagan, which played a no small role in undermining the foreign political positions of the USSR and forming its definite international image. Since that time new marker-stickers have appeared in the arsenal of the instruments of foreign policy of the only superpower, such as "State Sponsors of Terrorism", the "Axis of Evil" and "Outposts of Tyranny".

In its official documents and speeches by high officials the United States includes Cuba (since 1982), Iran (since 1984), North Korea (since 1988), Sudan (since 1993) and Syria (since 1979) in the group of the states sponsoring terrorism. Under Washington's pressure the West has introduced harsh sanctions (political, economic and cultural) against them, and also implements measures of military-strategic pressing. Certain states, which have changed their policies in line with the White House demands, have left the list of the rogue countries, among them Libya (it was on the list from 1979 until 2006), Iraq (from 1979 to 1982 and from 1990 to 2003) and South Yemen (1979-1990).

The term "Axis of Evil" was introduced by George Bush, Jr. It was first mentioned in his State of the Union Address to Congress in January 2002. At that time the axis included three states: Iran, Iraq and North Korea. In his words, "states like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference will be catastrophic."<sup>4</sup>

There is a relatively new category of states in the international political rhetoric of American leading figures – "Outposts of Tyranny". In January

2005, the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, included in this group Zimbabwe, Iran, Belarus, Myanmar (Burma), Cuba and DPRK.

The significance of the use of such indices of the second signal system as the preparatory stage for hostile, sometimes forcible aggressive actions as compared with prewar times or the epoch of the Cold War, has grown considerably. The point is that in our day the world community demands argumentation, a moral or, at least, "scientific" substantiation of the escalation of confrontation or any actions in the international arena. International ratings are called upon to perform this role.

Hence, there is the task to assess the adequacy of the widespread instruments of rating, on the one hand, and on the other, to solve the problem of using the latter in national interests – economic, social and ideological, including the working out of one's own indices and ratings which would contribute to the accomplishment of geopolitical and geoeconomic tasks facing Russia in its interests.

With a great number of various ratings in international turnover there are about ten key ratings quoted quite frequently. They are used for scholarly and propaganda purposes, in the mass media, by various non-governmental organizations, etc. The quality and the degree of objectivity and justice of their use are many and varied. Some of the indices are easily perceived, others cause rejection. A number of widespread indices-ratings are biased, nevertheless they are widely used by both our and foreign sources.

Among the most well-known and trustworthy indices are, in our view, the Human Development Index (HDI) of the UN and the Quality of Life Index (QLI) of the Economist Intelligence Unit. In the centre of our attention there is the well-known Failed States Index (FSI). The latter is one of the systems of assessing countries by the achieved development level of political institutions and the results of the socio-economic policy they pursue. It is believed that the main criterion of a "failed state" is the weak representative character of bodies of state power and their low legitimacy in the eyes of the population, which is manifested in the inability of the government to effectively control the country's territory.

As a result, such state proves unable to ensure the institutionalized conditions for economic progress, resolve the demographic problems, fight inequality, develop the economy of the public sector, and protect the rights of its citizens. The "failed states" characterized by the low development level of the democratic institutions of their political system display their "strength" in developing a system of secret service and paramilitary organizations, which make up for the weakness of the government by interfering in the private life of citizens and market competition. The most vivid examples of such negative phenomena in socio-political and economic life are provided by the states with the very high FSI.<sup>5</sup>

The central place in the methodology of the assessment of the socio-economic development of countries evolved by the "Fund for Peace" is

taken by the quantitative evaluation of the FSI. The value of the FSI for an individual country is obtained by summing up the values of 12 indices of the socio-economic and military-political life of an individual country. Each one of the indices has a value from 0 to 10 units, the greater value corresponding to a worse position in the assessed sphere. Accordingly, the value of the FSI is within the limits from 0 to 120 units. Below we give the names of the spheres assessed by corresponding indices (the number of the index coincides with the number of the problem), and characteristics of crisis phenomena expressed by indices.<sup>6</sup>

The analysis of the division of countries by the values of the FSI made it possible to determine four groups of states which tend to be closer to the “centre” and “periphery” of the world economy. This confirms the correctness of the evaluation of countries by the index and its values, however, the methods of summing up the indices evoke doubts connected with duplicating the closely connected problematic phenomena and distorting the final rating of the FSI.

The classification of countries by the relative values of indices made it possible to get 59 types of the structures of the FSI, twelve of which are the most widespread. By the results of the analysis of correlative connections between indices carried out for 66 countries distinguished by the said 12 types of “failure”, we got the “way” of unfolding problematic phenomena corresponding to indices. The empirical data have confirmed the conclusion of the theory of social choice that the key role in a crisis is played by the problems of the legitimacy of power (No. 7) and the degradation of the economy of the public sector (No. 8), and the need for the immediate elimination of these negative phenomena was substantiated.

The FSI is not the only system of the rating evaluation of the level of the socio-political development of states. From among the alternative synthetic indices examining the basic characteristics of the level of society’s democratization, the formation of political systems and the creation of the institutionalized foundations of economic relations, mention should be made of the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI), the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom (IEF), the Rating of countries by the indices Freedom in the World (FIW). A firm positive correlation is observed between each of these three indices and the FSI. A correlative-regressive analysis of the ratings of countries by the CPI and FSI evokes the greatest interest.

The FSI is not the only system of the rating evaluation of the level of the socio-political development of states. From among the alternative synthetic indices<sup>7</sup> examining the basic characteristics of the democratization level of society, the formation of political systems and the construction of the institutionalized foundations of economic relations special mention should be made of the following:

1. **The Corruption Perception Index (CPI)** for most countries of the world is compiled annually by the international organization Transparency International. The CPI has values from zero to 10, the greater the value the less corruption in the country. In contrast to the method of calculating the FSI which synthesizes data from various sources, the CPI is based on expert evaluations of the spreading of corruption in a country, that is, the extent of corruption as seen by researchers.

2. **The Index of Economic Freedom (IEF)** is calculated by the American public organization The Heritage Foundation (for more than 150 countries in 2006). This index is the arithmetical mean of the values of ten indices: trade, fiscal burden, state interventions, monetary policy, foreign investments, bank sphere, wages and salaries and prices, property rights, regulation, and informal markets. Each index (just as the IEF) has the value from 1 to 5, a lower value corresponding to a higher level of economic freedom in the country.

3. The rating of countries by the system of indices **“Freedom in the World” (FIW)** is compiled annually by the American public organization Freedom House. This rating is based on two indices calculated by a seven-point scale (lower value corresponds to greater freedom): “political rights” (including subindices assessing political process, political pluralism, the functioning of the state) and “civil freedoms” (subindices – freedom of speech and freedom of conscience, the rights of associations and public organizations, supremacy of law, and also the freedom of the individual and the rights of man). Ultimately, each country is assessed as “free”, “partly free” or “not free”.

Between each of these three indices and the FSI there is a strong positive correlation. The correlative-regressive analysis of the ratings of countries by the CPI and FSI is of the greatest interest. The rating of countries by the CPI for 2005 covers 159 states, 139 of which were also assessed by the FSI in 2006 (the rating of countries by the CPI is presented in Table 8). Taking into account the fact that both FSI and CPI have the minimal and maximal values, it is possible to draw the bisectrix representing the direct equality of ratings by the above-said indices. The results of the processing of the correlative-regressive model are presented on Diagram.




Diagram. Correlation of values of the FSI of countries that were participants in the rating for 2006 and the CPI.

Note:

- 1) \_\_\_\_\_ bisectrix of values of the FSI and CPI.
- 2) - - - - - line of cubic regression.

There is a positive correlation between the FSI and CPI, however, only a few countries received similar assessments simultaneously by two indices. The line of regression crosses the bisectrix in two points and divides the countries as follows. Countries with widespread corruption where the value of the FSI varies greatly are singled out. At the same time, in some well developed countries corruption is under control, but these states demonstrate a relatively high degree of “failure”.

Moreover, the FSI does not take into account the major components of the living standards and quality of life of the population necessary for the assessment of the results of the activity of the government and, consequently, “success and viability” of a state. Let us use the data of the Human Development Index – HDI, compiled annually by the UN Development Programme.<sup>8</sup> The HDI determines the developed human potential as the long life of an educated man having means of subsistence, and is calculated by *k*-oi country in the form of the mean of the following values:

### 1. Life Expectancy Index – LEI:

$$LEI(k) = \frac{LE(k) - LE_{\min}}{LE_{\max} - LE_{\min}}$$

where  $LE(k)$  is life expectancy (in years);

$LE_{\min}$  is minimal life expectancy (in years) registered in the world, with  $LE_{\min} = 25$ ;

$LE_{\max}$  is maximal life expectancy (in years) registered in the world, with  $LE_{\max} = 85$ .

### 2. Education Index – EdI

$$EdI(k) = \frac{2AL(k) + GEE(k)}{3 \cdot 100}$$

where  $AL(k)$  is the share of literate people among adult population;  
 $GEE(k)$  – share of population using educational system.

### 3. Gross Domestic Product Index (GDPI):

$$GDPI(k) = \frac{\ln(GDP(k)) - \ln(GDP_{\min})}{\ln(GDP_{\max}) - \ln(GDP_{\min})}$$

where  $GDP(k)$  – GDP by PPP (\$ per capita);

$GDP_{\min}$  – minimally registered world level of GDP by PPP (\$ per capita),  $GDP_{\min} = 100$ ;

$GDP_{\max}$  – maximally registered world level of GDP by PPP (\$ per capita), with  $GDP_{\max} = 40,000$ .

The methods of drawing up these indices are based on the rate-making of absolute values in relation to their best and worst magnitudes (difference in numerator and denominator), with subsequent transfer into shares (division). The GDP index also presupposes logarithmation, because to reach a certain welfare level corresponding to a “worthy” development level of human potential there is no need for a high per capita GDP.

The correlative dependencies between the FSI indices made it possible to evolve a more perfect Economic and Political Welfare Index (EPWI), in its calculation of which we offered a more adequate combination of the FSI indices, and also additional indices evaluating the achieved level of socio-economic development. This is not a fully independent index so far, but rather a corrected derivative index. The recalculation of the rating of the “failed” states by the new EPWI reflected more objectively the real level of “welfare” and success.

It should be noted that the EPWI is not counterposed to the FSI, but is based on its method and should better reflect the success of states. The EPWI has a magnitude from zero to one, and the greater magnitude reflects greater welfare. Let us determine the EPWI for *k*-oi country as the mean of the social (SI), economic (EI) and political (PI) indices:

$$EPWI(k) = \frac{SI(k) + EI(k) + PI(k)}{3}$$

Taking into account the fact that a greater magnitude of the FSI corresponds to a worse situation, let us take reverse values of this index (deduct the index value from 10). Using the results of the correlative analysis of the FSI we determine the EPWI in the following way:

1. The social index assesses (a) life expectancy, (b) educational level and (c) demographic situation (as the mean of indices No1 and No2 of the FSI):

$$SI(k) = \frac{LEI(k) + EdI(k) + \frac{20 - (x_k^1 + x_k^2)}{20}}{3} = \frac{1}{3} + \frac{LEI(k)}{3} + \frac{EdI(k)}{3} - \frac{x_k^1 + x_k^2}{60};$$

2. The economic index, first, assesses the GDP level by PPP per capita as the main index of development and, secondly, the specific features of inequality, the dynamics of production and the state of the economy of the public sector (half -sum of index No. 5 and the mean of indices No. 6 and No. 8 of the FSI):

$$EI(k) = \frac{GDPI(k) + \frac{10 - x_k^5}{2} + \frac{20 - (x_k^6 + x_k^8)}{20}}{2} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{GDPI(k)}{2} - \frac{x_k^5}{40} - \frac{x_k^6 + x_k^8}{80};$$

3. The political index consists of the following combination of indices of the FSI – half-sum of magnitudes by blocks “legitimacy of power” (the mean of indices No. 3,7 and 11) and “the rights of man” (the mean of indices No. 9 and No. 10):

$$PI(k) = \frac{\frac{30 - (x_k^3 + x_k^7 + x_k^{11})}{30} + \frac{20 - (x_k^9 + x_k^{10})}{20}}{2} = 1 - \frac{x_k^3 + x_k^7 + x_k^{11}}{60} - \frac{x_k^9 + x_k^{10}}{40}$$

Taking into account the results of correlative analysis, we shall not include indices No. 4 and No. 12 of the FSI in EPWI for the countries-participants in the FSI rating (Table 2).

Table 2

**Rating of Countries by EPWI  
(including initial data for calculation)**

№	Δ	Country	GDP	CPI	LEI	EdI	GDPI	HDI	SI	EI	PI	EPWI
1	-6	Somalia	600	2,1	0,35	0,32	0,30	0,324	0,272	0,231	0,049	0,184
2	0	DRC	705	2,1	0,31	0,54	0,33	0,393	0,300	0,226	0,056	0,194
3	-3	Chad	2090	1,7	0,31	0,29	0,51	0,370	0,233	0,319	0,079	0,210
4	1	Côte d'Ivoire	1551	1,9	0,35	0,46	0,46	0,423	0,330	0,311	0,027	0,223
5	4	Sudan	1949	2,1	0,53	0,53	0,50	0,520	0,365	0,308	0,038	0,237
6	-7	CAR	1094	...	0,24	0,42	0,40	0,353	0,275	0,286	0,160	0,240
7	2	Zimbabwe	2065	2,6	0,19	0,77	0,51	0,490	0,343	0,284	0,096	0,241
8	-2	Afghanistan	1158	2,5	0,35	0,34	0,41	0,366	0,271	0,311	0,167	0,249
9	-8	Sierra Leone	561	2,4	0,27	0,45	0,29	0,337	0,300	0,215	0,270	0,262
10	2	Haiti	1892	1,8	0,45	0,50	0,49	0,480	0,420	0,316	0,062	0,266
11	-4	Burundi	677	2,3	0,32	0,52	0,32	0,387	0,312	0,236	0,263	0,270
12	-14	Ethiopia	756	2,2	0,38	0,40	0,34	0,373	0,317	0,280	0,224	0,274
13	2	Liberia	989	2,2	0,29	0,57	0,38	0,416	0,334	0,252	0,244	0,277
14	-16	Burkina Faso	1169	3,4	0,38	0,23	0,41	0,340	0,288	0,278	0,281	0,282
15	-3	Myanmar	1027	1,8	0,59	0,76	0,39	0,580	0,488	0,279	0,093	0,287
16	4	Guinea	2180	...	0,48	0,34	0,51	0,443	0,362	0,343	0,158	0,288
17	-5	Nigeria	1154	1,9	0,31	0,63	0,41	0,450	0,415	0,309	0,141	0,288
18	-26	Niger	779	2,4	0,33	0,26	0,34	0,310	0,302	0,271	0,297	0,290
19	10	Pakistan	2225	2,1	0,64	0,46	0,52	0,540	0,390	0,356	0,123	0,290
20	16	Iraq	3500	2,2	0,56	0,69	0,59	0,617	0,465	0,373	0,046	0,295
21	1	Nepal	1490	2,5	0,62	0,51	0,45	0,527	0,488	0,311	0,091	0,297
22	6	Yemen	879	2,7	0,60	0,51	0,36	0,490	0,462	0,255	0,175	0,297
23	-23	Guinea Bisau	722	...	0,33	0,39	0,33	0,350	0,375	0,240	0,285	0,300
24	-5	Malawi	646	2,8	0,25	0,64	0,31	0,400	0,380	0,213	0,318	0,303
25	4	Uganda	1478	2,5	0,39	0,67	0,45	0,503	0,400	0,321	0,193	0,305
26	7	Bangladesh	1870	1,7	0,64	0,46	0,49	0,530	0,453	0,339	0,141	0,311

№	Δ	Country	GDP	CPI	LEI	EdI	GDPI	HDI	SI	EI	PI	EPWI
27	-11	Angola	2180	2,0	0,27	0,53	0,51	0,437	0,325	0,374	0,250	0,316
28	4	Rwanda	1263	3,1	0,32	0,61	0,42	0,450	0,368	0,344	0,239	0,317
29	-12	Mauritania	1940	...	0,47	0,49	0,49	0,483	0,405	0,370	0,241	0,339
30	16	DPRK	1400	...	0,63	0,93	0,44	0,667	0,620	0,258	0,138	0,339
31	-6	Togo	1536	...	0,49	0,54	0,46	0,497	0,463	0,341	0,220	0,342
32	-2	Kenya	1140	2,1	0,37	0,69	0,41	0,490	0,418	0,330	0,293	0,347
33	-3	Cameroon	2174	2,2	0,34	0,66	0,51	0,503	0,445	0,363	0,248	0,352
34	-20	Eritrea	977	2,6	0,49	0,50	0,38	0,457	0,410	0,349	0,302	0,353
35	-4	Bhutan	1969	...	0,64	0,48	0,50	0,540	0,472	0,350	0,263	0,362
36	-30	Zambia	943	2,6	0,21	0,63	0,37	0,403	0,373	0,310	0,407	0,363
37	-3	Laos	1954	3,3	0,50	0,66	0,50	0,553	0,488	0,421	0,185	0,365
38	15	Uzbekistan	1869	2,2	0,69	0,91	0,49	0,697	0,642	0,368	0,108	0,373
39	-32	Tanzania	674	2,9	0,35	0,62	0,32	0,430	0,427	0,300	0,405	0,377
40	-9	Papua-New Guinea	2543	2,3	0,51	0,52	0,54	0,523	0,502	0,358	0,298	0,386
41	-1	Tajikistan	1202	2,1	0,65	0,90	0,41	0,653	0,623	0,341	0,201	0,388
42	-39	Mali	998	2,9	0,39	0,24	0,38	0,337	0,332	0,306	0,535	0,391
43	-37	Mozambique	1237	2,8	0,28	0,47	0,42	0,390	0,433	0,345	0,405	0,394
44	16	Kyrgyzstan	1935	2,3	0,70	0,92	0,49	0,703	0,630	0,360	0,208	0,399
45	-2	Cambodia	2423	2,3	0,52	0,69	0,53	0,580	0,503	0,416	0,288	0,403
46	21	Sri Lanka	4390	3,2	0,82	0,81	0,63	0,753	0,607	0,456	0,164	0,409
47	14	Syria	3610	3,4	0,81	0,74	0,60	0,717	0,615	0,428	0,186	0,409
48	17	Egypt	4211	3,4	0,75	0,73	0,62	0,700	0,593	0,431	0,218	0,414
49	-34	Gambia	1991	2,7	0,52	0,42	0,50	0,480	0,463	0,393	0,409	0,422
50	-1	Guatemala	4313	2,5	0,71	0,68	0,63	0,673	0,552	0,438	0,292	0,427
51	19	Indonesia	3609	2,2	0,70	0,83	0,60	0,710	0,582	0,425	0,277	0,428
52	7	Turkmenistan	4584	1,8	0,63	0,91	0,64	0,727	0,660	0,450	0,173	0,428
53	-37	Benin	1091	2,9	0,49	0,40	0,40	0,430	0,445	0,339	0,504	0,429
54	2	Equatorial Guinea	20510	1,9	0,30	0,77	0,89	0,653	0,540	0,570	0,185	0,432

№	Δ	Country	GDP	CPI	LEI	EdI	GDPI	HDI	SI	EI	PI	EPWI
55	28	Colombia	7256	4,0	0,79	0,86	0,72	0,790	0,615	0,526	0,163	0,435
56	3	Iran	7525	2,9	0,76	0,75	0,72	0,743	0,583	0,559	0,176	0,439
57	1	Bolivia	2720	2,5	0,66	0,87	0,55	0,693	0,652	0,380	0,297	0,443
58	15	Russia	9902	2,4	0,67	0,95	0,77	0,797	0,620	0,553	0,165	0,446
59	2	China	5896	3,2	0,78	0,84	0,68	0,767	0,647	0,463	0,229	0,446
60	-39	Senegal	1713	3,2	0,52	0,39	0,47	0,460	0,452	0,419	0,471	0,447
61	2	Nicaragua	3634	2,6	0,75	0,75	0,60	0,700	0,633	0,379	0,350	0,454
62	-14	Morocco	4309	3,2	0,75	0,54	0,63	0,640	0,522	0,488	0,355	0,455
63	5	Moldova	1729	2,9	0,72	0,89	0,48	0,697	0,675	0,371	0,334	0,460
64	2	Azerbaijan	4153	2,2	0,70	0,89	0,62	0,737	0,628	0,468	0,293	0,463
65	17	Dominican Republic	7449	3,0	0,71	0,83	0,72	0,753	0,600	0,485	0,313	0,466
66	16	Belarus	6970	2,6	0,72	0,95	0,71	0,793	0,655	0,470	0,273	0,466
67	-8	Honduras	2876	2,6	0,72	0,77	0,56	0,683	0,648	0,374	0,390	0,471
68	-2	Vietnam	2745	2,6	0,76	0,81	0,55	0,707	0,632	0,468	0,316	0,472
69	9	Georgia	2844	2,3	0,76	0,91	0,56	0,743	0,677	0,458	0,288	0,474
70	15	Serbia & Montenegro	4992	2,8	0,80	0,89	0,65	0,782	0,661	0,483	0,281	0,475
71	36	Bosnia & Herzegovina	7032	2,9	0,82	0,87	0,71	0,800	0,647	0,523	0,257	0,475
72	8	Ecuador	3963	2,5	0,82	0,86	0,61	0,763	0,700	0,448	0,281	0,476
73	1	Algeria	6603	2,8	0,77	0,71	0,70	0,727	0,617	0,526	0,293	0,478
74	-10	Gabon	6623	2,9	0,48	0,71	0,70	0,630	0,540	0,496	0,401	0,479
75	12	Venezuela	6043	2,3	0,80	0,87	0,68	0,783	0,685	0,503	0,258	0,482
76	-17	India	3139	2,9	0,64	0,61	0,58	0,610	0,557	0,431	0,463	0,483
77	8	Peru	5678	3,5	0,75	0,87	0,67	0,763	0,688	0,488	0,282	0,486
78	10	Philippines	4614	2,5	0,76	0,89	0,64	0,763	0,675	0,491	0,303	0,490
79	6	Saudi Arabia	13825	3,4	0,78	0,72	0,82	0,773	0,618	0,659	0,194	0,490
80	19	Cuba	3500	3,8	0,88	0,93	0,67	0,827	0,733	0,506	0,238	0,492
81	4	Salvador	5041	4,2	0,77	0,76	0,65	0,727	0,600	0,495	0,401	0,499
82	8	Jordan	4688	5,7	0,78	0,86	0,64	0,760	0,667	0,476	0,354	0,499

№	Δ	Country	GDP	CPI	LEI	EdI	GDPI	HDI	SI	EI	PI	EPWI
83	18	Lebanon	5837	3,1	0,79	0,86	0,68	0,777	0,698	0,541	0,268	0,502
84	5	Thailand	8090	3,8	0,75	0,86	0,73	0,780	0,650	0,578	0,299	0,509
85	3	Turkey	7753	3,5	0,73	0,81	0,73	0,757	0,625	0,528	0,377	0,510
86	-5	Namibia	7418	4,3	0,37	0,79	0,72	0,627	0,543	0,494	0,493	0,510
87	-9	Botswana	9945	5,9	0,16	0,78	0,77	0,570	0,392	0,565	0,578	0,511
88	1	Paraguay	4813	2,1	0,77	0,86	0,65	0,760	0,768	0,470	0,326	0,521
89	-17	Ghana	2240	3,5	0,53	0,54	0,52	0,530	0,523	0,455	0,607	0,528
90	2	Kazakhstan	7440	2,6	0,64	0,96	0,72	0,773	0,735	0,540	0,319	0,531
91	13	Macedonia	6610	2,7	0,82	0,87	0,70	0,797	0,717	0,518	0,373	0,536
92	-3	Libya	7570	2,5	0,81	0,86	0,72	0,797	0,755	0,558	0,312	0,541
93	-7	Tunisia	7768	4,9	0,81	0,75	0,73	0,763	0,698	0,558	0,371	0,542
94	5	Armenia	4101	2,9	0,78	0,91	0,62	0,770	0,678	0,515	0,441	0,545
95	28	Israel	24382	6,3	0,92	0,95	0,92	0,930	0,698	0,650	0,308	0,552
96	-1	Jamaica	4163	3,6	0,76	0,79	0,62	0,723	0,700	0,504	0,453	0,552
97	11	Ukraine	6394	2,6	0,69	0,94	0,69	0,773	0,697	0,545	0,416	0,553
98	13	Mexico	9803	3,5	0,84	0,86	0,77	0,823	0,708	0,524	0,444	0,559
99	-9	Mongolia	2056	3,0	0,66	0,91	0,50	0,690	0,740	0,485	0,460	0,562
100	-10	RSA	11192	4,5	0,37	0,80	0,79	0,653	0,498	0,593	0,605	0,565
101	3	Malaysia	10276	5,1	0,81	0,84	0,77	0,807	0,707	0,594	0,401	0,567
102	8	Albania	4978	2,4	0,82	0,88	0,65	0,783	0,755	0,501	0,458	0,572
103	2	Brasil	8195	3,7	0,76	0,88	0,74	0,793	0,712	0,540	0,485	0,579
104	-3	Panama	7278	3,5	0,83	0,88	0,72	0,810	0,752	0,529	0,541	0,607
105	2	Bulgaria	8078	4,0	0,79	0,92	0,73	0,813	0,735	0,590	0,502	0,609
106	4	Romania	8480	3,0	0,78	0,90	0,74	0,807	0,720	0,580	0,531	0,610
107	2	Kuwait	19384	4,7	0,87	0,87	0,88	0,873	0,743	0,718	0,387	0,616
108	16	Cyprus	22805	5,7	0,90	0,91	0,91	0,907	0,793	0,648	0,438	0,626
109	5	Croatia	12191	3,4	0,84	0,90	0,80	0,847	0,708	0,634	0,542	0,628
110	1	Latvia	11653	4,2	0,78	0,96	0,79	0,843	0,720	0,601	0,634	0,652
111	-6	Oman	15259	6,3	0,82	0,77	0,84	0,810	0,813	0,783	0,420	0,672

№	Δ	Country	GDP	CPI	LEI	EdI	GDPI	HDI	SI	EI	PI	EPWI
112	-6	Mauritius	12027	4,2	0,79	0,81	0,80	0,800	0,800	0,655	0,589	0,681
113	2	Estonia	14555	6,4	0,78	0,97	0,83	0,860	0,748	0,696	0,601	0,682
114	0	Costa Rica	9481	4,2	0,89	0,87	0,76	0,840	0,750	0,638	0,676	0,688
115	3	Slovakia	14623	4,3	0,82	0,92	0,83	0,857	0,808	0,643	0,632	0,694
116	3	Lithuania	13107	4,8	0,79	0,97	0,81	0,857	0,767	0,645	0,681	0,698
117	1	Hungary	16814	5,0	0,80	0,95	0,86	0,870	0,795	0,668	0,687	0,716
118	3	Poland	12974	3,4	0,83	0,95	0,81	0,863	0,790	0,680	0,689	0,720
119	-3	Argentina	13298	2,8	0,83	0,95	0,82	0,867	0,853	0,678	0,686	0,739
120	0	Uruguay	9421	5,9	0,84	0,95	0,76	0,850	0,830	0,661	0,738	0,743
121	2	Czechia	19408	4,3	0,85	0,93	0,88	0,887	0,802	0,760	0,702	0,754
122	-2	Germany	28303	8,2	0,90	0,96	0,94	0,933	0,803	0,753	0,715	0,757
123	-3	Slovenia	20939	6,1	0,86	0,98	0,89	0,910	0,855	0,724	0,701	0,760
124	-1	Spain	25047	7,0	0,91	0,98	0,92	0,937	0,880	0,775	0,631	0,762
125	4	Greece	22205	4,3	0,89	0,97	0,90	0,920	0,847	0,744	0,725	0,772
126	-2	USA	39676	7,6	0,88	0,97	1,00	0,950	0,767	0,819	0,733	0,773
127	-5	Chile	10874	7,3	0,89	0,91	0,78	0,860	0,867	0,704	0,752	0,774
128	-2	Britainia	30821	8,6	0,89	0,97	0,96	0,940	0,830	0,820	0,713	0,788
129	0	France	29300	7,5	0,91	0,97	0,95	0,943	0,830	0,800	0,740	0,790
130	3	Italy	28180	5,0	0,92	0,96	0,94	0,940	0,855	0,789	0,734	0,793
131	0	Portugal	19629	6,5	0,87	0,96	0,88	0,903	0,843	0,746	0,803	0,797
132	9	Republic of Korea	20499	5,0	0,87	0,98	0,89	0,913	0,813	0,851	0,732	0,799
133	0	Singapore	28077	9,4	0,90	0,91	0,94	0,917	0,887	0,854	0,713	0,818
134	0	Netherlands	31789	8,6	0,89	0,99	0,96	0,947	0,842	0,843	0,821	0,835
135	-1	Austria	32276	8,7	0,90	0,96	0,96	0,940	0,877	0,819	0,824	0,840
136	1	Japan	29251	7,3	0,95	0,94	0,95	0,947	0,880	0,868	0,785	0,844
137	-2	Canada	31263	8,4	0,92	0,97	0,96	0,950	0,875	0,828	0,853	0,852
138	-2	Australia	30331	8,8	0,92	0,99	0,95	0,953	0,903	0,831	0,821	0,852
139	1	Belgium	31096	7,4	0,90	0,98	0,96	0,947	0,885	0,843	0,829	0,852

№	Δ	Country	GDP	CPI	LEI	EdI	GDPI	HDI	SI	EI	PI	EPWI
140	3	Denmark	31914	9,5	0,87	0,99	0,96	0,940	0,862	0,893	0,829	0,861
141	0	New Zealand	23413	9,6	0,90	0,99	0,91	0,933	0,930	0,806	0,871	0,869
142	0	Switzerland	33040	9,1	0,93	0,95	0,97	0,950	0,885	0,895	0,871	0,884
143	-2	Finland	29951	9,6	0,89	0,99	0,95	0,943	0,885	0,885	0,888	0,886
144	0	Sweden	29541	9,2	0,92	0,98	0,95	0,950	0,875	0,898	0,888	0,887
145	2	Ireland	38827	7,4	0,88	0,99	1,00	0,957	0,900	0,885	0,879	0,888
146	0	Norway	38454	8,9	0,91	0,99	0,99	0,963	0,892	0,910	0,888	0,896

1. No. – rating of country by the EPWI;
2. Difference between the place of country by the FSI and its place by the EPWI.

3. GDP in \$ by PPP per capita for 2004.

Sources: 1. Values of the CPI are on the site of Transparency International – [www.transparency.org](http://www.transparency.org)

2. Data by the GDP, LEI and EdI – Human Development Report 2006. N.-Y.; UNDP, 2006, pp.283-286.

3. Data by the GDP of some countries: a) the International Monetary Fund -- World Economic Outlook Statistical Database – [www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org); b) Geographical reference book of the CIA – [www.cia.gov](http://www.cia.gov)

Comparing the results, one can see that the economically weak countries, which are characterized by the low educational level of the population and short life expectancy have moved to the lower places in the EPWI rating, as compared with the FSI rating. The lowest rating is observed among African countries – Zambia, Tanzania, Mali, Mozambique, Gambia, Benin and Senegal, and also India.

Some countries of the former socialist camp, such as Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, as well as Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, North Korea and Cuba have improved their rating. The place of Turkmenistan, Moldova, Georgia and Kazakhstan practically did not change. A number of Arab countries (Syria, Egypt Lebanon and Iraq), Colombia and the Dominican Republic in Latin America, as well as Israel, Cyprus, Sri Lanka and Indonesia have moved toward the top of the rating. The developed countries at the end of the EPWI rating have not changed their places as against the FSI evaluations.

It is possible to introduce “colour zones” of failure for the EPWI dividing the values into quarters. Then the “red zone” of the EPWI will include only eight countries with magnitudes less than 0.25 units. In turn, the “green zone”, which includes countries with the values of more than 0.75 units of their index will be enlarged as against the similar zone of the index.

The ranking of states depending on the success of their socio-economic development calls for a serious research in the field of the elaboration of independent

methods for working out the necessary indices. The scientific research component does not present any serious difficulties, inasmuch as there are enough skilled Russian specialists capable to evolve the necessary methods, calculate indices and make the ranking of countries either by aggregate indices or by individual directions of special interest for this country. It is more difficult to evolve one’s own system of obtaining initial indices (even such an authoritative journal as “The Economist” relies for its indices on data obtained from third, sometimes dependent and unreliable, sources like “Freedom House”). Finally, the material backing of such elaborations will require more means than those provided by the existing schemes of financing research. Such important tasks can only be accomplished if the state is interested in this research and supports it.

#### Notes:

1. The text of a scientific report at a session of the Section of World Economy and International Relations of the Department of Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences on October 11, 2007. The report was compiled with the financial backing of the Russian Humanities Foundation as part of the project “The Formation of a Positive Image of Russia in the Context of International Efforts to Combat Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism”. The author thanks I. Abramova, Ph.D.(Econ.) and A. Sapuntsov, Ph.D.(Econ.) for helping in work on this material, including its econometric bases.

2. Бартенев С.А. История экономических учений. М.: Юрист, 2004. С. 368. [S. Bartenev. The History of Economic Theories. Moscow, Yurist Publishers 2004. P. 368.]

3. For more details about the role of the FIG in the development of the world economy and international relations see works by Л.Л. Фигуни «Международное движение капитала в условиях глобализации», М., 2000; «Новая архитектура мировой экономики // Российские стратегические исследования» М., 2002; «Россия в мире ФИГ: пределы роста и иллюзии возрождения» // Новый порядок на века? Политическая структура современного мира: Состояние, проблемы, перспективы», М., 2000. [L.L. Fituni – “International Movement of Capital in the Conditions of Globalization”, Moscow, 2000; “The New Architecture of the World Economy//Russian Strategic Studies”, Moscow, 2002; “Russia in the World of the FIG: the Limits of Growth and the Illusions of Revival”// “The New Order for Centuries? The Political Structure of the Modern World: Condition, Problems, Prospects”, Moscow, 2000.]

4. George W. Bush, 2002 State of the Union Address, Washington, January 2002.

5. For more details about the FSI and the problem of ranking see the monographs by И.О. Абрамова, Л.Л. Фигуни, А.Л. А.Л. Сапунцов «Возникающие и несостоявшиеся государства в мировой экономике и политике». М., 2007. [I.O. Abramova, L.L. Fituni and A.L. Sapuntsov – “The Emerging and ‘Failed’ States in the World Economy and Policy”, Moscow, 2007.]

6. These indices are presented on the site of the Fund For Peace – [www.fundforpeace.org](http://www.fundforpeace.org)

7. The indices and their calculation methods are presented on the sites of Transparency International – [www.transparency.org](http://www.transparency.org). The Heritage Foundation – [www.heritage.org](http://www.heritage.org). Freedom House – [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)

8. Human Development Report 2006. N.Y.: UNDP, 2006, pp. 283-286.

## AFRICA IN WORLD TRADE\*

**Vladimir Baskin**,

D.Sc.(Econ.),

Principle Research Fellow,

Institute for African Studies, RAS

The independence gained by most African countries at the end of the 1950s – beginning of the 1960s has instilled great hopes for a rapid development of the continent, which is so rich in natural and manpower resources. In their economic potential in the 1960s many African countries considerably surpassed their Asian counterparts whose prospects were regarded rather gloomy (for example, the famous Swedish scientist Gunnar Myrdal, in his three-volume work “Asian Drama” predicted stagnation on the Asian continent due to overpopulation and limited natural resources).

In 1965, the average per capita income and volume of export in Ghana were more than those of South Korea. But in 1972 the latter surpassed Ghana in per capita export, and four years later – in per capita income. During the period from 1965 to 1995 the export of South Korea, in current prices, increased by 400 times over, whereas in Ghana the increase was only four times, and real per capita incomes dropped.

Such comparisons can be applied to most African countries, whose economic and social indices in 1995 differed but little from those of South Korea in 1960, or those characteristic of Indonesia, Malaysia or Thailand in 1975.<sup>1</sup>

The reasons for Africa’s lag are many and varied. One of them is a shortage of financial resources for development and their ineffective use. The share of gross savings in the GDP in 1998 (15%, on average, in the Sub-Saharan countries of Africa) was not much lower than that in the countries of East Asia (17%) or Latin America (20%). But calculated in world prices, they are much lower. As a result, each dollar invested in economic development in Africa is equal to about 33 cents spent in the industrial countries of the West. Besides, the effectiveness of each capital investment in Africa (in commodity output) is considerably lower than in other developing regions. According to the data of the World Bank, in 1970-1997 the correlation between the unit of the increment in commodity output and the increment in capital investments was 12%, on average, in the developing countries of Africa, whereas in South and East Asia this index was 23%, or almost twice as high.<sup>2</sup> In other words, to gain an increment in commodity output worth one dollar in Africa, it would be necessary to invest 8.33 dollars, whereas in Asia the figure would be 4.35 dollars.

---

\* First published in 2006 as a section in the monograph “The Economic Security of African Countries,” Moscow.



Such a situation sharply aggravates the problem of repaying foreign debts. The borrowed capital should be returned, and the accumulation of the necessary resources for the purpose becomes ever more expensive. In other words, to pay interest (five percent annually) on the loan, the borrower-country has to create a new value no less than 20% in volume (with the “capital – production” correlation 4:1).

The economic development of African countries has also been aggravated by the problem of export trade. Africa (without the Republic of South Africa) was the only region of developing countries, which registered a reduction of export proceeds per capita during the period between 1970 and 1997 (in that period this index for the countries of South Asia increased by 3.6 times, East Asia – 8.7 times, and Latin America – 2.9 times).<sup>3</sup>

The low economic development rates led to low rates of the foreign trade of many African countries, which were ousted from their traditional markets by more successful competitors. In 1950 Africa accounted for 5.3 percent of world export (including Tropical Africa – 3.3%), whereas by 2002 the corresponding indices were 2.0% and 0.5%. Africa’s loss of foreign markets between 1970 and 1993 meant the annual loss of incomes amounting to 68 billion dollars, according to the World Bank data. The only export commodity for a small number of African countries, which could emerge to the world market as a serious force, was oil and natural gas.

Another adverse factor and a source of losses for many African countries is the constantly worsening correlation between export and import costs, or the so-called conditions of trade. If we exclude the oil-exporting countries (the movement of the costs of oil and oil products – their main export commodity – is influenced by the cartel organizations OPEC and OAPEC) and South Africa, the total amount of the losses suffered by these countries due to the worsening conditions of trade amounted to almost 120 percent of their GDP during the 1970-1997 period.<sup>4</sup> Such direct losses of resources mean a considerable reduction in the purchasing power of many African countries, depriving them of the possibility to diversify production and export and create conditions for drawing foreign capital. In this situation African countries continued to actively borrow money on market conditions. As a result, the volume of foreign debt of these countries comprised 106% of their aggregate GDP by 1997, and increased the sum of repayment.<sup>5</sup>

Despite the fact that many African countries during the years of independence have achieved certain successes in developing their industries and agriculture, they continue to remain the big suppliers of raw materials in their economic relations with the world. Primarily, this concerns mineral fuel (oil and natural gas), a number of mineral and agricultural raw materials (ores of ferrous and non-ferrous metals), as well as important products of tropical agriculture. Although Africa has expanded its export of manufactured commodities in the past two decades, among them processed raw

materials, refined non-ferrous metals, cut diamonds, chocolate, fabrics and garments, it continues to be a supplier of raw materials to the world market. In 2000 their share in African export (including fuel) amounted to 78.5%, although it was somewhat lower compared to 1980. Despite the growing share of manufactured commodities in export, the dependence of most African countries on the export of one to three types of raw materials remains exceptionally high. Sixteen countries of Africa depend on such export by more than 95%, ten – from 80 to 95%, and thirteen – from 50 to 78%.

In the years of independence the role of manufactured commodities in export has become considerably greater: from 4.0% in 1970 to 21.5% in 2000. There are African countries which export considerable quantities of manufactured commodities. Among these countries are Mauritius (up to 70%), South Africa and Zimbabwe (about 30%), Kenya and Senegal (about 20%).

Commodity export is the main source of foreign currency for most developing countries of Africa. In 2002 its sum amounted to 105,158 million dollars, or 1.6% of world trade. In addition, South Africa exported commodities worth 29,723 million dollars (including the export of gold). To these sums should be added the export of services, which has grown in the past 15 to 20 years (especially at the expense of North African countries) and in 2002 it amounted to 28,597 million dollars for African developing countries and 4,486 million dollars for South Africa (17,685 million and 3,560 million, respectively, in 1980).

The role of Africa as an importer is somewhat greater than that of exporter, for part of the imported goods is financed by foreign commercial credits and the official assistance of western countries, as well as direct and portfolio investments. In 2002 the cost of commodity import to African developing countries amounted to 102,741 million dollars, or 1.6% of the world’s index. Apart from that, services of various type were imported to the sum of 37,941 million dollars in 1999. The indices for South Africa were 29,267 million and 5,321 million respectively.

Thus, one can notice a certain increase in the commodity output of the African economy and its further inclusion in the international division of labour. However, the rates of this process proved very low, the world economy and world trade developed much faster during this period. As a result, Africa’s share in world export and import declined steadily, and the countries of the African continent were being ousted from the world trade turnover and material production.

There are several reasons for this phenomenon. One of them is Africa’s lag in the export of the products of the processing industry. In recent decades the world trade was expanding mainly due to the manufactured (especially science-intensive) industrial commodities and household goods. African countries are unable so far to develop the export of such commodities on a large scale. Technical progress has seriously reduced the needs for many types of industrial raw materials (and first and foremost, energy-

producing commodities), ferrous and non-ferrous metals, raw materials of plant origin (cotton, wool, jute, etc.). Even traditional food products, such as tea, coffee and cocoa, meet with a stiff competition from synthetic drinks (coca-cola and pepsi-cola) and natural fruit juices.

A definite role has also been played by a certain reduction in the export resources of some raw materials and manufactured goods due to the growing domestic market and the processing of raw materials on the spot (for instance, the cotton used in the production of goods for domestic consumption). Along with this, some African countries facing difficulties in selling their traditional products on the world market, undertake measures to diversify their export, turning to the export of such new commodities as flowers (Kenya, above all), and prawns or fresh vegetables and fruit which are delivered by airplanes directly to the centres of consumption (the important role in this is played by associations of the biggest supermarkets, especially British).

The view of the African countries in a real sense as producers and exporters of a number of essential commodities is not possible without the proper assessment of the development and quality of the infrastructure. A weakly developed infrastructure, the high cost of its use, the low quality of the services provided are important indices determining the competitiveness of the commodities supplied to the market.

The quality and development of the network of roads play a very important role in the competitiveness of goods. In 1997 there were 171,000 kilometers of paved roads in Africa (without South Africa), which was 18% less than in Poland. Due to bad maintenance, the state of one-third of the roads built in Sub-Saharan Africa has deteriorated during the past 20 years.

The countries lying deep inside the continent and having no access to the sea coast are in an especially difficult situation. For them transport expenditures are 50 percent higher.

The high expenses involved in cargo transportation constitute a major problem for Africa. They are the highest compared with other regions of developing countries. For example, they are twice higher than in India.

Air transportation across the African continent is from two to four times more expensive than across the Atlantic. In a number of districts of West Africa there is no cargo transportation by air.

High transport fares are a serious barrier in the path of development of the sphere of service and tourism. Mass tourism is especially sensitive to growing expenses. Leaving aside the quality of services, the increase in tourist trips' cost to double may result in a drop in demand for travel to one-eighth.<sup>6</sup>

More than 90 percent of tourists arrive by air, this is why this type of transport is especially important from the point of view of export incomes. For example, transport expenses involved in visits to East and South Africa

are ten times higher than visits to Florida, thus the number of tourists of average and lower means will be much smaller.<sup>7</sup>

The modern means of information and communications are a key element of the competitiveness of the products of any country, especially economically backward one. According to the data of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), each new telephone line is a contribution to the gross national product of Sub-Saharan Africa equalling 4,500 dollars, that is, it is much greater than to the economy of industrial countries. Meanwhile, Africa has the least developed information and telecommunication infrastructure in the world.

There are about 10 million telephones in Sub-Saharan Africa (less than in Brazil), which is seven percent of the world's figure. South Africa accounts for half this number, the rest is concentrated in capitals and other urban districts and belongs to businessmen and government officials.

The number of trunk telephone lines in Sub-Saharan Africa (without South Africa) is 10 per a thousand population (in Latin American countries – 110, in North Africa and the Middle East – 75).

The Internet has been developing quite rapidly in Africa in recent years. In 1995 it was available to four countries only, but in 1999 their number grew to 50. However, the communication hubs through the Internet are situated, as a rule, in big population centres. Besides, the high cost of its use limits its development. In 2000 the number of people using it in Africa was three million, as against 17 million in Latin America and 105 million in Asian countries and Oceania (In all, there were 407 million people in the world using the Internet in 2000).<sup>8</sup> The number of personal computers in Sub-Saharan Africa (including South Africa) was 7.2 per a thousand population in 1997 (in Latin America – 31.6).

Finally, it should be said that a great harm to the competitiveness of African commodities is also done by unreliable services. Systematic interruptions of production processes, intervals and breakdowns in electric power and materials supply, violations of deadlines, and bad communications – all this has an adverse effect on the supply to the customers of necessary commodities, especially those with a high value added element.

---

#### Notes:

1. World Bank: Can Africa Claim the 21st Century? Washington, 2000. P. 19.
2. Ibid., p. 8.
3. Ibid., p. 8.
4. Ibid., p. 21.
5. Ibid., p. 22.
6. "Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries 2002." Washington, 2002., p. 100.
7. Ibid., p. 101.
8. *Finance and Development*. Sept. 2001. Vol. 38. No. 3. P. 45.

**MINERAL RESOURCES:  
A THREAT TO SECURITY OR AN ECONOMIC  
MODERNIZATION RESERVE (ALGERIA'S EXPERIENCE)\***

**Vladimir Kukushkin,**  
Ph.D.(Econ.), Senior Research Fellow,  
Institute for African Studies, RAS

Decades after the biggest French concessions were nationalized in 1971, foreign investors were again allowed to operate in Algeria without being required to go into partnership with Sonatrach, a company fully owned by the government, and to compete against it, for example, at auctions selling licenses to carry out oil and gas projects.

The largest tax incentives are given for areas having the worst combination of geographic, geological, natural, and other conditions. Production fields are to be licensed out on the most transparent competitive basis. Less definite, in Western experts' view, are the liberal components of the new laws passed to regulate the Algerian gas industry, by contrast to what they are in the oil industry. Whatever the case, many obscurities have been spotted, along with obvious restrictions on competition within the industry.

The gradual leveling out of opportunities for national and foreign investors, and state and private capital, and the introduction of competitive elements in the oil and gas industries are important for the energy sector, which accounted for over 41% of GDP in 2003 and 2004, 77% of the budget revenues, and between 95% and 97% of the Algerian government's foreign exchange earnings.<sup>1</sup> Success of reforms in various industries could shore up significantly Algeria's positions at the talks on the republic's entry into the World Trade Organization.

Commercial development of the country's enormous natural resources started in 1956. After Algeria won national sovereignty in July 1962, the country advanced to the forefront of the most radical leftist countries among liquid fuel exporters that launched a vigorous struggle against foreign monopolies for a change in the terms on which its mineral resources were developed.

The chances for advancing independent Algeria's national interests in this economic sector were far from favorable, even against the general background of the Third World of the time. Commercial development of large Algerian oil fields started far back under the colonial rule which allowed the colonial power to capture firm positions in the mineral mining and energy sectors. The oil concessions cemented by the 1962 Evian Agreements integrating a Declaration of Principles of Cooperation in the

Use of Underground Wealth of the Sahara were worse in comparison with concessions operating at the time in a majority of other countries, both sovereign and politically dependent. In terms of the government's revenue per unit (barrel) of exported oil, Algeria was disadvantaged by a factor of almost 2.3 compared to its neighbor Libya and by a factor of 3 in comparison with Qatar, regardless of almost the same oil quality and geographically favorable location of its oil fields in North Africa relative to those in the Persian Gulf (for example, in Qatar).<sup>2</sup>

Faced up to real difficulties at the start of its independent development, Algerian oil policy was significantly different from the strategy and tactics of most other hydrocarbon exporters in the world. In particular, Algeria was the first former colonial and dependent country to impose effective government control over external financial transactions of concession companies, and succeeded in bringing their operational services and management bodies to its own territory. Moreover, Algeria replaced the little-efficient common practice of talking to transnational oil corporations with intergovernmental negotiations and agreements with the governments of the transnational corporations' host countries.


**SONATRACH to Begin and... Score a Long Series of Wins**

December 31, 1963, saw the establishment of a state-owned company, Sonatrach. Its unabridged French name lists its principal functions: National company for the exploration, development, transportation, refining, and marketing of hydrocarbons. Contrary to similar companies set up in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia a few years earlier, and transformed, by the time Sonatrach appeared on the scene, predominantly into financial junior or sleeping partners of Western and/or Japanese operators of joint oil production businesses, Sonatrach was immediately involved in the various aspects of the industry, beginning with its infrastructure components.

From the 1960s onwards, the Algerian government effectively played on the competition and differences between its opposite numbers that could be host countries of major transnational corporations (mostly, the U.S., the United Kingdom, and France) and the international corporations involved in the Algerian oil and gas business themselves. To do this, the government used various instruments of economics, international law, and politics, including reliance on its allies of the period. To give an example, the former Soviet Union helped it open a training centre in Boumerdes in October 1964, which was soon transformed into the National Oil, Gas and Chemistry Institute. In the late 1960s, engineers and experts from the Soviet Union and East European countries made up nearly a half of Sonatrach's staff of engineers and technicians. In 1973 already, the company could fill almost all medium-level staff positions and over a half of senior staff with Algerian nationals.

\* First published in *Asia and Africa Today*, 2006, No. 3, pp. 24-29.

**Diagram 1. Growth in the share of foreign interest in Algeria's oil production businesses (1995-2007)**



The turning point that came in the early 1970s was the end of the “old type” concession period, with agreements lasting 40 to 50 years, the extra-territorial status given to foreign concession holders, and many other extraordinary conditions accorded to the concessions. On the eve of the first “price revolution” on the world oil market, Algeria was fully ready for a nearly complete monopolization of its oil and gas industries by the government. Nationalization of the Algerian branches of Western companies that played subsidiary roles in Algeria’s oil production started in the latter part of the 1960s. In 1970, the Algerian government fully controlled the sale of petroleum products in the domestic and world markets, 92% of the land on which exploration and development operations were going on, and 90% of the refining capacities. The Algerian assets of all American oil companies, except for the branches of Getty Petroleum Co. and El Paso Natural Gas, were nationalized in 1970. The Getty and El Paso branches entered into separate agreements with the Algerian government, under which Sonatrach bought out 51% of those companies’ assets at the residual book value of their fixed assets.<sup>3</sup>

This principle caught on in later years as an international law precedent. In particular, it was used in all calculations as a basis for formulas to pay compensation for nationalized foreign assets in later years by Libya and Iraq as well.

As a result, with the French concessions taken over by the government, state ownership became dominant in 1972 and on in all segments of Algeria’s oil and gas industries. Financial results were the most prominent out-

come of reforms in these industries. Rent payments charged by the governments as part of its budget revenue rose sharply in size and percentage. When fuel prices soared from time to time in the world, Algeria made significant gains from the price hikes much faster and with greater effect than the majority of other hydrocarbon-exporting countries. For example, in 1973 it earned an average of 40% more profit from each exported oil barrel than Qatar (a far cry from 33% of what Qatar was making on oil export in the early half of the 1960s).<sup>4</sup>

The government achieved its principal regulation goals by various instruments, including contract law. For example, by reducing the terms of agreements between Sonatrach and former concessionaires, and, in later years, the owners of 49% of the capital in joint ventures (or associations, which is the current Algerian term) to ten years (instead of several decades as was the old practice). The government also reserved the right to amend selected contract articles with its partners’ consent before the halfway time of joint field operations. This right mostly applied to taxation; repatriation of the foreign member’s revenues and their mandatory investment in the exploration of new fields and/or projects to raise the output of those already under development; and pumping tariffs on the use of the main pipeline system brought into state ownership.

### French Business Abandons Algeria

In 1975, the French public company, ELF-ERAP, refused to renew production cooperation on new terms offered by Sonatrach after hard bargaining, and walked out of ELF-Algerie, one of the two biggest joint ventures. Five years later, another leading French company, CFP, refused to cooperate with Total-Algerie joint venture in a similar situation. By buying these foreign assets in the oil industry and, in this way, drawing out of both controversial situations, Sonatrach increased its share of oil and gas concentrate production to 98.5% and export of these products to 97.8% in 1981. At the time, the withdrawal of Western investors from operating oil and gas companies was rare for Third World countries, and was something of an exception for the Middle East and North Africa.

It is probable that the Algerian government’s direct financial aim – maximizing budget revenues – predominated in its oil and gas strategy, at least until the mid-1980s. It even was not restrained by the large-scale withdrawals of French assets from this segment of the industry. It would be wrong to assume that the Algerian government of the time ignored other important problems, including reproduction, or rather natural replacement of proved hydrocarbon reserves. At the time, however, those problems were dealt with at the tactical short-term level – making the profit while the market was hot – instead of being put in the long-term strategic perspective. Algeria’s foreign trade policy in liquid fuel export was that it added target

surcharges to official oil contract prices. Surcharges of \$3 per barrel, or 10% of the going price at the time, were introduced in early 1980 for customers who had had no part in oil and gas exploration on Algerian soil at the contract making time. These surcharges were credited to special bank accounts and were regarded as advance payments for the obligations of Sonatrach's foreign partners under anticipated joint venture agreements. From the time foreign partners entered into contracts with Sonatrach for joint geological exploration for new commercial hydrocarbon reserves, the importers of Algerian oil and condensate were released from obligations to pay the surcharges. At that same time, the funds accumulated on their accounts were started to be used for their primary purpose. If otherwise, those additional foreign exchange resources passed into Sonatrach's ownership at the expiry of the specified period.

This system was efficient on the upgrade of the industry's cycle. Foreign firms were attracted into partnership with Sonatrach by the deferral of rising payments that they would have to make as the price of their imports from Algeria went up. Really, as a contract on cooperation was signed, with the prospect of forming a joint venture, the levying of surcharges stopped immediately, and agreed investments into exploration projects were disbursed gradually, typically, over a four-year period. Besides, they were given an opportunity to compensate some of the costs of the fuel they purchased by reciprocal deliveries of equipment and technical services. In other words, surcharges could be regarded as discounts allowed from the contractual prices of liquid fuel for buyers participating in hydrocarbon exploration on Algerian territory. In 1980 and 1981, Algeria entered into 12 agreements of this type with foreign companies and their consortiums.<sup>5</sup>


As world prices started sliding down in 1982, those incentives lost their attraction and could not prevent stagnation, and at times even a scaling-down of exploration projects and, accordingly, the figures for proved oil reserves in Algeria. In the period between 1980 and 1989, the proved oil reserves varied between 1,131 million tons in 1982 and 1,322 million tons in 1983. By 1990, they dropped to 1,288 million tons, remaining at that level until 2003.<sup>6</sup> Reduction in reserves, combined with other factors, including OPEC quotas on oil production, resulted in a decline of Algerian oil output (disregarding gas condensate) from the maximum of nearly 60 million tons in 1978 to 33.5 million tons in 1986.<sup>7</sup>

We are not going to argue either that the oil revenues that required so much effort from the Algerian government to maximize in the 1970s and the early part of the 1980s had a definitely positive effect on Algeria's overall sociopolitical development. Apart from being the main source of revenue for accelerated modernization (actually, industrialization), another key function of these financial resources was that of a "stabilizer" that helped, in many respects, to round off the structural corners in the Algerian economy. The fact that reforms, however controversial, were carried on no

matter what, was largely due to the charismatic leadership provided by Houari Boumedienne.<sup>8</sup>

By the mid-1980s, Algeria's economy appeared to have overheated, and the country felt a "social fatigue" after 20 years of nationalization and accelerated industrialization (or "industrial revolution" as it was called in the official doctrine). First priority was given to heavy industry, frequently at the expense of other economic sectors. To an extent, this was because the country followed the example of the socialist community, and in part it was the result of selective application of Western theories. The worst affected by these option were agriculture, social infrastructure, and living standards of the majority of Algeria's population.

**Diagram 2. Growth in the share of businesses with foreign interest in the production of all types of hydrocarbons in Algeria (1995-2007)**



### They Wanted the Best in Algeria, too, but Got...

In the latter half of the 1980s, the "stabilizer" system collapsed catastrophically, particularly after the meltdown of oil prices in 1986, and soon by the fall of prices of other fuels. In 1985 and 1986, Algeria's average revenues from oil and gas export (or 97.5% of its total exports) contracted by a factor of 1.7 (to slightly over \$7.6 billion). Actually, the decline was almost by a half, followed by stagnation against the background of foreign debt growing fast to \$28.6 billion 1991 from \$15.7 billion in 1978 and \$18.5 billion in 1985. The sources for repaying the principals and interest,

nearly equal to the country's export receipts, were drying up, threatening the country with international bankruptcy. Algeria was forced to seek deferral of most of its debt repayments, and even stopped, in early 1994, repayment of medium- and long-term loans, without receiving the creditors' approval.

Algeria's foreign debt problems led to multiplying setbacks in its economy and falling living standards. Algeria's self-reliance on foodstuffs dropped from 73% in 1969 to 25% in 1986. Between 40% and 50% of manufacturing plants were idle regularly through the 1990s, frequently because of the shortage of equipment, materials, and spares. According to official figures, unemployment (excluding part-time employees), reached 21% to 25% of the working-age population in 1992 and 1993. The GDP per capita shrunk by 41.6% between 1987 and 1991.<sup>9</sup>

Attempts to at least partially offset market-made losses and resolve structural disparities at the expense of social budget allocations, and also make savings by large-scale subsidies of essential goods and services, and several investment programs as well only caused still greater shortages of subsidized products, a shortage of housing, inflation, and other problems. To put these problems right, the Algerian government began in the 1980s to adjust its development strategy, initiated decentralization of production, and launched liberal market reforms. The reforms included demonopolization, reorganization of the public sector, expansion of its economic components' autonomy, and encouragement to private enterprise in domestic and foreign trade business. By the end of the decade, a privatization program had been developed to set up holding companies that were eventually to be sold to Algerian and foreign investors.

These processes did not bypass the oil and gas sector as well, although to a lesser degree than other groups of industries, for two reasons. First, reforms in oil and gas did not go beyond the organizational aspects of the industries almost exclusively, and, in part, by commercialization, without touching ownership aspects for a long time. Second, those processes, no matter how limited, were ultimately easy to reverse. As an example, 13 former industry departments were spun off from Sonatrach, the biggest public company, as formally independent firms in the early 1980s. They included oil refineries and petroleum product marketing businesses, basic organic chemistry companies, companies to conduct geophysical exploration and drilling operations, and several firms providing services to oil producing companies. In 1994 and 1995, however, Sonatrach started reintegrating oil refineries and marketing operators into its central holding company on the pretext that the completed management reforms made the related "strategic" units profitable to operate within the framework of the holding company.

In its desire to maintain maximum conglomeration in the structure of this state-owned concern, its leadership sought vigorous support from the

industry's labor unions. Strikes by many thousand union members were called in support of the integration projects (for example, over 50,000 workers, almost half of the industry's work force at the time, laid down their tools for ten days in June and July 1995). The strikers demanded that the government get virtually all branches spun off in the years following 1980 back into Sonatrach. The workers and staff employees of the oil and gas sector pursued a number of their own objectives in this way. First, they were opposed to privatization plans, no matter how limited, involving any industry segments; second, they wanted to prevent reductions in employment; and third, they wanted to maintain a maximum of privileges available in the industry.<sup>10</sup>

Regardless of the numberless liberal declarations issued by several top Algerian leaders, the decisions they made on Sonatrach's organizational structure, or business, or any other affairs, in principle, changed little since the company was organized. Not infrequently, socio-political compromise prevailed over economic commonsense. Changes came with the order that the country's president signed on March 16, 1998. The order was, in fact, the first essential amendment to the December 1963 law setting up Sonatrach. The company's corporate status was approved, and its registered capital was fixed at an equivalent of \$4.1 billion, in full ownership of the Algerian government. The order banned expressly foreign ownership of the company's assets in whatever form.<sup>11</sup>

Although the oil refineries and the domestic petroleum product marketing network in Algeria kept their formal status of autonomous branches, their capital assets were 100% owned by Sonatrach holding company, that is, the government. The company remained the chief national monopolist. According to *Petroleum Intelligence Weekly*, an influential American periodical, the company was 12th among the world's biggest oil and gas companies in total sales in 2004. Its staff potential and know-how accumulated over many years enable Sonatrach to participate in foreign projects, such as the construction of main pipelines; equipment of oil fields in Yemen and gas fields in Peru; oil exploration in Libya, Angola, and Niger; and in oil refineries in Angola and Tunisia.<sup>12</sup>

And yet, the Algerian media, experts, and technocrats continue to discuss and lobby passionately for at least a clear separation, if not wrapping up, of government functions in respect of the country's oil and gas industries. The most tangible results have been achieved by the introduction (or, putting it into historical perspective, "partial restoration") of these principles in some relationships with foreign capital in oil and gas production of the country's oil and gas industries. In the early 21st century, these industries had over 25 companies from 20 countries, which were, under the law in effect until June 2005, Sonatrach's partners holding shares in joint ventures that operated across the full spectrum of the industry, from explora-

tion to development and export. The government set the industry the task of at least doubling the number of such foreign partners.<sup>13</sup>

Algeria's reputation among exporters of transnational capital in the oil and gas industries is gradually changing to the reverse of what it was in the 1970s and early 1980s. Nearly comprehensive state monopolism was evolving toward market "liberalism," even if strictly constrained and controlled. Liberalization was delivered by gradually lifting discriminatory restrictions, and opening and expanding possibilities for foreign business initiatives. For example, foreigners were permitted (as Sonatrach's partners) to jointly operate existing oil fields to raise their output, according to the "hydrocarbon resources" law passed in December 1991, while previously they could only join new businesses. The same law authorized foreign companies' "partnership" in exploration and development of gas reserves in Algeria.

### Foreigners Return, Oil Output Grows

At the turn of the 21st century, foreign business became significantly more conspicuous in Algeria's oil and gas industries, and their resources and productive potential grew faster as a result. After 13 years of stagnation, Algeria could announce growth of its proved oil reserves by more than 28% over as little as two years (2003 and 2004) to 1,652 million tons by early 2005.<sup>14</sup> Oil production (less natural gas liquids) also grew from 37 million tons to 59 million tons between 1993 and 2004. The share of joint production by Sonatrach and its foreign partners climbed rapidly from less than 2% in 1995 to over 50.8% in 2004 (*see*: Diagram 1).<sup>15</sup> The Joint ventures' contribution to the production of natural gas and other hydrocarbons rose as well (*see*: Diagram 2).

Foreign investors' instant reaction in response to even the cautious steps of the Algerian government to liberalize its oil and gas industries, and the high world prices stimulated the birth of ever more ambitious projects with an eye to the effect of the new laws passed in 2005. Investments amounting to \$24.5 billion are to be made in these industries over the span of five years (2005 to 2009). Apart from exploration projects (taking up 13% of total investments), most of the funding is expected to be funneled into development of oil (41.4%) and gas (37%) reserves.<sup>16</sup>

Now that the Algerian oil and gas industries are experiencing a revival, a national economic strategy has again become a priority. The key tasks remained unchanged – finding the most rational uses for the revenues from exceptionally rich, if exhaustible, natural resources and diversify and restructure, as soon as possible, the country's economy in order to wean it from dependence on the primary industries.

Many economists, some of them in Russia, who have been debating over the past 15 to 20 years the feasibility of these goals, are highly pessimistic about the prospects. Sources of rent revenue, above all rich mineral

reserves, and other components of natural mineral-based wealth are frequently more a curse than a boon to governments in control of them.<sup>17</sup> Meanwhile, other experts argue in favor of directly opposite approaches to the combination of natural resources and progress in the economy, entertaining "... a possibility of effective combination of development in the mining industry and industrial growth."<sup>18</sup> Far from claiming the role of a judge in the ongoing debates, this author regards it as a follow-up to the old disputes about socioeconomic determinism, including that of resources, the environment, economic geography, or anything else. These disputes have continued for at least two and a half centuries already.

In all probability, a majority of the determinist concepts advanced so far are, however, persuasive, each in its own way, but they are always confined to specific, usually small, backgrounds and chronological time frames. In our view, the example of modern Algeria is evidence that at least some countries with transition economies – former colonial or dependent countries as typical advocates of catching-up and forced industrialization strategies – are beginning to set themselves free from the curse of abundant natural resources and drawing rational lessons from their recent blunders. For example, the surge of prices of Algeria's chief national exports – hydrocarbons and crudely processed hydrocarbon products – after 2000 led to a fast and significant improvement in most of the country's macroeconomic indicators. Between 1998 and 2005, its export revenues rose from \$6.4 billion to \$29.8 billion (topping the historical peak of \$26.1 billion in 1980), its currency reserves shot up from \$12 billion to \$43.6 billion between 2000 and 2004, and the real GDP growth rate accelerated from 6.1% in 2004 to 6.9% in 2005.<sup>19</sup> The positive dynamics of these figures and favorable prospects did not provoke a new wave of ambitious projects. More important yet, they did not roll back or slow down liberal economic reforms.

The near future of the Algerian oil and gas industries can demonstrate how an "informed rentier state" of the modern age can turn the abundant natural resources into an efficient tool of modernization.

---

### Notes:

1. Sonatrach. The Algerian Oil and Gas Company, February 2006. p. 6. [http://www.worldenergy.org/wec-geis/global/downloads/members\\_news/sonatrach.pdf](http://www.worldenergy.org/wec-geis/global/downloads/members_news/sonatrach.pdf); "The Hydrocarbon Sector in Algeria." SH/SPE, April 2003, p. 4. <http://www.worldenergy.org/wec-geis/global/downloads/africa/Boufares0403/pdf>.
2. Computed from: OPEC Oil Report, 2nd Edition, London, 1979, pp. 33-39.
3. For more details, *see*: Кукушкин В.Ю. Нефть и развитие: Ливия, Алжир. М., 1985, с. 62-68. [Kukushkin, V.Yu., "Oil and Development: Libya and Algeria," Moscow, 1985, pp. 62-68.]

4. Computed from: OPEC Oil Report, 2nd Edition, London, 1979, pp. 33-39; *Petroleum Economist*, London, 1976, Vol. XLIII, No. 9, p. 338.

5. For more details, see: Kukushkin, V.Yu., *Op. cit.*, pp. 99-102.

6. Computed from: "World Proved Crude Oil Reserves, January 1, 1980 – January 1, 2005. Estimates."

<http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iealf/crydeoilreserves.xls>.

7. Computed from: Lawless, R.I., "Algeria. Economy. – The Middle East and North Africa 1996," Vol. 42, London, Europa Publ., 1995, p. 276; Table 4.2. "OPEC Crude Oil Production (Excluding Condensate), 1980-2004." <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ipsr/t42.xls>.

8. One of the influential leaders of the liberation movement during the war for Algeria's independence, and between 1965 and 1978, chairman of the Revolutionary Council, and then the country's president with very broad, authoritarian powers, who was able to rally the many, diverse elements of Algerian society (with the exception, very important in the future, of the Islamic radicals) and to maintain national accord. Significantly, he achieved this largely not by declarations and appeals to revolutionary enthusiasm and egalitarianism, typical of young sovereign countries, but by actually dictatorial tough fight against corruption in increasingly centralized society.

9. Joffe, G., "Algeria: The Failure of Dialogue. – The Middle East and North Africa 1995," Vol. 41, London, Europa Publ., 1994, pp. 4 and 10; Lawless, R.I., "Algeria. Economy. – The Middle East and North Africa 1995," Vol. 41, London, 1994, pp. 279-280 and 290-291; "The Middle East and North Africa 1989," Vol. 35, London, 1988, p. 314.

10. These privileges remained tied up tightly with ownership forms and legal status of businesses in the Algerian environment, the fewest of them being applied to employees of the private sector, "intermediate" privileges were accorded to employees of Sonatrach's fully autonomous branches, and the most extensive privileges were given to employees of the central holding company. Entelis, J.P., "Sonatrach: The Political Economic of an Algerian State Institution," January 2000, pp. 18-19. <http://www.cerisciences-po.com/archive/january/artipe.pdf>; Lawless, R.I., "Algeria. Economy. – The Middle East and North Africa 1996," Vol. 42, London, Europa Publ., 1995, p. 284; "Algeria's Stalled Hydrocarbons Law is Revived. Analysis." Republished from *African Energy*? October 2004. <http://www.africa-energy.com/html/public/data/algeria.html>.

11. Entelis, J.P., *Op. cit.*, p. 21.

12. "Sonatrach. The Algerian Oil..." pp. 9 and 23-25.

13. "Sonatrach. The Algerian Oil..." pp. 27-31; Rouag, D., and Oubouzar, M., "Forum des entrepreneurs et avant projet de loi sur les hydrocarbures," December 12, 2002. [http://www.pl\\_forum-etps](http://www.pl_forum-etps).

14. Computed from: "World Proved Crude Oil Reserves, January 1, 1980-January 1, 2005. Estimates."

15. Computed from: SONATRACH. Rapport Annuel 2004, p. 28; Table 4.2. "OPEC Crude Oil Production (Excluding Condensate), 1980-2004." <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ipsr/t42.xls>.

16. "Sonatrach. The Algerian Oil..." p. 20.

17. "Attempts have been undertaken repeatedly, without changing the import-substituting model, to take output beyond limits compatible with its sustainable operation. Incentives to depart from the import-substituting industrialization model in countries poor in natural resources arose at still earlier economic development stages than in those rich in resources. At the early development stages, with small GDP per capita, dismantling the existing mechanisms and launching market mechanisms are easier to accomplish than in more developed countries, and can go alongside economic growth. In the case of countries rich in natural resources that have achieved, within the framework of the import-substituting industrialization model, a relatively high income per capita, taking it apart and activating market mechanisms predictably means a serious economic crisis drawing out for many years." Гайдар Е.Т. Аномалии экономического роста. – Вопросы экономики. М., 1996, № 12, с. 26-27. [Gaidar, Ye.T., "Anomalies of Economic Growth," *Economic Problems*, Moscow, No. 12, 1996, pp. 26-27.]

18. "Initially, at the extensive growth stage, whatever the socioeconomic system existing in the country, mineral resources give a powerful boost to socioeconomic progress. As, however, a transition is made to an intensive economy type, they slow down continued development. At the same time, negative social and environmental consequences of the development of mineral resources begin, as a rule, to have a greater effect. True, the examples of the RSA, Australia, and Canada confirm the possibility of a country having an efficient mining industry and showing positive dynamics of general economic performance." Смирнов В. Минерально-сырьевой комплекс в структуре экономики России. – Вопросы экономики. М., 1998, №4, с. 144. [Smirnov, V., "Natural Resources in Russia's Economic Structure," *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 4, 1998, p. 144.]

19. CIA. The World Factbook. Algeria. Last updated on 30 August, 2005. <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ag.html>; "Algeria. Country Analysis." Brief, March 2005.



## AFRICA IN THE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

### AFRICAN MIGRATION: A REGIONAL ISSUE OR A GLOBAL PROBLEM?\*

*Irina Abramova*, Ph.D.(Econ.),  
Deputy Director of the Institute,  
for African Studies, RAS

International labor migration has received an added boost in this age of globalization. Labor movement across borders between different countries under the effect of structural changes in their economies and transfusions of investments merge national labor markets into a single marketplace to back up the movement of goods and services within a common economic environment.

According to UN statistics, the number of international migrants, or people living beyond their countries of origin, had reached 200 million by the year 2005, having more than doubled over the previous 25 years, to about 3% of the planet's population. A breakdown of this figure shows that nearly 30 million migrants are from the African continent.<sup>1</sup>

Most frequently, migration flows move from less developed countries in the East and South to more developed countries of the West and North. In the last quarter of the 20th century, more countries were added to the traditional centres of attraction for migrants – the U.S., Canada, and Australia. The latest additions include countries of Western Europe and the Asia-Pacific Region, oil-producing countries in the Middle East, Argentina and Venezuela in Latin America, and the more advanced countries in Africa, like Libya, the Republic of South Africa (RSA), and Botswana. To quote UN statistics again, 60% of all migrants are concentrated in developed countries, with the remaining 40% roaming along the South-South line, that is, from one developing country to another. In the second category, 49 million migrants now live in Asia, 16 million in Africa, and 6 million in Latin America and the Caribbean area.<sup>2</sup>

Over the next 10 to 15 years, migration from developing countries, including those in Africa, will grow under the impact of several factors.

In the first place, the swelling of migration flows along the South-North line is related to the aging of developing countries' populations, a process that goes on alongside the fast growth of the populations in developing countries. The demographic growth rates in developing countries averaged

1.6% between 2000 and 2005, or higher by a factor of 5.3 than it was in developed nations. In fact, developing countries contribute 95% of world population growth today, and their contribution will reach a full 100% in the next 25 years. Significantly, population growth rates of 2.5% to 3% per annum in Africa south of the Sahara are much higher than those in other developing countries. Today, one African woman of child-bearing age has an average of five or six children against one child or two children per a productive woman in Europe. Over the next 20 years, the African continent, even in the grip of an AIDS pandemic, is going to become a major source of world population growth. In the estimates of UN experts, Africa's population will rise to 1.1 billion in 2025 and 2 billion in 2050 from 794 million in 2000.<sup>3</sup> According to World Bank figures, the global labor market will expand to 3.4 billion persons in 2010 from 3 billion in 2004. Moreover, forecasts for the next 40 years predict a decline in working-age populations in a majority of developed countries, in Europe above all. In particular, labor resources are to grow at an annual rate of 40 million, 38 million of them in developing countries and only 2 million in developed nations. To offset the shortage of workhands, developed countries will recruit migrants from developing countries, including Africa.<sup>4</sup>

Implementation of the liberalization and economic restructuring programs designed by the IMF and the World Bank for African countries has failed to expand employment in those countries. Rather, opportunities for Africans to find jobs in their own countries have dwindled in the last 10 years. As a result, the number of workers in Africa south of the Sahara earning less than one dollar a day had grown by 28 million in the years 1994 to 2004.<sup>5</sup> Mass unemployment, particularly among young Africans who have joined, and continue to join, the currents of migrants, has become a real social malady here. In the estimates of UN experts, the number of new jobs created in African countries over the last five years is just enough to absorb 30% to 40% of the influx of fresh labor resources. According to unofficial data, unemployment has affected 20% to 25% of the able-bodied population in those countries.<sup>6</sup> Emigration is then frequently the only way to escape from poverty.

Inequality of personal incomes in developed and developing countries is still the chief reason behind labor migration. In 1975, the average income per capita in high-income countries was 41 times that in low-income countries, while today the difference has risen to 66 times.<sup>7</sup> The low economic growth rates in many countries, particularly in Tropical Africa, result in rising poverty. Emigration, therefore, appears to many Africans as the only step they have to take to improve their living conditions and the welfare of their families.

At the receiving end, businesses in developed countries are keen to hire immigrants for such reasons as, above all, their desire to cut production costs (primarily, their payrolls), the need to have labor readily available in

---

\* This paper was first published in *Problems of Modern Economics*, No. 4 (24), 2007, pp. 86-93.

production growth periods, and the shortage of workhands in industries known for their heavy or unfavorable working conditions. In the age of economic globalization, reduction in manufacturing costs is a key condition for survival in the domestic and world markets. Specifically, EU countries pay hourly wages to native labor that are 20% to 30% higher than the hourly rates paid by their main competitors in the U.S. and Japan, and two to three times as high as wages offered in industrial countries in Southeast Asia (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and the Republic of Korea).<sup>8</sup> These realities are painfully perceived in European countries because their economies are largely driven by exports. Many West European firms are, therefore, eager to recruit immigrants, including Africans, for employment in export-oriented industries.

Another major socio-psychological factor is the knowledge that residents of African countries receive, through modern communications, about the existing gap in living standards and its real magnitude. Disseminated by fast-developing mass communications, this knowledge has become a major force in shaping popular mindsets in remote and poor areas of the world, including the continent of Africa. Communications are backed up by fast advances in modern transportation facilities that facilitate travel at lower costs from poverty-trapped backwoods to "prosperity centres."

A further reason for the growth of migration flows in African countries lies in the outdated employment structure in many of the continent's countries. Over a half of Africa's able-bodied population is employed in small-scale commercial farming near the subsistence level, which faces competition from modern, government-subsidized agribusiness in developed countries. Millions of farming families in Africa are ruined every year, joining the ranks of internal (rural-urban), regional, and international migrants.

Unstable military and political situation in many African countries encourages internal and international migration still further. After 45 years of independence, Africa remains a hotbed of crises. Every year, 20 to 80 armed conflicts are registered around the world, with 10 to 30 of them on the African continent. In 2004, a quarter of African countries were drawn into conflicts. Even though the situation was defused in several conflict-plagued areas (Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Burundi), the year 2003 witnessed crises flaring up in the Central African Republic, Mauritania, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Guinea-Bissau; and Sudan was rocked by conflict in 2004 through 2006. Conflicts cause enormous damage to the countries involved in them, and lead to economic collapse and growing poverty of their populations. The world community today is watching disintegration of African states. Restoring the efficiency of the state in every individual African country is a relatively hard problem because the overwhelming majority of today's African countries had never had a working government in the past, and many of them even lacked the foundations of statehood. Conflicts and crisis of the statehood in Africa

contribute to an increase in the numbers of refugees. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Africa had 3.3 million refugees in 2002, almost 30% of the world's total. The data published by the Norwegian Council for Refugees in 2005 show that nearly 15 million (or half of 29 million displaced persons across the world) came from Africa.<sup>9</sup>

Africa today is a region of intensive migration. The high mobility of its population is not peculiar to its recent history only. It is a longstanding tradition, with many of today's patterns and trends of African migration existing long before the African colonies' political liberation. The borders between them were drawn by the colonial powers' bureaucrats, largely without regard for the traditional economic, ethnic, and cultural factors that underlay the diversity of links (including migration) among local communities. The ill-defined borders had no influence on traditions in either the colonial past or in the post-colonial period. Frequently, they are quite porous and ignored by the population on both sides of the borders. Hence, the vague and blurred differences between the internal (national) and external (cross-border) migration, and also between legal and illegal (undocumented) migrants.<sup>10</sup>

Migration processes in Africa, and in other regions, for that matter, include, above all, economic or labor migration, or labor turnover for economic reasons between rural and urban areas on the scale of a single country, between different countries within a single subregion, or, less frequently, the entire continent, and, finally, beyond continental bounds.

African cross-border labor migration, as a rule, involves countries at different economic development levels. Migrants from countries having extremely hard socioeconomic conditions move in search of jobs and a better life to more fortunate countries. Each subregion has one or several countries possessing relatively strong economies that draw in labor from their neighboring less developed countries. The principal currents of African cross-border migration flow from countries hidden deep inside the continent to coastal countries, and from countries devoid of any significant mineral resources to those that have them. There are many exceptions to this rule, though. For example, Zimbabwe, a continental country, was until recently attractive to migrants from neighboring countries looking for employment at highly productive farms owned by descendants of early white settlers. Algeria, a coastal country, exports hydrocarbons and much labor, and so on.

There are more sending than receiving countries. The leading exporters of migrants are Algeria, Angola, Benin, Egypt, Cameroon, Morocco, Swaziland, and Tunisia (the Arab countries in this list send migrants mostly beyond the continent). Labor migration is focused on countries exporting hydrocarbons and minerals – Libya, Gabon, Congo (Kinshasa), Congo (Brazzaville), Zambia, Côte d'Ivoire, South Africa, and Botswana, and also (if to a lesser degree) countries practicing a relatively developed capitalistic agri-

culture – Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania. Hundreds of thousands of seasonal migrants from Senegal, Burkina Faso, Benin, and Cameroon are heading every year for Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, and Ghana during the harvesting season for coffee, cacao, peanuts, sorghum, and other agricultural crops. Nigeria is a major migrant sending and receiving country. At times, migration currents flow in opposite directions simultaneously (like migration between Sudan and Ethiopia, Ethiopia and Somalia, Zimbabwe and Zambia, and so on).

The sale of child labor to other countries is a serious problem for African countries. In May 2004, the governments of Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire were engaged in cooperation over repatriation of 104 children from Côte d'Ivoire. In June 2004, ten children from Niger aged six to 15 years were intercepted by Burkina Faso police at Dori. Also in 2004, police arrested three Ghanaians for child trafficking. As early as January 2002, officials of several countries in West and Central Africa attended a conference sponsored by Côte d'Ivoire's government in cooperation with Interpol to discuss child trafficking in the subregion.<sup>11</sup> The issues raised at the meeting included prevention of trafficking and rehabilitation of the victims. The meeting adopted a program known as a project to support and rehabilitate children exposed to the worst forms of work and trafficking in agriculture. The project is financed under the international Child Labor Liquidation Program (a branch of the Geneva-based International Labor Organization, ILO). In the final declaration of the conference, the participants undertook to exchange coordinated information about child trafficking.

Migration processes under way on the continental scale can be broken down conventionally into two categories. The first, smaller category is migration of highly skilled professionals within the framework of various cooperation and development programs, and migration under education programs. The second, much larger category is migration of unskilled working-age population. The first migration category is immensely diverse geographically in Africa. A good example illustrating this is the situation in Benin where a group of UN experts was assigned in 2000 to look into migration problems. In that year, a program called Migration for Development in Africa brought together 159 experts from Burundi, Congo, and Rwanda. Years later, Benin continues to cooperate with these countries in migration studies to this day. Aside from Africans, projects under similar programs in Benin involve experts and consultants from European countries, primarily France, Italy, and Portugal. Benin operates several educational programs to train its own skilled labor. Educational services in the republic are substantially assisted mainly by the three above-named EU countries, with France carrying much of the burden, and the Russian Federation.<sup>12</sup> At present, more than 80 students from the Republic of Benin are studying at educational institutions across Russia. This type of labor migration is of great importance for foundations of science to be laid in a country capable of train-

ing its own skilled labor for work at its key enterprises. Migration of unskilled labor is of a far greater scale. According to UN data for 2000, Benin hosted 101,000 immigrants, who made up approximately 1.6% of the country's population. The Republic of Benin has a negative net migration, that is, more migrants come in than go out, which makes Benin a receiving country for foreign labor. A majority of unskilled immigrants come to Benin from neighboring countries, mostly from Togo, a republic that has a relatively unstable political system. To illustrate, 5,754 Togo nationals crossed into Benin in the wake of the elections on April 24, 2005, in Togo, and 750 of them still live in a refugee tent camp 80 kilometers from the seaport of Cotonou in Benin.<sup>13</sup>

Burkina Faso belongs in a group of countries that send and receive labor migrants. The country's economy depends heavily on remittances received from migrants. A majority of its male labor force migrates to neighboring countries in search of seasonal employment every year. Most migrants go to Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana to take jobs on coffee and cacao plantations or work as unskilled hands in those countries' cities. Labor emigration from Burkina Faso has intensified significantly in recent years. In the late 1990s, about 450,000 farmhands migrated every year.<sup>14</sup>

The government of Côte d'Ivoire takes a negative view of the migrants entering it from Burkina Faso. In the not too distant past, the central authorities obsessed with their country's superiority humiliated, threatened, and banished the arrivals from other countries. The recent unrest in Côte d'Ivoire and northern Ghana forced nearly 300,000 Burkina Faso's citizens to flee Côte d'Ivoire and return back home, where their prospects of finding jobs are almost zero.<sup>15</sup>

The heavy influx of migrants from Senegal to Gambia during the peanut harvesting time is another characteristic of migration flows changing in West Africa with the change of seasons in agriculture. The harvesting period begins at the end of the dry winter season (April, May, and, more rarely, June). Overpopulated as it is, Gambia experiences labor shortages, though, as much labor goes into growing and harvesting peanuts, rice, sorghum, and other farm crops, the other major reason being low productivity in agriculture. It is difficult to specify the numbers of migrants moving in for several reasons, such as the absence of a migration tracking system, unimpeded border crossings, and the like. In the rainy season, some of Gambia's own residents, predominantly farmers, migrate to Senegal and other West African countries. Manufacturing industries are not as advanced in Gambia as they are in Senegal, and Gambian farmers are driven to looking for jobs in other countries.

During the oil boom in the 1970s, labor flowed in heavy streams from West African countries to Nigeria. In the early 1980s, however, over 2.7 million of neighboring African countries' citizens were forced out of Nigeria that had turned into a scene of religious conflicts. Nigeria's gov-

ernment today encourages official export of labor to developed nations and neighboring African countries. Unofficially, its labor migrants move mostly to neighboring countries (Niger and Chad), and also to the RSA and Libya.<sup>16</sup>

The RSA is Africa's biggest labor importer in Africa. Right up to the 1980s, the workforce of South African mines was three-quarters foreign. In the late 1970s, though, focus shifted to giving more jobs to native labor. Between 1973 and 1990, the proportion of foreign labor in the country's mining industry was halved from 80% to 40%.<sup>17</sup>

Dismantlement of the apartheid regime brought about significant changes in the country's immigration policy. The country now needed more skilled workers, technicians, managers, and other trained professionals. The shortage of these labor categories among the local population called for their recruitment in other countries, Africans and non-Africans (in particular, African Americans from the U.S.). In a measure, the RSA replaced Europe and North America as the receiving destination of skilled African emigrants and made the brain drain a still worse problem for the sending countries, severe as it already was.

At the lower levels of the local workforce, high unemployment in the RSA, soaring above 40% in certain age groups,<sup>18</sup> forces the country's authorities to look for ways to improve employment opportunities for the black majority of their own population. The RSA government is intensifying border controls, and taking measures to reduce illegal immigration. It will take some time for this policy to produce results. Implementation of this policy is made more difficult by the government's reluctance to discriminate in its attitude to migration against neighboring countries, particularly Mozambique and Zimbabwe, which had provided its people with effective support in their fight against the apartheid regime.

In recent years, Botswana has become a real lure for migrants. Indeed, the country has rapidly evolved from a sending country to a receiving labor haven. Previously, Botswana was listed among the world's 20 poorest countries in development, with the annual personal income per capita of only \$300 in 1966. Thousands of workers were forced to leave Botswana to obtain employment under contract in other Southern African countries.

Beginning in the 1970s, Botswana's rapid economic growth necessitated increasingly more labor to be attracted into the country, and its liberal migration laws allowed labor to be recruited across the African continent. The number of emigrants from Botswana dropped to 38,606 in 1991, and to 28,210 in 2001, from 45,735 in 1971, while the number of legal immigrants living in Botswana tripled during 1971 to 1991 (from 10,861 to 29,557), and rose by a factor of six (to 60,716) in 2004.<sup>19</sup> In the last few years, the influx of labor from neighboring countries into Botswana has continued to rise. In the new situation, Botswana's government had to toughen its migration laws. It did this because, first, it was motivated by its desire to provide

employment to its own citizens, primarily, young people, whose educational standards and qualifications had risen significantly over the past 10 to 15 years as a result of the government's large outlays on education and skill improvement for Botswana's citizens. Second, the country's government hastened to toughen its migration policy when thousands of illegal immigrants trying to flee their own politically and economically unstable country suddenly swept into Botswana in a flood from neighboring Zimbabwe. Botswana's government responded quickly by imposing new border controls and more rigorous penalties for illegal immigration.

Libya has long been, and still is, a major centre of attraction for African migrants. Libya's disadvantage is that it is short of native labor. Its working-age population was 400,000 in 1964, 871,000 in 1981, around 1 million in 1991, and 1.2 million in 2004.<sup>20</sup> The Libyan authorities liberally encouraged foreign immigration for some time in the recent past. As the influx of petrodollars thinned out after 1982 and Libya's international standing deteriorated in the 1990s, particularly after the UN Security Council invoked sanctions against it following the explosion of a Pan American airliner over the town of Lockerbie in Scotland, which was blamed on Libyan nationals, the foreign community in Libya started to shrink rapidly. When sanctions were suspended in 1999, the number of immigrants in Libya went up again, and today it is second among the Maghreb countries for the number of immigrants. Today, it hosts between 2 million and 2.5 million immigrants (25% to 30% of the country's population), including 1 million to 1.5 million Africans. A breakdown according to countries shows over 500,000 Egyptians, 200,000 Moroccans, 60,000 Tunisians, and 20,000 to 30,000 Algerians among other nationalities living in Libya now.<sup>21</sup> Migrants from Arab countries feel more at home in the Libyan labor markets because they speak the same language. Typically, they are employed in the hospitality industry (restaurants and hotels). As well as working in the services industry and low-skilled positions elsewhere, many immigrants from Arab countries are also employed in jobs requiring high skills in the private and public sectors. Most Egyptians qualify for privileged positions. Migrants from Arab countries are normally received on a temporary basis, and yet many Egyptians, Tunisians, and Moroccans start families and remain in Libya for good.

After Muammar al-Gaddafi, the country's ruler, switched orientation of his foreign policy from Arab to African countries, Africans were offered free visas. This switch stimulated the influx of labor into Libya from countries south of the Sahara. The heavy influx of unskilled hands from Tropical Africa provokes many arguments in Libyan society today. Immigration from neighboring African countries is cited as a reason for growing crime rates and narcotic drug trafficking, causing competition to local labor, and creating problems in controlling illegal emigration to Europe through Libya. Emigration to Europe is the hardest problem to deal with today be-

cause illegal emigrants stay on in Libya for considerable lengths of time on their way to Europe. In the last few years, the Libyan leaders have been moving in their migration policy further away from Pan-Africanism toward restraints on immigration in order to have more job openings for their own citizens. The government's departure from its previous policy is dictated by both the high level of unemployment among the native population (30% by some estimates) and growth in government expenditures on the upkeep of immigrants at the cost of 10% of GNP, according to various estimates. Tripoli insists on reductions in the numbers of immigrants, particularly those who are employed without signing officially registered contracts. The Libyan government's latest turn in its immigration policy has produced beneficial results – between 2001 and 2004, the number of Libyans in employment rose by 15.6%, while that of foreign labor dropped by 53.7%.<sup>22</sup>

In intercontinental migration, a majority of African migrants go to Western Europe (France, Italy, Spain, Germany, and the United Kingdom), the U.S., and Persian Gulf countries. The Persian Gulf was the main receiving area for migrants from North Africa on the heels of the oil boom in the 1970s. The destinations of the migration currents from North African countries changed again by the early 1990s. The change was caused primarily by the Iraq-Kuwait conflict and deterioration in the economic situation in Iraq, after the Gulf War (Desert Storm), when over a million Arab emigrants left the country. These events happened at the same time with a steep plunge in oil prices, which forced the governments of Gulf countries to replace Arab engineers with far less expensive labor from South and Southeast Asia. And again, Western Europe regained its role as the principal receiving area of North African migrants.

Divisions of African immigration flows between receiving countries are largely explained by history (colonization of a sending country by a former colonial power) and closely related linguistic factors. In particular, in Tropical and North Africa, the number of French-speaking countries (former French colonies) as exporters of migrants to their former colonial power by far exceed that of English-speaking countries. The proportion between English- and French-speaking countries is reversed when it comes to migration to the United Kingdom. Residents of former Portuguese colonies in Africa make up a majority of immigrants in Portugal.

Most frequently, an emigrant arriving in a foreign country has no choice but to accept whatever job he is offered, even if he has been trained in a different field or is qualified to take a better job. Professionally, immigrants working in a foreign country may not be what they had been before they emigrated. Another important difference is whether an emigrant goes to a developed West European country or an Arab monarchy.

In most cases, emigrants to developed countries are offered nothing better than unskilled or low-skilled jobs. Receiving countries have no desire,

or even interest, to improve their skills. A majority of Africans are employed in manufacturing, commerce, and consumer services. And yet, Europe has lately been showing a shift in the traditional employment structure in respect of immigrants from Africa. The share of Africans employed in the service industry is rising, and figures for the Africans employed in the steel industry, metalworking, and the auto industry are falling.

The mainstream of Afro-European migration makes straight for France, and also trickles further north. Greater role is played today by transit and receiving countries – Spain and Italy – that only recently themselves were sending their surplus labor to richer European countries. France today hosts 97% of all Algerian, 68% Tunisian, and 47% Moroccan immigrants,<sup>23</sup> an overwhelming majority of immigrants from Senegal, Congo (Brazzaville), Mali, Mauritius, Cameroon, and other French-speaking countries. Moroccans also settle in The Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Germany, and Tunisians put down roots in Germany and Italy. Migration from English-speaking countries to the United Kingdom accounts for a very small proportion of the total migration figures.

Egypt is also a major labor exporter in North Africa because of the ever-present gap between growth in its working-age population and its inability to create new jobs in its own economy. According to ILO data, the number of Egyptian emigrants reached 3 million in 2003, a majority of them working in Libya and Saudi Arabia, and the proportion of migrants going to Europe to find well-paid jobs is constantly increasing.

As a general rule, migrants are physically strong, mostly young (up to 35 years) males of varied qualifications and educational standards, from illiterates to graduates of higher education institutions. Emigrants from North African countries are broken down according to educational standards as follows: 37% of them are illiterate, 42% have a primary school education, 14% are dropouts from secondary and professional schools, and 7% are secondary and higher school graduates.<sup>24</sup>

Besides, there is a common link between a migrant's educational and qualification standards and purpose of emigration, which, in turn, reflects on how far he is prepared to go. While a migrant with little or no education is generally satisfied with a modest, stable wage in a city in his own country, a university graduate will certainly look for adequate remuneration. If he does not find it in his own country, he travels to a foreign country, preferably in the economically developed part of the world. The brain drain from Africa to Western Europe and even North America increases with growth in the number of university graduates who find no employment in their own countries. In the estimates of UNCTAD, an average of 1,800 highly educated professionals migrated annually from Africa in the period from 1960 to 1974, 4,400 during 1975 to 1984, 23,000 from 1985 to 1987, 28,000 during 1990 to 1995, and 35,000 during 1996 to 2003. World Bank experts believe that over a half-million professionals in various fields (30%

of high-skilled labor) emigrated from African countries in the period from 1960 to 2003.<sup>25</sup> Although the share of skilled professionals in Africa south of the Sahara does not exceed 4% in the total labor force, they contribute over 40% of the migrants. In five African countries, migration drains their professional work force of more than 50% of what they count on, in particular, 67.5% in Cape Verde, 63.3% in Gambia, 55.9% in the Seychelles, 56.2% in Mauritius, and 52.5% in Sierra Leone.<sup>26</sup> On the west and east coasts of Africa, a very high rate of migration (over 30%) has been registered in Ghana, Mozambique, Kenya, Uganda, Angola, and Somalia. According to UN data, 16,000 trained nurses left Africa for the United Kingdom in the period from 2000 to 2004. Of the 600 doctors trained in Zambia, 50 only have practices in their homeland, and the city of Manchester in the UK alone has more doctors from Malawi than that African country as a whole has.<sup>27</sup> Little surprise, then, that the pay differential average is from 30 to 40 times. Departure of high-skilled professionals is a great loss for the African countries themselves. Actually, African countries today are subsidizing further development of Western countries, rich as they already are, taking over from them the costly and onerous business of training national professionals on a scale that suits their needs. Considering the increasing brain drain in many African countries and the negative effect the emigration of professionals has on them, the receiving countries have probably to cooperate with the sending countries in finding a solution to this problem acceptable to both sides.

Understandably, the growing scale of labor migration increases the remittances from migrants. Today, the African continent's share of the total official remittances from migrants is relatively small, 15%, with Tropical African countries taking 5% only. The principal beneficiaries of remittances are Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda, Lesotho, Senegal, and Mauritius. Remittances make a significant contribution to many countries' GDP. The most impressive examples are Lesotho, with 23%, followed at a distance by Cape Verde (13.5%), Burkina Faso (6%), and Benin (4.5%). In 2003, the African continent received nearly \$14 billion in remittances from migrants through official channels. The banking system in African countries being inadequate, a considerable part of remittances is sent through unofficial channels. Preference is also given to unofficial channels because of the high costs of official transfers, at times reaching 10% to 15% of the remittances. World Bank experts suggest that unofficial remittances to African countries are two to three times the amounts remitted officially.<sup>28</sup> In Uganda, as an extreme case, official remittances claim a share of only 20% of all the money entering the country from emigrants.<sup>29</sup>

Migrants' remittances are of substantial help to their families. To give an example, more than 400,000 farmhands in Burkina Faso alone migrate to other countries, most of them to neighboring Côte d'Ivoire, in search of

jobs. The money they remit back home help their families to survive. Remittances go to pay for foodstuffs, school or medical services, purchase cattle, plows or farm machines, mills or stores, make investments, buy land for crop farming, build houses, and so on. Remittances flow in by two methods – official and unofficial. The official method uses post offices, banks, money orders, and services of specialized companies, such as Western Union. In 2000, the International Bank of Burkina Faso started working in cooperation with a bank in Côte d'Ivoire on a project to enable migrants from Burkina Faso to open bank accounts in Côte d'Ivoire for remitting their savings back home. Until a bank account owner returns home, his funds are remitted to a relative or friend. In the other, semiofficial or informal method, money is given to a friend, relative or an acquaintance returning home and agreeing to deliver it to the addressee. Occasionally, the money entrusted never reaches the addressee because the carriers are robbed on the way back home, or payoffs are extorted from them by the authorities (at police stations, checkpoints, customs, by military police or army patrols, who subject them to numerous body searches and confiscate their documents that they have to buy out).

In recent years, *hawala* has become a widespread and popular money transfer system. *Hawala* is a fast, very economical, and reliable method of delivering migrants' remittances worldwide, best suited to low-income people. In contrast to bank transfers, *hawala* dealers (*hawaladars*) usually charge a fee within the range of 0.25% to 1% of the transfer amount. Tracing what happens to the money sent through *hawala* will help one understand why *hawala* is so attractive. An immigrant from Burkina Faso pays a part of the amount he wants to remit to a *hawaladar* in Côte d'Ivoire who, in turn, communicates the recipient's name and code word (most frequently, a banknote number) to a *hawaladar* in Burkina Faso. The next day, the migrant's money is delivered to his native village, where the recipient is required to name the code word to be given the money. It all appears as though the money sinks in at one side of the border to float up, without any inconveniences, on the other side. In the case of migrants' remittances, family relations, ethnic ties, and personal relationships between a *hawaladar* and a migrant make this system even more convenient and casual. Flexible working hours and proximity of a *hawaladar* are valued highly by migrant communities. To win customer loyalty, *hawaladars* could request their opposite numbers on the other side of the border to deliver the money to recipients even before the migrants pay up. Besides, traditions encourage working migrants to remit their earnings through the *hawala* system to avoid causing inconveniences to their family members. Many migrant communities are made up of men only. Their wives and other family members stay behind in their native land, maintaining few contacts with the outside world as tradition prescribes. A trusted *hawaladar* known in the village and familiar with the rural code of conduct is an acceptable intermediary

who protects the women against direct business contacts with banks and other agents.

Upon return home, the migrants invest their remittances in export or import businesses, transportation companies, or hotels. A majority of large hotels in Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, belong to people who lived abroad for many years. So do transportation companies, too.

A similar situation exists in other African countries as well. Remittances play a significant role in the life of society in many of the continent's countries. For millions of poor African families, they contribute nearly a half of their overall money incomes, which they spend to improve their living conditions, buy consumer goods, invest in their own businesses, and pay for education and health care.

Aside from economic motivations, migration is caused by political reasons (warfare and ethnic strife) and environmental disasters (droughts, floods, and so on) – both produce streams of refugees. A virtually permanent political instability in Africa's various subregions makes these streams a very prominent component of migration in general. Between 1960 and 1986, the number of forced refugees rose by a factor of 13, from 300,000 to 4 million. According to several estimates, the number of African refugees rose to the extent of 20 to 25 million by 2004. The scale of this phenomenon puts Africa far ahead of other regions – every second refugee in the world is an African.<sup>30</sup>

Typically, most refugees lack the money to travel far. This fact, and their desire to be back home at the earliest opportunity, drive them to look for safe haven in their own country, in the first place (internally displaced persons, or IDPs),\* or, if they find none, cross into neighboring countries. In the 1990s, Ethiopia provided refuge to nearly 300,000 Somalis, and Zaire (now the DRC), gave safe haven to 676,000 refugees from neighboring countries, particularly Rwanda. Of all African countries, Guinea gives asylum to the largest number of refugees. In the early 2000s, it hosted approximately 800,000 refugees, most of them from Liberia and Sierra Leone, or 10% of its own population.<sup>31</sup> Only a small part of this multitude of forced migrants left the continent with the status of “asylum seekers” and “refugees.”

In the last few years, there has been a significant increase in illegal migration from Africa to Europe. The European Commission estimates the number of illegal immigrants, many of them from Africa, living in 15 EU countries at 3 million to 5 million.<sup>32</sup> African migrants attempt to reach

---

\* Estimates of their number in Angola in 1997 placed it at over 1.2 million out of the country's total population of 12.2 million; in Liberia, where civil war continued for many years until 1997, a third of the population fled their homes at one time or another; and in Somalia, internal migration involved up to three-quarters of the population (Africa South of the Sahara, 2001, L., 2000, pp. 163, 659, 1024).

Europe's southern shores from Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia. The route from Morocco to Spain across the Gibraltar Strait (13.9 km wide) has become one of the favourite choices in recent years. Between 100,000 and 120,000 illegal migrants, 35,000 of them from Tropical Africa, cross the Mediterranean every year.<sup>33</sup> Illegal migration has become a real scourge for Libya as well. In 2005, the authorities arrested over 40,000 illegal migrants. Attempts by citizens of African countries to reach European countries from Libyan territory are reported almost daily. Immigrants planning to escape further north make up almost 20% of the country's population. In 2005 alone, the Libyan authorities uncovered and broke up more than 40 organized crime rings ferrying illegal migrants from Libya to other countries.<sup>34</sup> As a general rule, migrants are carried in the holds of freighters or small, old ships. Hundreds of migrants die before they land in Europe.

Illegal migration is causing concern in the EU by related threats and risks. Above all, illegal migration poses a challenge to employment and the labor market. The influx of illegal migrants erodes a country's sovereignty, legal system, and internal security, and throws doubts on its ability to control entry and exit traffic. Frequently, illegal migration encourages crime, particularly smuggling and trafficking of narcotics, weapons, and people. European countries also face the threat of terrorism and extremism practiced by foreigners, including their membership of organizations endangering the security of European countries.

Illegal migration is a greater evil for southern EU countries than it is for other EU members. The south European countries that were recently the chief suppliers of labor in Europe found themselves, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, flooded with hundreds of thousands of illegal migrants, converging mostly on Spain and Italy (1.5 million) and Portugal (nearly 300,000). In 2005, these countries made countless attempts to sort out their migration worries with Morocco and Libya, the chief transit countries. The problem is complicated by the fact that Spain has two enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, on the northern coast of the African continent. In 2004, 55,000 illegal immigrants attempted to enter the enclaves, and another 16,000 were intercepted by the Spanish Navy, which captured 740 boats and motorboats.

The Italian island of Lampedusa, 300 km north of the Libyan coast and 200 km south of Sicily, is another gateway from Africa to the European Union. In 2004 and 2005, 30,000 illegal migrants were arrested on the island.

To keep away illegal migrants from Black Africa, an Atlantic Wall was set up in 2002. It is a system of comprehensive surveillance over the sea expanses between the Canary Islands in the south and the Spanish province of Andalusia. The system comprises 25 tracking stations, 20 mobile radar complexes, and as many patrol ships. The European Union paid 300 million euro for putting the Wall in place. The Wall, however, restricts the penetra-

tion of illegal migrants to Spain from the Atlantic only. The main routes followed by migrants to reach Europe, however, begin on the coasts of West and East Africa. In the west, migrants from Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Cameroon, and the Western Congo converge on the town of Agades in Niger, from where they move on along three routes to Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria. Once in Libya and Algeria, they try to find a way to cross over to Malta or Italy. Otherwise, the same stream that reaches Algeria flows on to Morocco, and then crosses the Gibraltar Strait to Europe. They stay on for some time at an illegal camp, Magnia, that arose spontaneously at the Moroccan border. From there, migrants cross the border and head toward Ujda (Uida), a township known as the unofficial "capital of illegal migrants."

In East Africa, Khartoum, the capital city of Sudan, serves as the rallying point for migrants from Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, and Ethiopia. The route then follows to southern Libya, where the migrants split into two streams, one of which attempts to cross over from the Libyan port of Benghazi to Malta or Lampedusa, and the other tries to reach the same destinations starting out from Tripoli.

A migrant from Tropical Africa needs 12 to 16 months, on average, to reach Europe. It costs him about 2,000 euro to proceed along the route that is controlled by criminal rings, which have made the guiding of migrants to Europe their exclusive trade.

To back up its Atlantic Wall, the European Union is trying to build a network of camps in Libya, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. So far, Libya alone has agreed to have such camps or centres, where the EU immigration service is going to examine migrants' applications for the refugee status or temporary permits to live in Europe. Migrants who do not qualify for either will be sent back home or allowed to remain in the camps for indefinite periods. Many migration experts have doubts about such centres becoming an effective way to control illegal migration.

In the talks it conducts with African countries the EU has always insisted on preferences it was ready to offer them being reciprocated by their obligations to migrant readmission (return of illegal migrants to the last non-EU country from which they arrived). Readmission agreements have been signed by Spain with Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, and Nigeria, and by Italy, with Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Nigeria. Generally, the South European countries insist on tougher migration policies. Their efforts are blocked, however, by more remote countries such as Sweden, Denmark, and Norway.

At present, 80% of Europeans support stricter controls on the European Union's outer borders, although 56% of them have nothing against foreign workers and professionals coming to the EU on invitation.<sup>35</sup> Opinion polls show that Europeans are coming out increasingly for the need to protect their own culture and their lifestyle.

Critics of tougher migration controls argue that controls would be inadequate in achieving the desired effect, and put forward an alternative – the West as a whole would help itself by helping Africa to proceed with its social and economic development in order to create employment opportunities on the continent and gradually raise the living standards that would reduce the scale of intercontinental migration.

Viewed in general terms, while the influx of legal and illegal migrants from African countries into Europe and America has helped to ease the shortages of labor in low-paying industries of the developed countries' economies, it has caused many socioeconomic problems.

The ethnic enclaves of immigrants from African countries have been integrated into the social, political, and economic structure of the receiving countries as closed communities unassimilated with the national environment, and yet claiming all the social services available in these countries. What is more, these enclaves serve frequently as home base for fast-growing criminal rings, shadow economies, and, at times, even terrorist operations. All these darker sides of the ethnic enclaves brought ethnic conflicts in the receiving countries to a head in the late 1990s.

It would certainly be an exaggeration to contend that all immigrant communities tend to isolate themselves within enclaves. As a basic framework for recent-wave immigrants, enclaves are not the only choice available, and the assimilation principle is as valid as ever. A rising number of mixed marriages is one of the reliable criteria supporting this statement. This opposite trend does not, however, alter the overall pattern of the newcomers' increasing isolation. This is largely due to the fact that new migrants arrive regularly to join the existing ethnic communities. Besides, these communities have very high natural growth rates far exceeding the receiving country's average.

The European Union probably needs a new concept that looks at migration in the positive, instead of negative, light. It is perfectly clear that drastic constraints on migration will not be of any benefit to the economic and demographic situation in Europe and other developed countries. Rather than trying to keep immigrants away, the EU might do better by controlling immigration in accordance with its labor needs through encouraging labor influx and restricting illegal migration, and, at the same time, addressing the causes behind the Africans' torrent-like exodus from their native countries.

Robert Kaplan, writing in his famous 1994 book, "The Coming Anarchy," predicted a worldwide crisis caused by the dissolution of West African states, followed by a powerful "immigration explosion." Migrants from Africa, he wrote, would be trying to reach the prosperous Maghreb countries and Europe. His predictions are coming true today. The demographic explosion on the African continent is accompanied by collapse of governments and mass-scale migration of the population. A solution to this prob-



lem can only be found when economic and social development of African countries resumes, which is only possible by the joint efforts of African countries and the world community in general. These efforts might start out from the world's considerable "negative" experience of assistance to African countries. The most significant international assistance programs operate today in Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Congo, Sudan, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. An analysis of their setbacks shows that the region's countries that have emerged from an internal crisis need more than short-term programs designed to produce immediate results – they need comprehensive assistance for many years.

#### Notes:

1. [www.gsim.org](http://www.gsim.org).
2. Ibid.
3. [www.unfpa.org/modules/briefkit/English/ch05.html](http://www.unfpa.org/modules/briefkit/English/ch05.html).
4. [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org).
5. *Africa Renewa*. N.Y.: United Nations Department of Public Information, Vol. 19, No. 4, January 2006, p. 16.
6. [www.ilo.org](http://www.ilo.org).
7. "Global Economic Prospects. Economic Implications of Remittances and Migrations." Washington: The World Bank, 2006, p. 6.
8. Stalker, P. "Workers without Frontiers: The Impact of Globalization on International Migration," New York, 2000, p. 59.
9. Human Rights Watch World Report. 2005. Africa: Overview. <http://www.hrw.org/wr.Africa.html>.
10. Потемкин Ю.В. Миграции в Африке // Страны Африки 2002. – М., 2002. – С. 60-62. [Potyomkin, Yu.V., "Migration in Africa." In: *African Countries 2002*, Moscow, 2002, pp. 60-62.]
11. "Exploitation and Abuse of Children Migrant Workers." Booklet 4.: ILO, 2004, pp. 15-16.
12. [www.sas.upenn.edu/African\\_Studies/Country\\_Specific/Benin.html](http://www.sas.upenn.edu/African_Studies/Country_Specific/Benin.html).
13. <http://www.hrw.org/wr.Africa>.
14. [www.sas.upenn.edu/African\\_Studies/Country\\_Specific/Burkina.html](http://www.sas.upenn.edu/African_Studies/Country_Specific/Burkina.html).
15. Ibid.
16. [www.sas.upenn.edu/African\\_Studies/Country\\_Specific/Nigeria.html](http://www.sas.upenn.edu/African_Studies/Country_Specific/Nigeria.html).
17. Stalker, P., *Op. cit.*, p. 236.
18. "International Migration Policies," p. 154.
19. [www.gov.bw](http://www.gov.bw).
20. [www.libia-olafur.com](http://www.libia-olafur.com).
21. [www.edt.it/lonelyplanet/microguide/text/054/](http://www.edt.it/lonelyplanet/microguide/text/054/)
22. [www.indexmundi.com/es/libia/](http://www.indexmundi.com/es/libia/)
23. C. de Wenden, "L'immigration en Europe," Paris, 1999, p. 32.

24. According to data of the Seventh European Regional ILO Meeting (Budapest, February 14-18, 2005).
25. [www.wdsbeta.worldbank.org](http://www.wdsbeta.worldbank.org).
26. "Global Economic Prospects. Economic Implications of Remittances and Migrations," Washington: The World Bank, 2006, p. 91.
27. [www.gsim.org](http://www.gsim.org).
28. "The Development Dimension of Migrant Remittances." In: *Migration Policy Research*, No. 1, June 2004, p. 13.
29. "Global Economic Prospects. Economic Implications of Remittances and Migrations," Washington: The World Bank, 2006, p. 56.
30. [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org).
31. C. de Wenden, "L'immigration en Europe," Paris, 1999, p. 68.
32. Николаев Д. Единая пограничная служба Европы // Независимое военное обозрение. – 2003. – 26 июля. [Nikolaev, D., "Europe's Unified Border Service." In: *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye* (Independent Military Review), July 26, 2003.]
33. [www.gsim.org](http://www.gsim.org).
34. [www.libia-olafur.com](http://www.libia-olafur.com).
35. [www.imo.org](http://www.imo.org).

## THE “NORTH-SOUTH” RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE G8 ACTIVITY\*

*Alexei Vasiliev*, Director  
of Institute for African Studies,  
Corresponding Member  
of the Russian Academy of Sciences

In this hall are scientists and scholars engaged in solving the pressing problems facing our country: from the creation of missiles, nanotechnologies and biotechnologies to the calculations of economic construction. They may look at and listen to me with surprise and ask: “What do we need Africa and African research for?” To this I shall give a short and categorical answer: “We need Africa more than it needs us”. We believed that the great size of our country determined its inexhaustible natural resources. We have a shortage of manganese without which there can be no ferrous metallurgy. But there is manganese in Africa. We have a shortage of chromium necessary for the production of pipes used in power transmission and production. But there is chromium in Africa. We have a shortage of bauxites, we import copper and uranium from Central Asia. It is necessary to examine how much it costs; perhaps, it would be cheaper to buy it in Africa. We have a shortage of some rare-earth metals, like niobium. But there are such metals in Africa. We need cotton, not only Central Asian, for our industry. In Soviet times we caught tremendous quantity of fish in the African waters. We used to be on a par with Europe in the per capita consumption of fish – 20 kilos. Now the figure is eight. We consume tea, coffee, cocoa, bananas, oranges and other tropical and subtropical products. This short list shows why we have to tackle the problems of the North-South relations within the G8 framework, or outside it. Besides, the best proof of why we should do this is provided by the results of China’s African policy.

In 1990 China’s trade turnover with Africa was about one billion dollars, and the year before last – about 40 billion. The figure for last year, I think, is still bigger. It is planned to increase it to 100 billion dollars in 2010. Our trade turnover with Africa is about five billion dollars, according to the data of the customs services.

But this is, as it’s said, an introduction.

I would like to mention some of the features of Southern society:

Predominantly raw-material character of export and production;

Low indices of the level and quality of life, low longevity and high death rate;

High social stratification;

Large-scale corruption at all levels of power, nepotism, clan character of society;

High crime rate in society;

Degradation of the traditional system of values, thriving consumerism, destruction of national traditions;

Undefined borders combined with separatism, interethnic contradictions and local conflicts;

The use of armed forces for solving domestic problems.

Wouldn’t it be useful for Russia in these conditions to look into the African mirror from time to time? Wouldn’t it be useful to compare development trends in Russian and African societies so different in nature?

I could have enumerated the different features of Russian society compared to those of the South, but this is beyond the limits of my discourse.

The G8 countries, the post-industrial countries, or the so-called North, pay more and more attention to the South. It can be explained by the fact that about three billion people on the globe live in abject poverty, on less than two dollars a day. The poorest of them live in Africa, about 300 million live on less than one dollar a day. The difference between the most developed countries and the less developed ones is simply unbelievable – about 300 times.

Can we regard the actions of the G8 as charity, altruism? Not at all. The point is that the global interests of mankind demand the liquidation of this crying inequality, these “black holes” which breed terrorism, drug trafficking, and slave trade.

Now, let us agree on the terms. What do we mean by the “North” and the “South”? Otto von Bismarck, the German Chancellor of the latter half of the 19th century, once said: “Whoever utters the word ‘Europe’ talks nonsense”. He meant that Europe was a purely geographical notion, but the countries and peoples of Europe were so divided culturally, civilizationally and historically, their development levels and the interests of their ruling elites differed so greatly, that it was simply impossible to speak of Europe as a single whole. He was right, to a degree, because after his epoch Europe was torn apart by two bloody wars which resulted in enormous number of victims and immense losses. Now it is possible to speak of Europe as a single whole (in any case, of Western and Central Europe, and partly, of East Europe), as a single economic entity. But, using Bismarck’s words, whoever utters the words “the Third World” or “the South”, also talks nonsense. Old terms become obsolete very rapidly, and using them one should mention their conditional character. Let us agree that we shall use the word “North” to denote North Atlantic civilization, that is, the countries of Western Europe, the United States and Canada, and, naturally, Australia and New Zealand. Until recently, although it is now questionable, highly-developed Japan, which is the second largest economy in the world, was

---

\* The Report was initially delivered at the Russian Academy of Sciences Presidium Meeting on January 22, 2007.

being included in this group. At present the North gives about two-thirds of the world's GDP – the United States and Europe claim about half and half. This region has entered into the so-called post-industrial development stage, the economy of knowledge, one might call it “information society”. Along with it, there is now East Asia – new industrial states with rapidly developing China as their centre. They produce industrial goods and consume knowledge acquired elsewhere. Even in Japan, which will apparently join this region, the import of innovations and knowledge is eight times bigger than their export. This proportion is still higher for China. Another centre is India, which is also developing very rapidly, but has not yet become China's rival; the gap between them is some 15 to 20 years. But the specific features of its development lie in the production of information technology items and in incomes earned from the so-called outsourcing (a new term meaning transfer of certain operations, including those in the field of information technologies, on contract). There is the region of Eurasia, that is, the former Soviet Union and Soviet republics. But this is a special subject. There are the South and the Deep South. They include Africa, Central America, Albania, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Laos, Cambodia, and certain other countries. They have mainly biospheric economies, that is, chiefly agricultural production on a scale detrimental to the environment.

There is much talk at present about assistance to the countries of the South. I'd like to repeat that the term “developing countries” cannot be applied to many states of the South. These are “non-developing” countries. In many of them the per capita GDP has been falling during the past 40 years, and the main problem facing them is not only abject poverty, but also the disintegration of society. This means that the state in African conditions turns into an “antistate”. One of its functions is corruption and the plundering of the population, but not service to society. Africans realize this only too well, and this was why a programme has emerged with the designation “NEPAD” (“New Partnership for African Development”). It emphasizes the responsibility of the Africans themselves for a solution of their problems in partnership with the North.

Since the late 1990s the G8 has paid more attention to Africa at its meetings. At the meeting in Genoa in 2001 the G8 decided to cooperate with Africa on the basis of the NEPAD programme. At the meeting in Gleneagles (Scotland, 2005) a plan of actions for Africa was adopted which envisaged a programme of fighting poverty and assisting a steady development of the continent. At the summit in St. Petersburg the three main topics were infectious diseases (above all, HIV/AIDS), education and energy security, which had direct bearing on the problems of the South.

Back in 1755 Adam Smith wrote that peace, light taxes and more effective and decent administration of justice were necessary for economic development. These maxims of his, though slightly modified, are still applicable to African reality. Africa has been torn apart for decades by wars be-

tween states and civil wars. Conflicts engulfed almost 20 percent of its territory, they resulted in millions of victims, 20 million refugees and displaced persons. There could be no talk of any normal economic development in these conditions. But the efforts of the world community, the G8 above all, have extinguished conflicts, stopped the civil wars in Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo (the former Zaire), and brought to a halt the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The situation has improved, although conflicts are still going on, in the Horn of Africa, in Sudan (Darfur) and in Chad. The African stand-by forces as well as international centres for training the peace-keeping forces in Africa and other regions are formed with the help of the G8. The UN organizes the Central Fund for quick response. Economic indices are improving.

Measures are taken for organizing a more effective management in the introduction of democratic principles. (Remember Adam Smith's words about more effective and decent system of justice). The UN Anti-corruption Convention has come into force with the support of the G8. Efforts continue to increase the mutual responsibility and accountability of African countries.

Investments are made in the development of human potential, including the fight against HIV/AIDS, and the development of education and scientific research in Africa.

Steps are undertaken to encourage development through improving the conditions of foreign trade, and a decision has been adopted to increase official aid to development. In 2005 it amounted to 107 billion dollars for the entire world, 75 percent of this sum was provided by the G8 members. Africa received 25 billion dollars, and the amount is planned to be doubled by 2010. All debts of the poorest countries have been written off.

It would seem that all this information should sound like a bravura march. However, why do we think that the UN Millennium Declaration adopted in 2000, which declared that the level of poverty on our planet would be reduced by 50 percent by 2015, will not be fulfilled? Why are the poor in Africa the poorest people in the world? Why have the new industrial countries achieved the greatest economic successes, although democracy there is far from exemplary? Why is Vietnam, which receives very little official assistance to development, moving forward more successfully than “the best proteges of the International Monetary Fund” in Africa?

There could be more questions than answers. But by asking these questions one is plunging into an abyss of more complex problems which touch on the character of the present world order and its future, globalization and protests against it, and civilizational characteristics contributing to or obstructing development.

What does Russia do within the G8 framework? Russia has written off about 12 billion dollars' debts of African people and has announced that it intends to write off another 750 million dollars. (For the moment more than

16 billion have been written off. – A.V.) But this should not be taken as charity. First, nine-tenths of the African debt to Russia has been formed as a result of arms deals. Nobody ever pays for the borrowed bullets, moreover, bullets that have missed the target. Besides, nobody knows the real cost of the military hardware which have been left to rust in depots, and then given over to somebody else. If a tank, which could in another case be remelted, was bartered for several tons of bananas, this was a good result, too. And so, Russia has written off these debts and 750 million dollars more.

Contributions to other programmes which Russia makes are not comparable with those of western countries and Japan. But Russia invests tens of millions of dollars in the programme of fighting infectious diseases and certain other programmes. This policy is justified. When we, following the course of political correctness (I have done this time and time again), discuss programmes of aid, we usually neglect one essential aspect, namely, what part of this aid later returns to the economy of the donor-countries. Some figures are well known. During about forty years Africa has received some 550 billion dollars' worth of aid. In the same period Africa returned to western economies in the form of repayment, interests on debts, transfers to western banks by the corrupt elites, investments in real estate, shares and bonds about the same sum – 500 to 550 billion dollars. At present Africa owes countries of the North around 250 billion dollars.

Certain things are not mentioned also due to political correctness. The North ignores the task of putting an obstacle in the way of transferring the money of the corrupt elites to banks and to real estate, virtual or real, in the West. Because this is actually "the buying up of the stolen property" in colossal amounts. Russia could objectively be interested in this, too. Because the "buying up of the stolen property" from Russia is tens of times greater than the return of the stolen money to the Russian economy. According to some data, Russia has lost in the years of our "great reforms" from 200 to 400 billion dollars.

Another problem really important to Africa is the opening of markets for its commodities, above all, agricultural products. Naturally, the North could get along without its agricultural products. Oranges can be grown in California and Florida, peanuts in the southern states of the US. But it is a fact that developed countries grant subsidies and privileges to their agriculture in various forms to the extent of 300 to 320 million euros annually. This exceeds many times over their aid to the South. As a result, African products are not competitive.

At present a subsidy per one cow in Europe is about 2,000 euros, which is 15 times larger than per capita income in Ethiopia. And here is another important detail: a considerable part of aid has been channeled to the poorest countries, yet these countries have registered the lowest development level and the lowest growth, or even the reduction, in the GDP. This means that they have been sitting on the "drug" of aid, embezzling it mercilessly.

This creates another problem, namely, how to distribute aid and control its effectiveness. The G8 should also deal with it. Indeed, debts of the poorest countries have been written off, but if they make new debts, the result may be the same.

Serious problems of the future world order also arise in the North-South mutual relations. Prior to Russia joining G7, this group actually was the headquarters of the NATO countries headed by the United States plus Japan connected with it by allied relations. This was something like an empire, although it is rather dangerous to use old, obsolete terms in relation to new realities. And in answer to the requirements of this group of countries, the neoliberal theories of the withering away of the state have emerged. Indeed, European states have transferred an insignificant part of their state functions to supranational structures, although it is too early to speak of a political confederation of Europe. As to the countries of the South, their future, namely, the direction and character of financial flows, is decided not at their government and parliament level, but mainly at the financial offices of Washington, London, Paris and Frankfurt.

It is claimed that the Westphalian system has come to an end. Let's recall that according to the Westphalian Peace in Europe in the 17th century, the right of states to exist as sovereign entities, without outside interference, say, the interference of the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, became universally recognized. So, it is too early for the big countries to speak of the withering away of the state. Much has been said of the superfluous nature of states in Africa, because they were alien to the local people, their national interests, mentality and civilization. But it turned out that there was simply nothing to replace the state, even a weak one, in small African countries.

Tens of thousands of non-governmental organizations and non-state subjects operate in the international arena. The main ones of them are transnational companies. In their economic and financial might some of them even surpass the aggregate GDP of, say, the states of Central Africa, or even South Africa. In international relations when certain problems are discussed, the formal democratic rule: one person – one vote, is now replaced by the rule: one dollar – one vote. In this connection the question arises as to whether such situation is rational, let alone moral, in the world order, under which 200 richest families with an aggregate capital of about one trillion dollars exist side by side with three billion people living on one to two dollars a day. So far, there are no appropriate legal standards determining the framework of the activity of transnational companies.

The future of the backward countries is really unpredictable. When we talk of the post-industrial countries, though this term is rather imprecise, we know that three quarters of the growth in the GDP there are due to scientific discoveries. This means that the next social transformation is already going on there. But we do not know in what form the new class, or social group of

intellectuals, that is, scientists, responsible for this additional GDP will emerge. As is known, about five percent of the population can be engaged in research work. As far as Africa is concerned, it is facing the task of jumping over the wide gap separating pre-industrial society from post-industrial society. It is a fact that a several African countries are de-industrialized, which is partly due to Chinese competition, for instance, in the production of textiles and ready-made garments.

An answer to globalization in its present form would be the development of network structures, which will result in a greater flexibility of “transnational actors” in the international arena. Network structures of a criminal type and entire criminal communities emerge whose incomes are comparable with the gross national product of countries of an average development level, like, say, Spain. Network structures emerge whose aim is to destroy this world of ours by means of terror. “Al Qaeda” is not a vertically ruled organization. It has one inalienable resource – motivated self-destruction. It’s not for nothing that Pope John Paul II, in one of his encyclicals, called it “the culture of death”. In Africa, if a state fulfils just one anti-national function and corruption becomes its main function, society disintegrates and becomes ungovernable, chaotic and closely connected with the world criminal community.

This situation can only be overcome by the joint efforts of representatives of the countries of the South and the G8.

A theory has emerged (in Russia, too) that colonialism is returning under the guise of protectorates with the consent of Africans or Asians themselves. (We should recall that neocolonialism has never disappeared). However, one important factor is overlooked, namely, that changes, even blissful changes, cannot be foisted upon nations from outside, especially with the use of force.

Let us turn to recent history. The British Empire was one of the most successful empires in the history of mankind. In the early 20th century peace and stability in many countries of the world with the population of about 400 million were maintained by the armed forces numbering 240,000 men. This is less than the armies of the coalition which invaded Iraq. But the insulted national dignity of the elites and popular masses, perhaps, were the main driving force in the anticolonial struggle. Just remember the speeches of the great orator Gamal Abdel Nasser half a century ago. One of his key words was *karama* – “dignity”. What was the result of Arab nationalism is quite another question. But it will be impossible to return to open colonialism.

Is any new imperial structure possible in the modern world? I think not. The point is not only the appearance of real rivals of the United States, such as China with its rapidly growing economy, interconnected with Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. To boot, Europe now is not a satellite of the United States, but its real rival economically. The point is that it is impossi-

ble to force one’s own order, one’s own values even on weak countries with the use of arms. American failure in Iraq is well-known to all. Here I’d like to recall a little-known fact of an event which took place in Africa over 100 years ago. When the British invaded the small territory of Benin, they destroyed the royal palace along with unique Benin bronze, which was actually an unwritten history of the country and its people, and banished the sacred king. However, the British could not rule the country properly and after 25 years were forced to call back the son of that sacred king to the throne. He was the embodiment of the sacred forces and the spirit of ancestors, although many of his subjects had become Christians by that time. The British invaders were unable to rule the country without this sacred king. His role can be compared with that of Dalai Lama in Tibet. By the way, we have visited Benin and the residence of the sacred king. It was the first visit of Russians in the 600-year-long history of this dynasty. The sacred king studied at Oxford and spoke perfect English. Our group included Doctor Bondarenko, a young africanist, who presented the king with his books, the world’s best, about his dynasty and his country.

I shall not dwell on many problems of the North or the South. I’d like to mention that the US failure in Iraq means the beginning of the end of the neo-imperial American policy. The United States is facing more serious problems than that of Iraq – economic, financial and others.

I’d like to dwell on another aspect. The G8 renders assistance to certain countries of the South. But the main mechanism of development, the main factor of progress of these or other countries is not mentioned. It is customary to talk of Puritan ethics which was the driving force of capitalism (we mean work, ascetic life, service to God, accumulation of capital). Activity was based on rationalism, discipline, and accurate book-keeping. It was presumed that the main figure, the centre of society, was the individual, man, and the main ideology was individualism. Its ideas took shape during the period of Renaissance and Reformation, and were then developed by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Montesquieu.

I don’t say that in modern western (northern) society these ideals are replaced by the ideals of hedonism, or consumer society (incidentally, if China follows the American way of life, the environment will collapse. But this is a separate subject). It was presumed that only these ideals of western (northern) society could encourage and help the rest of the world to develop. In other words, all should follow the social, economic, political and ideological model of the United States and Europe.

But neither individualism, nor private ownership, nor personal freedom has ever been the foundation of the existence of society in the East or in Africa. The combination of the producer with the means of production was a function of power, or community, team, corporation, tribe, brotherhood or caste there. People differed from one another not only in the presence or absence of property, not only in individual talents and abilities, but also in

their social role and place in society to which they belonged both vertically and horizontally. In our days, too, African, Arab or Indian in society is rather a collective being, a member of a tribe, a family to which he or she belongs. The prestige and influence of the individual is determined, above all, by his group. Its power, both collective expressed by public opinion, and personified can be made sacral by religion or custom, or both.

The social system of the Orient presupposes patriarchal and patronage-cliential relations, which were laid down in China by Confucius: "The Father should be father, the son – son, the emperor – emperor, and the subject – subject". In other words, the father teaches the son, guides him, passes on to him his mores and morals, and at the same time is responsible for him, and the son, taking everything from his father, is also responsible to him, has to continue his business, take care of his family, his parents in old age, etc. The same is true of the emperor. Similar patronage-cliential system exists in the biggest corporations of Japan – "Sony" and "Mitsubishi", and the well-known Korean "chebols". These relations are quite natural for Africa. Can they be an obstacle in development? If a man of some tribe becomes a minister, it would be unbelievable that he would not appoint his fellow-tribesmen to important and lucrative posts, or would not place profitable orders with his tribesmen doing business.

I would call African society multi-dimensional and multi-patterned, but not multi-structural. Why such a definition? Because man can exist in different dimensions; a government official who has graduated from Oxford or Sorbonne, might share democratic views and western ideals. Being a government official of a repressive state apparatus, he acts contrary to his ideals, but within the framework of his functions. But outside his office, doing business, he can act according to the market laws, rather a corrupt market connected with access to state benefits. But at the same time he is a member of a tribe, witchcraft alliance or Sufi brotherhood, and this is why he must share his opportunities with other members of this body. Moreover, he may have to submit to the leader of this social group. Such are the real conditions of African life.

But if African society is a multi-dimensional, multi-patterned one, then the Marxist premises which we adhered to for quite a long time cannot be applied to it. Marx wrote that a definite form of the development of production, exchange and consumption evolves a definite social system, a definite type of the organization of the family and sections or classes of civil society. This definition is incorrect at the present stage of social development.

Take the problem of migration. One of the reasons for the competitive weakness of North Atlantic civilization, that is, Europe plus America, as compared with China and India, is that the white population is dwindling. Immigration is necessary, but it will result in increasing the number of newcomers from the South in the centres of the North, changing its national identity and confessional composition, to say nothing of the colour of skin.

This is why obstacles are raised in the way of this migration. A contradiction arises between the proclaimed principles of freedom, free trade and the movement of capital, on the one hand, and the free movement of workforce, on the other. Thus, a system of global apartheid has emerged, which collapsed in South Africa. Things are simpler among the Chinese or Indians. Attendants, street-, office-, windows-, toilet-cleaners will be either a Chinese or an Indian. Both China and India draw human resources from the colossal reserves of low-paid workforce, which Europe and America are so short of. Despite the birth control measures, China has a population surplus of 13 million each year, and India's population growth is even greater. However, this will be their advantage for several decades ahead.

A question arises whether I am a pessimist or optimist with respect to Africa. There is "afropessimism", that is, nothing will come out of any assistance rendered it, Africa is a "black hole", etc. On the contrary, according to "afrooptimism", if this assistance is 100 billion dollars a year, everything will come out all right. I regard myself an "afrorealist", claiming that no matter how complex the fate of the continent is, its problems can be resolved.

An old Russian jocular question – "What would you like: Constitution or sturgeon, horseradish sauce?" will be in an Afro-Arab context as follows: "What would you like: democratic freedoms or a plate of kus-kus?", that is, economic upsurge and higher standards of living. Naturally, the answer of the overwhelming majority of the population will be in favour of the latter, that is, enlightened authoritarianism ensuring social and economic progress. By enlightened authoritarianism we mean a regime oriented to socio-economic development, restricting democracy, yet observing the basic human rights.

Do African misfortune and misery mean that Africa hopelessly lags behind the modern world and has lost the ability to solve its own problems forever? History shows that the superiority or domination of one or another country, region or civilization is a temporary, transient phenomenon. Just remember the Ancient Roman historian Tacitus who spoke of the Germans as dirty, undisciplined barbarians incapable of leading a civilized life. It was only yesterday or the day before that pessimistic assessments prevailed concerning some Asian countries. The Nobel Prize winner Gunnar Myrdal asserted that the economic future of China and India were simply hopeless. But the world is changing and the prophets of yesterday are being proved wrong. If one takes long periods and thinks not about years, but decades, one may presume that Africa has a future.

## THE AFRICAN UNION AND RUSSIA\*

**Yevgeny Korendyasov**, Ph.D.(Econ.),  
Head of the Centre for Russian-African Relations,  
Institute for African Studies, RAS

**Vladimir Shubin**, D.Sc.(Hist.),  
Deputy Director of the Institute  
for African Studies, RAS

*The formation of the continental organization – African Union (AU) – opens up new opportunities for the development of relations between Russia and the countries of Africa. The formation of the AU is an important step toward the implementation of the concept of African unity in the present conditions. An analysis of the basic documents and the activity of the new African organization demonstrates a greater resolution of the African leaders to follow the path of uniting the political and economic forces of the continent, and their desire to speak in unison in the international arena in order to ensure Africa a worthy place in the new world order.*

More than 40 years ago the concept of African unity was put forward by the then President of Ghana, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah who advocated the formation of “the United States of Africa” with one government and a united army. However, at the time everything ended in the formation of the Organization of African Unity in 1963, which united the independent states of Africa. During later decades political and economic life in Africa developed mainly within the framework of individual states or regional associations, whereas the OAU was only the venue of discussions between the leaders of these countries on questions of decolonization and settlement of interstate differences by peaceful means.\*

At the same time, by the late 1990s the need for a closer political and economic integration of the continent became ever more evident. The cardinal political and socio-economic changes at the turn of the century, both on the continent and in the world, and the emergence of new challenges demanded an adequate reaction on the part of Africans. Thus the idea emerged to reorganize the OAU and set up the African Union. It was called upon to present an effective answer to the challenges the African continent faced at the end of the 20th century, namely, the threats of marginalization

---

\* First published in *Vostok* (Oriens), 2007, No. 5, pp. 118-126.

\*\* The results of the activity of the OAU, and also the first steps of the AU were analyzed in Yu. Potyomkin's article “The African Union: Eventual Reality or Vain Troubles?” [*Vostok* (Oriens), 2003, pp. 96-109].

of African states along with the development of globalization, the further aggravation of poverty, inter-African armed conflicts, and socio-political stagnation.

Heated debates arose among African leaders on the problems of the competence of the new union, its structure, and the principles and methods of its work. As it is now, just as the OAU 45 years ago, the AU is an unstable compromise between the “maximalists” and “minimalists”. The chief “maximalist” was the Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi. Speaking at the OAU summit in Algiers in July 1999, he insisted that the new union should adopt the form of the “United States of Africa” with legislative, executive and financial-economic bodies having wide supranational powers, and with common armed forces. But his bold and resolute proposals were not supported by most African leaders.

An analysis of the Constitutive Act of the AU endorsed at the OAU summit in Lome (Togo) in July 2000, which went into force in May 2001, and the OAU Charter, makes it possible to understand as to what extent the new organization will continue the course of its predecessor, and also as to what are the differences between them. In the very beginning the Act declares that the heads of state and government of African countries, while adopting the Act, “are inspired by the noble ideas, which guided the founding fathers of our continental organization and the generations of Pan-Africanists in their striving to contribute to unity, solidarity, cohesion and cooperation between the peoples of Africa and African states” (*Constitutive Act*, 2001, p. 3).

Just as the OAU, the new Union proclaims “the protection of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member-states” as its task. However, the Constitutive Act speaks not only of “sovereign equality”, but also “the interdependence of the AU member-states”. African leaders proclaimed the right of any member of the AU to ask for “the interference of the Union with a view to restoring peace and security” (*Constitutive Act*, p. 5). Moreover, the Act envisages the right of the AU, on the basis of a decision of the Assembly of the heads of state and government adopted by the two-third majority of votes, to interfere directly (including with the use of arms) in the affairs of a member-state in the event of emergency situations on its territory, like: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. A principally new premise of the Charter, reflecting changes in the international situation, was the denunciation of and refusal to recognize the governments that came to power unconstitutionally (*Constitutive Act*, p. 12). Both these premises reflect the historical experience of the independent African states, where coups, bloody civil wars, and even genocide have taken place.

A separate clause of the Act emphasized “assistance to the maintenance of peace, security and stability on the continent” (*Constitutive Act*, p. 4). The protection of peace is also mentioned in the principle, inherited from

the OAU, of “respect of the state frontiers of the members of the organization, which existed by the time of their gaining independence”. Inasmuch as the borders between African states were, as a rule, established as a result of the colonial division of the continent, disregarding the ethnic factor and natural boundaries, in the conditions of the growing struggle for resources there is a danger of fanning interethnic conflicts and territorial disputes by outside forces, namely, transnational companies, as well as the local elites.

Changes have also taken place in the organizational frame of the continental union. The name and organizational structure clearly resemble the European Union. The highest executive body of the AU is called Commission, but not General Secretariat as it was in the OAU, and the post of its head is called Chairperson of the Commission as in the EU, but not Secretary General. An essential difference from the OAU is the setting up of the Pan-African Parliament and African Court on Human and Peoples Rights, along with the previous Assembly of the Heads of State and Government and the Executive Council (which replaced the Council of Ministers). Together with the formation of parliament, the democratic nature of the AU bodies should be reflected by the Economic, Social and Cultural Council inasmuch as this consultative body includes representatives not only of governments, but also non-governmental organizations and professional groups. Economic integration should be promoted by specialized technical committees, the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund and the African Investment Bank (*Constitutive Act*, p. 9) set up by the Assembly.

Thus, the founders of the AU have placed in the forefront questions of political and economic integration of the countries of the continent with a view to “jointly opposing all challenges”, with which Africa meets in the context of “the social, economic and political changes going on in the world” (*Constitutive Act*, p. 3).

At the same time the organizational potential of the managerial bodies of the African Union does not always correspond to the character of new tasks and, as before, is imprecise and short of real power. Thus, there is still a possibility of turning the AU into a powerless “trade union of the heads of state”, something the OAU was during the last years of its existence.

\* \* \*

During the five years of its existence the AU has exerted its main efforts along the following lines: the formation of working bodies, settlement of conflicts, mobilization of international resources for integration projects. Of course, the first years of its existence do not present the grounds for drawing definite conclusions about how effectively its future mechanisms will contribute to the achievement of the aims and integration of African countries. It should be admitted that from the very first practical steps the AU encountered definite difficulties.

At the meeting in Lusaka in 2001 African leaders were unable to agree on the candidacy of the new Secretary General of the OAU, who had to carry on practical work about its transformation into the AU. Then during the institutionalization of the AU in 2002 the acting Chairperson of the Commission was elected for a term of one year only. At the next summit in Maputo (the capital of Mozambique) in 2003, the representative of Mali, Alfa Oumar Konare, became the legitimate head of the Commission, and the representative of Rwanda, Patrick Mazimhaka – his deputy (*Summary of the Election...* 2003, p. 11).

The election of the former President of Mali to the post of the head of the executive Commission was well received in Africa and elsewhere. A well-known African intellectual, the author of quite a few books on African history, he has twice been elected President of Mali, and later was the head of the Economic Community of West African States (1999-2000). He advocated not only economic, but also political integration of the region right up to the formation of the “federal West African Republic” (*Profile...*, 2005, p. 1).

Apart from the chairperson of the Commission and his deputy, eight members (commissioners) were elected, among them five women, reflecting the desire to enhance their role in the political life of Africa. Thus the Commission consists of ten persons, two from each region of Africa. This is their sphere of activity:

- Peace and Security – Said Djinnit (Algeria)
- Political Affairs – Ms. Julia Dolly Joiner (Gambia)
- Infrastructure and Energy – Bernard Zoba (Congo-Brazzaville)
- Social Affairs – Ms. Bience Philomina Gawanas (Namibia)
- Human Resources, Science and Technology – Ms. Nagiya Mohammed Essayed (Libya)
- Trade and Industry – Ms. Elizabeth Tankeu Essayed (Cameroon)
- Rural Economy and Agriculture – Ms. Rosebud Kurwijila (Tanzania)
- Economic Affairs – Maxwell Mkwezalamba (Malawi)

The highest official of the AU is its Chairperson who is elected by the Assembly of the heads of state and government for a term of two years.

The body whose activity should ensure stability in Africa is the permanently working Peace and Security Council (*Protocol...*, 2002). The setting up of this body was not envisaged when the Constitutive Act was adopted, however, the possibility of forming “other bodies” by a decision of the AU Assembly was mentioned. A protocol on the setting up of the PSC was adopted at the first conference of the heads of state and government of the African Union in Durban (South Africa) in July 2002. It began functioning in May 2004, and the criteria of selecting the “Panel the Wise” are still under discussion (conversation with J. Mugumya, 2006).

The Peace and Security Council has the duty to undertake preventive measures, in accordance with the conditions determined by the Constitutive



Act and other AU documents, with a view to averting conflict situations and conflicts; take the necessary actions with a view to stopping conflicts, including the deployment of peacekeeping missions; recommend the Assembly of the heads of state of the AU to resort to the use of force on behalf of the Union on the territory of a state where war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity are committed; proclaim sanctions against a state where the anti-constitutional overthrow of government takes place; implement measures against terrorism; ensure interaction and cooperation with the regional centres working for peace, with the UN and other international organizations. The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC does not mention the mandatory character of the decisions adopted by this body, but points out that the AU member-states agree to accept and implement the decisions of the Peace and Security Council in accordance with the Constitutive Act” (*Conseil...*, 2005, p. 26).

To ensure the fulfillment of the PSC functions, the Panel of the Wise and the Continental Early Warning System, the African Standby Force, a special Peace Fund, and the Military Staff Committee have been set up under it (*Protocol...*, 2002, pp. 17-21). The PSC consists of 15 persons, ten of whom are elected for two years and five for three years (*Protocol...*, 2002, p.8). It has been established that three persons should represent Central Africa, three – East Africa, two – North Africa, three – Southern Africa, and four – West Africa. Decisions on procedural questions at the PSC are adopted by simple majority, and on other questions – by two-thirds of votes. Thus, the system of the formation and the rules of work of the PSC differ from those of its “global analogue” – the UN Security Council. There are no permanent members, no rule of veto, no mandatory decisions. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that in certain cases there can be deviations from the “sacral” principle of non-interference in its internal affairs.

Initially it was expected that the African Standby Force would be formed by the end of June 2004, however, it was later postponed to 2010. These forces are to consist of five brigades numbering 20,000 men deployed in northern, eastern, western southern and central regions of Africa. The headquarters of these forces commanded by General Ishaya Hassan (Nigeria), appointed in 2005, were to be situated in Addis Ababa (*People’s Daily...*, 17.1.2006).

The formation of another important body of the African Union – the Pan-African Parliament – proceeded slowly, too. Although a protocol determining its functions and composition was unanimously adopted by the AU members, only 18 states of 53 ratified it during the first year, which resulted in the violation of the decision concerning its first meeting before January 31, 2004. This meeting was held in Addis Ababa only in March, because several countries vied for the place of its work. It was only in October 2004 that it began to function in South Africa, namely, in Midrand, halfway between the official capital – Pretoria and the economic capital Jo-

hannesburg. The first session of the Pan-African Parliament elected Gertrude Mongella of Tanzania as its chairperson. The composition of this parliament, which has only consultative functions so far, was done by the national parliaments of the AU member-states, which delegated their representatives in equal number. It is envisaged that in five years the Pan-African Parliament will acquire legislative functions (like the present European Parliament) and its members will be elected by the direct vote of African citizens. For comparison’s sake, it should be said that this practice of electing European Parliament was established only after 25 years of its functioning.

Just as other bodies of the AU, the Pan-African Parliament has encountered financial difficulties. The situation became so tense that the holding of a regular session of the PAP in October 2006 had to be postponed for a month, and it took place with the participation of Nelson Mandela, who supported the setting up of the Trust Fund of Pan-African Parliament, which was to become an additional source of financial means necessary for its functioning. It was expected that contributions to it would come from the “corporate sector”, that is, private companies (*Pan-African Parliament*, 2006). Besides, the means of the foundation will be replenished from sources outside the African continent: thus, right after its establishment Germany donated 0.5 million dollars. As to the African Court, its judges were appointed only in July 2006, and it has not yet begun its work on permanent basis in the town of Arusha (Tanzania).

Such delay is caused not so much by financial and material-technical problems, or bureaucratic twists and turns, as by fear and unwillingness of many African leaders “to have their hands tied”.

\* \* \*

The formation of the African Union has proceeded in the situation of continuing international conflicts and civil wars. In the 1990s the old “demons of wars and violence” became more active, and new ones emerged: interethnic and religious wars, anti-constitutional coups, acts of terror, illegal arms trade, drug trafficking, organized crime, etc. In 2006, on the fifth year of the existence of the African Union, nine African states were in the zone of armed conflicts or acute domestic instability, with the wide use of violence.

The African Union is working more energetically for stopping conflicts and achieving a peaceful political settlement of contradictions. In particular, it has made a substantial contribution to the efforts to reach a peaceful solution of the situation in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia. By a decision of the African Union and African regional associations, African peacekeepers were sent (as a rule, in cooperation with the UN) to Burundi, Somalia (1,700 men, July 2005), Côte d’Ivoire (1,300 men, September 2002), Liberia (3,500 men, August 2003), Sudan (3,500 men, 2004).

Nevertheless, the leading role in the development of peacekeeping process belongs to the UN Security Council. It is due to the lack of experience, both organizational and military, and a shortage of financial and material resources of Africans. But there are other factors, too, which influence the situation: fear to violate the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of countries, the desire of the conflicting clans not to let “aliens” on to their grounds, and also the fact that internal conflicts quite often turn into a profitable business for “warlords” and a source of enrichment of a great number of African adventurers.

The African Union consistently adheres to the decisions denouncing anti-constitutional coups. From 1995 to 2006 there were more than ten forcible overthrows of governments. All of them were denounced by the leading bodies of the African Union. However, this denunciation was of a declarative, political-diplomatic character. Steps have not been taken to introduce concrete sanctions envisaged by the basic documents of the AU.

The African Union is striving to concentrate its main efforts on tackling the problems of economic development, above all, the reduction of poverty. Up to now, practical activity in this field has been carried on within the framework of the programme “New Partnership for Africa’s Development” (NEPAD) regarded as the economic programme of the African Union. The elaboration of this program proceeded parallel with the process of the transformation of the OAU into the AU, even running ahead of it. The initiative to work out and implement a common continental strategy in the conditions of the globalized world belonged to the presidents of South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria – Thabo Mbeki, Olusegun Obasanjo and Abdelaziz Bouteflika, to which the President of Senegal Abdoulaye Wade joined later. The NEPAD programme was approved at the OAU summit in July 2001. That year the Committee of the Heads of State and Government on the implementation of a new programme began to work, and the NEPAD Secretariat was set up in the South African town of Midrand. The programme was endorsed by the UN, the Committee G8 and the leading world financial organizations. Although the first summit of the AU proclaimed the NEPAD its current economic programme, the fact that it was elaborated “autonomously”, and also that its Secretariat was outside the AU headquarters, does not contribute to the proper coordination of its activity.

The implementation of the NEPAD programme has encountered considerable obstacles. Certain African countries suspect that the NEPAD will serve the interests of big African states with “high world ratings”, like, say, South Africa. Besides, western partners maintain that the establishment of the democratic principles of a western type, a “good governance” and free market in Africa is the main requisite for the fulfillment of this programme, whereas the Africans have their own understanding of these problems and they place an emphasis on practical support of western partners in tackling the economic and social problems of the continent.

Difficulties have also arisen in the organization of the African Peer Review Mechanism envisaged by the NEPAD programme, which was called a voluntary “self-monitoring mechanism” (38th Ordinary Session... 2002). Up to now the document on participation in this mechanism has been signed by 27 states, and only seven states have joined the process (Algeria, Ghana, Gabon, Rwanda, Kenya, Mauritius and South Africa).

The African Union runs against many difficulties, and the plans of continental integration often contradict African realities. The Chairperson of the Commission talked with bitterness about it to the authors of this article. It can be said without any exaggeration that there are two opposing positions in Africa. Some people, above all M. Qaddafi and A. Konare, want the Commission to turn into a real executive body, in its own way an all-continental government, and the commissioners to have the powers of “all-African ministers”. The other position boils down to observing the sovereign rights, which were gained along with independence, and dragging out the realization of the supranational competence of the African Union.

A group under the guidance of O. Obasanjo has been set up to examine the problems of reorganizing the AU Commission, and the results of its work have been discussed at the AU summits. Debates were quite heated, for the interests of all 53 member-states of the AU had to be taken into account. At the 9th summit of the AU (July 1-4, 2007) M. Qaddafi’s idea to step up continental integration and form the unified armed forces of the continent was again turned down. The South Africa President Thabo Mbeki said in his speech that the main aim at present was the implementation of the plans of integration within the regional framework and the settlement of conflicts (*Puls planeti*, July 5, 2007, l. AF-2).

\* \* \*

In its main programmatic aims and practical activity the African Union is in line with the aims and priorities of Russia in the international arena and on the African continent. Along with its formation and development as an authoritative political and economic association, and given the efforts of the Russian side, the African Union can become an important additional lever for broadening Russian positions and influence on the continent, and for enhancing its international prestige, especially in the zone of the countries of the South.

A message of President V. Putin to the President of Ghana John Agyekum Kufuor on the occasion of his election as Chairperson of the African Union in July 2007 said: “Russia highly values the energetic steps of the African Union to consolidate the efforts aimed at tackling the problems facing the continent. The broader participation of the Pan-African organization in world affairs objectively contributes to greater global stability and a more balanced system of international relations... We are interested in strengthening versatile cooperation with African countries. We rely on a

broader dialogue with their most authoritative association – the African Union – in the entire range of mutual relations” (<http://www.kremlin.ru/text/news/2007/02/118621.shtml>).

There are objective and subjective foundations for such cooperation. Russia, while overcoming “confusion and vacillations”, have accumulated vast financial resources and can now find quite a few objects in Africa to invest these means with a view to getting mineral raw materials and products of tropical agriculture and broader markets for selling its machines and equipment.

The meetings with political figures and scientists and scholars, which the authors of this article have recently had in several countries of Africa -- from Algeria to Zimbabwe – show that most of them favour cooperation with Russia. This can also be applied to the leadership of the African Union. We had meetings with the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Alfa Oumar Konare, the commissioners on the infrastructure and energy, and on trade and industry, the heads of the department on peace and security and the political department at the headquarters of the AU in Addis Ababa. These meetings showed that such positive attitude is based on “historical memory”, on the high evaluation of the role of our country in decolonization and the liquidation of racist regimes in Africa, in the economic development of independent African states, and especially in the training of their highly-skilled national personnel. It is indicative that of the five high officials of the AU we talked to, two were graduates of Soviet educational institutions.

## POLITICS AS A FACTOR OF RUSSIA’S IMAGE IN AFRICA\*

*Tatyana Deich*, Ph.D.(Hist.),  
Senior Research Fellow,  
Institute for African Studies, RAS

In our view, two basic images of Russia and its domestic and foreign policy have been formed in Africa by now. The **first** is founded on the perception of Russia as the direct heir of the Soviet Union, which is, as before, a great power, irrespective of the present geopolitical and geoeconomic situation, capable to exert decisive influence on the correlation of forces in the world. From the point of view of the implementation of Russia’s foreign-policy strategy and its policy in African countries such perception is quite favourable.

The **second** image is based on the attitude to Russia as a part of the former superpower, which has lost its previous strategic advantages, has taken a backward step in the economic sphere, and now holds a modest enough place in the hierarchy of great powers. The perception of Russia in this view creates serious difficulties, giving rise to a negative idea of our country as an unpromising partner.

Of course, there are intermediate images, combining certain features of the first and the second images, but on the whole, African public opinion tends to associate Russia with the image of the second type.

According to the data of a sociological poll conducted in a number of Arab countries, including Egypt and Morocco, by the American research service “Zogby International” in December 2005, the image of China is noticeably better than that of Russia. In particular, 70 percent of Egyptians and 52 percent of Moroccans sympathise with China.<sup>1</sup> Similar situation prevails in Tropical Africa, where China’s policy is more popular than that of Russia and, accordingly, the image of China looks more attractive.

After the disintegration of the USSR, the perception of Russia by Africans could not but change. The balance of views of rank-and-file African citizens forming public opinion, as well as the elite making a considerable contribution to the creation of the image of Russia on the continent, was determined by the sum total of a number of factors: the interpretation of events in Russia by the mass media and leading politicians; the perception by Africans of the role and place of Russia in the changed geopolitical conditions; and finally, by the attitude of the Russian leadership to African problems and policy on the continent.

---

\* First published in *Asia and Africa Today*, 2007, No. 6, pp.29-40.

As a result, a trend toward a cooling of bilateral relations as well as toward a revision of the image of Russia by Africans has become quite pronounced.

The African mass media began to harp on the theme “Russia has left Africa to the mercy of fate” (it was especially popular in the 1990s). Today, too, the thesis about Africa being at the “back yard” of Russian foreign policy mainly oriented to the West is as popular as ever. It dominates the personal opinion of Africans who happened to study or work jointly with citizens of our country. This situation can be changed by the acquaintance of Russians with real Africa, and Africans with real Russia. At the same time our country and its leadership have to undertake great efforts to overcome the habitual stereotypes in the sphere of its international policy toward Africa.

### **The Role of Russian Diplomacy**

The collapse of the Soviet Union has disrupted the ties of Russia with African countries. The relations with Africa have taken one of the last places among foreign-policy priorities. In 1992 Russia closed down nine embassies and four consular offices on the continent. Most cultural missions and centres ceased to exist. All this dealt a serious blow at our diplomacy and policy in Africa.

Today Russia has diplomatic relations with 53 African countries, however, there are no Russian diplomatic missions in 13 of them. At the same time 14 African countries with which Russia has established diplomatic relations have no missions in Moscow: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Cape Verde, Comoros, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Swaziland, Seychelles and Togo.<sup>2</sup> Not a single Russian leader visited Tropical Africa right up to 2006; this is an unprecedented situation for the diplomatic practice of the leading western countries and China with regard to African countries. The level of cultural and scientific exchanges has dropped sharply.

The beginning of the new millennium was marked by stepping up diplomatic exchanges. In 2006 President Vladimir Putin visited Egypt – the leading country of North Africa, and the Republic of South Africa, the leading country of the South of the continent, which, undoubtedly, was of a great political significance for the Russian-African relations and the image of Russia in Africa.

From 2001 onward a number of visits to Russia by the leaders of some African countries (Gabon, Guinea, Nigeria, Ethiopia), and foreign ministers of other African countries (Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Africa) has taken place. In turn, Africa was visited by I. Ivanov, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and S. Lavrov, the present-day Minister of Foreign Affairs. A. Saltanov, the

Deputy Foreign Minister, visited Egypt in March 2006, and Ethiopia in January 2007. The Russian Premier Mikhail Fradkov’s visit to Africa (Angola, Namibia and South Africa) took place in March 2007. More than 30 political consultations with diplomatic departments of African countries were held in 2005-2006.

Inter-parliamentary cooperation also developed. A Russian parliamentary delegation headed by G. Boos, deputy speaker of the State Duma, visited Mozambique and Angola in 2005. As a result of this visit a protocol on cooperation between the State Duma of Russian Federation and the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique was signed. Another Russian parliamentary delegation visited Equatorial Guinea. In turn, parliamentary delegations from Madagascar, Botswana and the Democratic Republic of Congo visited Moscow.<sup>3</sup>

In recent years agreements on cooperation with a number of African countries have been signed or renewed. Among them are agreements on cooperation in sea shipping with the RAS, memorandums on cooperation of the Russian Trade and Industry Chamber with the Chambers of Commerce of South Africa and Angola, an agreement with Botswana on visa-free travel with diplomatic and service passports, etc.<sup>4</sup>

The Russian leadership broadened cooperation with African regional organizations, primarily, with the African Union. In 2005, the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Ethiopia was accredited at the Commission of the African Union. That very year a Russian delegation headed by Doku Zavgayev, Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, took part in the work of the 6th session of the Heads of States and Governments’ Assembly of the African Union in Khartoum (Sudan). Contacts have been stepped up with ECOWAS, SADC and other subregional organizations. Russia’s interest in developing relations with ECOWAS was confirmed during the visit of Y. Fedotov, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, to Nigeria in 2004, in a conversation with M. Chambas, executive secretary of the above mentioned organization.

More attention was paid to personal contacts with African leaders. In March 2007, A.M. Vassiliev, Special representative of the President of the Russian Federation for relations with the leaders of African states, Director of the Institute for African Studies, RAS, visited Ghana on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of that country’s independence and handed its President a message from the President of Russia Vladimir Putin with congratulations on that momentous occasion.

The present policy of Russia on the African continent makes an emphasis on cooperation with the most economically developed countries promising from the point of view of partnership (South Africa, Nigeria, Angola, and others). Special attention is paid to broadening contacts with South Africa, which provides access to other countries of the subregion. Russia’s in-

terest in cooperation with the Republic of South Africa regarded as a highly developed country by African standards and as the leading country of the South of the continent is based on the tradition of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the liberation forces of South Africa at the time of struggle against apartheid.

During her visit to Russia in July 2005, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs Nkosazana D. Zuma said that South African citizens and leaders have warm feelings toward Russia. Several thousand South Africans have received an education in Russia. Many of them still speak Russian well today. The Russian Federation is a country that made a great contribution to the decolonization of Africa and helped its peoples in their struggle for independence. Russia should not miss the chance to consolidate what it achieved in the past.<sup>6</sup>

In November 2006 Russia was the venue of the G8 Summit. Among the priority problems for discussion (global energy security, education, fight against infectious diseases) the Russian President named the problem of resolving regional conflicts and strengthening the anti-crisis potential of regional organizations, including the African Union. In the course of the St. Petersburg Summit a statement on "Work with Africa" was adopted. African problems were also reflected in the basic documents of the Summit.<sup>7</sup>

### **Russian Military and Technical Cooperation with African Countries**

Bilateral military and technical cooperation between Russia and African countries is one of its most important aspects of our relations as it has a great impact on the image of our country on the African continent.

This problem is far from simple. On the one hand, such cooperation, which was especially active in **Soviet Union times**, was highly praised by the countries which received Soviet military assistance, and it made a substantial contribution to the decolonization of the continent, the struggle against racism and apartheid, and the formation of independent African states. This cooperation is remembered in such countries as South Africa, Angola and Nigeria. For example, Angolan officers still maintain warm relations with their Russian counterparts who worked as military advisers in their country at that time. Some former and present-day leaders of African countries remember with gratitude the Soviet military aid. The President of Nigeria O. Obasanjo wrote very warmly in his memoirs about the assistance rendered by the Soviet Union to his country during the separatist movement in the Nigerian province of Biafra in 1967-1970.<sup>8</sup> It would be appropriate to note that this aid was rendered on a commercial basis, which disproves the allegations that the USSR supplied arms and ammunition to Africa exclusively free of charge.

On the other hand, in the cold war epoch Soviet arms and ammunition were often used for the realization of the political ambitions of the leaders

who claimed that their countries were marching toward socialism, these facts gave grounds for accusing the "superpower" of escalating tension on the continent.

Today there is no talk of free deliveries of arms and ammunition to Africa within the framework of military and technical cooperation. At the same time, the sales of Russian military hardware and equipment take a more prominent place in the system of the commercial and economic ties of Russia with the countries of the African continent.

In 2005 the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) published the data, according to which Russia became the world's biggest supplier of arms during the past five years, having outstripped the United States. From these data it followed that the cost of the arms sold by the leading arms dealers amounted to: Russia – 26.9 billion dollars; the United States – 25.9 billion dollars; France – 6.3 billion dollars; Germany – 4.8 billion dollars; Britain – 4.4 billion dollars.<sup>9</sup> We should note that in their estimates, Swedish experts proceed from the "military value" of the arms, which is not always the equivalent of their real cost. According to the data of Rosoboronexport, Russia holds third or fourth place on the list of international arms dealers. Nevertheless, the SIPRI data makes one stop and think about how the export of Russian arms influences the image of Russia in Africa.

Experts note a sharp rise in the Russian presence on the African arms market as of 1998. According to the view of K. Makienko, deputy head of the Centre of analysis of strategy and technologies, the internationalization of the Congolese conflict and the inclusion of the armed forces of some African countries in it have resulted in the growing demand for helicopters, fighter-planes, assault-planes, tanks and armored troop-carriers in Angola, and helicopters and MIG-23 fighter-planes in Zimbabwe. The Congo and Ethiopia and Eritrea conflicts have caused the growing import of military hardware and equipment to a sum of up to half a billion dollars, which Russia satisfied by 60 to 70 percent.<sup>10</sup>

Military and technical cooperation with Africa is a promising business. Russia has arms and ammunition which are in demand on the African continent. Among the Russian customers are such countries as Angola, Ethiopia and Nigeria. A shortage of currency in the purchasing countries prevents an increase of sales. This problem can be resolved with the help of barter operations or concessions. However, in our view, the sales of arms and ammunition to the countries taking part in African conflicts, although they are profitable financially, may damage the moral prestige of Russia.

### **Factor of Peacekeeping**

Russia's influence in Africa has diminished as compared to the Soviet period, due to the change of the international status and the cardinal

changes in its domestic policy. At the same time, new factors are emerging, which turn Russia into a kind of stabilizer in the system of international relations and contribute to its growing prestige in African countries.

The leading place among these factors belongs to the participation of Russian peacekeepers in the UN operations for maintaining peace on the African continent. For the time being the participation in peacekeeping operations is one of the means for Russia to broaden its influence in African countries by demonstrating its national interests and potentialities. In recent years Russia has regularly put forward peacekeeping initiatives at the UN.

Russia has never taken part in the peace-forcing operations, but it never refuses from participation in the operations to maintain peace. In all instances, it acts with the accord of the conflicting parties and a decision of the UN Security Council, making its contribution to peace by sending its observers and military contingents for the peacekeeping operations.

Russia has been involved in practically all operations for maintaining peace on the African continent. Russian peacekeepers took part in the operations in Burundi, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Western Sahara, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia and Eritrea.<sup>11</sup> In accordance with the order of the President of the Russian Federation of September 25, 2000, it was decided to send up to 12 Russian observers and liaison officers to the UN mission in Ethiopia. A Russian helicopter unit worked in the zone of conflict under a contract with the UN. (In December 2003, forty liaison officers and military observers)

At the height of the civil war in Sierra Leone a Russian contingent numbering 115 men was deployed there, along with four Russian military transport planes with crews.<sup>13</sup> Russian airmen accompanied land convoys, provided military reconnaissance and covered operation of the UN peacekeeping forces.<sup>14</sup> Our men's performance was highly praised by the UN command,<sup>15</sup> and some of them were awarded the UN Medals for peace service.<sup>16</sup>

As S. Ivanov, the former Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, said on May 25, 2004, nine groups of Russian observers and staff officers were incorporated in the UN peacekeeping forces. Twenty-five Russian military observers were dispatched to Western Sahara, 29 to the Democratic Republic of Congo, and four were included in the UN mission in Côte d'Ivoire. In 2004 the Russian Federation took part in the UN operation in Burundi, where there were 40 military experts from our country.<sup>17</sup> In December 2005, the Council of the Federation, on a proposal of the President of Russia, adopted a decision to send a Russian military unit to the UN peacekeeping mission in Sudan, which was set up by a decision of the UN Security Council at the end of March 2005 to watch over the observance of a truce in the south of the country.<sup>18</sup> In April 2006 a group of the Russian Ministry of Defence was sent to Sudan to prepare for the deployment of an airforce unit as a part of the UN mission in Sudan. Then four transport military helicopters were dispatched to the country to support the rapid reaction

forces, take part in medical service and salvage operations, air reconnaissance, and UN cargo and personnel transportation.<sup>19</sup> In 2006, there were 34 Russian military and police officers in the UN mission in Sudan, and 133 men and officers in an airforce unit.<sup>20</sup>

Russia also renders assistance to African countries in training specialists to take part in peacekeeping operations on the continent. On April 2, 2007, there was a graduation ceremony at the All-Russia Institute of upgrading interior ministry officers, which trained 60 peacekeepers from 13 African countries.<sup>21</sup>

Although the peacekeeping activity of Russia in Africa has been increased in recent years, it seems that our country's possibilities in this sphere are not fully used.

In 2006, 220 Russian military observers took part in the UN peacekeeping operations.<sup>22</sup> However, in the number of peacekeepers Russia holds last place among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and lags far behind countries which are much smaller and less influential in international affairs. For instance, Poland has sent 716 peacekeepers, Ukraine – 556, Ireland – 467, Sweden – 336, Slovakia – 293, Mongolia – 257, Romania – 243. At the same time China sent 1,271 representatives to take part in the UN peacekeeping operations in 2006.<sup>23</sup> “The 40th place in the number of peacekeepers taking part in these operations under the UN aegis, and the share of peacekeeping operations in the budget (1.4%), do not correspond to the role of Russia in the modern world,” says the “Review of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation” prepared by the Foreign Ministry of Russia in March 2007.<sup>24</sup>

Unlike the USA Russia cannot afford to finance the UN peacekeeping operations for a long time. Nevertheless being a permanent member of the UN Security Council Russia has considerable political opportunities to block any decision threatening its security or detrimental to its prestige.

A certain increase in the activity of the Military Headquarters Committee under the UN Security Council, which Russia supports, and more powers given it in commanding the UN peacekeeping operations, presupposes greater participation of representatives of the countries – permanent members of the UN Security Council in this body's work. This could ensure Russia a worthy role in the implementation of peacekeeping operations.

The Russian officer and soldier bringing peace to Africans not by force of arms, but by his very presence and authority, and stopping bloodshed – is a factor contributing to the greater prestige of our country and demonstrating the potential of Russia and its people.

### Ways of Optimization of Russian Politics

At present Russia is losing to western countries and China in Africa. A specific feature of its foreign policy, in the view of some experts, is “the

method of trials and errors, which results in delayed reaction to changing circumstances".<sup>25</sup> The policy of concessions to the West, which was actively pursued during the first years after the disintegration of the USSR, has led to the downfall of its prestige on the continent and the strengthening of the influence of the countries pursuing a more active policy.

Meanwhile it should be borne in mind that the West has been spreading the idea of globalization all over the world, which is received negatively by many Africans. Some people there think that Russia could restrict "globalization the American way".

Russian influence in Africa can be more effective if its policy is oriented more correctly. Russian political analysts maintain that "Russia should be more principled in the implementation of its strategy, it should look more attractive, moral and, possibly, missionary. Then it will be able to win the battle for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) from America".<sup>26</sup> We could add here: "...and the battle for Africa, too..."

It should be mentioned that quite a few Africans still retain in their memory the image of the Soviet Union, and they are still nostalgic for the idea of social justice, the embodiment of which was seen by them in our country.

Taking into account these sentiments, we should pay more attention to the former allies, but at the same time try to win support of the countries which have never felt any sympathy for the USSR and are oriented to the West, especially if we have in mind economically advantageous partners. China can serve as a good example in this respect. It ably divides its attention and benefits among all countries of the continent, but in doing so it is guided, first and foremost, by its own economic interests.

Although Russian policy toward Africa has been set in motion and become more active recently, many officials continue to follow old stereotypes, regarding Africa as a continent of hunger, diseases and ethnic conflicts, a land under the domination of the West, and now of China, which have captured all spheres of the economy of these countries and dictate them policy. A consequence of such attitude is the evaluation of trade-economic and business relations with this continent as unpromising and fraught with squandering the financial and other means.

On the other hand, a distorted perception of Russia often takes shape among Africans. This perception is based on the abortive economic reforms in our country, acts of terror, recent events in Chechnya, and, what is more important, the facts of discrimination and violence against their fellow-countrymen. The organizer of the international forum on the status of refugees in the world, Doctor Albert Antwi Boasiako (Ghana), complaining about ineffective development of the Russian and African relations, believes that Russia does not use properly its vast potential for partnership with Africa. At the same time he notes that Africa, too, has quite a few problems of its own in building relations with Russia. He says that Africans

should renounce their former stereotypes of thinking, according to which nothing positive will come out from dealing with Russia. Some Africans adhere to the idea that fruitful relations are only possible with the West. Africans should try all ways and means of active human diplomacy with a view to developing proper relations with Russia.<sup>27</sup> Africa is interested in cooperation with Russia – this follows from a statement of the Ambassador of Angola in Russia, Roberto Leala Ramos, which he made in 2003. Emphasizing that the peoples of South Africa enthusiastically welcomed progress in Russian-African relations, he noted that the Russian government and business circles should realize that it was high time to turn to Africa, a promising and dynamically developing region.<sup>28</sup>

All this calls for greater attention to Africa in Russian foreign policy and serious changes in Russian policy on the continent. This should begin with the assessment of the role and place of Africa in the modern world economic ties and its significance for Russia.

In revising Russian policy in Africa the following factor should be taken into account, which is of enormous propaganda significance. We mean personal contacts allowing people to strengthen ties between themselves and, due to that, change their attitude to the country. Such contacts include the exchange of visits between scientific and cultural figures, theatre companies, exhibitions, film festivals, etc. These ties, which developed quite actively in Soviet times, are almost neglected now. Secondly, and this is most important, African countries consider the exchange of visits at high levels especially of great significance, for they are assessed in Africa as the presence or absence of interest in a given country and the continent as a whole. The experience of China is quite indicative in this respect. Its leaders have visited Africa time and again, and the new minister of foreign affairs started his term of office with a visit to Africa. This has largely contributed to the formation in Africa of the image of China as a country concerned with its problems.

Interest in Africa and an officially proclaimed and implemented policy toward its countries constitute an important factor determining the image of the country on the continent, and a positive image is, first of all, in the interests of Russia itself. This interest is conditioned by Russia's desire to win back its prestige in world affairs, partly lost after the disintegration of the USSR, as well as the problems of its economic growth, which largely depends on the existence of partners beyond its borders. In this respect the African continent, with the help of which both the West and China hope to ensure their economic security and to which they devote greater attention in their policies, is undoubtedly a very advantageous partner.

The prospects of cooperation with this partner largely depend on whether the policy of Russia in Africa will be able to overcome the negative tendencies and ensure the creation of a positive image of our country on the continent.

---

**Notes:**

1. Российско-китайский портал 08.12.2005 (RusChina. Russian-Chinese portal). [http://ru.ruschina.net/news/page 13047/page 15719](http://ru.ruschina.net/news/page%2013047/page%2015719).
2. On diplomatic relations of the Russian Federation with foreign countries (as on July 4 2005). 22.07.2005. <http://www.In.mid.ru/ns-vnpop.nsf/osn.copy>.
3. Relations of Russia with African countries south of Sahara in 2005. <http://www.In.mid.ru/drpf4.nsf/itsgi>.
4. Ibid.
5. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RF. Information & Press Dpt. 2192-12-10-2004. <http://www.In.mid.ru/nsrafr.nsf/ofob8bac>.
6. Fieldpost No. 85 – July 18, 2005. <http://www.fieldpost.ru/N85/subbotin.shtml>
7. About work with Africa. St. Petersburg. July 16, 2006. <http://www.g8-russia.ru/docs/13.htm>.
8. Старостин Д. Африка хочет наши самолеты. Интервью с Константином Макиенко [D. Starostin. "Africa Wants Our Airplanes." Interview with Konstantin Makienko]. – Vesti.Ru. April 12, 2001 – Makienko.htm.
9. SIPRI Yearbook. 2005. Armament, Disarmament and International Security. Stockholm. 2005.
10. D. Starostin. Op. cit.
11. Russia and problems of African continent. <http://www.In.mid.ru/ns-vnpop.nsf/osn.cjpy.08.01.2006>.
12. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RF. Information & Press Dpt. Information bulletin. February 26, 2004 <http://www.In.mid.ru/ns-konfl.nsf>.
13. Russian military observers take part in UN missions all over the world. <http://www.peacekeeper.ru/indel.php.mid-250>.
14. UN Radio News. March 2, 2004. <http://www.un.org/Russian/avradio/2004/mar/04030200.htm>.
15. Петров Н. Суданские перспективы [N. Petrov. Sudan Prospects]. December 21, 2005. <http://www.strana.ru/stories/01/12/10/2189/268646.html>.
16. UN Radio News. March 2, 2004.
17. Иванов В. Русские поедут мирить африканцев [V. Ivanov. Russians Will Go to Reconcile Africans]. – *Nezavisimaya gazeta*. 23.07.2004.
18. UN News Centre. 27.12.2005. [http://www.un.org/russian/news/fullstorynews.asp.news ID-4835](http://www.un.org/russian/news/fullstorynews.asp.news%20ID-4835).
19. Миротворцы из РФ внесут положительный вклад в стабилизацию в Судане – Оборона. Ру. 20.04.2006 [Peacekeepers from Russia will make positive contribution to stabilization in Sudan. – Oborona. Ru. 20.04.2006].
20. Российский миротворец [The Russian Peacekeeper]. 2006-06-01 <http://www.peacekeeper.ru/indes.php.nud-1394>.
21. Peacekeeper.ru. 2007-04-02. <http://peacekeeper.ru/index.php.mvd=3591>.
22. Joint report of personal representatives of leaders of G8 on Africa. The Civil Eight 2006. <http://civilg8.ru/ngo/Africa/836>.

23. Contributors to United Nations Peacekeeping Operation. Monthly Summary of Contributions (Military Observers, Police and Troops). As of 30 April 2006

24. Обзор внешней политики Российской Федерации [Review of foreign policy of the Russian Federation]. 27.03.2007. <http://www.In.mid.ru/brpf4.nsf/sp83647DA972>.

25. Лактионова Н. Геостратегические приоритеты России на постсоветском пространстве // Мир перемен. – Москва, 2005. – № 5. – С. 80 [N. Laktionova. Geostrategic Priorities of Russia in Post-Soviet Space – *Mir peremen*. Moscow, 2005. No. 5, p. 80].

26. Атанесян А. Стратегия перетягивания канатов и перераспределения сил на постсоветском пространстве // Мир перемен. – Москва, 2004. – № 2. – С. 136 [A. Atanesyan. Tug-of-War Strategy and Redistribution of Forces in Post-Soviet Space. – *Mir peremen*. Moscow, 2004, No. 2, p. 136].

27. Albert Antwi Boasiako (Ghana). Africa-Russian Relations. The Need for Reassessment. 16.05.2003. <http://cofn.bstu.ru/conf/docs>.

28. *Diplomat*. Moscow, November 2003, No. 11.



## RUSSIA'S IMAGE IN AFRICA: ECONOMIC ASPECTS\*

Vladimir Lopatov, D.Sc.(Econ.),  
Senior Research Fellow,  
Institute for African Studies, RAS

*The noticeable changes that occurred in the Russian-African relations (visits of the Russian President to Algeria, Egypt, South Africa and Morocco, visits of the Prime Minister to Egypt, South Africa, Angola, Namibia, repeated journeys of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and other statesmen to African countries, interest of Russian big business in spectacular projects in Africa) show the growing interest of Russia in establishing versatile interaction and cooperation with African partners, and renunciation of the heightened orientation to the West. Africa takes a worthy place in Russian foreign policy.*

The consolidation of our positions in Africa should be regarded as a component part of a strategy aimed at creating optimum conditions for Russia's socio-economic development, which will contribute to its turning into a centre of influence in the world community.

It should be borne in mind, however, that the steps being taken to create conditions for the development of the Russian-African relations have not been conceptualized. This can be explained, in our view, by the absence of the clearly formulated aims, orientations and priorities of the socio-economic development of Russia itself. This has been noted by quite a few Russian economists, for example, V. Kushlin, D.Sc.(Econ.), who, in his article "Development Strategy and Its Aims", emphasizes that "the state pursues a policy reacting only to the current, day-to-day course of events, without thinking about how to develop the country's economy for a longer period".<sup>1</sup>

This circumstance renders more difficult the solution of many foreign-policy and foreign economic problems, inasmuch as neither inside the country nor outside it we are able to explain the motivation of our actions in a clear manner.

But even with the presence of conceptual requisites for executing tactical and strategic tasks, it is necessary to form a proper international image, which would be positively received by partners.

The formation of a positive image of Russia in Africa is a difficult task.

Numerous suggestions to raise the prestige of Russia on the continent will hardly bear fruit, if they are not tied not only with the socio-economic situation in the country, but also with the determination of its national interests in Africa.

We share the view that "the image of a state should be formed in conformity with concrete aims or national interests, that is, it should be pragmatic".<sup>2</sup> This presupposes the presence of a well-elaborated comprehensive policy of a state concerning its image, which we don't have so far.<sup>3</sup>

Let us try to analyse the role of individual factors and subjects in the formation of our country's image in Africa in the past and present, paying special attention to economic aspects.

### What we have lost

Although the historical conditions during the existence of the USSR and after its disintegration have radically changed, we should pay attention to the positive aspects of the past and use them at present, revise the negative stereotypes concerning the socio-economic situation in Africa and choose the most effective mechanisms of the formation of Russia's image in Africa, which would be compatible with our possibilities and in line with our national interests.

Our national interests in Africa lie, above all, in ensuring favourable conditions for the expansion of the market for our industrial commodities and access to the raw material resources of the continent on a mutually advantageous basis, and in preserving peace and security there.

Turning to the Soviet period, we shall see that the purposeful efforts of the mass media to form a positive image of our country and friendly attitude to it in Africa were more active and fruitful than at present. Such powerful propaganda units as the TASS, APN, SSOD, Progress Publishers, and Radio Moscow broadcasting service for Africa did much to describe and explain Soviet life at home and the foreign policy of the USSR. There were cultural centres and Soviet-African Friendship Clubs in many countries of the continent, which were engaged in active work with representatives of African young people and the local intelligentsia. The House of Friendship in Moscow played an exceptionally important role in the consolidation of friendly ties with African countries and the formation of a positive image of Russia as the real friend and ally of the African peoples in their struggle for social justice and national independence.

At present the mechanism of information impact has undergone unfavourable changes. The APN, Progress Publishers, Radio Moscow broadcasts to Africa and the House of Friendship in Moscow have ceased to exist in their previous form. The number of cultural centres and friendship clubs in African countries has dwindled considerably. As a result, the interest of the African public in Russia has dropped to a very low level. In turn, the Russian mass media, especially the Radio and TV, mention Africa (where more than 800 million people live) very rarely, mainly in connection with military conflicts, coups or natural calamities. This gives a distorted idea about the real situation on the continent.

\* First published in *Asia and Africa Today*, 2007, No. 6, pp. 34-40.

Thus, "the tasks of improving the image of our country are virtually neglected. There is no special unit, no financing, and no concept to tackle them".<sup>4</sup>

There are special centres abroad whose activities are financed by the state budget. For instance, Japan spends on the formation of its image abroad almost 300 million dollars a year, Australia – 106 million, France – 65 million, the Netherlands – 40 million and Austria – 32 million.<sup>5</sup>

The study of foreign experience and, possibly, the opening of such a centre in Russia would allow us to pursue a more rational and effective policy of promoting the country's image abroad and evade the failures caused by "megalomania and inferiority complex".<sup>6</sup>

Indeed, one could hardly agree with categorical assertions by certain scholars that "after the collapse of the USSR Russia continues to remain one of the important geopolitical centres of the world, largely determining its destiny".<sup>7</sup>

Speaking of Russia's influence on everything going on in the world, we sow illusions and are engaged in wishful thinking. Those who maintain that "first of all we should realize that Russia, outside the former USSR, cannot claim its place in the new world..." are quite right.<sup>8</sup>

The recognition of this fact will help understand why the image of the superpower, which the USSR used in Africa, has now changed in the eyes of Africans, and now Russia is taken for a state unable to perform, as before, in the role of an influential player on the continent. It is precisely from these realities, but not from the exaggerated assessments and pompous assertions of African partners of love and friendship, that we should proceed in shaping our policy on the African continent.

The attractive image of the Soviet Union in the eyes of Africans consisted not only of its authority as the leader of a big group of states in the East and West, but also of its consistent support to the efforts of the African people for their liberation from colonialism, and struggle against economic backwardness and dependence on former metropolitan countries.

### **How it was...**

Economic and scientific-technical cooperation played an exceptionally important role in the formation of our country's positive image in Africa. Now that many events and facts of Soviet-African contacts and cooperation have been forgotten, it would be expedient to cite some concrete examples. Among the countries to which the USSR rendered assistance in building power projects (about 30 of them with an aggregate capacity of 2.9 million kw) are Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Somalia, Zambia and Guinea. The biggest of these projects is the Aswan High Dam, which is still bringing a great benefit to Egypt. Enterprises of ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, oil refineries, as well as engineering and metal-processing plants have been constructed in Egypt and Algeria (in all, 29 objects).

Taking into account the fact that Africa is a mainly agrarian continent, assistance in building irrigation installations, enterprises for the processing and storage of agricultural and stockbreeding products (about 40 projects) and the opening of veterinary clinics were of great significance.

It should be emphasized that the USSR was actually the world's first state to support the just demands of the liberated African countries to use their natural resources as they deemed fit. They received much help in geological prospecting work, the construction of mining enterprises and the opening of educational centres. This is an important factor in creating a positive image of Russia, for it serves as an example of its selfless assistance to the consolidation of the independence of African states.

Assistance in training local personnel at almost 100 educational establishments built in 15 African countries with the participation of the Soviet Union, and also on the objects of cooperation, as well as the enrollment of African boys and girls in the educational institutions of the USSR, the upgrading of African specialists at Soviet enterprises, etc. were an effective form of creating a positive image of our country as a reliable friend and ally of the African population.

The USSR actively developed military-technical cooperation with African countries. Its participation in the strengthening of the armed forces of young African states contributed to the consolidation of the prestige of Russia in the eyes of Africans. This aid was accompanied not only with the deliveries of Soviet military hardware and equipment, but also the training of commanding officers of African armies, which enhanced respect for our country among the military and the civil population.

Personal contacts in the most diverse forms were exceptionally important for Africans. Among them were mutual visits of statesmen and party figures, government and parliamentary delegations and representatives of public organizations. Establishing and developing personal contacts with representatives of African countries, the Soviet leadership enhanced the prestige of the USSR in the international arena.

This is why today, when President V. Putin suggests that we begin to use the potential accumulated by the USSR in its relations with Africa because "it is a promising direction in our activity, our foreign policy and our economic expansion – in a good sense of this word..."<sup>9</sup>, it would seem expedient to use what has been achieved and make the necessary conclusions in order to develop and improve the Russian-African relations in the future.

The situation in the world, on the African continent and in Russia has radically changed as compared with the 1960s, when the beginning was made for the flourishing of the foreign-policy and foreign economic interaction with African countries. Russia at present is at the level of Brazil in economic development, in the view of many experts. In these conditions the attitude of Russia to Africa and of Africa to Russia has radically changed. Russia has lost the former attractiveness of its image in the eyes of Africans.

Right up to the late 1990s interstate contacts at a high level were practically confined to formal exchanges of messages of congratulations between the heads of state and government on the occasions of national holidays, which looked as a manifestation of the lack of interest in Africa on the part of Russia, especially against the backdrop of the policies of western countries, China, India and Japan. Hence, a certain cooling of African relations with Russia.

### What about now?

During the period after the disintegration of the USSR a change of generations has taken place, and the present young people do not take the objects of Soviet-African cooperation for a manifestation of selfless assistance in tackling the economic problems of African countries. Besides, the present economic interaction is based on market mechanisms, but this does not contribute to the formation of a positive image.

Russia's share in world trade amounts to 1.7 percent and the share of engineering commodities manufactured here does not exceed 0.5 percent, this is why our country does not evoke any interest as a trade partner in Africa. Russia accounts for only 1.3 percent in Africa's foreign trade turnover.<sup>10</sup> The preponderance of raw materials in Russian export deliveries to Africa, given such small volume of mutual trade, hardly contributes to improving Russia's image as a promising and irreplaceable partner, especially if one takes into account the fact that the share of high-tech commodities in Russian export is only 0.13 percent.<sup>11</sup>

The sharp worsening of the Russian economic situation, which took place in the course of the so-called reforms in the country, the destruction of its industrial potential, and the turning of Russia into a raw material appendage of the industrial countries, like African countries themselves, have a negative effect on the image of Russia in the eyes of Africans. According to the data of *The Global Competitiveness Report*, Russia's rating of competitiveness steadily goes down: in 1996 it held 49th place, in 1998 – 52nd place. According to the data of *World Economic Forum*, in 2005 Russia was in 53rd place, and in 2006 – in 62nd place,<sup>12</sup> whereas Tunis held 30th place and South Africa – 45th place in 2006.<sup>13</sup>

The Soviet-African relations in the sphere of education and personnel training have left a good memory among rank-and-file Africans, as well as many statesmen. For instance, the President of the South African Republic Thabo Mbeki and the Minister of Defence Joe Modise, and also the ambassadors of South Africa, Sudan and Kenya to Russia have studied in the USSR.

Unfortunately, during the post-Soviet period this circumstance, quite favourable for the formation of a positive image of Russia, was pushed into the background. Education at Russian universities and institutes is now

available to a very limited number of African young people (only 700 grants are allotted for the purpose annually). But in the present situation in Russia where murders of African students become a frequent occurrence, there is nothing surprising that some countries do not use even this meager quota offered by Russia. In other words, the real support to the positive image of Russia in Africa can be provided by people who studied here prior to the disintegration of the USSR.

The positive results of the past can well be used now, for example, in geological prospecting and other work.

Thus, one can conclude that Russia's possibilities for adding dynamism to its relations with Africa are not too great as some Russian and African official representatives are wont to say. But they are right in expressing the view that the relatively high level of political cooperation needs to be complemented with more active economic ties. The formation of a positive image of Russia on the African continent depends on their development level.

### Writing off debts, and more...

The formation of the "Russian brand" in Africa and its successful promotion on the continent at present largely depend on an answer to the question "What can Russia give to Africa?" The minister of trade and investments of the most populous country – Nigeria, Shei Onofokan, noted that his country would be glad to receive businessmen from Russia and other CIS countries to take part in the development of agriculture, trade, transport, chemical and engineering industries, power production, and other spheres.<sup>14</sup>

Examining the problem of the development and prospects of Russian-African relations from these positions, it should be emphasized that so far Moscow has been boasting, first and foremost, of its "charity acts", like writing off old debts. Whereas, according to the observer of *My Africa Magazine* Dr. Yusuf Balla, Africans wish partnership with the African business community in the construction of plants, especially in such branches as electric power generation, agricultural production, oil and gas extraction, erecting and assembly enterprises, telecommunication systems, etc.<sup>15</sup>

Russia could render assistance in the development of the material-technical base of African states on the basis of market competition and in various forms of the share participation of local capital.

Certain progress was registered at the turn of the century. For example, the construction by the AvtoVAZ of an automobile plant in Egypt with a capacity of 5,000 vehicles a year, which was commissioned in February 2006; the UAZ and KamAZ plants, through the "Russmotors Limited" registered in Kenya, have become active on the automobile market in East Africa. Russian "Gazelle" vans are delivered to, sold and maintained in South

Africa by the group “Russian Automotive Investment Southern Africa” (RAISA).<sup>16</sup> True, the comment on the quality of our vans is not too favourable. Apart from their deficient quality, this may be due to competitors’ opposition.

In September 2006 Moscow made an offer to Pretoria of building a nuclear power plant. In the view of President V. Putin, Russian companies had much to offer – from unique engineering and design solutions to the training of highly-skilled personnel.<sup>17</sup> The Russian side expressed readiness to help develop a gas infrastructure. It is also planned to build a plant for processing manganese ore and producing ferrous alloys with a capacity of up to 250,000 tons of metal a year. Russia and South Africa could also cooperate in power production and engineering, and the construction of an aluminium plant, with investments running into hundreds of millions of dollars.<sup>18</sup>

The Russian “Asen” Company and the Nigerian “Codel International Ltd” have signed an agreement on the construction of a gas-turbine power plant in the State of Bayelsa (Nigeria).<sup>19</sup>

The construction of a hydropower plant on the Shikapa River in Angola continues, with the participation of the Russian Company ALROSA, one of the world’s biggest diamond-mining companies (about 23 percent of output). The commissioning of the hydropower plant will help raise the productivity of the Angolan “Katoka” enterprise, which has cooperated with ALROSA for over ten years.

Russian business circles are beginning to better realize the needs and wishes of African consumers and make them offers maximally reflecting the interests of potential buyers. During a visit of the representatives of the All-Russia public organization “Delovaya Rossiya” to Madagascar in January 2006, the Malagasy side was offered designs of small hydraulic power plants (with a capacity of 5 to 500 kw) for rural districts.

Russia readily agrees to participate in more spectacular projects. For instance, it gave a positive answer to a request for assistance in the reconstruction of a railway line in Sierra Leone. Cooperation with Russia in this sphere was initiated by Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, the President of that country.<sup>20</sup>

In the middle of 2001 the construction and commissioning of one of the biggest hydro-power complexes in the Arab world – “Al Wahda” in Morocco (it generates 30 percent of electric power in the country) was completed with the assistance of Russian specialists.<sup>21</sup> In 2006 work on the construction project of the modern hotel and tourist complex “Tameslot Resort”<sup>22</sup> near the town of Marrakesh began.

These are just a few examples of Russian-African cooperation, which African countries are interested in. An important aspect is that Russian business demonstrates efforts to work on the African market, offering it products, which can contribute to improving the image of our country as the producer of modern industrial commodities. At the same time, the volumes

of participation and offers are not too great to enable Russia to claim the role of a big industrial partner on the African continent.

Parallel with this trend, there is a tendency, unseen previously, of Russian capital acquiring, partly or fully, the already functioning mining and metallurgical enterprises, or taking part in the construction of new ones.

We shall now enumerate some of the latest agreements, deals and contracts signed by Russian entrepreneurs with their African partners. In the spring of 2006 the Russian concern RUSAL, which has firm positions in Guinea and is holding 85 percent of the shares of the “Alumina Company of Guinea” and 100 percent of the Campagnie des Bauxites et D’alumine de Dian-Dian, bought for 19 million dollars from the government of Guinea the bauxite-alumina complex “Frigia”, which the Russian company has managed since 2004. The “Frigia” includes a bauxite mine with a capacity of 2.2 million tons of ore a year, an alumina plant, a railway line and a sea port. RUSAL pledged to pay off the “Frigia’s” former debts (105 million dollars) and additionally invest 65 million dollars in production.<sup>23</sup>

In 2006 the “Rusal” bought 77.5 percent of the shares of the “Aluminium Smelter Company of Nigeria” (ALSCON) for 250 million dollars. The company includes a plant with a capacity of 193,000 tons of aluminium a year, a port on the Imo River and a thermal power plant. The co-owners of the plant are the German “Ferrostaal AG” (15 percent) and the government of Nigeria (7.5 percent), which intend to invest additionally, along with the RUSAL, another 150 million dollars in the modernization of the ALSCON within the next three years.<sup>24</sup>

The plant bought by the RUSAL in Nigeria will supply its products to the customers of the Russian company all over the world. Alumina for the plant will be delivered from the RUSAL concession in Guinea.

Russian business made a claim to acquiring the controlling block of shares of the world’s leading producer of vanadium – the South African company “Highfield Steel and Vanadium”, which belongs to the conglomerate “Anglo-American”. The cost of shares is more than one billion dollars.<sup>25</sup> In the beginning of 2005 the Russian-South African consortium “United Manganese of Kalahari” was set up for prospecting, mining and processing manganese ores on the South African territory, where 80 percent of the world’s prospected deposits of manganese are concentrated. The Russian side includes the group of companies “Renova”, which owns 49 percent of the joint enterprise. The total volume of the planned investments of “Renova” in mining and processing the ores and producing ferroalloys will exceed one billion dollars.<sup>26</sup>

The management of the ALROSA has announced its plans to diversify its activity and purchase assets in the gold-mining, oil and gas industries. The company will prospect for gold, oil and gas in Africa, too. Besides Angola, it has started prospecting work for diamonds in Guinea and plans to do the same in Congo.

The stepping up of the activity of these companies in Africa, undoubtedly, lends positive aspects to the image of Russia on the continent. The scope of capital investments is staggering, for they will involve the creation of new jobs, the training of the local personnel and the modernization of production. These investments give Africans the grounds to believe that the "Russians" have come on a long term perspective to the countries where they have made these large investments.

It would be appropriate to mention the development and commissioning of the mechanism of financial support of Russian business in Africa. In July 2006 the "Vneshtorgbank" set up a joint financial company "VTB Capital" (Namibia). The VTB's share in the company is 50 percent + two shares, the remaining part is with the big Namibian firm "Capricon Investment Holding". It is planned to have among its customers Russian companies interested in developing business in the south of the African continent in such fields as the mining and processing of mineral raw materials and other natural resources, power production, telecommunications, fisheries, construction and trade.<sup>27</sup>

In Angola the "VTB-Africa" Bank with the authorized capital of 10 million dollars has been organized with the participation of the "Vneshtorgbank". The VTB owns 66 percent of its capital, the remaining 34 percent belong to Angolan companies, including the "Portmil Trading Investment Ltd" registered on Virgin Islands.<sup>28</sup>

The bank will devote main attention to investment activity, and also participation in infrastructural projects in Angola, as well as in other African countries – Equatorial Guinea, Mali and Nigeria.

The interaction of the "Vneshekonombank" with the South African "Industrial Development Corporation" and "Nedbank Limited" will contribute to the promotion of partnership of Russia and the Republic of South Africa.

The agreement with the "Industrial Development Corporation" is aimed, among other things, at developing cooperation in export and implementing investment projects to stimulate export-oriented industries. It should be emphasized that the two sides will regard each other as the priority partners in servicing the contracts in the sphere of power and infrastructure, as well as in the mining industry.

The agreement with the "Nedbank Limited" envisages joint financing and bank support to investment projects in various spheres of industry, including the mining industry.

The "Vneshekonombank" is the only Russian bank which operates in the RSA at present. This is why its agreements with South African banks open up for Russian business circles a real opportunity to rely on the resources of big financial institutions in implementing projects in South Africa and the neighbouring states – Angola, Namibia and others. On the other hand, South African companies will have an opportunity to develop their business in Russia.

In recent time, new countries have appeared on the scene, cooperation with which may acquire wide scope in the very near future. In this connection the IFC "Metropol" plans to open a bank in Congo in 2007.<sup>29</sup>

### Will there be a turning point?

The above-mentioned actions to step up cooperation with African countries show, in our view, a definite positive change in the attitude to Africa as a promising partner. Speaking at the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation, President V. Putin emphasized the importance of "broadening the horizons of Russian foreign policy and searching for new opportunities for cooperation, keeping in mind the need to preserve and promote positions where we have invested considerable resources in the past..."<sup>30</sup>

In our view, it's time for Russian big business to search for a more profitable market to apply its capital to, when it is being realized more and more that access to the western markets is becoming more difficult. The African alternative may become more acceptable.

Can the turn of Russian business to Africa contribute to improving the image of Russia on the African continent? If so, what should be done accelerate it?

It would be oversimplification to regard the present level of political and economic mutual relations sufficient for the formation of a positive image in line with the national interests of Russia.

First of all, it should be borne in mind that the present volumes of trade-economic relations with most African countries are at a very low level. For example, the Republic of South Africa has been chosen as a springboard for expanding the economic interaction of Russia with the countries of the southern part of Africa. But can one look at these projects seriously when trade turnover between Russia and South Africa amounted to 170 million dollars in 2005, whereas that of China and South Africa exceeded seven billion dollars?<sup>31</sup> The structure of Russian export to South Africa consists of crude and cut diamonds comprising 57 percent, and the rest includes rolled ferrous metal, chemical products, fertilizers and products of the automobile industry. There are practically no industrial commodities which could compete with foreign goods on the South African markets. During the visit of the Russian premier M. Fradkov to South Africa in March 2007, it was pointed out that trade turnover between Russia and South Africa amounted to 180 million dollars in 2006, and Russian export accounted for only 20 million dollars.

Morocco is another example. It is Russia's biggest trade partner, its share in the total volume of Moroccan trade turnover was 4.6 percent in 2005, which is not bad. However, if we turn to the **structure** of Russian export to that country, it consists of oil comprising 75 percent, rolled metal 8.6 percent, grain five percent, sulphur 4.5 percent, ammonium and ni-

trogenous fertilizer 3.5 percent. Timber, power equipment and consumer goods account for slightly more than three percent. Thus, Russia is a supplier of raw materials and half-finished products to Morocco. These examples indicate that the backward structure of export should be changed, otherwise Russia will not be able to make a breakthrough in Africa.

The list of Russian high-tech commodities for export is confined to the products of nuclear power engineering, arms and the services of missile-space sphere.<sup>32</sup> However, the requirement of African countries for these commodities and services, except arms, are rather limited. Special research is necessary to determine the possibilities of supplying Africa with industrial commodities, but not only with raw materials.

In view of the serious problems facing Russian export, it was suggested to set up a special department in the Federal Agency for Promotion of Export, which would include Russian trade missions in foreign countries, the export-import bank, exporters' associations, regional administrations, and the Academy of Foreign Trade.<sup>33</sup>

The main coordinator of the promotion of export will be the State Corporation of Development.<sup>34</sup> It will deal, among other things, with granting export subsidies to Russian exporters.

In our view, it would be necessary to set up a special Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development with such specific partners as Africa, Asia and Latin America. Such agencies exist practically in all western countries.

Under the aegis of this organization it would be possible to evolve the concept of the economic cooperation of Russia with the developing countries, the elaboration of foreign economic policy and bilateral trade and economic relations with them in line with Russia's national interests, consolidation of the efforts of private capital and state bodies in their relations with the developing countries, etc. The correct choice of cooperation strategy between the state and private business could ensure their effective interaction in the foreign economic sphere. But this will become feasible, provided there is a strategy of the country's economic development and an appropriate concept of strategic partnership with African countries, which could be a real foundation for the formation of the positive international image of modern Russia.

#### Notes:

1. *Экономист*. – М., 2006. – № 1. – С. 3. [*Economist*. Moscow, 2006, No. 1, p. 3.]

2. *Кашлев Ю., Галунов Э.* Информация и PR в международных отношениях. – М., 2003. – С. 353. [*Yu. Kashlev, E. Galunov*. Information and PR in International Relations. Moscow, 2003, p. 353.]

3. *Политический журнал*. – М., 2005. – № 17. – С. 26–27. [*Politichesky zhurnal*. Moscow, 2005, No. 17, pp. 26–27.]

4. *Ibid.*, p. 27

5. *Давиденко И., Кеслер Я.* Ресурсы цивилизации. – М., 2005. – С. 529. [*I. Davydenko, Ya. Kesler*. "Resources of Civilization." Moscow, 2005, p. 529.]

6. *Политический журнал*. – М., 2005. – № 17 – С. 27. [*Politichesky zhurnal*. Moscow, 2005, No. 17, p. 27.]

7. *Галунов Э.* Имидж против имиджа. – М., 2005. – С. 388. [*E. Galunov*. "Image Against Image." Moscow, 2005, p. 388.]

8. *Давиденко И., Кеслер Я.* Указ. соч., с. 526. [*I. Davydenko, Ya. Kesler*. Op.cit., p. 526.]

9. Пульс планеты. – М., 8 сентября 2006. [*Puls planety*. Moscow, 2006. September 8.]

10. Calculated by *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*. Vol. LX, No. 2, 2006.

11. *Коммерсант*. – М., 11 октября 2006. [*Kommersant*. Moscow, 2006. October 11.]

12. *БИКИ*. – М., 23 декабря 2006. [*BIKI*. Moscow, 2006. December 23.]

13. *БИКИ*. – М., 7 декабря 2006. [*BIKI*. Moscow, 2006. December 7.]

14. *Моя Африка*. – М., 2006. – № 3. – С. 12. [*Moya Africa*. Moscow, 2006, No. 3, p. 12.]

15. *Yusuf Ballah*. "What does Africa Expect from Russia as Chair Person?" – *My African Magazine*. Moscow, 2006, No. 3, p. 12.

16. Пульс планеты. – М., 22 сентября 2006. [*Puls planety*. Moscow, 2006. September 22.]

17. *Компас*. – М., 2006. № 37. – С. 13. [*Kompas*. Moscow, 2006, No. 37, p. 13.]

18. Пульс планеты. – М., 7 сентября 2006. [*Puls planety*. Moscow, 2006. September 7.]

19. *Моя Африка*. – М., 2006. – № 3. – С. 19. [*Moya Africa*. Moscow, 2005, No. 3, p. 19.]

20. Пульс планеты. – М., 22 сентября 2006. [*Puls planety*. Moscow, 2006. May 22.]

21. *В. Лопатов*. Современное состояние торгово-экономических отношений России с африканскими странами. – М., 2000. – С. 30. [*V. Lopatov*. Present Conditions of Trade-Economic Relations of Russia with African Countries. Moscow, 2000, p. 30.]

22. *Компас*. – М., 2006. – № 36. – С. 25–26. [*Kompas*. Moscow, 2006. No. 36, pp. 25–26.]

23. Пульс планеты. – М., 25 мая 2006. [*Puls planety*. Moscow, 2006. May 25.]

24. Пульс планеты. – М., 6 и 9 февраля 2006. [*Puls planety*. Moscow, 2006. February 6 and 9.]

25. Пульс планеты. – М., 7 февраля 2006. [*Puls planety*. Moscow, 2006. February 7.]

26. *Пульс планеты*. – М., 7 сентября 2006. [*Puls planety*. Moscow, 2006. September 7.]
27. *Пульс планеты*. – М., 28 июля 2006. [*Puls planety*. Moscow, 2006. July 28.]
28. *Аф-Ро*. – М., 2006. – № 4. – С. 19–20. [*Af-Ro*. Moscow, 2006. No. 4, pp. 19-20.]
29. *Ведомости*. – М., 29.04.2007 [*Vedomosti*. Moscow, April 29, 2007.]
30. *Международная жизнь*. – М., 2004, № 7–8. – С. 104. [*Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn*. Moscow, 2004, No. 7-8, p. 104.]
31. *Africa Confidential*. November 3, 2006. Vol. 47, No. 22, p. 7.
32. *Коммерсант*. – М., 11 октября 2006. [*Kommersant*. Moscow, 2006. October 11]
33. *БИКИ*. – М., № 101. – 7 сентября 2006. [*BIKI*. Moscow, 2006. No. 101, September 7.]
34. *Коммерсант*. – М., 11 октября 2006. [*Kommersant*. Moscow, 2006. October 11.]

## FOREIGN POLICY OF RUSSIA AND RUSSIAN-CONGOLESE RELATIONS\*

**Galina Sidorova**, Ph.D.(Hist.),  
Head of Centre for Information  
and International Relations,  
Institute for African Studies, RAS

*Today, the independent voice of Russia in international affairs is much more confident, because its foreign policy pursues not only its own interests, but also the aims common to those of the entire world community. Russia is now regarded as a serious partner in resolving global problems, and its foreign policy is based on the principles of realism and pragmatism.*

Africa takes a special place in Russian foreign policy. In a message of the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, to the President of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Joseph Kabila, on the occasion of Africa Day it was said that Russia intends to consolidate the positive dynamics of the past few years in its relations with the countries of the region, creatively use the experience gained and search for new forms of cooperation. By joint efforts we could ensure further development of a Russian-African political dialogue and mutually advantageous cooperation in the trade-and-economic and other spheres.

The foreign-policy course of Russia, widely recognized in the world, enables it to advocate consistently the strengthening of collective mechanisms to manage international processes. Russia will continue to contribute to the solution of the pressing problems facing African countries, including that of the implementation of the appropriate Plan of actions of the G8, by using the UN and other international forums.

Russia makes a substantial contribution to easing the financial burden of African states within the framework of the Paris Club and the Initiative to reduce the debts of the poorest countries. During the period from 1998 to 2004 alone, we wrote off debts worth 16.5 billion dollars.

Cooperation between Russia and Africa within the framework of the NEPAD programme has been strengthening. Africa is an important region for Russia and NEPAD is a programme of action for it.

---

\* Report made at the Conference “Congoles policy of the DRC partners and international organizations” at the DRC Ministry of foreign affairs in Kinshasa on January 18, 2005. It was first published in the collection “Premier cours executive sur la carriere diplomatique.” L’Université de Kinshasa, République Démocratique du Congo, 2005, pp. 8-13.

Substantial assistance is rendered to African countries in training national personnel in the sphere of health service. Last year the countries of the region were granted 800 stipends from the Russian state budget, and cooperation in this sphere included the training of personnel for sub-regional organizations, among them the Southern African *Development Community*. Russia continues to participate in financing the Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria (Russian contribution amounted to 20 million dollars), and the World Initiative for the liquidation of poliomyelitis.

The prevention and settlement of crisis situations remains one of the key issues for Africa's emergence on to the road of stable development. An enormous negative potential of conflict problems has been accumulated on the continent, which threaten peace and security, the sovereignty and integrity of states, and the life and welfare of people. During the past decades millions of Africans have become disabled persons and refugees.

Russia calls for a rapid and adequate reaction of the international community to the challenges connected with the unfavourable situation in Africa. The practical interaction of the UN and the regional and sub-regional structures, including the Council of Peace and Security of the African Union, as well as individual states acquires special importance for strengthening security on the continent.

Russia takes an active part in all peace-keeping operations in the region under the mandate of the UN Security Council, and it intends to increase its contribution to the training of the African peace-keeping forces at Russian training centres.

Russia is also present in the structures of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It is represented there by 23 officers as military observers, five police officers, and people at various headquarter services of the Mission. Three Russian helicopter companies work there under contract with the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo: "Nefteyugansk Unit" with 58 people and nine "MI-8 MTV" helicopters, "UTair" (Tyumen) with 26 people and two "MI-26T" helicopters, and "Vertical-T" with 12 people and one "MI-26T" helicopter.

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council our country actively participates in working out the general strategy of resolving conflicts on the continent and the political course of the international community in a concrete crisis situation. The President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, speaking at the Security Council's meeting in New York on September 14, 2005, emphasized that the Russian Federation was profoundly convinced of the necessity to raise the efficiency of the UN Security Council for preventing armed conflicts, including those in Africa.

Russia consistently supports the process of political settlement in the Democratic Republic of Congo and cherishes the friendly relations that have been established between the two countries.

Russia and the Democratic Republic of Congo have much in common. Russia, just as the DRC, has passed through a transition period in its history. It is well aware of the problems connected with political and socio-economic reforms, the establishment of democracy and the fight against poverty. Our countries have gone through the wars forced on them, when they had to defend their territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Africa still retains a bitter memory of the cruel war of 1939-1945. Thousands of Africans fell in battles. Soldiers of your country also made their contribution to the cause of winning peace: they fought courageously in the deserts of Libya and Egypt and the jungles of Burma. More than 2,500 Congolese men did not return home. The Soviet Union's losses in World War II amounted to more than 27 million lives.

Our countries know what terrorism is. Last September was the anniversary of the Beslan tragedy, when 330 schoolchildren and their parents became hostages of terrorists in a school in the Republic of Northern Ossetia in the North Caucasus. This tragedy, just as the acts of terror in the United States, Britain, Egypt and Spain, shocked all people of goodwill on our planet. The Congolese people expressed sympathy for the people of Russia in connection with the tragedy and many of them put their signatures to the Beslan Appeal in memory of the victims of terrorists.

May I recall some of the pages of the history of the relations between our countries.

This year we marked the 45th anniversary of the establishment of the diplomatic relations between our countries. The Soviet Union was one of the first countries to recognize the independence of Zaire and render political, diplomatic and economic support to the government of the first premier Patrice Lumumba. The new leaders of Zaire broke diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union unilaterally twice – in 1960 and 1963.

In 1968 important negotiations were held between the Soviet Union and Zaire, which determined the basic directions of cooperation between the two countries. In 1972 the Soviet Union and Zaire signed an agreement on scientific and cultural cooperation, which laid the foundation for the study of Zaire students at institutes of Moscow and other cities of the USSR. This tradition is still alive. This year Russia granted 15 scholarships to the Congolese side.

Russia continues to expand the legal base of its relations with the DRC.

There are intergovernmental agreements between our countries on air transportation (1974), on the general principles of economic, scientific-technical and cultural cooperation (1976), on trade (1976), on sea navigation (1976), on cultural and scientific cooperation (1983), and on military-technical cooperation (1999).

Recently, more positive trends have emerged in the Russian-Congolese relations. In 2004, consultations were held between the deputy foreign ministers, as well as traditional consultations between the ministries of foreign



affairs, in which the head of the African department of the Russian foreign ministry, and the Minister of foreign affairs of the DRC, R. Ramazani, and the director of the cabinet of the President of the DRC, E. Boshab, took part. Both sides reaffirmed their intention to continue interaction in the political-diplomatic, trade-economic, military-technical and cultural spheres. Russian parliamentarians have visited Kinshasa for the first time. Last September Congolese experts in anti-terrorist activity were in Moscow in response to an invitation of the Ministry of Interior of Russia.

In this important period the government of the Russian Federation and the Russian people support the steps undertaken by the Congolese government aimed at a peaceful settlement and successful termination of the transition rule, which should end in general elections.

The Democratic Republic of Congo is in the centre of the African continent, and stability on the African continent depends on peace in that country. We'd like to express the hope that the second regional summit for peace and security in the region of Great Lakes, which was planned to be held in Nairobi in November 2005 would have mapped out concrete ways for resolving the situation in the region.

We express satisfaction in connection with a definite progress reached in fulfilling the comprehensive agreement. A greater part of the path has been traversed. Some more efforts remain to be made.

## THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARISTIC TENDENCIES IN US POLICY IN AFRICA\*

**Mikhail Vishnevsky,**  
D.Sc.(Hist.), Leading Research Fellow,  
Institute for African Studies, RAS

*The problems of the military policy of the United States in African countries are traditionally regarded in American literature as part of the strategy aimed at creating a favourable climate for the promotion of Washington's interests on the continent so rich in natural and manpower resources. These problems are reflected in various monographs and articles, and also on the Internet sites of the Department of Defense and other government offices of the United States. It should be noted that the US military policy in Africa has been studied very little in Russian scholarly literature (although it was given some attention in the past). This article is an attempt to fill up this gap.*

It is believed that prior to the disintegration of the USSR the United States pursued, first and foremost, military-strategic aims in Africa. On January 1, 1983, the Central Command (CENTCOM) was set up, whose zone covered the territory of 25 countries by May 1, 2002, including 11 states of Africa (Egypt, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Mauritius, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea).<sup>1</sup> Speaking at the US Congress on December 22, 1983, the Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger dwelt on the global American strategy of deploying forces on forward lines, having in mind the African continent, too.<sup>2</sup>

CENTCOM, just as other strategic military commands of the United States (among them EUROCOM and PACIFICOM), plays a major role in the implementation of the global imperial policy by the United States. They are especially important for the defence of the strategic land, sea and air communication lines which could be used, in an event of military operations, for transporting troops and cargoes, as well as for protecting the routes of supply of mineral raw materials so vital for the American economy.

According to American experts (for instance, a group of members of the Council on Foreign relations in New York headed by Professor Janifer Whitaker), the United States is interested, along with other matters, in having control over the shipping from the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb to the Arabian Sea. No less important for the United States are sea routes from the eastern part of the Pacific, past

---

\* First published in *Asia and Africa Today*, 2007, No. 8, pp. 5-10.

Cape Horn (or the Panama Canal), and also via the South Atlantic, past Cape of Good Hope to the Indian Ocean.<sup>3</sup>

To replenish the supplies of food, fuel and water, the American warships patrolling the above-mentioned strategic sea communication lines have to use local resources, which makes it imperative for the United States to create friendly regimes in the coastal countries, including those in Africa.

In times of the Cold War this strategy was implemented by modernizing or building US military objects which were used, as a rule, jointly with the local authorities. In Egypt there were Cairo West, Wadi Kena, Luksor, Aswan, Ras Banas (on the Red Sea shore), military objects in the vicinity of the Farafra Oasis, near Mersa Matruh and in the district of El Alamein (on the shore of the Mediterranean). In Kenya the port of Mombasa was modernized to make it suitable for receiving large vessels. In Somalia the port and airfield in Berbera were reconstructed, and the runway of the latter was prolonged to over four kilometers so that it can now receive all types of modern military aircraft. In Sudan military bases were built in Suakin (on the Red Sea shore), El-Fasher (near the border with Libya and Chad) and in Dongola (north of Khartoum). In Morocco military objects were established in Tangier, Sidi Yahya, Sidi Buknadele, Ben Gerir and Ben Sliman. An agreement was concluded between the United States and Morocco on "strategic accord".<sup>4</sup> In the 1990s these bases were either closed down temporarily or transferred to the management of the receiving side.

It was supposed that all these objects were intended for the rapid deployment of the forces to be used within the framework of CENTCOM and EUROCOM. Judging by the US Department of Defense,<sup>5</sup> the zone of responsibility of the latter includes Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, the Republic of South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Air and naval bases have been built on Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean capable to receive the B-52 strategic bombers and nuclear submarines. These military objects were used three times: in 1991 during the "Desert Storm" operations in the Persian Gulf, in 2001 during the operation against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and in 2003 during the war in Iraq.

Since the 1990s in connection with the changing of the global intentions of Washington, the significance of the military-political aspect of the US strategy in Africa considerably increased. Washington began to pay major attention to the formation of the "inter-African peacekeeping forces".

In August 2001, the Pentagon evolved a Strategy for the Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>6</sup> It envisaged the possibility of the participation of US armed forces

in guarding the places of mining and transporting strategic raw materials from African countries (oil, gold, diamonds, copper, bauxites, uranium, manganese and cobalt), as well as fighting drug trafficking, and carrying on peace-making operations.

### **Foundations of US Military Policy in Africa**

After September 11, 2001, the United States has revised its global plans. Just as at the time of the cold war, the African continent again becomes important militarily and strategically. At the same time, Washington's rivalry with other major world powers intensifies as their interests in African natural wealth, primarily fuel-and-power resources increase. The terrorist acts in New York and Washington forced American statesmen to change their attitude and attach greater importance to African countries. Professor Peter Schraeder of the Chicago Loyola University regards them as "the second front" in the global war against terrorism.<sup>7</sup> Pentagon pays special attention to the countries of North and East Africa because they are close geographically, culturally and religiously to the regions of the Middle East, which are the "centres of global terrorist activity" on vast territories from Morocco to Indonesia.<sup>8</sup>

In this context, the US Department of Defense has worked out and implemented several programmes regarding African countries. The first of them concerns the activity of the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa. Its purpose is to fight the cells of al-Qaeda and its supporters in East Africa – Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia.<sup>9</sup> More than 1,000 troops of the US Special Forces take part in land operations. The combat Group-150 patrols coastal waters. It consists of American, German, Spanish and British warships. Along with them, the region is also patrolled by a special CIA aircraft "Predator", whose task is to find and destroy terrorists. For example, a missile fired from the "Predator" in Yemen killed the local leader of al-Qaeda and his four companions travelling in the same car.<sup>10</sup>

In this connection it should be noted that, as President Bush put it, the Republic of Djibouti is at the peak of the struggle against terrorism in the region.<sup>11</sup> The "Radio Sawaa", which broadcasts round the clock in Arabic to Sudan and the countries of the Middle East, is stationed there. Although no official information is published on this score, Djibouti is regarded as one of the biggest recipients of American military aid.<sup>12</sup>

Another regional programme of ensuring security in African countries initiated by the Pentagon after the events of September 11, 2001, was the Pan-Sahelian Initiative. At first, four countries took part in it – Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. Its aim is to prevent the al-Qaeda terrorists who left Afghanistan after the American military action, as well as their supporters in Iraq, to set up well-armed and well-trained units of Islamic militants, receiving ample financial assistance from their patrons.<sup>13</sup>

In fact, the implementation of this initiative proceeds in the form of the US Special Forces taking part in joint operations with local armed units to track and destroy “Islamic terrorists”. The operating American-African units have army trucks and special equipment (Global Positioning System) making it possible to determine the exact location of objects to be destroyed. With the consent of the American side and the participation of US army contingents, these units have carried out several successful operations, the most important one being the capture of the leaders of the “Groupe Salafite pour la Predication et le Combat” based in Algeria.<sup>14</sup>

The US Department of Defense has come to the conclusion that the Pan-Sahelian Initiative should include a greater number of African countries than it was planned in 2001. As a result, this programme was changed into the Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative. Apart from the four already-mentioned African countries, it now includes Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Senegal and Nigeria. To implement the US military plans in this region, it attaches special significance to the participation of Senegal, the most important French-language partner of the United States in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as Algeria, where trans-Saharan routes intersect.<sup>15</sup>

The US Congress allocated 500 million dollars for the next five years in 2005 for the implementation of this initiative.<sup>16</sup> This programme was officially launched in June 2005, when joint military exercises under the code-name “Flintlock 2005” were held, in which units of the US Special Forces as well as contingents of all the African states connected with this initiative took part.<sup>17</sup> Later, cooperation between the US Special Forces and African military units was put on a regular basis by patrolling local areas jointly.

The third military programme directly dealing with Africa was launched in 2003 under the name “East Africa Counter Terrorism Initiative. It includes such countries as Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The implementation of the programme is supervised by the US Department of State, which also provides its financing to the amount of 100 million dollars annually. The aim of the programme is to smash the terrorist network of al-Qaeda in East Africa and preclude its operations in the region, such as the attacks on the US Embassy in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and on Israeli tourist targets in Mombasa (Kenya) in 2002. Within the framework of this programme the “Safe Skies for Africa Initiative” is implemented, protecting the security of air communications in the region. The US East African Aviation Security Advisor is stationed in Nairobi (Kenya) who officially coordinates all activity in the region within the framework of this initiative.<sup>18</sup>

The above-mentioned programmes are the basis of the modern military policy of the United States in Africa. The African countries are divided on the basis of the priority principle for American foreign policy. The first, and the most important, group includes the states of North and East Africa, in as much as they are close to the region of the Middle East conflict, the epicen-

tre of the “global war on terrorism”. The second group includes big African countries, known as the regional centres of force,<sup>19</sup> which support the American policy of struggle against terrorism. Among them are Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, Ethiopia, Kenya and Senegal. The third group consists of oil-producing countries of the Guinea Bay, which are important for the United States economically. The remaining sub-Saharan African countries are not too interesting to American policy in the region and form the fourth, the least priority, group of states.

### **Military-Technical Assistance**

The stepping up of American military political activity in Africa, observed recently, has contributed to the expansion of the US military-technical aid to the countries of the continent. The point is that of the Programme of International Military Education and Training (IMET) within whose framework African countries send their officers to the United States for study. Apart from its purely military character, this programme is also of political significance, in as much as during their training African military officers are educated in the spirit of the great respect for American might, policy and culture, and upon return to their respective countries they become advocates and promoters of the US policy in Africa. In 2005 there were 41 African countries which took part in this programme, and in 2006 – 45 countries in the sub-Saharan region. Except Libya, the countries of North Africa, too, take part in the programme. Expenditures for the study of officers from these states have grown considerably after September 11, 2001.<sup>20</sup>

There is another programme developing in Africa after the terrorist attack against the United States in 2001. It is called the Foreign Military Financing Programme – FMF. Within its framework Washington grants friendly regimes American military equipment and hardware, which will enable them “to strengthen and modernize their defence capacity, render safe their borders and territorial waters, provide for their other needs in the sphere of security, improve their interaction with the American armed forces in the struggle against terrorism”.<sup>21</sup> In 2006 eight countries took part in this programme – Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda.<sup>22</sup>

In 2006 the Bush administration initiated another programme – Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which took the form of the ACOTA programme (African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance). This programme replaced the African Crises Response Initiative (ACRI),<sup>23</sup> which was in force from 1996. The main distinction of ACOTA from ACRI is that the former is targeted at training servicemen for offensive operations in the African Horn region. An example of such an operation can be provided by the participation of the Ethiopian army in the onslaught on the

capital of Somalia – Mogadishu in early 2007 in order to free the city from the units loyal to the Alliance of Islamic Courts and coming out against the Provisional transitional government of Somalia. American planes repeatedly bombed targets on the territory controlled by the Alliance.<sup>24</sup>

In East Africa the ACOTA programme is implemented in the form of the Counter Terrorism Initiative (EACTI Initiative), and in the Pan-Sahelian region – as the Counter Terrorism Initiative in the Sahara region (PSI and TSCTI Initiatives). The main recipients of means within the ACOTA programme are Mali, Niger, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda.<sup>25</sup>

In December 2006 the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Mohammed ibn Shambas, requested the United States to increase allocations for training the ECOWAS Standby Force, for the purpose of their more active participation in peace-making operations, which were planned within the framework of ECOWAS.

These forces participate in the ACOTA programme which is coordinated by the United States European Command (EUROCOM), in cooperation with the American corporation Northrop Grumman, the ECOWAS Secretariat and the Kofi Annan International Centre on peace-making operations stationed in Accra (Ghana). The ECOWAS forces include contingents from Benin, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal. Its headquarters in Abuja (Nigeria) is in constant contact with all its military units. In 2006 their numerical strength was 1,500 men, and by 2010 it is expected to be 5,000, which will make it possible to form an efficient military unit on which the African Union will be able to rely on in conducting its operations.<sup>26</sup>

By the Commander of the NATO forces in Europe, General James Jones, the main aim of the US military activity in Africa is to create a “community of bases which would allow the Pentagon to realize the premise of the National Security Strategy of the United States for dealing preventive strikes on the heavens of terrorism.”<sup>27</sup>

Thus the Bush administration intended to fight against terrorism with the support of a coalition of states, including those of Africa, interested in combating terrorist activity. By August 19, 2003, there were 70 countries in the anti-terrorist coalition.<sup>28</sup> The contribution of each of them varies from direct participation in military operations to diplomatic support to the US actions in the international arena.

From a military-political point of view, the growing interest of the United States in African countries at present can be explained by the need to create the necessary military infrastructure, and also a system of relations guaranteeing free access to the sources of mineral raw materials on the continent. In this connection another statement by General James Jones evokes a certain interest. He said that the United States was striving to increase the number of their servicemen in Africa, above all in the regions where there are large districts uncontrolled by the local authorities, where drug-

trafficking routes pass and training camps of terrorists and seats of instability are situated. Africa is important for both NATO and the United States. Strike airforce groups and expeditionary forces should not be on constant six-month duty in the Mediterranean. They should spend half that time on the coast of West Africa.<sup>29</sup>

In April 2004 the first meeting of the defence ministers of the North African countries and those of the Sahelian zone with the commander of the US forces in Europe was held in Stuttgart (Germany). It was attended by representatives of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Chad and Niger. An agreement was reached at the end of the meeting that these African countries would render assistance to the EUROMED in ensuring security along the transportation routes of oil and gas.

The president of the “Chevron Texaco” Co., George Kirkland, said in this context that oil was an important part of the American strategic interests. Without the regular deliveries of African crude oil the American economy would need 10 million gallons of petrol additionally each year. The African representatives at the meeting expressed readiness to take steps for the liquidation of the “instability belt” in the Sahelian zone of Africa. The deputy commander of the US forces in Europe, General Charles Wald, said that the United States was alarmed over the fact that “the Islamists use scarcely populated or practically uninhabited places in the Sahelian zone for training terrorists there. It would take them only a few hours to reach the territory of the United States or European countries.”<sup>30</sup>

### Washington’s “African Policy”

As it is emphasized in the White House document “African Policy”, the Bush administration intended to form “coalitions of the willing” with such “key” countries for the American strategy in Africa as South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia for joint actions in the struggle against terrorism. It is expected that military units from these countries will form the backbone of the future contingents within the framework of the African Union or on another collective basis, which will carry on anti-terrorist operations on the African continent.<sup>31</sup>

Various situations could be chosen as pretexts for such actions. For example, the US naval forces have intensified patrolling the coastal waters of Somalia and a number of other states in the region in order to counteract the threat of terror against American interests in Africa, beginning from 2003.<sup>32</sup>

It should be emphasized that the US military and military-political efforts to defend American interests in Africa are also made through the allied countries on the continent. According to the new version of the National Security Strategy of the United States, these countries should be able to ensure effective management of their economy and state apparatus, and also to popularize American interpretation of democracy and the need to

fight terrorism in other African countries. An important role is given to the African Union as a continental organization called upon to contribute to the political stability and economic development of the African states, especially those where civil wars have been quelled with American military-political participation, and where power has gone over to the forces which are thankful to the United States for its support in the past.<sup>33</sup>

The peak of the military and military-political activity of the Pentagon in Africa was reached when President Bush decided to set up, before the end of this fiscal year (2008), the Unified Combatant Command for Africa (Africa Command). Explaining his decision, President Bush declared that the new command would bolster cooperation between the United States and African countries, bring peace to the peoples of the continent and contribute to their economic and humanitarian progress. The United States intends to closely cooperate with the leaders of African countries within the framework of the Africa Command.<sup>34</sup> By the US Assistant Secretary of Defense, Henry Rhine, representatives of the Department of State and other bodies will work at the headquarters of the Africa Command, who will help the Pentagon to plan and carry out operation in Africa. According to Henry Rhine, the US Administration recognizes the transformation of African countries into key subjects in the world arena. The Department of Defense, as part of the US government, is ready to recognize this reality and cooperate with African states in their new quality.<sup>35</sup> In the 2007 fiscal year the expenditures for the upkeep of the Africa Command would reach 50 million dollars. A greater sum is envisaged for the year 2008.<sup>36</sup>

An article of the South African information agency "Inter Press Service" gives the following explanation of the need to set up a special military command of the United States for African countries. It says that Washington is especially concerned over the growing importance of African countries in the global war on terrorism, and the importance of African natural resources, especially oil and gas, in the world economy, as well as the noticeable increase of rivalry with China and some other countries for possessing these resources.<sup>37</sup>

In the opinion of the US Senator Russel Fiengold, the Africa Command is vitally important for strengthening US relations with African countries, and also for preventing their turning into a region of the concentration of terrorists for an attack against the United States and its allies.<sup>38</sup>

It is important to note the role of the US Intelligence in African countries. According to Richard Armitage, US Assistant Secretary of Defence in the first administration of President Bush, the significance of foreign intelligence has considerably increased after September 11, 2001.<sup>39</sup> Quite a few operations carried out by the CIA within the framework of the struggle against international terrorism in Africa remain top secret to this day, and much time will have to pass before they become known.

As the former US Ambassador in Kenya William Atwood testifies, the US Ambassadors in Africa work in close contact with the CIA and are well aware of all measures carried on by that department.<sup>40</sup> In his view, the CIA has always been and remains the most important instrument of the American foreign policy.<sup>41</sup>

The former head of the Planning Department of Foreign Policy at the US Department of State, Richard Haasse, gave the following interpretation of the concept of national sovereignty in connection with the anti-terrorist campaign. In his view, the traditional views on this subject become a thing of the past, and a state connected with terrorism should not expect recognition of its sovereignty by other countries. Thus, the growing militarist trends in the US policy toward Africa are well adapted to the "National Security Strategy of the United States."<sup>42</sup> According to this strategy, the US, after the September 11, 2001, has the right on a preventive strike in any form, including a military operation, against any state that is connected with terrorism in one way or another.<sup>43</sup>

Another important reason for this trend is the desire to prepare for the inevitable rivalry with other big states for the natural resources of Africa, above all, its fuel-and-power resources. On the whole, the decision of the Bush administration to set up AFRICOM, just as the purpose of other military-political programmes of the United States in that region, shows the considerable growth of the priority of African countries in the US foreign policy. And the military methods and means will play an ever greater role in the implementation of this policy.

---

#### Notes:

1. US CENTCOM. Mission statement. 20 May 2002, p. 2. <http://www.centcom.mil/who-we-are/mission-statement.asp>.
2. Американский экспансионизм. Новейшее время. М.: Наука, 1986, с. 582. [Cited from American Expansionism. Modern Time. Moscow, Nauka Publishers, 1986, p. 582.]
3. "Africa and the United States Vital Interests. A Council on Foreign Relations Books". N.Y.: New York University Press, 1978, p. 128.
4. Американский экспансионизм. Новейшее время. М.: Наука, 1986, с. 582. ["American Expansionism", p. 582; Cooperation for Development: Africa, the Soviet Union and the United States. Moscow: Novosti Publishers, 1991, p. 38.]
5. <http://www.eucom.mil/ADR/index.htm>. -18 June 2003.
6. DoD Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa. August 2001. <http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/isa/africa/africa-strategy-draft.pdf>.
7. Schraeder, P. North and East Africa as "Second Fronts" in the Bush Administration's War on Terrorism. A Presentation Paper for 49th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Nov. 16-19, San Francisco, California, p. 8.
8. Ibid.

9. Feickert Andrew. The U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism. Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines and Columbia. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress. Feb. 4, 2005, pp. 7-8.

10. Ibid.

11. The U.S. Department of State. The Congressional Budget Justification. Foreign Operations. Fiscal year 2006 (further on cited as "Bush Administration foreign Aid Request for 2006"), Wash., 2005, p. 253.

12. Ibid.

13. *The International Herald Tribune*, Paris. May 12, 2004.

14. Schraeder, P., op.cit., p.8.

15. Bush Administration Foreign Aid Request for 2006, pp.268-269.

16. Ibid.

17. Schraeder, R., op.cit., p.9.

18. Bush Administration Foreign Aid Request for 2006, p.269.

19. President George Bush. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, Washington.

20. Bush Administration Foreign Aid Request for 2006.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. VOA News. Washington, 25 July 2002.

24. [www.allafrica.com](http://www.allafrica.com)- January 18, 2007.

25. Ibid.

26. This Day. Lagos, December 13, 2006.

27. President George Bush. The National Security Strategy...

28. The U.S. Central Command International Contributions to the War on Terrorism. Wash. 19 August 2003. <http://www.centcom.mil/operations/coalition/joint.htm>.

29. Foreign Policy in Focus Special Report. N.Y. 21 July 2003. <http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/pdf/gac/OU307southafrica.pdf>.

30. [www.allafrica.com](http://www.allafrica.com)-April 15, 2004.

31. The White House. President George W. Bush. Africa Policy, pp.3-4. [www.whitehouse.gov](http://www.whitehouse.gov).

32. Promoting Transparency in the African Oil Sector. A Report. Council on Foreign Relations, N.Y. March 2004, p. 4.

33. President George Bush. The National Security Strategy..., pp. 37-38.

34. The U.S. Department of State. The White House Press Release. February 6, 2007.

35. The U.S. European Command Press Release. February 8, 2007.

36. Ibid.

37. [www.allafrica.com](http://www.allafrica.com) – February 1, 2007.

38. Ibid.

39. Armitage, R. Intelligence Sharing and September 11 Attacks. U.S. Department of State. Wash., 19 September 2002.

40. Atwood, W. Red and Black: Personal Impressions. M., Progress Publishers, 1968. Issue One, transl. from English, p.183.

41. Ibid., p. 163.

42. President George Bush. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, September 2002.

43. Haass, R.N. Reflecting a Year After September 11. Remarks. U.S. Department of State. Wash., 13 September 2002.

## HISTORY, CULTURE, ETHNOGRAPHY, LINGUISTICS

### AT THE 15TH SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN 1960\*

**Vassily Solodovnikov,**  
D.Sc.(Hist.), Corresponding Member  
of the Russian Academy of Sciences,  
Ambassador

On December 14, 1960, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples. That was an important stage in the struggle of the Asian and African nations against imperialism, for their national and social emancipation. The Declaration summed up the historic changes in the world after World War II, on the one hand, and on the other, it created an international legal basis for the immediate and complete abolition of colonialism.

The more time from the 15th session of the UN General Assembly, the more significant the initiative of the Soviet Union to discuss at the session the question of decolonization and the draft Declaration on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples. That was a truly outstanding contribution of the USSR to the struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America against imperialism and colonial oppression, against racism and apartheid.

The Soviet government attached great importance to its draft of the Declaration on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples and its discussion and adoption at the UN. This was confirmed by the fact that the Soviet delegation to the 15th General Assembly session was headed by N.S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. The Soviet delegation included A.A. Gromyko, the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, and several top officials of the foreign ministry.

The delegations of Ukraine and Belorussia were headed by their leaders.

The delegations of other socialist states and many liberated countries were also headed by their leaders – Jawaharlal Nehru, Sukarno, Kwame Nkrumah, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Secou Toure, and others.

On September 23, the head of the USSR delegation N.S. Khrushchev made a speech in which he put forward and substantiated the Soviet proposal on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples to be discussed at the session.

He said that the Soviet government submitted to this session of the UN General Assembly the draft of the Declaration with the following demands:

1. *To grant without delay full independence and freedom to all colonial countries, trust and other non-self-governed territories in the construction of their national states in accordance with the freely-expressed will and desire of their peoples. The colonial regime, colonial administration of all types should be abolished completely with a view to granting the peoples of these territories the opportunity to determine their destinies and forms of government themselves.*

2. *To liquidate all strong points of colonialism in the form of possessions and leased districts on alien territories.*

3. *The governments of all countries should strictly and consistently adhere, in the relations between states, to the premises of the UN Charter and this Declaration on the equality and respect of the sovereign rights and territorial integrity of all states without exception, without manifestations of colonialism, exceptional rights or privileges for some states to the detriment of other states.*"

For the first time in the UN history, the pro-American "mechanism of the majority" did not work at the 15th session. This was due, as we see it, to the radical changes that had occurred in the world, especially in Africa. In just one year 16 states in Africa gained independence, and 15 of them became UN members. This has changed the alignment of political forces during voting at the UN General Assembly session.

On September 28, five days after the Soviet proposal was made public, the US delegation asked the UN Secretary General to include in the agenda an additional question: "*Africa – a programme of the UN of ensuring independence and development*".

The US proposals could not satisfy the delegations of Asian and African countries which wanted the UN to contribute to the complete and rapid abolition of all forms of dependence. The initiative of the Soviet government looked important and timely against the background of the document proposed by the United States. Two different approaches, two policies toward decolonization became quite clear once again.

The draft resolution submitted by the US delegation did not mention the question of decolonization at all. This made its proposal unacceptable for most Afro-Asian delegations. Although the American draft by itself was a considerable concession of the West to the developing countries as far as economic, technical and humanitarian assistance rendered them was concerned, but it was not in accord with the agenda of the session on decolonization and was evolved by its authors exclusively as a counter-proposal to the Soviet initiative.

On October 12, heated debates unfolded at the plenary session of the General Assembly in support of the Soviet proposal to the effect that discussions on decolonization be held not in committees, but at plenary sessions.

---

\* First published in *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn*, Moscow, 2006. No. 6, pp. 112-122.

“The discussion of the problem of the abolition of the colonial system at the plenary sessions, with the heads of government and foreign ministers of the UN member-states taking part,” N.S. Khrushchev said, “will lend it the most authoritative character and ensure the most favourable conditions for its successful solution within the framework of the UN.”

Many delegations, especially those of Asian and African countries, including the heads of state and government of India, Egypt, Indonesia, Cuba, Guinea, and others, supported this proposal. The session approved the Soviet proposal by a majority of votes.

The debate on the draft Declaration submitted by the USSR opened at the plenary sessions of the UN General Assembly on November 28, 1960, with a speech by the Soviet delegate Valerian Zorin.

In the course of the discussion 43 delegations of Afro-Asian countries, in order to prevent the failure of the draft Declaration on decolonization submitted by the Soviet delegation because it was initiated by the USSR, put forward their own draft, which took into account and reiterated the main premises of the Soviet draft. However, in the view of the Soviet delegation, it had some imprecise wordings. The delegations of the developing countries, which were forced to consider the position of western powers, wanted to achieve the unanimous approval of the Declaration.

On December 14 voting took place on the draft Declaration. Although the Soviet draft received the support of most developing countries, it did not have the necessary majority of votes. Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Ethiopia, and other African countries voted for it. Thirty-two votes were cast for the Soviet draft, 35 were against and 30 abstained.

On that very day, December 14, 1960, the UN General Assembly adopted the draft Declaration on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples submitted by 43 Afro-Asian countries. It received 89 votes, including the votes of all socialist states.

Nine delegations abstained from voting for the draft of 43 countries – the United States, Britain, France, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, the Union of South Africa, Australia and the Dominican Republic. Most probably, they were persuaded by the United States, thus having become the defenders of colonial and racial domination.

Although the Soviet draft of the Declaration on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples was not adopted, the USSR and other socialist states were not disappointed with the outcome of the discussion and voting, inasmuch as the adopted declaration was quite close in its content to the Soviet draft.

At the same time the proposal put forward by the United States, which was discussed at the meetings of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, was turned down by the overwhelming majority of the delegations of the developing and socialist countries.

Its discussion was postponed to the next session of the UN General Assembly.

On April 11 and 12, 1961, twenty-four African countries submitted their draft resolution on the US document, which essentially differed from the US draft due to the addition of new articles to it, and proceeded from the premises of the Declaration of independence known as the UN resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960. The American authors of the programme, after their draft resolution had been revised in the spirit of the Declaration, lost all interest in their own proposal. This was why this point was not included in the agenda of the 16th session of the UN General Assembly in 1961, and the US proposal was dropped altogether.

France continued a full-scale war in Algeria, despite the call of the UN to stop it. As a result, 1.5 million people were killed during the period from 1954 to 1962. In 1961 the United States committed an act of aggression in Bizerte, Tunisia.

Portugal waged colonial wars against the people of Angola, Mozambique, Cabo Verde and Guinea Bissau right up to 1975.

Belgium supported by the United States interfered in the internal affairs of Congo (Zaire). They came out against the legitimate government of Patrice Lumumba, who was ousted from power with the support of their special services, and then killed.

Britain suppressed an uprising in Mauritius with the use of arms in 1965.

The regime of apartheid in South Africa pursued a cruel policy against the African people in its own country and in Namibia.

Mention should be made of the unprecedentedly large-scale aggression of the United States in Vietnam, where the US army, in defiance of international standards and laws, used chemical weapons against peaceful citizens. In the course of that aggression the United States lost more than 50,000 of their men and officers, and the number of victims among the Vietnamese people amounted to three million.

To complete the story about the adoption of the UN Declaration on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples, it should be added that on the initiative of the developing countries supported by the socialist states, and with a view to implementing the basic premises of the Declaration, the UN set up a *Special Committee for the realization of the Declaration on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples*, known as the Committee on Decolonization, or the Committee of 24 (by the number of its members).

In 1962 a special UN Committee against apartheid was formed, and some time later the Council on Namibia was set up, and a high commissioner on Namibian affairs was appointed.

The activity of these UN bodies contributed to speeding up the process of decolonization on the African continent and the abolition of apartheid in South Africa.



The discussion of the Soviet proposal turned into the moral and political denunciation of the countries which continued to keep the peoples in colonial bondage. From that time on, the moral and political prestige of western countries in the Third World has been undermined considerably. And the policy of the socialist countries aimed at supporting the national-liberation movements, including the granting of material assistance and arms supplies, has received international-legal backing. This was why the USSR and other socialist states had no need to conceal their material assistance and arms deliveries to the national-liberation movements.

The adoption of the Declaration proved a big success for the USSR and its diplomacy, whereas it was a setback for the United States and its western allies.

During the 1961-1964 period I worked at the UN Secretariat as the director of the Department of Industrial Development and at the Soviet UN mission as a deputy Permanent Representative of the USSR at the UN. At that time I witnessed and took part in many debates on the colonial question. I saw how a group of western states stubbornly defended the interests of colonialism and neocolonialism.

On July 11, 1963, the leaders of the African countries – member-states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) demanded that the UN Security Council force Portugal to immediately grant independence to the peoples of the Portuguese colonies in Africa.

The OAU Council's meeting was attended by the ministers of foreign affairs of Ghana, Morocco, Tunisia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Malagasy Republic.

The discussion of the draft resolution submitted by the OAU was quite heated. The western countries – permanent members of the UN Security Council (the United States, Britain and France) tried to remove the draft from the agenda. The Soviet delegation came out for the adoption of the resolution and stated that it would vote for it in its initial form. The western states threatened that they would veto it, if its authors would not take their suggestions into account.

In order to have the Security Council adopt the resolution demanding that Portugal immediately grant independence to the peoples of its African colonies, the OAU representatives agreed to some suggestions of the western delegations, which slightly softened the initial draft resolution.

On July 31, 1963, the Security Council put the resolution submitted by Ghana, Morocco and the Philippines to the vote. Brazil, Venezuela, Ghana, Morocco, Norway, the USSR and the Philippines voted for the resolution.

Despite the fact that the draft took into account the position of the delegations of Britain, the United States and France, they did not abstain, for they were against the resolution in principle.

Speaking at a meeting of the Security Council in the debate on voting, I noted the significance of the adopted resolution for the decolonization of

Africa and outlined the principled position of the USSR on the problem of the abolition of colonialism.

The voting of the resolution demonstrated that the USSR sided with the African peoples, whereas the United States, Britain and France supported Portugal, which wanted to continue its colonial domination in Africa.

In 1963, the Declaration on the abolition of all forms of racial discrimination was adopted at the 18th session of the UN General Assembly. As a member of the Soviet delegation I took part in the work of the Social Committee of the UN General Assembly which discussed the draft of the Declaration. In the heated debate on the Declaration the alignment of forces was just the same as during the voting on the Declaration on independence. This has shown once again that the countries of the world have divided into those calling for the immediate liquidation of colonialism, racism and apartheid in all forms and manifestations, and those defending the colonial order, racism and apartheid in Africa not only in politics, but also with the use of force and economic and other forms of pressure.

The well-known French political figure, the director of the weekly *L'Express* and the leader of the party of radicals and radical-socialists Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber published in Paris in 1980 a book entitled "The Global Challenge", which caused sensation in the West. In it he described his conversation with the President of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, in 1977, soon after a visit to Zambia of a Soviet delegation headed by Nikolai Podgorny, the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The French politician made a pessimistic forecast with regard of the growing anti-western sentiments in the Third World countries.

Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber wrote: "Right after a visit to Zambia of the influential apparatchik Nikolai Podgorny, a young emissary from the United States, Andrew Young arrived in Zambia with a view to demonstrating his country's interest in that region. Andrew Young was America's 'Black Star' in the UN with the rank of Ambassador.

"We are not alarmed by the Soviet presence in your countries. You will see for yourselves that they are unable to do anything for you. Only we can help you, by supplying you with the necessary boons and commodities," Andrew Young stated.

This was said at a news conference, as Servan-Schreiber's book mentions. One Zambian journalist interrupted Andrew Young: "Everything you're saying are empty words, Mr. Young, nothing more. Who supports the 'Anglo-American', 'De Biers', 'Rio Tinto' – the mining companies which are plundering and ruining us? Is it the USSR or the West?"

This frank dialogue, Servan-Schreiber writes, reflected the thirty years of the opportunities missed by the West, unrealized and vain illusions and obstinate blindness. How come that the West full of self-confidence, thinking that it possesses the wisdom of the world, and fully understands its own interests, overlooked the oncoming threat? That was why the

Bandung Conference of the Asian, African and Latin American countries was held.

The French political figure was quite correct in noting that the abolition of the colonial rule of the imperialist metropolitan countries did not resolve the economic contradictions between the industrially developed capitalist West and the weakly economically developed South.

The abolition of the military-political colonial domination did not result in the liquidation of the unequal, non-equivalent exchanges between the industrial and developing countries. And this inequality and non-equivalence between the two groups of countries grow all the time.

I think that Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber was quite right by quoting the words of Cecil Rhodes, the famous British imperialist figure of the late 19th century and the founder of Rhodesia, who said that in order to fill our bellies it was necessary to plunder the world and thus avoid revolution. "But today's plunder the world over breeds revolutions," the French bourgeois politician concludes.

A gap in the economic development level, in the living standards and the quality of life of people in the Third World, on the one hand, and those in the countries of the "golden billion", on the other, has become even wider. This is the principal cause of international instability and a host of interstate and interethnic conflicts in the Third World.

In my view, an upsurge of the economy, rising living standards, and the narrowing of the gap in the quality of life of people in various countries remain the main challenge to mankind and the world community in the 21st century.

The success of Soviet diplomacy at the 15th session of the UN General Assembly is hardly possible now, in the conditions of weaker Russia. Andrei Gromyko in his memoirs published in 1988 devoted a whole chapter to the Soviet Union's efforts to put an end to colonialism.

"One after another representatives of the colonial countries mounted the rostrum and spoke with wrath and indignation about colonialists. This forum resembled an international tribunal passing sentence on the criminal guilty of brigandage and enslavement of over half the world's population.

"The overwhelming majority passed a political sentence on colonialism. That session of the UN General Assembly was a stirring event. One could see the breaking of the chains that fettered dozens of states and peoples for centuries.

"When the General Assembly adopted the main resolution it seemed the hall's walls and ceiling would collapse from a storm of applause. Politicians shook hands and congratulated one another on the occasion."

Another participant in those historic events in September-October 1960, the chief adviser of the USSR mission at the UN, V.A. Brykin, also remembered how the discussion of the Soviet proposals at the 15th session of the General assembly proceeded. He wrote about it in the book "African

Diplomat at the UN" (my review of it was published in the magazine *Narody Azii I Afriki*, Moscow, No. 2, February 1986.)

"On December 14, 1960," the author recalls, "89 states approved the draft Declaration on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples, nine countries abstained. Among the latter were the colonial powers and the Dominican Republic.

"At the 15th session of the UN General Assembly the great truth of history clashed with the petty lies of the colonialists. The victory scored by the forces of truth over the forces of lies was so impressive that its consequences are felt all the time and in every place where people are fighting for their independence and sovereignty."

Boris Pyadyshev has published memoirs for the 60th anniversary of the UN about his participation in the 15th session of the General Assembly. I think the reader can find something of interest, including his impressions of Khrushchev's behaviour on board the ship "Baltika" and at the session of the UN General Assembly, where he was opposed by such a strong political rival as President D. Eisenhower and other leaders of western countries.

In our view, B. Pyadyshev makes an important and well-founded conclusion about the success of Soviet diplomacy. He praises the role of Soviet diplomacy at the 15th session of the UN General Assembly. In the chapter "Four Summits in Different Worlds" he writes: "The first gathering of world leaders in the UN halls in 1960 was a triumph of the Soviet Union and its allies from the Third World. However, that triumph was temporary, because the economic strength of the West was firm enough not to permit drastic changes in the world to the detriment of the West. And the western states succeeded in doing this.

*"When world leaders gathered in the UN Palace in New York for the second time the situation was quite different. The pretext for their meeting was the 50th anniversary of the UN, and the event took place in September 1995.*

But the Soviet Union was no more. It disintegrated in December 1991. During the years that have passed since then, Russia has not succeeded in standing firmly on its feet. And there could be no talk about its allies. They have long gone over to the side of the United States, NATO and other western organizations.

At the meeting in 1995 Russia was practically alone, although the imposing figure of Boris Yeltsin and some statements by him and President Clinton created an impression that something important was taking place in the relations between the United States and Russia. However, there was nothing of the kind.

Such are the views of analysts and participants in the historic session of the UN General Assembly which adopted, on the initiative of the Soviet delegation, the Declaration on granting independence to colonial

countries and peoples, which speeded up the decolonization process in Asia and Africa.

**P.S.** In this context I cannot understand the reason why the authors and editors of the *Yubileiny vestnik* published in Russia for the 60th anniversary of the UN failed to include the 15th session of the UN General Assembly in the “**Ten Most Important Dates of the UN History**”. Meanwhile, they did not forget to include in “Ten Funniest Events in the UN History” the episode with “Khrushchev’s shoe” which took place at the 15th session.

## AFRICAN CIVILIZATION IN THE MODERN WORLD\*

*Anatoly Savateyev*, D.Sc.(Hist.),  
Executive Secretary of the  
Academic Council for the problems  
of Economic Social,  
Political and Cultural Development  
of African Countries

THREE CONTRADICTIONS characterize the image of Africa which has taken shape in science and ordinary consciousness. More often than not it is connected with poverty, wars, ethnic and religious conflicts, backward socio-economic relations, etc. Indeed, more than thirty poorest countries in the world (by the UN classification) are in Africa. Military operations continue in the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire) and Côte d’Ivoire, the situation is rather tense in Sudan, Liberia and Congo (Brazzaville). The President of Nigeria Umaru Yar’Adua can hardly be envied, because he is facing the real prospect of a split of his country – this time into the Moslem North and the Christian South. And all this is combined with the increased activity of various nationalist organizations cherishing the ideas of the creation of independent ethnic states. Nigeria is not the only example of such a situation.

However, there are different realities on the continent. For instance, Tanzania, Benin or Madagascar, Zambia..., the list of countries with political stability can be prolonged. This is why those who blame Africans themselves for wars and conflicts on the continent are wrong.

There is another distinction in the assessment of the existing contradiction between the globalization processes and the desire of the African countries to preserve their national-state and ethnocultural identity. Practically all Africans, scholars and foreign politicians are far from unanimous in assessing this contradiction. The liberal part of the intelligentsia and political figures assess globalization as a boon, as a current in the general human flow of progressive development without alternative. Others (we may term them “Afrophiles”) believe that globalization spells doom to the original African socio-cultural foundations.

The third contradiction, or a myth demanding definite correction, if not denial, is reliance on the western models of socio-political, economic and cultural organization of society’s life as the only possible means to be in line with the demands of the 21st century and enter the community of “civilized states”. Such is the supreme goal which should be attained at all costs.

---

\* First published in *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn*, 2006. No. 4, pp.127-137.

## **African Civilization in the System of World Globalism**

DO THE AFRICAN PEOPLES have their own inner reserves whose mobilization would allow them, while combining these reserves with the political and socio-cultural technologies of the most advanced states, to make a breakthrough, like the one made by East Asian countries? Let us turn to the historical roots of Africa. Everything is clear as far as North Africa is concerned. There are the richest Ancient Egyptian civilization, the Carthaginian branch of classical Ancient civilization, and Islamic civilization. On the contrary, in the Sub-Saharan zone we do not find the usual features of civilization: towns, written languages, and monotheistic religions. Nevertheless, the philosophical perception of the problems of life among the Bantu people, the cosmological ideas of the Dogon people in Mali,<sup>1</sup> and other peoples show that we should abandon the simplified notions about the absence of civilization among the peoples of Tropical Africa. Adherence to humanistic values, that is, the family, kinship and friendship with the near and dear ones and strangers, mutual assistance and mutual understanding, the feeling of closeness to each person and each creation of nature, the perception of life as harmonious coexistence are inherent in African society. Such sentiments and ideas constitute the essence of the civilization complex of Tropical Africa, distinguishing it from Christian and Islamic civilizations with their written rational rules and standards of behaviour. However, the usual legal standards are used in Tropical African civilization, too. They envisage the priority of collective interests over individual ones, while creating a socio-cultural community which is manifested in stylistic unity of material culture and beliefs. Spirituality inherent in great religious beliefs in African civilization is manifested, for example, in a kind attitude to people and hospitality. Russian ambassadors to the states of Black Africa always remember this feature of local people, both in big cities and rural areas. These elements can be seen in utilitarian everyday activity, and they are explained not by classical science, but by civilizatory theory.

In the 9th-10th centuries great Islamic civilization began to penetrate Africa. At present more than 130 million people in Africa are Moslems, and their number is growing rapidly. Islamic civilization prevails in the greater part of West Africa and plays a major role in East Africa, too. Islam brought a system of lofty rational views on the purport of human life, established personal responsibility for every act committed by man before God, and proclaimed man's difference from nature. A question arises as to why wars break out in such seemingly harmonious medium.

### **The Departure of Colonialists as a Source of Conflicts and Wars in Africa**

WESTERN HISTORICAL SCIENCE praises colonialism for stopping wars that were raging on the African continent prior to the arrival of

Europeans there. Was it a civilizatory mission of the white man? Yes and No. In actual fact, there were as many wars in Africa as in medieval Europe. Clashes between tribes were caused by disputes over hunting grounds and pastures, but they were often settled by agreements in accordance with usual customs, not by force. The wars for the creation of a unified state (Ghana, Mali, Songhai, the Khaliphate of Sokoto) were bloody, indeed, but they had a rational justification from the historical point of view. Can we always find enough arguments in defence of religious wars in Europe?

The European colonialists conquering the continent by force of arms needed a calm and stable situation on the territories they captured in order to sell their commodities and exploit the natural and manpower resources of the enslaved peoples, and they widely used the crude force of arms for establishing their law and order.

The departure of the colonialists has removed the old fears, and the competition for political power, which gave broad opportunities for using natural resources, turned into interethnic, clan or confessional rivalry, which often took the form of armed clashes. As a rule, African political leaders were supported by their ethno-regional groups or religious associations: the noble feelings of solidarity and mutual assistance turned into support of their "own" leader and became a justification in the struggle against the "aliens". Wherever the local politicians, who, as a rule, having received an education in western universities and imbibed western "democratic values", discarded traditional African values, there was, and now is, bloodshed. If one looks closer, one can see the glitter of diamonds and feel the smell of oil in the murk of the fighting. The natural minerals, which Africa is so rich in and are so needed in Europe and Asia, can serve as an economic reason. These and other sources of cataclysms, which are usually ordered by people living far from the African continent, have been known for quite some time.

In our epoch there is another instrument of influence on societies and states both on the African continent and in the entire world. This instrument is globalization which, in contrast to the previous process of the all-embracing unity of the world on the economic basis, is manifested in the actual shaping of the entire system of international relations – political, social and cultural – depending on the whim of one main character or the financial, economic and political forces prevailing on a global scale.

Globalization has contributed to the extreme complication and sharp increase of mobility and changeability of international relations, and sometimes the destabilization of the development of countries.

Attempts are made from time to time to establish control over the world under the guise of globalization, by the countries of the "golden billion", which result in the creation of obedient political elite in subordinated states, but not in organizing decent life in these countries (Afghanistan, Iraq and

Somalia are the cases in point). However, wars are transferred to the territory of the aggressor. And if the events of September 11, 2001, could seem a casual success of the “al Qaeda” extremist organization, the subversive acts on the Madrid railway in Spain in 2004, and the London explosions on July 7 and 21, 2005, demonstrated that the war was gradually becoming universal, that it would be waged without any rules, and that the countries of the “golden billion” would be unable to control its course.

### **The Place of Africa in the Global World of the Future**

IT SEEMS that along with the development of globalization, the network of inter-civilizational actions loses the opportunity to play the role of the all-embracing system of international relations. The new network of global contacts services new information, cultural, financial and other processes and structures. Indeed, modern globalization, having a gigantic and still growing potential to organize and regulate global processes, especially in the sphere of world communications, the mass media and new social movements, at the same time gives rise to such phenomena of self-organization and self-regulation, which have nothing to do with world civilization or world culture.<sup>2</sup> For example, financial capital, being closely tied up with a state and acting on a worldwide scale, does not need any moral legitimation of its operation and, consequently, strives to avoid social responsibility. Cultural bounds or state restrictions seem nothing more than a trifle to it, even when the fate of the world is concerned. It declares cultural values of the peoples and religious symbols of entire civilizations to be prejudices allegedly standing in the way of the formation of “progressive all-embracing human culture” corresponding to the new image of the “democratic world”. Naturally, traditional relations based on moral and religious principles are unable to survive in the conditions of such a massive total pressure.

The feeling of the loss of the basic values of civilizations is increased by an ever harsher confrontation between western culture claiming to be universal, on the one hand, and the great variety of African civilizations, on the other. The significance of the historically recognized universal civilizational principles – morality and law forming the backbone of civilization, which prevent the manifestations of immoral, uncivilized behavior, is lost. This results in the existence of such a terrible custom as cutting off the right arm of young people belonging to a different ethno-political organization in Liberia, and in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo – killing people of a different tribe en masse. However, the right of the West to claim the expression of the entire cultural heritage of mankind looks doubtful in the eyes of African peoples. Moreover, it is disputed by representatives of fundamentalist Islam in North Africa and many sheikhs (leaders) of Moslem spiritual (Sufi) tariqats-brotherhoods.

This withering away of principles, ideals and structures of civilization can be termed “anti-civilization”, inasmuch as African society finds itself rather weak to oppose the rampage of regional and ethnic separatism, crime, religious extremism and corruption.

The West uses the thesis of the rights of man not so much as a value, but as an instrument against the principle of state sovereignty, and the right to free self-expression of man and his individuality, against the values of solidarity, common survival, collective traditional mutual assistance. In this paradigm of actions the assessment of man’s material achievements is increasingly at variance with the assessments of ethical achievements or failures, cultural gains or losses.

### **What Africa Puts Forward to Defend Its Civilizational Authenticity**

FIRST, the integration of efforts at the level of interstate relations in the political, diplomatic, economic, financial and military spheres. The setting up of the African Union in 2001, which replaced the amorphous Organization of African Unity, the programme of “New Partnership for Africa’s Development” (NEPAD), the Continental Court, the Central Inter-African Bank, the formation of the first joint military units, etc. manifested the Africans’ intentions to tackle their own problems by their own combined efforts. At the same time it was a warning to developed countries that the peoples of Africa did not wish to see them as the mediators in resolving conflict situations. Besides, they also expressed their unwillingness to share the fate of Yugoslavia, Afghanistan or Iraq, no matter how their domestic situation develops. Some positive results have already been achieved: thanks to the participation of the inter-African military units the armed conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone were quelled.

Naturally, the organization of consolidating structures does not mean that the position of Africa as a backward part of the socio-economic area of the world will change rapidly. Africa’s foreign debts now amount to 300 billion dollars, 34 billion of which being the share of Nigeria. Its example is indicative enough: Nigeria is potentially one of the richest countries of the continent (oil, gas, other natural resources, water and manpower, iron-and-steel plant, automobile assembly plant); it has already paid 42 billion dollars as part of its foreign debt, which originally comprised 13.5 billion dollars. This sum with interest has reached 76 billion dollars.<sup>3</sup> Part of the national elite embezzled portions of the national income by illegal methods. As far as NEPAD, the African Union and other structures are concerned, the country firmly intends to move forward independently in deciding its destiny.

But having embarked on this difficult road, Africans should not discard the rules and habits of traditional political and administrative management, the customary legal regulation of public relations, to say nothing of the

ethical standards still exerting considerable influence on people's behaviour and mentality. Contrary to widespread views, traditional standards and mechanisms can become a means of resolving the most pressing problems of today. For example, in Rwanda, after the International criminal tribunal (similar to that regarding former Yugoslavia) proved unable to resolve the key problem of the country – to reconcile the warring ethnic groups of the population, the Tutsi and the Hutu, a way out has been found: after consultations with various sections of society the country resorted to the traditional Rwanda system of justice – *gacaca*. Its essence boils down to solving the most controversial problems on the spot, with the participation of the entire local community. The process of reconciliation has thus moved forward and the situation in the country became less tense.

Experience shows that peace and security in African countries, especially those with a complex ethnoconfessional structure, will be ensured, provided the traditional political and administrative institutions strictly correspond to modern democratic practice. This should be done, primarily, at the grassroots level, that is, in villages, districts and city neighbourhoods. Such system envisages the participation of people of all ethnic and confessional groups in the local administrative bodies on the principle of proportional representation or changeability (as, for instance, in Daghestan in Russia). The traditional institutions of power in the form of chambers of chiefs at the state level proved their viability and efficiency in Nigeria, Ghana, Zambia and Kenya, where they contributed to reducing tension and resolving conflicts in a number of cases.

In Senegal, Mali, Niger, in the north of Nigeria and in Somalia a stable political process is possible, provided the leaders (sheikhs) of Moslem religious orders take part in it, because they have profound influence on their followers and real political prestige. The sheikhs' words addressed to their congregation and their indication about who they should vote for often prove decisive and ensure electoral legitimacy. This form of participation in the political process does not contradict democratic procedure, inasmuch as the final result of elections is determined by the decision of the voter. This was why Senegal, which was ruled by the *immortel* of *l'Academie Française*, poet and philosopher, Leopold S. Senghor for over twenty years, was rightly considered one of the most democratic countries of the continent.

### **The Civilizatory Reserve of Africa**

JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA AND SINGAPORE are usually cited as good examples of democracy in the East, which still have influential traditional institutions: paternalism, corporatism, and family and clan ties. It is due to the effective combination of traditional mechanisms used for centuries with modern life that these states have made their impressive breakthrough which causes admiration.

The experience of many states in Asia, Africa and Europe, including Russia, has shown that the imposition of impersonal democracy of American style, its transference to a new soil, usually provokes an exacerbation of relations in society. This takes place at individual enterprises, on a regional level, and even in the entire nation. The political restructuring of African states without the adaptation of western political standards and institutions to the local socio-cultural conditions will look like a fight, but not a civilized competitive struggle.

The most crucial question: Does Africa have such internal civilizatory reserves and opportunities which would allow it, or at least one of its states, to make a breakthrough comparable to that made by the Southeast Asian "tigers"? "It's fantastic," any person may answer confidently. I will not categorically dispute this opinion, but will cite just one fact.

The Mouridiya *tariqat* has existed in Senegal for over a century, founded by the local sheikh Amadou Bamba. It is famous for the solidarity and high discipline of its members. A word said by its head – the supreme *khaliph* – is the law for all. The rank-and-file *Mourides* work on the peanut fields of their sheikhs, who pray for their congregation. All people, big and small, are united by belief in the supernatural capabilities of Amadou Bamba, who is the object of reverence and the main subject of the history and culture of the entire country. The person of Amadou Bamba unites all people – peasants and intellectuals, workers and students, young and old. The social cohesion of Mourides has emerged on the spiritual basis. The economic base of the *tariqat*, along with the monopoly on growing, processing and selling peanuts to Europe, now includes the building industry, trade, bank business, handicrafts and food production, etc. The ethics of labour has taken shape, proclaiming physical work as God's blessing, which earns respect and income. Just as the Protestant doctrine, the Mourides believe that material benefits come to those who are chosen by God. Already in the 1970s the first millionaires appeared in Mouridiya who give part of their income to the brotherhood fund. The *tariqat* has transferred its activity overseas, having opened bank offices, trade missions and spiritual and cultural centres in New York and France. Mourides can now be met on Moscow markets, too. The *tariqat* helps its members receive a higher education, including in foreign countries. This gives an impetus to the rapid economic and socio-cultural progress of Senegal.

Thus, among the crucial problems facing Africa, the pride of place should be given to the preservation and understanding of the civilizatory identity of Africans, using the inner socio-cultural reserves and searching for their own road in this world of ours. Evidently, the humanistic values, solidarity and love of life inherent in African peoples will have to play an important role. Non-traditional forms, methods and spheres of activity (for example, African countries becoming rest and recreation and ethnocultural zones) can also be regarded as promising.

*Natalia Ksenofontova*, Ph.D.(Hist.),  
Head of the Centre of Editorial  
and Publishing Board,  
Institute for African Studies, RAS

Conditions have emerged in Africa allowing its peoples to put an end to the myths of their helplessness in tackling domestic political and foreign economic problems. Inner concentration, temperance and even certain asceticism characteristic of Moslem brotherhoods, and strict adherence to laws, both state and spiritual and communal, can play a definite positive role on this road. But it is necessary to overcome the myth of globalization, which shows only one direction of development, namely, toward the western (American) model of society as the ideal. It is necessary to use the technical and technological achievements of all humanity, the new forms of the organization of labour and adapt to modern realities. But at the same time it is necessary to oppose them with the integrity of one's own world and proceed from the basic principles in evaluating the role of Africa as a region of original human qualities.

Such is the strategic course. Having determined its aims, essence and direction, it will be possible to tackle tactical problems – economic growth, the accumulation of means, the formation of social assistance and cultural-educational progress. The path is far from easy. Africa can now be compared to a short-distance runner, but its athletes have proved their ability to endure and emerge victorious. Africa will be able to traverse the difficult road ahead.

### Notes:

1. The French ethnologist M. Griaule came to the conclusion that the peoples inhabiting the present states of Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea have very rich and original mythology. See: *Griaule, M.* Dieu d'eau. Entretiens avec Ogotemmelli." Paris, 1948. See also the work by the Rwanda theologian A. Kagame, *Kagame, A.* "La philosophie Bantu comparée." Paris, 1976.

2. This term was introduced by the Russian scholar of culture A. Gordon to denote the culture of Europe in the epoch of great geographical discoveries, which was characterized by its striving for boundless expansion.

3. *Большов И.Г.* Проблема внешней задолженности – угроза национальной безопасности Нигерии // Безопасность Африки: внутренние и внешние аспекты. Тезисы. М., 2005, с. 270. [*Bolshov, I.* "Nigeria: Economic Security and the External Debt Problem." // Security for Africa: Internal and External Aspects. Abstracts. Moscow: Institute for African Studies Press, 2005. P. 270.]

Researchers (from Z. Freud to modern psychoanalysts), who devoted their work to finding out the peculiar features of the behavior of *homo sapiens* and his instincts, have convincingly shown that each one of us is dominated at the subconscious level by the fear of death, thirst for power and sex urge, which are the manifestations of the instinct of self-preservation.<sup>1</sup> These three components are closely connected with, and support, each other. Moreover, as most psychologists think, many actions of ours are not a consequence of the impulses of our soul or the function of our brain, but in actual fact they have completely hidden erotic motives.<sup>2</sup> This is also true of man's thirst for power (in the family, in a work team or at a state level.) It should be emphasized that thirst for power is not the wish to gain a formal title and possess the regalia accompanying it, but is the striving to impose one's own will and world outlook on others, and assert one's superiority (muscular or gender) on others. This is why, as Anthony Giddens believed, power is an inalienable part of human relations; many conflicts in society, including conflicts between the sexes, are due to the struggle for power, be it at a state, family or community level.<sup>3</sup> This struggle is founded on the clashes of opposite interests, views and wishes.

Inasmuch as the main driving force of the gender system of connections is the precise hierarchy of male and female interests, the relations of power and subordination are the determining factor in this hierarchic system. And it may seem surprising at first glance that the dominating position has not always been taken by representatives of the male part of the population. Looking back at the history of world civilizations from the East to West, from the South to North, one could see quite a few interesting examples of how gender relations determined the struggle for power and elevated purely personal intimate relations to a state level.

This phenomenon was especially clearly seen in the institution of favoritism, which was typical of many Oriental and European monarchies.

Historians single out several types of this social phenomenon.<sup>4</sup> In Europe female favoritism predominated. The famous mistresses of French monarchs gained a very noble status in society, acquired great wealth and exerted considerable influence on the rulers and the entire court life in the 15th-18th centuries.<sup>5</sup>

---

\* First published in *African Kaleidoscope*, Moscow, 2005. Issue 27, pp. 124-139.

The Russian autocracy created a special type of favoritism – male favoritism. The epoch of the Russian empresses, Catherine I, Anna Ioannovna, Anna Leopoldovna, Elizaveta Petrovna and Catherine the Great (the 18th century) was famous for their brilliant lovers, who had a serious impact on the entire life of the state. Suffice it to recall such omnipotent favourites as Alexander Menshikov, Ernst-Johann Biron, Grigory Potyomkin and the Orlov Brothers.<sup>6</sup>

Examining the institution of favoritism, it should be emphasized that its essence goes far beyond the bounds of sexual-intimate relations between the supreme ruler and members of the court close to him or her. It should be viewed as a specific type of the relations between man and woman, who play specific social roles under certain conditions, which are often of state importance.

When the ruler (he or she) chooses the lover (male or female), this means that the latter not only becomes closer to the monarch or the queen, but also that he or she is equaled to the latter. As the well-known German historian Edward Fuks wrote, “whoever felt the constant interest of the monarch himself or herself, became united with his or her divinity, he or she felt elevated high above his or her compatriots, the eye of the Sacred Ruler was turned to him or her. Honours ordered by the king to be paid to his official mistress, are given to her with the same reverence as to him.”<sup>7</sup>

Pay attention to the words “official lover” which many historians use in describing the life at the courts of European and Asian states. They mean that the favourite becomes a person of social and state importance. The status of the first lover was often equaled to the highest government posts. Quite often the power of favourites was simply boundless. They approved (or disapproved) the selling of posts and titles, established or ruined reputations, and settled diplomatic disputes.<sup>8</sup> Quite often, these people were endowed with great talents and ambitions and had such great influence on the monarch that they virtually took his functions into their hands and became unofficial rulers of the state.

It should be noted that the existence of numerous lovers and favourites of monarchs contributed to their prestige among the members of the court and people, and created a greater charisma of the ruler himself. For example, in the French history of the 15th-18th centuries public opinion regarded favourites as special confidantes and bearers of state secrets, and as a pillar of the monarchy, and official tradition lauded them as the muses and inspirers of the supreme ruler to better performance of his duties as monarch and man, which should contribute to the welfare of the state. This resembles a situation in many traditional African societies where the wellbeing of the entire community depended on the male potency of the ruler, which should be demonstrated by all his wives and concubines.

The edifice of the divine royal apotheosis was built on the relations between the monarch and his mistresses. As Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret wrote, the connec-

tion of favourites and their admirers led to the creation of special mythology, which described “the image of the monarch’s mistress as sacral and thus elevated his image and glorified his person.”<sup>9</sup> He seemed to soar to the skies in his magic image over and above human existence, and his mistress was described as a Goddess. Their relations were likened to those between Gods and Goddesses.

It should be admitted that in most cases the favourites did not stay on the divine throne for life. They lived in society where relations between the sexes were built on the patriarchal principle. Their roles had been prescribed long ago by their fathers, husbands, brothers, kings, and the leaders of the opposition and rival parties, etc, that is, they were needed by persons around them who put forward their claims through them. There were quite a few outstanding and talented women among these favourites, who rendered services not only to the monarch, but to the whole of society. This was why her power never ended with her life. Due to various circumstances (the appearance of a new favourite of the monarch, the latter’s death, court intrigues, etc.), her luck came to an end, she could fall into oblivion, be banished, or even executed.

Sometimes these women played the role of a “lightning conductor” for the monarchy. In the crisis period the favourite was the “scapegoat and the ideal target for discontent and malice. She was to blame for everything: natural calamities, military setbacks, heavy taxes, even hails destroying harvest. She became the object of universal hatred.”<sup>10</sup>

In other words, the institution of favourites was created not for allowing individual women to get equal rights with men. They became an essential element of patriarchal culture in which they played the role of a chess figure in a big political game. They created the necessary background and atmosphere in which men could not only better demonstrate their abilities, but also emphasize their importance.

Male favoritism had somewhat different nuances. It was an attempt to prove the inability and dependence of women-rulers who took male powers upon themselves. However, for the sake of justice it should be admitted that men were unable to always discredit queens and tsarinas. As is known, such women as Elizabeth I, the Queen of England, successfully ruled for 45 years, Queen Victoria of England was on the throne for 64 years; in France, Louise de Savoie ruled the country for 15 years, Catherine de Medicis – 20 years, Anne d’Autriche – 18 years; in Russia, Anna Ioannovna ruled the country for 10 years, Elizaveta Petrovna – 20 years and Catherine the Great – 34 years.

The institution of favoritism was quite widespread in many world cultures, it had no national or state boundaries. It could also be observed in African societies. Male favoritism was especially popular at the court of Malagasy monarchs in the State of Imerina in the 19th century.

During that period Madagascar was ruled by four queens for almost 70 years. It was the time of female reign with the participation of male fa-



avourites. The most striking thing was that the latter managed to create a dynasty of favourites – representatives of the Andafiavatra family. The “post” was inherited by son from father, and younger brother from elder brother.<sup>11</sup> The last representative of this “dynasty” – Rainilaiarivony was the lover of three queens, the prime minister and the virtual ruler of the entire island (from 1864 to 1895), right up to its capture by France.

Compared to most African countries in the 19th century, Madagascar’s society was more developed. It was the time of ethnic and political consolidation, economic and cultural progress, when a uniform state was taking shape. All these achievements were connected with the name of the reformer-ruler Radama I (1810-1828) who is often likened to Peter the Great of Russia by national historians in the grandeur of personality and the contribution to Malagasy history. His rule began at a difficult time for Madagascar, when France and England actively struggled for the possession of the island. Radama I, ably balancing in the diplomatic ocean, managed to uphold the country’s independence and, having secured British support, proclaimed himself the king of the whole of Madagascar. From that time on we could speak of the State of Malagasy, which was officially confirmed by the Anglo-Malagasy treaty of 1817.

Under his rule the foundations were laid of Madagascar’s relations with Europe, which exerted considerable influence on the development of the country’s education, culture and economy, and gave an impetus to progressive transformations there. According to national historians, Radama I, despite strong resistance on the part of the local reactionaries, “opened a window to Europe”, brought master-craftsmen to the country, and surrounded himself with outstanding scientists and scholars.

Many young Malagasys were sent to England to study humanities and English, and various trades. In turn, foreign craftsmen, merchants and entrepreneurs were invited to Madagascar where they invested money and developed handicrafts and industrial enterprises. The country began to build roads and canals, the monopoly on the sale of gunpowder and firearms was introduced, and the island was gradually included in international trade.

Radama I succeeded in making a sharp turn to cultural development. It was even possible to speak of a radical change in people’s consciousness.<sup>12</sup> It was facilitated by the intensive campaign for literacy. British missionaries helped open schools and popularize European cultural and technical skills and habits. A system of primary education was set up in the country within several years, the Latin alphabet instead of Arabic letters was introduced in the Malagasy written language, print-shops were opened, which published text-books, dictionaries and collections of fairy-tales and proverbs.

Although Radama I continued to rely on the old feudal nobility, which constituted a privileged section of society, *Andriana*, major social shifts took place during the period of his rule. The bulk of the Malagasy popula-

tion of Imerina consisted of the “third estate” – *huva*. It included land-tillers, handicraftsmen and merchants who could earn considerable profits, open enterprises and organize and carry on local trade. Besides, this young “bourgeoisie” was supported by the industrial and political circles of Britain. Many representatives of this group of the population succeeded in advancing to leading government posts and securing the support of the monarch himself.

Radama I abolished estate restrictions in clothing and food, introduced European garments and banned the wearing of estate decorations, the use of poison *tanghena* by priests in rites,<sup>13</sup> and the ritual killing of children born at bad time. Slavery and slave trade were also banned. In other words, the rights and privileges of the traditional upper crust of society were restricted, and requisites were created for lifting estate barriers, which obstructed the progress of all caste groups to go up the socio-political ladder. At that time certain innovations were introduced in the family and marriage relations, and land and property rights.

Unfortunately, all these progressive transformations were retarded after the sudden death of Radama I, who borrowed from western civilization not only its cultural achievements, but also its vices. During the last years of his life he drank too hard, and in a fit of delirium tremens he cut his throat.<sup>14</sup>

As historians note, his sudden death resulted in a serious political crisis due to the intense contradictions within the various groupings of the ruling section of society. The traditional nobility (previously, slave trade was in their hands, and they wanted to resume it) wanted to regain their old privileges and posts and feared that the legitimate heir to the throne, Prince Rakutube, the king’s nephew, could come to power and would continue to pursue the policy of his uncle. These circles were actively supported by the French.

This was why, contrary to all customs and traditions which forbade women to occupy the throne of their ancestors, the local aristocracy decided to crown Ramava, one of the wives and a cousin of the late monarch, under the name of Ranavalona I (1828-1861). They thought that “the illiterate woman, who had no connections with Europeans and adhered to traditional beliefs, would heed their advice, as well as the recommendations of the guardians of idols.”<sup>15</sup>

Thus, the feudal nobility violated their own order of succession to supreme power and tried to disguise it by the sham practiced in Ancient Egypt, Kush, and other African civilizations. The new queen was declared “man” and all twelve wives of Radama I were proclaimed to be her wives.

Such precedent was observed in many traditional societies of East and Central Africa. It was conditioned by the requirements of the family, community and the state, and also by the interests of the woman in question. For example, the well-known scholar of African cultures, V.B. Iordansky, writes that in Swaziland in order to prevent the ritual desecration of the

king many of the women in his surrounding were symbolically identified with men.<sup>16</sup> After the first wife gave birth to the king's heir, the custom prohibited her to have children and she was treated as "inkozi" (man). In some cases the ritual wives of the king were also called "inkozi. In the State of Bunyoro the princesses were addressed as men and there was no distinction between them and the princes both in everyday life and in the sphere of rites. Moreover, they were forbidden to marry, although they could have intimate relations with the princes. But if they became pregnant, their children were killed, and the birth was kept secret from the ruler.<sup>17</sup> In some situations there was a possibility for a woman to change not only her social, but also biological status. In everyday life girls before marriage and grandmothers were also equaled to men.

All these examples show that the case of Ranaivalona I was not an exception in the history and culture of African peoples. Her "becoming man" was a historically justified act. In the academic library of the state capital Tananarive, there are chronicles of those years, which wrote of a queen as a male. The traditional nobility believed that she would be a toy in their hands, remaining on the throne until they considered it advantageous for them. However, the reality turned out to be different and quite unexpected for them.

The queen successfully ruled the country for thirty-three years. Her main achievement was a sharp turn in foreign policy aimed at strengthening national independence. Aware of her own strength and opportunities, Ranaivalona I entered into a bold political game with Europe, above all, Britain and France, the latter persistently trying to lay its hands on the island. She forced western powers to respect the rights of Imerina, and gradually curtailed relations with them. Her policy was aimed at reducing European domination and reflected the aspirations of the indigenous population, and the interests of the aristocracy, the new nobility and the *huva* estate. The ruler saw danger in spreading Christianity in the country, as well as in western education as a means of suppressing the population by the foreign forces.

According to the law of 1835, all missionaries were expelled from the country, and professing Christianity was banned for the Malagasy people under the threat of death. This law was implemented very strictly. In accordance with it, Christians were exterminated en masse. Besides, the local people were told to return to observing ancient religious rites and customs. These measures were supervised by the court and they were supported by the broad sections of the population, for whom Christianity became a symbol of foreign interference.

Education was also taken under strict control and subjected to reprisals. In 1832, studying was banned for slaves and many groups of the independent population, and two years later for all who were not in the government service. The rights of all Europeans were strictly limited, and they had to submit to and observe all Malagasy laws.

To emphasize her adherence to the age-old traditions and customs Ranaivalona I abolished all innovations introduced by Radama I in the sphere of national culture and religion. Slave trade was resumed. The traditional rites and customs connected with the family cult of ancestors were reintroduced. Everywhere – in noble families and peasant homes – family graves were taken care of and big sums were spent on erecting new tombs. The queen reintroduced the "Court of God" and the poison *tanghena* as the decisive factor of court procedure. In the view of researchers, this law proved fatal for tens of thousands of the island residents. Very few of them could save their lives with the help of priests. The policy of this queen, on the one hand, contributed to the centralization of royal power and the strengthening of the state and the position of the traditional nobility, and on the other, led to the isolation of local society from the outer world, and the preservation of the old archaic structures, incapable to develop any further.

At first glance, it would seem that such actions of supreme power demonstrated a success of the feudals' and slave-traders' camp, which was called the "French party" on Madagascar, due to the reactionary position on this question of the government of the Restoration. In actual fact, however, although the traditional nobility continued to remain the main pillar of the monarchy, the queen began to take measures gradually in order to restrict its omnipotence. Since the time of Radama I, new groups began to emerge in the state, which exerted great influence on society. They included the new class of government officials and the class of merchants gaining strength.

The economic development of the island facilitated by the reforms of the former ruler, continued at a more rapid pace, because Ranaivalona I realized that it was only a swift progress that could ensure the country independence from Britain and France.

It was not surprising that the queen appointed men of *huva* origin (merchant class) her advisors. This fact irritated the traditional aristocracy. The two brothers Roombana and Rahaniraka, close to the queen, wrote in their diaries with disdain about the promotion and enrichment of these upstarts from common folk.<sup>18</sup> They cited a case of such a person, a former soldier, who became one of the richest government officials. The Malagasy merchants, in contrast to the feudal lords, supported the capitalist development of the country and opposed feudalism and slavery; they belonged to the so-called English party. They were against the island's isolation from the outer world and advocated close cooperation with British industrialists and merchants.

Thus, a political crisis was in the offing, for the confrontation of these groups diametrically opposed to each other in their views about the country's development became very strong.

A way out had to be looked for in order to reach a balance in society and its upper echelons and to satisfy the interests of both parties. A com-

promise was indeed found. On the one hand, Ranavalona I was the keeper of ancient traditions, customs and habits and the guarantor of the preservation of the laws and rights of the aristocracy, and on the other, she chose her favourites (who were her advisers, guardians, instructors, lovers) from the *huva* estate. In other words, the queen being officially bound by marriage with her twelve wives, by virtue of her sovereignty free from any social bans, took representatives of the merchant class as official lovers.<sup>19</sup> Thereby, the ruler “adopted” that person, as it were, which gave him the opportunity to take the post of the head of government.

The first official favourite of Ranavalona I and the prime minister backed by the richest families of Madagascar both from *andriana* and from *huva* was Rainiharu. Being “plebian” he later became the head of the court officers. Supported by British merchants, he earned big money from the sales of European consumer goods and Malagasy agricultural products. After his death in 1852 his place was taken by his eldest son, who became the prime minister and the queen’s lover officially. These posts became hereditary in this family. Its members played an important role in managing the affairs of the island’s ruler. In the mid-19th century they even succeeded in restoring trade relations with foreign countries, which was definitely a victory for the advocates of the development of trade over the old part of the supporters of slavery.

Members of the families of favourites not only took many leading government posts, but also became the richest people of Madagascar. What is more important, the policies pursued by lovers-premiers and the queen herself in the spheres of the economy and socio-political development were aimed not at complying with the interests of the merchant *huva* estate, but enriching a narrow group of people. Certain sources define them as the twelve families. Among them were princes and princesses of the royal blood, and brothers and children of the head of government. The queen bestowed her graces and presents on them, gave them land, even entire provinces, palaces, and licences for the monopoly on foreign trade in the most important export commodities.

With a view to strengthening central power all twelve wives of the ruler were given vast tracts of land in various parts of the island. Their power over the population on these lands became hereditary.

Ranavalona I herself was always surrounded by black slave-bodyguards. She lived in multi-storey palaces in luxury and comfort. Her popularity with the people was quite high. During her reign the cult of the ancestors of the royal family and the deification of the queen reached unprecedented heights. This cult became state religion and was practiced with various rites and sacrifices in which the entire people took part.

She died on August 16, 1861. Her reign cannot be assessed in simple terms. No doubt, it was not ordinary. Summing up the results of that period, researchers note that “the queen’s desire to preserve the independence of

the country was intertwined with her striving to support the traditions and order established by her predecessors, but this was not possible, taking into account the evolution of the entire world and her own people.”<sup>20</sup> Malagasy historians themselves assess it as follows: “Despite all dangers, manifestations of greed and various innovations, Ranavalona I managed to bring into motion the slumbering forces of the nation. Her extreme actions awakened Malagasy consciousness. She forced great western powers to respect the rights of her country and scored for Madagascar a place in the community of free independent nations.”<sup>21</sup> Her death marked the end of the period of the independent rule of Malagasy kings.

Her son and heir Radama II (1861-1863), although he had unlimited power in the country for solving the problems of life and death for his subjects, was a puppet in the hands of French advisers; he tried to turn the State of Malagasy into a French semi-colony.

All concessions to foreigners were, first of all, against the interests of the growing merchant class, which had lost control over supreme power and the post of the favourite. The well-off *huva* carried on ideological brainwashing among the popular masses, especially the peasants, who rose in revolt. Their movement was of a specific character and rooted in the cult of ancestors. It was headed by the “*ramanadzans*”, or “those possessed by the spirit of the late queen.” Malagasy people regarded them as saints and believed every word they said, often falling into a mystical trance after their sermons. Leaflets appeared, allegedly written on behalf of the “suffering ancestors”, which said that the new king did not follow the political testament of Ranavalona I and wanted to betray the country to foreigners, that the ancestors left their graves and declared Radama II unworthy of his crown.

On May 8, 1863, the crowds of plebeians and soldiers burst into the palace and strangled the king.

Behind the back of the enraged crowd stood Rainiwuninahitriniuny, the former favourite of Ranavalona I, and his younger brother Rainilaiarivony, who held the post of commander-in-chief at the time. On the day of the murder of Radama II they told his wife Rabudu to adopt a Charter proclaiming a constitutional monarchy in exchange for staying in power. The forced constitution included the following main premises: the abolition of the use of *tanghena* poison, the proclamation of laws by the nobility and “leaders of the people, but not by the queen”; freedom of conscience for all subjects of the state.

On August 30 the coronation of the new queen under the name of Rasohery (1863-1868) took place, but this ceremony was of a purely formal character. In reality it was the sacral endorsement of the prime minister’s power, who by tradition became the official lover of the queen. Rainiwuninahitriniuny clad in a luxurious dress made a speech and, pointing to the idol of the *Mandzaka tsi ru* (“two persons cannot rule”), exclaimed: “There

is only one ruler in Madagascar, and if, for supporting this view of our ancestors, we should kill two-thirds of the population, we will do so.”<sup>22</sup>

However, this favourite did not stay in power for long. In less than a year, on July 14, 1864, his brother (commander-in-chief) staged a coup, overthrew his rival and sent him to exile. Rainilaiarivony became the official lover of the queen and took the post of prime minister, which he held for over thirty years.

He built a luxurious palace on the highest spot of Tananarive, close to the queen's palace. This embodied the dual nature of the government and reflected the dual origin of the rulers of the Malagasy people.

The new favourite was a cunning politician who managed to retain all his formal and informal posts under the rule of three queens. After Rasoherina he became the head of government and the lover of Ranavalona II (1868-1883), and later of Ranavalona III (1883-1896). In the view of most experts, the rule of this man was the most tragic period in the history of Madagascar.<sup>23</sup>

The fate of Rainilaiarivony was very unusual from his very birth. Astrologists said the stars and planets were in a bad position when he first saw the light and he was destined to bring great suffering and grief to his family. This was why the boy was rejected by his parents, and the two falanxes of the forefinger and the middle finger of his left hand were cut off. In other words, he felt his social deficiency from the very first years of his life. Perhaps, this fact served as an impetus for him to train his will power and strive to always be the leader and achieve the goals he set for himself.

Luckily, the boy's relatives took care of him. At the age of six he was placed in a missionary school where he learned to read and write. From ten years on he had to earn his living himself, and when he grew up he became engaged in commercial business and got in touch with Europeans. Soon he became rich and then his father, being the favourite of Ranavalona I, got him the post of the queen's secretary. At that time he supervised the work of all customs offices, which enabled him to conclude lucrative business deals with foreign merchants. Through his office the young courtier became a companion of several trade and commercial firms. In 1853 he was put in charge of supervising the use of the royal seal. After the death of his benefactress he took the post of the commander-in-chief of all forces. Having become the prime minister, he headed the entire state apparatus, controlling the royal treasury and appointments to the highest government posts.

The first years of his rule he devoted to the elaboration of legislation designed to strengthen his personal power, place it on a proper legal foundation, and implement the planned reforms.

Rainilaiarivony came to power at a difficult time for the country. The domestic and external political situation was quite complex. However, the prime minister managed to improve it. By diplomatic efforts and using the contradictions between European powers and the United States, he achieved a stable equilibrium in his country's relations with foreign coun-

tries. This allowed him to concentrate attention on domestic problems and successfully carry out economic and socio-political reforms. By 1860s the State of Malagasy became one of the most developed countries of Africa. Suffice it to mention the introduction of free and universal education, the development of health protection, the reorganization and strengthening of the army, the development of export and import trade, and the organization of an efficient administrative apparatus. The prime minister took the path of fighting the old feudal aristocracy and obsolete reactionary customs. All missionaries returned to the island and Protestantism became state religion.

Rainilaiarivony was the real ruler, not the queen. All three queens who submitted their life and the country's fate to him, proved weak. They were only symbols of power. Despite their conservative minds, they were forced to sign progressive laws.

After the death of Rasoherina in 1868, her cousin acceded to the throne under the name of Ranavalona II. The uniqueness of the situation was that it was the prime minister who chose and proclaimed the queen, but not vice versa. Now it was not the ruler who appointed the official favourite, but the favourite appointed the queen. Ranavalona II adopted Christianity. During the coronation ceremony she held the Bible in her hands, and then issued the law on the destruction of twelve idols of the *Ambuhimangi*. The royal talismans, *sampi*, were burned. Bonfires burned all over the country and sacred books were thrown into them. In 1878 she issued a special law banning once and for all the use of *tanghena* poison in court procedures. Thus, an end was put to the barbarian custom which threatened the lives of many Malagasys and was a powerful weapon in the hands of the priests for manipulating the lives of their fellow-compatriots.

From the 1890s the State of Malagasy lived through a difficult transition period aggravated by the actions of France which was actively preparing for the annexation of the island. Besides, the upper crust of the nation was disunited. It was divided into many groupings conflicting with one another and upholding their narrow selfish interests.

This struggle aggravated during the reign of the last queen of Madagascar, Ranavalona III. She was also chosen by Rainilaiarivony (she was a distant relative of the previous queens) with a view to further strengthening his power. At first she played the role of the mouthpiece of the prime minister, but later she began to show independence. According to historians, the queen and her entourage obstructed the actions of the premier and discredited them in the eyes of the popular masses. As the years passed, he gradually became the most unpopular person in the country. “Instability, the absence of unity in the higher echelons of the administration and the lack of understanding between Rainilaiarivony and Ranavalona III, and her constant opposition to the prime minister in all his actions,”<sup>24</sup> – all this made him more suspicious and cruel, even with regard to the closest relatives (he accused his son, nephew and brother-in-law of plotting against him.)

He suffered one setback after another in his confrontation with the French invaders, both in the diplomatic sphere and on the battlefield. As a result, his government collapsed and the island was proclaimed a French protectorate in 1895. The prime minister and old favourite was exiled to Algeria, where he died, and the queen was deposed and banished to Reunion Island.

That was the end of the tragic page in the development of Malagasy society.

The history of the State of Imerina in the 19th century serves as a striking example of the gender aspect of society's development, the struggle between male and female power-base, male and female world outlook, and male and female mentality. Female rulers expressed the interests of the conservative circles of traditional society, whereas the actions of the favourites were directed to satisfying the requirements of the new "bourgeois" social section which strengthened its positions in the country from the middle of the 19th century.

#### Notes:

1. Курпатов А.В. 3 роковых инстинкта. Жизнь. Власть. Секс. М., 2005. С. 32. [Kurpatov, A.V. "Three Fatal Instincts. Life. Power. Sex." Moscow, 2005. P. 32.]
2. Ibid. P. 34.
3. Гидденс Энтони. Социология. М., 1999. С. 664. [Anthony Giddens. "Sociology". М., 1999. P. 664.]
4. Биркин Кондратий. Временщики и фаворитки XVI, XVII и XVIII столетий. В 2 кн. М., 2002. [Kondraty Birkin. "Powerful Favourites, Male and Female, in the 16th, 17th and 18th Centuries." 2 volumes. Moscow, 2002.]
5. Шоссинан-Ногаре Ги. Повседневная жизнь жен и возлюбленных французских королей (от Агнессы Сорель до Марии-Антуанетты). М., 2003; *Клулас И.* Диана де Пуатье. М., 2004. [Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret. "Everyday Life of Wives and Mistresses of French Kings (From Agness Sorel to Marie-Antoinette)," М., 2003; *Clulas, I.* "Diane de Poitiers." Moscow, 2004.]
6. Анисимов Е.В. Женщины на российском престоле. СПб., 1998; Екатерина II и ее фавориты. Черты. – Свидетельства. – Анекдоты. – Шутки. М., 2004. [Anisimov, E.V. "Women on the Russian Throne." SPb., 1998; "Catherine the Great and Her Favourites. Features – Testimony – Cases – Anecdotes – Jokes." Moscow, 2004.]
7. Фукс Эдуард. Иллюстрированная история нравов. Галантный век. М., 1994. С. 17. [Edward Fuks. "Illustrated History of Mores and Morals. Age of Gallantry." Moscow, 1994. P. 17.]
8. Павленко Николай. Страсти у трона. М., 1996. С. 263–281; *Сосновский А.В.* Лики любви. Очерки истории половой морали. М., 1992. С. 139–142. [Nikolai Pavlenko. "Passions at the Throne." Moscow, 1996, pp. 263-281; Sos-

novsky, A.V. "Images of Love. Essays of the History of Sexual Morality." Moscow, 1992, pp. 139-142.]

9. Шоссинан-Ногаре Ги. Указ. соч. С. 87. [Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret. Op.cit. P. 87.]

10. Ibid. P. 28.

11. Орлова А.С. Общественный строй мальгашей в XIX в. (из истории острова Мадагаскар) // Африканский этнографический сборник. Т. II. М., 1958. С. 39. [Orlova, A.S. "The Social System of Malagasys in the 19th century (From history of the Island of Madagascar)" // *African Ethnographical Collection*. Vol. 2. Moscow, 1958. P. 39.]

12. Емельянов А.Л., Мыльцев П.А. Забытая история великого острова. М., 1990. С. 18. [Emelyanov, A.L., Myltsev, P.A. The Forgotten History of the Great Island. Moscow, 1990. P. 18.]

13. Ганиев А. Его величество тангин // Азия и Африка сегодня. М., 1984. № 12. С. 50–51. [Ganiyev, A. Its Majesty Tanghena // *Asia and Africa Today*. Moscow, 1984. No. 12, pp. 50-51.]

14. Буато П. Мадагаскар. Очерки по истории мальгашской нации. М., 1961. С. 107. [Buato, P. Madagascar. Essays on the History of the Malagasy Nation. Moscow, 1961. P.107.]

15. Ibid. P. 108.

16. Иорданский В.Б. Хаос и гармония. М., 1982. С. 175. [Iordansky, V.B. "Chaos and Harmony." Moscow, 1982. P. 175.]

17. Needham, R. "Right and Left in Nyoro Symbolic Classification" // *Africa*. L., 1967. Vol. XXXVII. No. 4, pp. 431-432.

18. Siegrist, A. "Manuscrit de Raombana et Rahaniraka. – *Bulletin de l'Academie malgache*, n.s., 1936. Tananarive. 1937. Vol. XIX, pp. 49-76.

19. Буато П. Указ. соч. М., 1961. С. 111.

20. Ibid. P. 135.

21. Rabemananjara, R.W. "Madagascar. Histoire de la nation malgache." Paris, 1952, pp. 59-60.

22. Buato, P. Op. cit. P. 145.

23. Chapus, G-S. et Mondain, A. "Rainilaiarivonu, un homme d'Etat malgache." P., 1953.

24. Emelyanov, A.L., Myltsev, P.A. Op. cit. P. 91.

## VISITING THE *OBA* OF BENIN\*

**Dmitri Bondarenko**, D.Sc. (Hist.),  
Deputy Director of the Institute  
for African Studies, RAS

The programme of any international gathering include so-called “cultural programme”. However, our journey to Benin City, five-hour ride to the east of Lagos, hardly could be described by a dry protocol term. It was a real journey into history, nay, living history.

Benin City is one of the most “historic” cities of Nigeria. In times of yore it was the capital of the mighty “kingdom” of Benin formed by the Bini people in the beginning of the 2nd millennium A.D., and in the mid-15th-early 17th century it was a regional superpower stretching to the territory of present-day Ghana in the west. It was the Bini people who founded the biggest city of Black Africa – Lagos – in the 16th century. Although the oldest cultural layers of Benin City investigated by archaeologists (primarily by the British scholar Graham Connah) refer to the 12th-13th centuries, there are grounds to believe that the city had grown from an 8th-century settlement. Europeans who visited Benin City in the 16th –18th centuries admired its beauty and hustle and bustle, and even compared it to London and Amsterdam. In 1897 the city was occupied by the British, the palace of the supreme ruler, titled *oba*, was plundered and ruined and the last ruler of independent Benin, *oba* Owonramwen, deposed and exiled to Calabar where he died seventeen years later. In 1900 the territory of the “kingdom” of Benin was included in the colony of Nigeria. Now it is the state of Edo, part of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Like the states of the USA, the Nigerian states have unofficial but generally known names, which are indicated on car licence plates. Those registered in the state of Edo have the inscription: *The heartbeat of Nigeria*.

The main purpose of our trip to Benin City was a meeting with His Majesty Erediauwa, the *oba* of Benin. In 1932 the “traditional monarchy” of the Bini people was restored by the British colonialists themselves. The well-known historian of the Bini, Philipp Igbafe wrote: “When the throne became empty, the people ceased to exist as a single whole. After Owonramwen’s death the British realized that if they wanted to ensure at least a semblance of Bini identity, they should restore monarchy. Thus, the ousting of Owonramwen did not mean the downfall of the monarchy which today, too, enjoys love and respect.”<sup>1</sup> Indeed, if one reads numerous Internet-sites of public, historical-cultural and other Bini associations, one will see that even in our day the *oba* is not a sham, is not a “historical reconstruction”, or

a “vestige of the past”, but is the living symbol and embodiment of the unity of the people, their cultural tradition and identity, which continues to exert a great influence on the consciousness of the Bini. Evidently, for many Bini people those who recognize the power of the *oba* of Benin are “theirs”, whereas whoever does not recognize the *oba* is alien.<sup>2</sup> The connection between the attitude to the traditional ruler and the problem of tribalism, one of the most acute political problems of many post-colonial African states, including Nigeria, is quite evident.

The present *oba* of Benin, Erediauwa, is the 38th ruler of the Akenzua dynasty from the time it entrenched itself on the throne, according to the Bini oral historical tradition, in the 13th century, and the third ruler from its restoration over 70 years ago. Prior to his accession to the throne in 1979 he graduated from one of the British law schools. His Majesty received us in the throne hall of his palace built in 1948, several hundred meters away from the place where the former palace had stood which was destroyed by the British during the siege of the city. The architecture of this palace greatly resembles the outline of its predecessor: this is an elongated one-storey building with a ridged roof and with several adjoining smaller buildings – the living quarters of *Eghaevbo N’Ogbe* – palace chiefs, who are members of the ruler’s entourage (this post was created in the middle of the 13th century by *oba* Ewedo). In front of the palace is a spacious building with the sacred places of worship of the *oba* ancestors, the rulers of the past. The entire rectangular compound is surrounded by walls. Above the gates to the palace there is an inscription in English – *Oba Palace*, on both sides of which the ritual swords *ada* and *eben* are depicted, the attributes of the power of the monarch, like the sceptre and power of the Russian tsar. Of course, there are features of modernity, too: the roof of the palace is slated, there are air conditioners under the roof, a car park in the courtyard, and noisy souvenir vendors calling for purchasers. There are more essential differences of the present palace from the precolonial one: in 1897 the British destroyed the original altars of the deceased *oba*, whose main elements were the world-famous “bronze heads” (*uhuw-elao*) with carved tusks inserted in them, on which there were pictures of the history of the rule of the monarch. The British also tore down hundreds of cast reliefs from the inner walls of the palace, which illustrated the history of the country and the *oba* dynasty. Alas, the proper restoration of the altars and the interior decorations is impossible.

The audience which His Majesty has agreed to give us has been arranged by our colleagues from the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs in Lagos. It was to take place at 11 a.m., but we were delayed en route and arrived only at 12.30 p.m. Luckily, our apprehensions that the *oba* would not receive us did not materialize. We were told to wait until the monarch finished his conference with the local chiefs. Half an hour later we were ushered in and saw the “real king”. Erediauwa was sitting on the

\* First published in *Asia and Africa Today*, 2006. No. 7, pp. 70-73.

throne against the backdrop of numerous photos of him. On his side stood the page (*emada*) with the ritual sword in his right hand, just as centuries ago. A modern wrist-watch glistened on his left hand. On both sides of the monarch sat palace chiefs. They all wore long white robes, but the monarch had a snow-white cap on his head. All of them had red coral necklaces – the symbol of power, the loss of which was punished by death in the past. As legend has it, one of the *oba* stole corals many centuries ago from Olokun, the king of the sea and wealth.

The secretary of the *oba* warned us that the meeting would be short, not more than ten minutes. According to the agreed scenario, the head of our delegation Alexei Vassiliev, the Director of the Institute for African Studies, and Vladimir Fedotov, an official of the Russian Embassy in Nigeria, were introduced to Erediauwa. And they introduced all members of the Russian delegation. As we saw, His Majesty was pleased to learn that people in far-off Russia know about the history and culture of his country and the deeds of his noble ancestors. He admitted that although foreigners visit Benin and his palace quite often, he saw the Russians for the first time. His Majesty displayed an avid interest in visitors from Russia after one of us handed him his publications about the history of his country and dynasty: two thick monographs with English summaries and two articles in English. The *oba* asked about the sources of these works, asked to translate the titles of some of the Russian publications, and read excerpts from the English-language articles aloud for the chiefs sitting in the hall. We were allowed to take pictures, and then we were photographed together, His Majesty sitting on the throne with us standing on both sides. The exchange of compliments was followed by the exchange of presents. Among the *oba* presents was a massive bronze casket in the form of the leopard's head (the leopard is the main symbol of his power) filled with cola nuts. They are presented to guests as a token of sincere cordiality and wish for a long and happy life. We believe that we and His Majesty *oba* of Benin Erediauwa liked and will remember each other.

The audience lasted longer than ten minutes and we left the palace accompanied by a young handsomely-built courtier who was ordered by the *oba* to be our guide. First we went to the National Museum, a three-storey building of original modern design. Of course, most monuments of Benin art are now kept in European and American museums; the Benin collection in the main museum of Nigeria, in Lagos, is much larger than that in Benin City. Yet, the items on display are many and varied and evoke great interest of spectators. Pity, it's not allowed to take pictures at the National Museum, and albums and picture postcards are not sold there or nearby, which is typical of African museums.

Then we went to the house of the chief bearing the title of *Ogiamwen*, just as his ancestors, since the 13th century. In the interregnum period, the latter half of the 12th century, a man named Ogiamwen became the ruler of

the country and tried to turn his power into monarchical. But he was overthrown by the founder of the dynasty *oba* Oranmiyan, however, his descendants retained the chief's title with the name of the failed monarch. The Nigerian historian Elizabeth Isichei writes about the house we visited: "The house of the chief *Ogiamwen* in Benin, a widely known example of pre-colonial Benin architecture, is interesting because it is not a museum, but a house inhabited by a family. The house has many patios... It is full of sacred places and objects showing continuity between the living and the dead, between the physical and the spiritual."<sup>3</sup> The masters of the house did not allow us to enter the courtyard, and we could only have a glimpse through the gates. Outwardly the compound was a wonderful and at the same time typical example of traditional Bini architecture, whose main features were mentioned in describing the palace complex of the *oba*.

Having parted with our guide, we went to a hotel. The local and federal authorities are striving to turn Benin City into a big tourist centre. Naturally, there are solid prerequisites for it in the form of the richest cultural heritage enjoying world fame as one of the major centres of African history. However, they have begun to create the necessary infrastructure only recently. True, the hotel we were put in was the city's best and it satisfied our modest requirements. A scholar of Africa, who has just met the *oba* and seen monuments of precolonial art should not pay too much attention to such trifles as inadequate service at the hotel restaurant.

Our hotel was quite close to one of the best preserved sections of the "Benin City walls", and this is why we began our second (alas, the last) day in Benin City with going around them. Any associations with the fortress walls of medieval European cities would be wrong here, because the Benin "walls" were actually moats and ramparts now covered with thick tropical undergrowth, so that someone unfamiliar with Benin history and looking at its monuments from the aesthetical point of view would have passed by without noticing anything worthy of attention in these ditches, if not for the board with the inscription *Benin moats*. They were made at the end of the 13th – middle of the 15th century, according to the oral historical tradition, exclusively for the purpose of defence from the outside and inside enemies (in the struggle for power). However, scholars believe that the moats marked boundaries between kin and communal groups inhabiting different parts of the town.

On the site of the palace destroyed by the British at the time of their capture of Benin is now the main city square with a monument to *oba* Owonramwen in the centre. The *oba* market stretches from here for a great distance. Previously it adjoined the palace and was controlled by special chiefs. Since the time of its foundation by *oba* Ewedo, simultaneously with the construction of the palace, that is, the mid-13th century, the "*oba* market" has been Benin's biggest. It is colourful, noisy and swarming with people, like all such places in Africa today, it is full not only of local vege-

tables and fruit, but also of Chinese consumer goods. If you have to buy anything, you' would rather go to one of the smaller and less crowded markets where you would be able to better look and choose what you want, and haggle over the price to your heart's content.

We strolled along the *oba* market back and forth, although we did not want to buy anything. The point is that if one looks from the square farther to the end of the street, which used to be the city's Main Street in precolonial times, one will see a place sacred for all Bini people. According to a legend, in the middle of the 15th century the woman named Emotan helped Prince Ogun take back the throne from his brother who had usurped power. After his accession to the throne under the name of Ewuare he turned Benin into a mighty power. His reign was a turning point in the country's history, he was the first outstanding ruler of the period of Benin's flourishing, and he was named by his descendants *Ewuare Ogidigan* – Ewuare the Great. If not for that woman Emotan, everything could have been different... Grateful Ewuare ordered to plant a tree in honour of the brave woman named "the Tree of Emotan." It grew at the place where we were heading to, worming our way through hundreds of buyers, sellers and loafers roaming the *oba* market. There is no tree on that spot now, but a special altar with a monument to Emotan was put up there in our time. After a short discussion with the man in charge and a small sum paid to him we were allowed to go inside and take a photo of the sculpture.

Finally, we arrived at the Igun Street, the last point of our two-day itinerary. Countless works by Benin court master-craftsmen, which museums all over the world boast of, were made on this street. According to a legend, *oba* Oguola invited the man named Iguegha from the sacred town of Ife at the end of the 13th century, who was famous for his works of cast bronze. The *oba* told him to teach his art to Bini people. This was how the famous "Benin bronze" came into being. Far from all specialists – historians, art historians and anthropologists – believe in this. The initial dating of metal casting art of Benin remains arguable, particularly because some authoritative scholars believe that Oguola ruled one hundred years later than the Benin oral tradition claims. The very fact of Benin art's succession from Ife art, although it is recognized by most researchers, is still disputable. But it is a known fact that it was only members of the community living in Igun Street who had the right and duty to cast works for the *oba* and his court. It should be admitted, to our disappointment, that Igun Street does not differ in any way from adjoining streets, for instance, the parallel Onwinna Street – the street of court weavers. But just like in the days of yore, the master-craftsmen casting metal for His Majesty live in Igun Street for many generations. No doubt, the casket in the form of the leopard's head presented to the head of our delegation by *oba* Erediauwa has been made here, in this street. In earlier times, any attempt by a court master-craftsman to sell his item "on the side" was regarded a crime, but now this is quite ordinary, the

fruits of labour from Igun Street can be found even on the market of souvenirs in Lagos and neighboring countries. We dropped in to tiny shops adjoining workshops and living quarters. Among many works, which cannot boast of artistic quality of making or stylistic originality typical of the masterpieces of the past, one could find items showing that the traditions of the great art of "Benin bronze" are still live. Quite a few boys running around us and trying to get into the photos we were taking may become talented master-craftsmen of metal casting just like their fathers and forefathers when they grow up.

We were leaving Benin City, looking from our bus windows at this big and clean (by African standards) town with many sculptures, monuments, which is not so typical of most cities of the continent. All these monuments devoted to events and outstanding people in the rich history of Benin but created in our time organically combine a modern view of urban sculpture with the ancient artistic canon. Indeed, if Bini people believed that their city was the centre of the universe in which the world of humans was quite close to the spirits of deities and ancestors, we were leaving Benin City with a feeling that we visited a place where history merges with modern time, where the past permeates the present, which breathes it, lives with it, and where history is the inalienable and necessary part of our epoch, just as the cars with the inscription *The heartbeat of Nigeria* on their licence plate, which overtook us on the road.

---

#### Notes:

1. Igbafe, P.A. "Owonramwen and the Fall of Benin" // *Leadership in the 19th Century Africa*. London, 1974. P. 175; also see: Nevadomsky, J. "The Benin Kingdom: Rituals of Kinship and Their Social Meanings" // *African Study Monographs*. 1993. Vol. 14. Pp. 66-67; for more details see: Зотова Ю.Н. «Традиционные политические институты Нигерии. Первая половина XX в.». М., 1979. С. 105–114. [Zotova, Yu.N. "Traditional Political Institutions of Nigeria. First half of the 20th century." Moscow, 1979. Pp. 105-114.]
2. Melzian, H. A. "Concise Dictionary of the Bini Language of Southern Nigeria". London, 1937. P. 43.
3. Isichei, E.N.A. *History of Nigeria*. London etc. 1983. P. 274.



## RUSSIAN WOMEN AND THE SHARIA: DRAMA IN WOMEN'S QUARTERS\*

*Natalia Krylova*, D.Sc.(Hist.),  
Principal Research Associate  
at the Institute for African Studies, RAS

According to the data of the Department of Consular Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, most women – citizens of the former USSR or the new independent states in the post-Soviet era, who are married to citizens of African countries, are Russian by nationality. As to the places of their settlement on the African continent, Russian women live in 52 states of Africa. About 60 percent of them are the wives of men from North Africa – the main Islamic belt of the African continent.<sup>1</sup> This circumstance prompted the author of this article to acquaint the reader with certain specific features of the social and legal practices of the Magrib countries in relation to foreign citizens marrying citizens of North African states.

In this connection we are interested, first and foremost, in the acculturation problem through marriage in modern Islam, particularly, the problem of the adaptation of Russian women in the Islamic world, if not their participation in religious rites then their everyday life in the Moslem medium.

Touching on the socio-cultural aspect of the problem (the legal elements of the Sharia have thoroughly been analyzed by many scholars of the Orient, especially the Arab East<sup>2</sup>), I shall note that, according to Moslem concepts, woman is not an independent creature, but one living in order to belong to man. Such discrimination (from the European point of view) begins from the very birth of a girl – the fact negative in Islamic perception. Later, it is manifested in a different approach to the upbringing of boys and girls, and also during all periods of woman's life. The main task of her existence is marriage, the birth and upbringing of children, and her main ideology is unconditional submission to the husband.

In contrast, boys are taught from the very first years to think of and feel their superiority, their future role as masters, continuers of the family, who should not only support women materially, but also act as intermediaries in their relations with the outer world.

One of the most conservative principles of the Moslem social doctrine in its attitude to women is the institution of seclusion. This principle should be strictly observed by the family and the outward attribute of it is the veil, or *hidjab*. This is a subject of continuing discussions between the supporters of the preservation of traditional Islamic values, on the one hand, and

modernists, on the other, as well as between various scholars and public and political figures. The married woman in the Islamic family often becomes a privatized object of private life, deprived of personal contacts with the surrounding world, strictly controlled by man and fully dependent on his will.

### Traditional Islamic Model of Marriage and Family Relations

An interesting tendency was observed in Côte d'Ivoire in the mid-1990s, which was manifested in the relations between indigenous black men and young Lebanese women living in the country, which some of the local mass media regarded racist. During the past several decades people from the Middle East have settled in Côte d'Ivoire and neighbouring countries, however, mixed marriages between Lebanese and Africans have been few and far between. And it was not due to racialism. It was because the Oriental traditions were too strong in the consciousness and everyday life of the fathers and brothers of potential brides, who strictly controlled and guarded them, keeping them untouched before marriage. Marriage and sex relations in Côte d'Ivoire, especially in its capital Abidjan, were many and varied. Polygamy, levirate,<sup>\*</sup> premarital relations, etc. were rather widespread, and this was why there were cases of fist fights between relatives and the claimant, as well as direct imprisonment of women within the four walls of their family homes.

The private life of a woman, including sex life, in Moslem interpretation is based on such Koran premises as honour, chastity and modesty, which are a must and form the basis of the strict control of society over its members. Let us turn to an interview given by I. Abramova, which illustrates attempts to violate certain premises of the Koran undertaken by Russian wives.

*"Relations in the family went from bad to worse. After all, they were educated girls from Moscow used to a different way of life. But they had to stay at home all day long and do household chores. They had no right to work. That is, they had that right, as far as I know, but they had to have their husbands' permission, which they, naturally, did not give. Such life was not to their liking. Then quarrels, even scandals began. They tried to defend their rights, but were told that there were no rights for them, and that they had to obey the husband and mother-in-law."*

The system of traditional Moslem education and upbringing demands that woman should observe the rules of social behavior, such as lower her eyelids when meeting a man, hide not only the head and body, but also decorations under garment, move noiselessly, not leave home without per-

\* First published in *Asia and Africa Today*, 2007, No. 1, pp. 47-54.

\* The custom ordering the younger brother to marry the widow of his elder brother.

mission, perform ritual ablutions, and do many more things, according to the Sura "Women" (IV) of the Koran. As to the intimate relations (no matter how varied customs and habits might be in the different social spheres of the Islamic world), according to the Koran and the official position of most societies of this cultural-religious zone, all questions pertaining to sex can only be resolved in marriage. Naturally, the Koran regulates sex relations and forbids adultery and incest. It is indicative that the culture of *hid-jab* does not pacify men sexually. On the contrary, experts emphasize that deprived of the opportunity to see the faces and bodies of women, Moslem men feel greater tension and are more aggressive sexually than men representing cultures which do not have such strict bans concerning women.<sup>3</sup>

The Magrib expert A. Buhdiba points out that during the past centuries various social sections have evolved their own specific attitude to the traditional Islamic model of the ethics of relations between men and women. True, any society (and the Islamic world is no exception) has a great variety of sex relations. The Magrib tradition denounces this, society closes its eyes to it, but in actual fact, all these questions are surrounded by the wall of public silence.<sup>4</sup>

Finally, it should be admitted that young people in the Islamic regions of Africa (as in other cultural-historical zones of the continent, for that matter) break through the bounds of this single and generally accepted model and more insistently orient themselves to other examples of marriage-sex relations, primarily, European ones.

On the other hand, it is precisely the ideas of chastity and honour based on the Koran that continue to shape and influence the outlook of the new generation of Moslems, form the basic element of their upbringing and education, and realize the intricate mutual connection between the socio-cultural innovations and the value-cultural traditions of definite social groups – ethnoses, classes and generations. Our compatriot (her name is Lyuba) notes:

*"One Somali man says that my marriage with Said (the first husband of Lyuba. Now she is married again to a Somali) is unhappy because Christianity and Islam are different cultures and cannot be compatible...However, women's education raises their status and freedom in Somalia, it seems to me. This is why they forgive me much..."*

Let us examine the problem in its civil and legal aspect. As is known, the marriage and family codes in African countries are many and varied. On the one hand, they were formed under the influence of the local historical and cultural tradition and the system of common law connected with it, and on the other, they were (and still are) influenced by the European legal standards, thus presenting an intricate (sometimes conflicting) mixture of the common law, the religious marriage and family system, and the modern state legislation.<sup>5</sup> The standards of behaviour and morality of people are often determined by a traditional religious-legal system, which continues to

play a major role in marriage and family relations, including those with people of other religions. It is especially well-pronounced in the North African region, in the countries with the firm Islamic tradition, where the views on marriage, the family and family life are strictly regimented by the Moslem dogmas, law and ethics contained in the Koran. Besides, most Russian women marrying men from the African countries of the Islamic belt do not know Africa,<sup>6</sup> they are completely ignorant about Moslem legal culture, in general, and about the Sharia as the universal code of behavior, both religious and secular, which is especially strict in the system of marriage and family relations and in the questions of succession. We shall dwell on the problem using the example of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and the Tunisian Republic.

### Mixed Marriages and Traditional Religious-Legal System

Although the Sharia in Mauritania became the basis of its legislation comparatively recently (in the early 1980s), its standards regulate practically all spheres of the public, family and private life of the country's citizens.<sup>7</sup> Along with this, the common law (*adat*)<sup>8</sup> plays an important role in the family relations of people in Mauritania. The wedding ceremony of Mauritanian Moslems is not as solemn as Russian women are used to. This is how it is described by one of our respondents, who lived in the city of Nouakchott:

*"The ceremony is very modest. Marriage is registered either at home or in a mosque in the presence of close relatives. The written document is not necessary: suffice it to have two male witnesses, or one male and two female witnesses. Their presence at the ceremony is simply formal when the parents of the groom pay engagement money to the father of the bride, and the priest reads certain Suras of the Koran and repeats the terms of the marriage contract three times...If religious marriage is concluded between a Moslem man and a Christian woman, their marriage contract stipulates the minimal engagement money, or there can be no contract at all. Incidentally, when marriage is concluded between a Moslem man and a Moslem woman, witnesses must be Moslem, too. Jews or Christians can be witnesses in exceptional cases, when a Moslem marries a daughter of a 'man of Scripture', that is, Christian or Jewish."*<sup>9</sup>

As to mixed marriages, they occupy a special place in the Islamic legal system. The Koran and other fundamental Islamic documents concretely determine the conditions permitting marriage with members of other religions. Referring to numerous quotations from the Koran devoted to marriage, directly or indirectly, which divide mankind into the believers and the infidels and define the boundaries between the "pure" and the "impure", separating Moslems from non-Moslems, the well-known French scholar of Islam, M. Arcoun, notes that already in the early epoch of the Koran, peo-

ple knew that legitimacy of each marriage was connected with the level of religious "purity."<sup>10</sup> It should be noted that the appearance of bans and permissions in the legal system regulating mixed marriages was, as a rule, connected with concrete historical conditions. In some cases Islam categorically forbids marriages between members of other religions, and in other cases, on the contrary, it supports them. Islam is absolutely intolerant toward concluding marriages between Moslems and heathens (2: 220-221).

The Sharia has a different attitude to marriages between Moslems and persons of Christian and Judaic religions. When concluding marriage with women of these religions, the Moslem should observe the same conditions as in the Moslem marriage. At the same time, Moslem marriage with a Christian or Jewish woman is permissible only if the latter are "women of Scripture." Marriage of a Moslem woman to a Christian or Jew is out of the question. In our case there are no collisions, because most mixed marriages are between African Moslem men and Russian Christian (or atheist) women. If a Moslem woman dares commit such apostate act, she may be put to prison to enable her "to think of her fallacy." This happens because (as local experts on the Sharia standards assert) man with his unlimited power and undisputed authority in the family will be able to turn his wife to his faith. Such "religious evolution" of the infidel is approved by Moslem morality which gives her absolution.

For this very reason Islam is absolutely intolerant to marriages between Moslem women and persons of alien faiths. Finally, marriages with atheists are banned altogether. Thus, marriage unions between Mauritians and Soviet/Russian women concluded in the former USSR or the present Russian Federation have no legal status on the territory of Mauritania (even if they are sealed in full conformity with the Soviet/Russian law), they are not registered officially and are regarded as cohabitation. True, by their national character Mauritians are distinguished by religious tolerance, this is why public opinion in the country, as a rule, recognizes Russian-Mauritanian mixed marriages de facto.

Quite a few works are devoted to the specific features of Moslem marriage and the family, the history and traditions of the social behaviour of men and women in the world of Islam, the way of life, morality and psychology and the rules of behavior of married woman in Moslem society.<sup>11</sup> It should be borne in mind that polygamy in its most widespread form – polygyny – is a most typical feature of Moslem marriage. The Koran allows Moslems to be married to four women (the Koran 4:3). This premise is considered to be the sacred foundation of polygamous Moslem marriage. Although in a modern Mauritanian family (and in a North African family, for that matter) this privilege is not used by all men (because of the influence of the democratically-minded forces who denounce polygyny among officials, and also due to purely economic reasons, because far from all men can provide the necessary means to several women simultaneously.)

At the same time the social doctrine of Islam, which institutionalized the inequality of sexes in Moslem family, laid the foundation for the dependent position of woman with regard to her husband in case of divorce. It is here that male "autocracy" is revealed in its true form.

### **Divorce "Moslem Style" (Mauritania)**

Perhaps, the principal feature of the Sharia divorce is that its initiative comes practically always from the husband. Divorce is considered a unilateral action which is usually started by man. The latter enjoys unrestricted rights in divorce. For instance, he can divorce any of his wives as he pleases at any time without giving any reason. (There have been such cases in the compounds of our compatriots who were married to North African Moslems and lived in African countries permanently.<sup>12</sup> The consequences of Moslem divorce for woman are exceptionally hard, both morally and economically. To say nothing of the difficulties she will encounter if she wants to build a new family, especially if she is a foreigner.

The divorce procedure also grants privileges to man. According to a Russian woman who was a party to a divorce, the husband has only to say three times "You're my wife no more", and divorce comes into effect. In other words, an oral statement is enough to break up marriage.

There are many nuances in the divorce procedure in the Moslem world, but all of them have a pronounced anti-feminist character. We should also note that Moslem legislation recognizes certain reasons which allow woman to come out with the initiative of divorce. Among them are apostasy, prolonged absence, or certain physical defects concealed before marriage.

In this connection we'd like to turn attention to several interesting aspects which are part of Mauritanian Moslem law and are directly connected with the discussed case of Afro-Russian marriage.

Our compatriots who have registered their marriage with Mauritians in their native country sometimes use the premise of the Sharia forbidding Moslem to conclude marriage with an atheist in their own interests. In the situation when they themselves wish to divorce the citizen of Mauritania, they declare in court that they concealed their atheistic convictions when concluding marriage, after which the judge immediately pronounces marriage null and void. (But even in this case the children born of this marriage remain with their father and are regarded citizens of Mauritania.) Nevertheless, the Mauritanian still retains a loophole: he may apply to the secular court (Mauritania has double legislation) which may pass a ruling on the basis of the standards of the French secular law.

Property matters in divorce cases of a foreign woman and a Mauritanian citizen are settled on the basis of the Sharia. There are specific features of the status of a Russian woman who concluded marriage with a

Mauritanian in her native country, which is legally invalid in Mauritania. She has certain privileges in divorce as compared with a Moslem woman. The point is that in breaking up Moslem (religious) marriage the divorced woman has no right to claim any part of the common property, except her personal savings, incomes and presents from the husband. In case of marriage of a Russian woman to a Mauritanian concluded in Russia, the Moslem court, not recognizing this marriage legal and regarding it as a form of cohabitation by mutual consent (partnership), recognizes the woman's right to common property. The examination of such a case in the Mauritanian court is considered as the examination of a civil property suit and is not regarded as divorce. If the woman succeeds in proving the fact that she had incomes of her own and gave them over to her companion, or that some property was acquired by her money, the court may rule to give her a part of that property or pay certain compensation. After divorce foreign women may continue to stay in Mauritania for quite a long time using their national passport, which should be registered with the police every year. Foreign women can obtain Mauritanian citizenship after five years of staying in the republic.

### **The Code of Personal Status and Women's Rights in Tunisia**

The spheres of law regulating marriage and family relations in Tunisia bear a noticeable imprint of traditional Moslem ideas and premises of the Koran, although the problems of the legal position of women, equality of their rights (just as the women's problem as a whole), in contrast to other Arab countries in North Africa, have developed more favourably there. These specific features should be taken into account when examining the question of the legal position of Russian women married to Tunisians.

The Code of personal status adopted in 1956<sup>13</sup> laid down the basic principles of the emancipation of Tunisian women at a state level. The personal inviolability and human dignity of women it proclaimed were later bolstered by a whole range of measures, among which were a ban on polygamy (any violation of the ban was punishable by law); the establishment of legal divorce given by husband to wife, and the official right to divorce given to both; permission to the mother to have the right to custody over minor children in an event of the father's death, etc. The Code of personal status existing for half a century has constantly been revised and amended in accordance with the country's legislation.

Tunisian legislation, regulating the legal status of women, envisages six civil states of a woman in her life: woman as bride, as wife, as mother, as divorcee, as guardian, and as worker. We shall deal with those of their states which can be applied to a foreigner married to a Tunisian.

Leaving aside the general Tunisian standards of marriage procedure (they are much like those in Mauritania), we shall note that by Moslem law

the suitor must make a "marriage settlement (*Mehar*)" on the bride. This condition is contained in the Code of personal status (Article 12, revised version), although the size of the "settlement" is not agreed upon (it can even be symbolic), but it is always considered the private property of the wife only to be paid to her in case of a divorce (the "private property of the wife", according to Tunisian law, includes presents and incomes from hired work or business, which remain in her possession in case of divorce.)<sup>14</sup>

As to the rights and duties of foreign woman, they are determined by Article 23 of the Code of personal status, and practically all its premises have been taken from the Koran. Despite the fact that the new version of that article formally grants the wife equal rights with the husband<sup>15</sup> (the previous version of that article (para 3) made it incumbent on the wife to obey her husband in everything), in the event of legal collisions, for instance, a Moslem marrying a non-Moslem woman, or a suit being examined in court, the Sharia plays a considerable role as before.

Brought up and educated in the spirit of the socialist equality of rights of men and women, Russian wives of North African Moslems cannot get used to the legally endorsed supremacy of the husband and submission to him as the head of the family, which inevitably results in family collisions often leading to divorce.<sup>16</sup> However, as the practice of Russian consular offices in those countries shows, there is a possibility to adjust and balance such situations. For example, Article 11 of the Code of personal status envisages that marrying persons may conclude, along with marriage settlement, contracts of other types, conditioning certain specific features of the given marriage. Unfortunately, this article is used rather seldom and not always correctly. Although there is a quite reasonable condition (which is essential from the point of view of the legal position of the foreign wife) determining temporary employment, place of residence, joint property, etc. For instance, the Tunisian husband, as the head of the family, has the right to prevent his wife from working. On the basis of the above-mentioned article it could have been possible to fix her "right to work" in marriage settlement or supplements to it. Besides, a step forward has been made by the Tunisian legislation in the sphere of economic and social rights. The Code of duties and contracts broadens the Sharia framework regulating the rights of women and grants them the right to sign contracts and agreements in the sphere of property relations, buy, sell and dispose of their property.

The same can be said about the place of residence which is also chosen by the husband. Then again, a foreign wife, who does not want to follow her husband to Tunisia can state her wish beforehand, or choose the concrete place to live in Tunisia. Thus, there is a possibility to fix legally certain liabilities of the husband with regard to his wife.<sup>17</sup>

We should also note that on the whole the local legislation, while regulating the legal rights of a divorced woman (incidentally, no distinctions are drawn between a Tunisian woman and a woman-citizen of another coun-

try), regards the latter in two positions – the divorcee and the divorcee with the right of guardianship. We'd like to turn attention to several circumstances connected with the fate of the children after divorce in a mixed family.

Prior to 1966 there was the rule according to which priority right with regard to children was given to the mother, irrespective of whether she was Tunisian or foreign. At present local legal practice is based on a rather vague term "the interests of the child." Thus, in case of divorce, guardianship is given to one of the parents or a third person, with due regard for the interests of the child. But if the mother takes guardianship, she bears full responsibility for the upbringing and education of the child, his or her health, rest and recreation, travel, and financial expenses (this is stated in the new Article 67 of the Code of personal status which now gives the mother some of the rights or the full right of guardianship, depending on the real state of affairs.)<sup>18</sup> This is why in a mixed marriage, where the legal and economic status of woman, as a rule, is rather unstable, the question of children staying with one of the parents after divorce is settled in favour of the Tunisian father. The main argument of the latter is the assertion that the mother will take the children back home, depriving him of guardianship, that is, of the parental rights to participate in the upbringing of the children. At the same time, in a number of cases of divorce, there may be a positive decision in favour of mothers-foreigners (Soviet/Russian citizens), who had the Tunisian national passport. Considerable role was played by the personal qualities of the woman, her ability to keep her temper in bounds and act properly, to converse in a foreign language, as well as her profession or trade, her living quarters, etc.

In general, it should be noted that when we talk of easy divorce according to the Sharia law, it does not mean that this can widely be applied to all Moslem countries. There are many reasons for this connected with the specific features of the historical and cultural traditions, and also those of an economic character. Although the Sharia formally places all Moslem men in a similar legal position, divorce is a rare phenomenon among the poor sections of the population, inasmuch as it is rather expensive to turn a legal possibility into reality.

As to the minor children left after the husband's death, the modern Tunisian legislation envisages that their mother is their guardian with all ensuing rights (Article 154 of the Code of personal status), irrespective of whether she is Tunisian or foreign. This article went into force in 1981. Before that guardianship was given over to the nearest heir-man. According to the modern Tunisian legislation, in 1993 the divorced mother received the right of guardianship of her child. Previously, according to Moslem tradition, this right was granted exclusively to men (Article 5 of the Code of personal status).

Examining the new laws and amendments called upon to strengthen the legal status of woman (including foreign woman) in the system of marriage and family relations, it should be noted that despite the efforts of the government, their implementation is accompanied by great difficulties. In general, the practical solution of all these questions, although they have many specific features and nuances, largely depends, as before, on the position taken by the husband himself, or his relatives.

Finally, it would be expedient to mention changes in the attitude of Moslems themselves toward mixed marriages. In the view of M. Arcoun, mixed marriage leads not only to psychological and cultural perturbations. Based on the family cell alone represented by husband and wife and their children, it destroys the patriarchal family as such, which needs broader framework of social solidarity, which is quite effective and cannot be replaced by any modern institutions of social security (in the West such bodies are often publicly recognized as unfit, useless and even harmful, for instance, in social welfare in old age; old people often find themselves outcast and become marginalized.)

Thus, the modern problems of mixed marriages are based not so much on religious and racial grounds, as on weightier moral, psychological and cultural foundations.

\* \* \*

Not claiming the universal character of the maxim "forewarned is forearmed", we, nevertheless, think that it would be quite useful for the new generations of Russian women who choose husbands from among people in the Islamic world, to acquaint themselves with this information.

---

#### Notes:

1. We emphasize that this concerns only the Islamic belt of the continent. In reality, the total number of Moslems in Africa comprised over 40 percent of the entire population of Africa by the early 1990s. Forty-six percent of them lived in North and Northeast Africa, about 18 percent in East Africa, 32 percent in West Africa, and about three percent in South and Central Africa. The largest Moslem communities are in Egypt (over 90 percent of the entire population of the country), Nigeria (46 percent), Algeria (99.6 percent), Morocco (99 percent), Tunisia (98.7 percent), Sudan (about 73 percent), Ethiopia (no less than 50 percent), Guinea (over 80 percent), Senegal (80 percent), Tanzania (over 25 percent of the entire population), Somalia (almost 100 percent), Libya (about 90 percent). For more details see: Африка. Энциклопедический словарь. Т. 1. М., 1986, с. 590-591 [Africa:Encyclopaedic Reference Book.Vol 1, Moscow, 1986, pp. 590-591.]

2. See, for example: Гилязутдинова Р.Х. Юридическая природа мусульманского права // Шариат: теория и практика. Материалы Межрегиональной научно-практической конференции. Уфа, 2000; она же: Дискриминация женщин по мусульманскому праву // Актуальные проблемы теории права и государства и экологического права. М., 2000; Сюкияйнен Л.Р. Шариат и мусульманская правовая культура. М., 1997; он же: Найдется ли шариату место в российской правовой системе // Ислам на постсоветском пространстве: взгляд изнутри. М., 2001 [Gilyazutdinova, R.Kh. "Legal Nature of Moslem Law/The Sharia: Theory and Practice. Abstracts of the Interregional Scientific Conference." Ufa, 2000; The same author: "Discrimination of Women by Moslem Law" // Practical Problems of the Theory of Law and the State and Ecological Law Moscow, 2000; Syukiyainen, L.R. "The Sharia and Moslem Legal Culture." Moscow, 1997; The same author: "Will the Sharia Find Its Place in the Russian Legal System?" // Islam in the Post-Soviet Era: View from Inside. Moscow, 2001]. Accepting the system of definitions of the latter presented by the above-mentioned authors, including the cultural-legal incorrectness of identifying Moslem law with the Sharia, which is, above all, the religious conceptual basis of Moslem law, we shall use the terms currently practiced by consular offices and organizations in charge of our fellow-compatriots permanently living in African countries.

3. Мехти Ниязи. Мусульманская женщина: сложные последствия наложенных ограничений // Gross Vita. Вып. 1 (Mehti Niyazi. "Moslem Woman: Difficult Consequences of Restrictions" // Gross Vita. No. 1) – gias@nursat.kz

4. Восток (Vostok). 1992, No. 1, p. 61.

5. Синицына И.Е. Обычай и обычное право в современной Африке. М., 1978; она же. Человек и семья в Африке (По материалам обычного права). М., 1989; Энтин Л.М. Роль государства в общественном развитии стран Африки. - В: "Общество и государство в Тропической Африке". М., 1980; Иорданский В.Б. Хаос и гармония. М., 1982; Право в развивающихся странах: традиции и заимствования. М., 1985; Сюкияйнен Л.Р. Мусульманское право. Вопросы теории и практики. М., 1986. [Sinitsyna, I.E. "Habit and Common Law in Modern Africa." М., 1978; The same author: "Man and the Family in Africa (On Materials of Common Law)." Moscow, 1989; Entin, L.M. "The Role of the State in the Social Development of African Countries" // "Society and the State in Tropical Africa". Moscow, 1980; Iordansky, V.B. "Chaos and Harmony." М., 1982; Law in Developing Countries: Traditions and Borrowings. Moscow, 1985; Syukiyainen, L.R. "Moslem Law. Questions of Theory and Practice." Moscow, 1986]. Also: "Le Droit de la famille en Afrique Noire et a Madagascar." Paris, 1968.

6. "Marriage as a Way Out" to Other Cultural-Religious Areas Is Not Typical, as a Rule, of Moslem Women.

7. For a number of years there have been attempts in Mauritania to evolve a civil code of marriage and the family, always obstructed by the Moslem clergy. Thus a decision was adopted by the Politburo of the ruling party of the Mauritanian people in the latter half of the 1970s on introducing the Sharia as a code of legislative and ethical principles in the country's state and public life.

8. There have always been various traditions and customs in the Islamic world. In this connection the question of the correlation of the Sharia and the adat (the term meaning customs, habits and traditions which regulate, along with the Sharia the way of life of the Moslems of one or another region.) has become quite important. However, the Sharia principles and standards are considered mandatory and should be strictly adhered to, and they are above all rules of behavior, including the adat. This plays a major role in the regulation of marriage and family relations with persons of other religions. Moslem legislation allows people to be guided by the adat, provided it does not run counter to the Sharia, however, in the real life of many Moslem nations customs and habits continue to exist, which do not fully coincide with Islamic precepts, and sometimes, even contradict them. Islamic scholars point out that the term adat is used to denote the common law of Islamic people. The system of the rules of behavior, which is a combination of local customs and certain standards of the Sharia, can be termed the adat law, whose certain premises are recognized by courts, and sometimes form the foundation of the marriage and family legislation. (For more details see: Сюкияйнен Л.Р. Мусульманское право. Вопросы теории и практики. М., 1986). Syukiyainen, L.R. "Moslem Law. Questions of Theory and Practice." Moscow, 1986.) The adat as a system of social standards based on local customs of non-Islamic origin is quite widespread in a number of African regions to this day. Most of these customs and habits took shape back at the time of the existence of tribal family relations and paganism. Even the introduction and establishment of Islam have not led to their complete replacement with the Sharia.

9. From the personal archives of the author. Letter from Mrs. A.M. in Nouakchott, September 20, 1997.

10. Аркун М. Смешанные брачные союзы в мусульманской среде // Восток. [Arcoun, M. "Mixed Marriages in the Moslem Medium" // Vostok]. 2001, No. 6, pp. 131-132.

11. See, for example: Сиверцева Т.Ф. Семья в развивающихся странах Востока (социально-демографический анализ). М., 1985; она же: Модернизация и ее влияние на семью на Востоке // Взаимодействие и взаимовлияние цивилизаций и культур на Востоке. М., 1988; она же: Страны Востока: модель рождаемости. М., 1997; Бухдиба А. Магрибинское общество и проблемы секса // Восток, 1992, № 1; Пономаренко Л.В. Ислам в общественно-политической и культурной жизни Франции и государств Северной и Западной Африки // Вопросы истории, 1998, № 9; Аркун М. Смешанные брачные союзы...; [Sivertseva, T.F. "The Family in the Developing Countries of the East (socio-demographic analysis)." Moscow, 1985; by the same author: "Modernization and Its Influence on the Family in the East" // Interaction and Mutual Influence of Civilizations and Cultures in the East. Moscow, 1998; by the same author: "Countries of the East: Model of Birth Rate." Moscow, 1997; Buhdiba, A. "Magrib Society and Problems of Sex" // Vostok, 1992, No. 1; Ponomarenko, L.V. "Islam in the Public, Political and Cultural Life of France and the States of North and West Africa" // Problems of History, 1998, No. 9; Arcoun, M. "Mixed Marriages..."; Mernissi, F. "Sexe, Idéolo-

gie, Islam.” Paris, 1982; “Women and Gender in Islam. Historical Roots of a Modern Debate.” Yale Univ. Press, 1992; Tersigni, S. “Foulard et Frontière: le cas des étudiantes musulmanes à l’Université Paris” // Cahiers de l’URMIS unité de recherche migrations et société. Paris, 1998, No. 4, etc.

12. Information from the Soviet Embassy in Sudan of April 6, 1987, to the head of the Consular Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry; documents from the Soviet Embassy in Tanzania of February 14, 1978 to the head of the Consular Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry, to the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine, to the Personnel Department of the USSR Ministry of Defence, etc.

13. Personal status is a section of Moslem law regulating the major sphere of the legal position of Moslems. It includes marriage, family and hereditary property relations, mutual obligations of relatives, guardianship, and some other problems. Moslems pay much attention to them because most premises on personal status are contained in the Koran and Sunna.

14. The former President of Tunisia Habib Bourgiba tried to include in legislation in 1980 the premise declaring that all property (personal and real) acquired by one of the spouses becomes the common property of the family. However, his attempt ran against the strong opposition of traditionalists. A year later a so-called life-long alimony was introduced to compensate women for moral and material loss in divorce, the size of which was determined on the basis of the “average living standard of the family.” The alimony could be replaced by a lump sum if the divorced woman so wished.

15. The revised Article 23 of the Code of personal status says that both husband and wife should treat each other with love, kindness and respect, avoiding negative impacts on each other. They should perform their marital duties in conformity with traditions and customs. They should run their household and bring up the children properly. The husband as the head of the family should support his wife and children in every way, and the wife should also contribute to the welfare of the family if she has means to do this (Najet Zonaoui Brahmi. Des amendements et des dispositions nouvelles. Une volonté égalitaire, 1997, No. 12, pp. 35-36.)

16. Consular data show that most divorces take place in the families in which the wives are Russian (Ukrainian and Belorussian); there can practically be no divorces in the families where the wives are of Central Asian or Transcaucasian origin, who are fewer and far between among those living in Tunisia permanently today.

17. Document of the USSR Embassy in Tunisia “On Organizing Registration Office in Tunisia” of March 13, 1990; Document of the USSR Embassy in Tunisia on “Certain Aspects of Legal Position of Foreign Citizens Married to Tunisians” of May 21, 1991.

18. In 1995 the government of Tunisia published the law No. 65/93 and set up special Guarantee Fund for paying alimony and bonuses to divorced wives and their children. This Fund is under the National Insurance Fund (CNSS) and draws its means from the state budget, alimonies and pensions on divorce, interest, and fines, incomes from capital invested by the Fund, as well as donations from private individuals.

## **DIFFICULTIES OF CULTURAL BOUNDARIES: “BREAK-UP”, “BORDER” OR INEVITABLE “TRANSITION”? LITERARY FRENCH LANGUAGE OF THE ARAB WORLD\***

*Svetlana Prozhogina*, D.Sc.(Philology),  
Principal Research Associate,  
Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS

*“Where the West meets the East...”*  
N. Gumilyov

This epigraph metaphorically expresses the geography and history of the subject which I have been dealing with for many years, having written the book “The Boundary of Epochs – the Boundary of Cultures”<sup>1</sup> over two decades ago, devoted to French-language literature of the Maghrib countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia), which is a noteworthy phenomenon in the world literary process.

An analysis inevitably led to defining this phenomenon as “border-line” in historical-political, historical-cultural, socio-cultural and socio-psychological sense. Today, summing up the results of the past century and looking into this, 21st century, one can say that the literature created by Arabs and Berbers in French, and writers and their heroes themselves have been, and still are, examples of the “border-line area” where certain cultural and even social interpenetration of various ethno-confessional communities takes place, which seem to have been divided (during the colonial epoch and in post-colonial time) by impenetrable barrier.

Moreover, one could say that it was not only the oppressed “majority” of the indigenous population of Maghrib that experienced a considerable influence of French civilization, and the Maghrib intelligentsia borrowed and multiplied the fruits of its cultural impact (so that one could talk of certain “assimilation”), but also the European minority of Maghrib colonial society, which dominated politically at the time, was also strongly influenced by Maghrib culture. Having borrowed many attributes and features of the way of life on North African land, Europeans learned dialects of the Arab and Berber languages and retained for a long time to come, after leaving Maghrib, quite a few local habits and preferences in food, music, garments, rest and recreation, and mutual relations, and in the French language – a multitude of “Arabisms” and “Berberisms”. They, especially the Frenchmen, who lived in North Africa for generations, were nicknamed, not for nothing, “*pièdes-noirs*”, for they had been deeply entrenched in the Maghrib soil.

---

\* First published in *Asia and Africa Today*, 2006, No. 12, pp. 49-55.

Many authors born in Maghrib (among them was such an outstanding “Algerian” as Albert Camus) regarded themselves quite seriously as members of the “Algerian”, or “Tunisian”, or “Moroccan” school of writers connected with French literature only by tradition and the language...<sup>2</sup> Today, when several million ethnic Arabs and Berbers live in France, French culture itself (music, cinema, literature, even the language) is “inlaid” with the culture of North Africans who are striving to find a worthy place in French society and acquire the right to be equal and at the same time to be different.<sup>3</sup>

But let us go back to history. Evidently, the literature created by bicultural (and in the case of the Berbers polycultural) Maghribians within the framework of the colonial cultural system or, later, French-language writers of the independent countries of Maghrib, was the product of the meeting and conflict of two civilizations (eastern and western), and this was why it was on the border-line, at their meeting point, which was marked not only by the “fruits” of their meeting, but also by the “scars” of their conflict. This “border-line” character was seen and felt during the colonial period in literary apprenticeship of French-speaking Maghribians (they managed to get an education at French schools), expressing itself in a certain “split” of their artistic consciousness, which tried, on the one hand, to describe truthfully Maghrib reality, and on the other, to satisfy the tastes of the European reader,<sup>4</sup> which gave their work certain “exotic” features, inevitable for colonial literature.

Nevertheless, the phenomenon of the Maghrib literary trend toward the French language has strengthened in the creation and development of national literature in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, and a whole galaxy of talented prose writers and poets have come to the fore there (M. Feraoun, M. Dib, M. Mammeri, M. Haddad, Kateb Yacine, Dris Chraïbi, Ahmed Se-friuyi, M.-A. Lahbabi, A. Djébar, A. Krea, and others.<sup>5</sup> Among them were good writers describing everyday life and social realities, as well as romanticists who praised their wonderful Motherland, which should be guided by the ideals of harmony uniting East and West.

But there were also those full of despair and bitter disappointment who lost the illusions of acquiring these ideals on both sides of the Mediterranean. The works by these outstanding representatives of new Maghrib literature expressed the difficulties of “being on the border-line” and “scars” of their bicultural nature, which gave rise to this east-west “hybrid” where the drive for self-assertion, the romantic nobleness of feelings and passionate search for ethnic *self-identity* merged with Cartesian doubts, self-torture, mutinous spirit and torment in trying to find the meaning of national history, the war for liberation and the freedom won as a result. French-language Maghrib literature has reached unbelievable heights, having performed the *compensatory* function in the system of national literature (taking into account the weak development of Arab literature in the colonial

epoch.) A new group of writers emerged in the late 1960s-early 1970s, whose works were distinguished by new artistic methods, styles and forms of expression (R. Boudjedra, T. Benjelloun, A. Khatibi, R. Mimouni, M. Khaïr’Eddin, M. Nissabouri, A. Laabi, A. Meddeb, and others.)<sup>6</sup> They took upon themselves a *complementary* function in the system of national literature, in which Arab literature gradually occupied the position of the representative of “official” culture (the states which became independent pursued the policy of total “arabization”).

French-language literature has assumed the mission of defending the ideals of the struggle for independence, denouncing the “new betrayal” of the people’s interests; it was full of new protests and armed with a sharp weapon of social and political criticism, “revealed” the weak and painful spots of new societies and new state structures and continued its struggle for the renovation of the “Old World” and for the destruction of its pillars, which obstructed social and cultural progress. In the post-colonial epoch many French-language writers who found themselves in the seemingly inner Maghrib “border-line area”, were forced to live in political emigration; others were persecuted and imprisoned, and practically all of them were able to publish their works only in the West. This “subjective” confrontation of writers educated in the spirit of European humanism, who imbibed the principles of “Liberty, Equality and Fraternity”, was taken by the authorities of the countries, where Islam became state religion, for the confrontation of cultures and civilizations. In the late 1980s, for example, the Islamists who came to power in Algeria, simply killed those speaking or writing in French.<sup>7</sup> Thus, cultural “boundary” gradually became a source of some kind of “marginalization”, pushing and ousting (or simply destroying) French-language writers (for instance, Yousef Sebti, Tahar Jaout, and others), throwing them out to the side of the road of new life, where there was no place for cultural values of European civilization.

Of course many writers (Mohammed Dib, Albert Memmi, Assia Djébar, Dris Chraïbi, Tahar Benjelloun, Abdelhak Serkhan, Mustafa Tlili, Ahmed Jemaï, and others) continued to write in France, some did it underground (Rashid Boudjedra) or in prison (Abdellatif Laabi), or under pen-name (one such pen-name became famous – “Y. Hadra”), bringing fame to their countries, winning prestigious prizes and gaining world renown. At the same time, realizing their political “roguishness”, their status of “political exile”, they sometimes felt their absolute “alienation.”<sup>8</sup>

Of course, in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, and also in the beginning of the 21st century French-language literature in Maghrib continued to exist and develop, acquiring new forms,<sup>9</sup> describing life as it was, developing the subjects of the “classics” of the 1950s-1960s, and renewing the attempts to see in the new realities of their countries some “changes for the better”, or turning to “eternal” subjects and collisions in the life of their heroes trying to overcome the contradictions of traditional society and “challenges” of



modern time. The latter is especially typical of the French-language “women writers” prose and poetry which rapidly developed in the Maghrib countries (which is quite indicative, taking into account the Moslem context in which the very fact of the woman “taking the floor” is regarded not only as the drive for emancipation, but also as a kind of “rebellion”).<sup>10</sup> But this French-language trend inside the Maghrib countries is evidently a new attempt to synthesize the opportunities which emerge due to possessing the attributes of different cultures and which is marked by the “scars” of a certain cultural “discomfort.”

In the late 1970s-early 1980s the bounds of Maghrib French-language literature gradually moved and broadened. Emigration from Maghrib countries resulted in the formation of a special cultural layer in France, called the French-Arabs, that is, ethnic North Africans (Arabs and Berbers) who retained their ethno-confessional affiliation in the second and third generations. Born in France, they are regarded as French citizens and use mainly French. Their literary works created in western conditions, that is, at the new junction of two cultures and civilizations, were distinguished by the influence of the “border-line area”, even a peculiar “malady” (“Mal de soi”), especially when the political, social and cultural barriers of the “accepting” society become discriminatory.<sup>11</sup> The literature of French Arabs, while actively developing in the context of western culture, continues to reflect not only numerous contradictions of its own “traditional world” (many “patriarchal” families of their parents who had long been living in France), but also the inner contradictions of the French medium, becoming a mirror, as it were, of the very conflict of integration, its French model. Thus, this literature reflects the objective (and rather painful) processes of France becoming polyconfessional, polyethnic and multicultural.

Maghrib French-language literature, if one speaks of its ties with world literature, has served as a “bridge” along which different civilizations were going towards one another.

### Break-up

Evidently, there was no problem of the “clash of cultures” for the French-language authors of Maghrib (they voluntarily chose the French language and felt completely at ease in both cultural and linguistic media, their own and French), or their “self-identification” with the “dominating group” in the conditions of colonialism. The point was to choose definite aesthetic standards for the creation of literature of a new type, as compared to brilliant medieval Arab literature. There was nothing humiliating or undignified in orienting to contemporary West European (even American) literature.

It should be noted that there were no special “discriminatory” (cultural) barriers for indigenous writers wishing to write in French during the colo-

nial epoch. On the contrary, they were patronized by the gurus of both colonial and French literature. Many Maghrib authors of older generations were proud in their friendship with Robert Randeau, Albert Camus, Jules Roi, Gabriel Odisio, Emmanuel Robles, Eugene Gilvic and many other outstanding French writers of the time, who invited their Maghrib colleagues to work for literary magazines and helped them publish their books, and sometimes even rendered them material assistance.

However, the realization of the contradictions of the surrounding world, in which a majority of the population in one or another Maghrib country was *downtrodden*, the realization by Maghrib writers of their historical role as the voice of their people, their aspirations, their wish to gain independence and have equal rights with other, independent peoples, could not but exert a special influence on the cultural and social image of a person who has found himself, or herself, on the “boundary” of two different worlds.

This original “marginality” could be observed in the destiny and work of practically all outstanding Maghrib prose writers and poets. It should also be admitted that they realized and experienced their “departure” from their native soil, for they created works in the language which was *alien* to their *own* people, their books were read mainly by people with a European education, and they were few and far between among their fellow-countrymen.

The first attempt to get rid of this dramatic “split” which resulted from closeness to cultural “border-line”, an attempt to “pass” from one epoch to another, from the colonial Past to the Future, to get rid of the scars of one’s “being on the border” and to assert oneself only in the realm of the native language and national traditions was made by Malek Haddad (1927-1978), a contemporary of M. Feraoun, Kateb Yacine, M. Dib and M. Mammeri, the founders of new Algerian literature. He decided to interrupt his creative work at the end of the 1950s, which brightly illuminated the literary horizon of Maghrib, and, having imbibed the best traditions of French literature, he succeeded in expressing the soul of his beloved people and Motherland in French. He wrote such outstanding works as “Le malheur en danger” (1956), “La dernière impression” (1958), “Je t’offrirai une gazelle” (1959), “L’élève et la leçon” (1960), “Le quai aux fleurs ne répond pas” (1961), “Ecoute, et je t’appelle” (1961), and while living in emigration he wrote an essay “Les Zeros tournent en rond,”<sup>12</sup> in which he expressed the drama felt by a man forced to live in the area of an alien language and culture and create the images of his country in a foreign land, separated from the “revolution” and the struggle of his people for liberation.

Realizing his “marginality”, feeling that work in the French language is a kind of “alienation” from his Motherland’s history and native soil, departure from his native roots, self-exile to an alien text, which his own people are unable to read, the writer castigates his cultural “border-line area” as a

*bitter fruit of colonialism*, which, in his view, may remain in history as an example of man's delusion and despair.

M. Haddad's essay showed many facets of this "cultural border-line area" and the inner contradictions of the individual "at the border of cultures" and, paradoxically, it proved somehow in line with the present epoch, when the fighters for "returning to the sources", for the "purity of faith" and the "purity of traditions" in Algeria came out against the West and its culture, regarding them as the source of new misfortunes for their country and its people. It would be appropriate to remember Malek Haddad, who half a century ago warned that his Motherland, which he metaphorically called his "Misfortune", was in danger, and that the beautiful Gazelle which embodied Freedom for him was under threat of being captured and *killed*.

Calling the work of Algerian French-language authors "idling" and his native land a "shadow" of France<sup>13</sup> in the epoch of the "pathological transformation of History – colonialism, Malek Haddad understood, nevertheless, the objective benefit, which the French-language writers brought to Algeria, telling the world about its life and struggle. But being sure of the fact that the genuine cultural wealth can only be created in the "native" language understandable to common people, Malek Haddad considered French-language literature a "historical delusion", and spoke of its "transient nature" and historical narrow-mindedness, although he realized that it was, just as the French language itself, an "inalienable part of Algerian cultural wealth". He suffered from his "break-up" with the Motherland, was seriously ill, and died prematurely. But what's important, he stopped writing too early, and ceased to give the readers living images, living reality, living soul, and living pain of his much-suffering and dearly loved Motherland.

### Boundary

Of course, far from all Maghrib authors (Arabs and Berbers) had a negative attitude to their work in the French language, as M. Haddad. They viewed differently their tasks and possibilities "to overstep the boundary" and write only in the language of "their people." Should one regard oneself a "national writer, that is, as Haddad understood it, a writer whose works are read by *his own* people, or shouldn't – this problem has not been too acute for them, because they knew what they were writing for. (Dris Chraïbi, for example, answering my question as to what writer he was – Moroccan, although he lived in France for a long time, or French, although he continued to write about Morocco – answered that "he was simply a writer...")

For other founders of this "movement" (the emergence and development of French-language literature in Maghrib can be defined by this word), such as, for example, the Algerian Berber M. Feraoun, the attempt to stay on the border between cultures, continuing to reflect Algerian life in

the French language and *serve the cause of his people* while recognizing the grandeur of the "spirit of France", believe in the values of humanism and stay within the framework of European Enlightenment, and for some time even have doubts about the necessity of the struggle for liberation, ended tragically. He, a teacher of Algerian children, was shot on the eve of the independence of Algeria (1962) by the French from the "Armed Secret Organization", which did not want to give Algeria back to the Algerians...

Feraoun remained in the history of Algerian literature as its national pride, as one of the first "voices" of his land who told the world about its *real life*, cares and hopes, having made his native Kabylia, its customs and traditions, the central point of national aspirations and problems.<sup>14</sup>

His fellow-countryman, M. Dib, Arab by nationality, never doubted that he was a "national writer", he simply created from the very beginning an expressive "fresco" of the contemporary history of Algerians, taking part in their resistance to colonialism. And even forced to leave his country at the height of the Algerian war for independence and having lived the rest of his life in France, M. Dib retained his Algerian citizenship, of which he was so proud, although he was sorry that this did not let him receive the Goncourt Prize. But his being on the "border-line" of literature has brought fruit after some time. Feeling himself detached from his Motherland, suffering from everlasting alienation ("sans detour," as he himself wrote), seeing his inability to combine his former ideals with the realities of new Algeria and the West, Dib became a philosopher rather than a writer, he increasingly "universalized" the problems and subjects of his creative work, losing his old Algerian roots and new French roots, and becoming part of the "Mediterranean medium ..." Having lived a long life (1920-2003) on the "border" of two worlds, M. Dib remained in the history of Algerian literature, like Haddad and Feraoun, as the Voice of *his people*.<sup>15</sup>

M. Dib's contemporary, the Tunisian author Albert Memmi, having left his Motherland due to disagreement with the policy of the total "arabization" of culture, did not suffer from the loss of his cultural identity (in any case, he did not complain about that). He found his place in the cultural realm of France, having become a professor at the Sorbonne, recognized sociologist and expert on the problem of the "oppressed peoples." But his heroes (which is, perhaps, more significant) felt their being on the cultural "border-line" as alienation, psychological "nothingness", which brought them to suicide and to the view on their own history and the history of mankind as a meaningless path from "one desert to another."<sup>16</sup>

There was no language problem for the famous Algerian writer Kateb Yacine, the author of the novel "Nedjma" (1956), who symbolically expressed the idea of eternal rebellion of Algeria against foreign rule, the eternal thirst of Algerians for "winning their beloved Motherland", for the sake of which they waged the struggle for liberation. He used the French language as the "weapon" of his creative work until his death. The very im-

age of Nedjma (which means "star" in Arabic), which can be found in several works of his, seems to have combined many elements of different civilizations, which left an imprint on Algerian land. And turning his weapon (the French language) wrested from the enemy's hands against the *oppressors* of his people and other peoples,\* the writer found no problems in his predominantly French-language work (although he staged his plays written in French in Arabic at Algerian theatres). Having died in France in 1989, Kateb Yacine is considered the best representative of new Algerian literature and at the same time one of the founders of the French "new novel", which became widely popular in France in the 1960s-early 1970s.<sup>17</sup>

Kateb Yacine's heir, the talented Algerian writer Rashid Boudjedra has been actively working in literature since the early 1970s, and he used his French-language works "to denounce the internal enemy" in new Algeria. He was fighting not only the betrayal of the former ideals of the "revolution for liberation", but also the new internal contradictions in Algerian society.

But recognizing the limited character of his socio-political criticism in the conditions of present-day Algeria, and aware of the greater popularity of his works in Europe, which watched the progress of militant Islamism, the writer himself translates his works into Arabic (or even writes them in Arabic, simultaneously translating them into French, thus using "bilingual" literary work as a "way out" from "border-line area."

One of the founders of new Algerian literature in French in the 1950s-1960s, was the outstanding writer Mouloud Mammeri,<sup>18</sup> Kabyle, who turned to professional studies of berberology in the 1970s and tried to revive the Berber written language and write fiction in the native language of his people. But at that time, in the conditions of the "total arabization" of culture in the country, Mammeri was persecuted, wrote very little and died tragically in the early 1980s. At present Kabyle is the second official language (after Arabic) in Algeria, used at schools and in literary work. But having given his life for the freedom of choosing the language of national literature, Mammeri remained in the history of Algerian culture as the harbinger of the "necessary changes" and the "awakening from the slumber" of the colonial night, although the writer proclaimed this in the French language.

### Transition

This feeling of a man "from different shores" in constant wanderings\*\* is quite typical of many French-language Maghrib writers,<sup>19</sup> and they begin

\* I have in mind his play "L'homme aux sandales de caoutchouc" devoted to Vietnam and its leader Ho Chi Minh (P., 1970)

\*\* One of the poetic collections of Tahar Bekri was called "Le Chant du roi errant" (P., 1985)

to see and feel their "cultural belonging" to two different worlds ever more clearly.

Assia Djébar, a classic of Algerian literature, in her novel "Love, Fantasy" (1985) wrote, in contrast to Malek Haddad, that the French language became the "second mother-tongue" for many Algerians, because with its help they were able to receive an education and become acquainted not only with French culture, but also with world civilization. And this language, this "wealth" of Algerians, was gained at a high price – the loss of independence. But the capture and colonization of Algeria were like a "bloody wedding" of two worlds, as A. Djébar wrote, as a result of which a new world, new knowledge and new Algerians were born, capable to see "new horizons..."<sup>20</sup>

This cultural "wealth" at the "crossroads" of different civilizations in one person has become a subject of writings by Maghrib authors who live and work in France which became their second Motherland. This cultural wealth enables man to live in new reality, to be a "citizens of the world," feel his affiliation as an artist with "the general cultural wealth."

"It's because I fully belong to two worlds," the Kabyle singer and authoress Djura, living in France, wrote in her book "La saison des narcisses" (1993) wrote, "I'm fighting for this new personal identification, for our wealth, which all children of immigrants like me, who grew up in the West, have. They must enjoy the honey of our bilingual existence, the beauty of our *common being*, and breathe the aroma of two cultures..."<sup>21</sup>

However, the "children of immigrants" are not all able to see and evaluate this wealth properly, living in society which is not too favourably disposed to them, although there is no problem of choosing the language for those who were born and work in France. For them the French language is the native tongue, even if they preserve their ethno-confessional identity. The problem of becoming like the French in terms of the language and way of life has turned for them into the problem of their real integration in the culture of the society "accepting" them. Answering the question "Who are they?", Arabs more often than not call themselves "French" quite legitimately, because they are the citizens of France. But Arab authors, writing about themselves and their community, about its *special* relations with the surrounding reality of the West, and its relations with them, continue, in their own way, the artistic traditions of Maghrib socio-critical realism, its manner to describe everyday life, its avant-garde rebellious spirit and its insurrection against the domination of religious dogmas and the despotism of social traditions. And it is precisely this difference from the surrounding European world, this understanding of their special position in it, that give birth to psychological discomfort, which is felt as the difficulties and even torment of being on the cultural, social and political "border-line"..."<sup>22</sup>

Gradually, Arab authors begin "to write simply", not insisting on their "difference" and not provoking hostility toward themselves. They realize

that it is necessary to get rid of the feeling of guilt before their parents, their past, and their country for the fact that they and their children live in the West and speak the language of the country which gave them shelter, and they already love this “other” country, not having seen their “historical Motherland.”

Souad Belhaddad wrote about this in her book “Entre deux ‘je’” (2001),<sup>23</sup> in which she described the process of the realization of belonging to two worlds. “I travel much and with every passing year, while roaming around the world, I realize full well that I become more and more attached to both France and Algeria, my two native lands.” She resolutely refuses to wander in the “jungles of self-identification” and simply lives “normally.” She gets rid of the torment of her “dual nature”, her “being on border-line.”

This *new motive* of creative work of Arab authors not so much reconciles them with the surrounding reality as shows that the boundary of the alien world has been left behind. They have already crossed it, although not all have noticed it, the scars of their clashing with this alien world are still painful... And those French-speaking Arabs who have realized “their cultural wealth” (they are still few and far between), like the Lebanese writer, laureate of the Goncourt prize Amin Maalouf, believe that searching for and upholding one’s identity within the framework of just one culture and one language mean “apology”, militant “nationalism”, and the manifestation of extreme, aggressive forms of personal self-assertion.

Amin Maalouf does not renounce his “Lebanese” self or his French citizenship. He upholds the integrity of his self consisting of numerous “components”, which are one in their intricate mosaic and create a definite personal value.

“From the time I left Lebanon in 1976, and settled in France,” Maalouf writes, “I was repeatedly asked whether I feel more French or more Lebanese. And I invariably answered – ‘Both’. Not because I wanted to keep some balance or parity, but because if I’d said differently, it would have been untrue. This means that I really feel to be on the border of these two countries, belonging to both of them, just as I regard two or three languages and several cultural traditions my own. This position determines my identity. Would I be more ‘authentic’ if I cut off one of the parts forming my own self?”

“To those who ask me these questions I patiently explain that I was born in Lebanon, lived there until I turned 27, that Arabic is my mother tongue, and that I discovered for myself Dumas, Dickens and Swift in translations into Arabic, that I grew up in a mountain village where my ancestors lived, where I found my first child’s happiness and heard stories which inspired me later when I wrote my novels. How can I forget all this? How can I renounce my past? On the other hand, I have been living in France for over twenty years, drink its water and wine, caress its ancient stones with my hands, and write my books in its language. France shall never become an

alien land for me. What am I then? Half French, half Lebanese? Not at all! Identity cannot be divided into component parts. I don’t have several identities, but only one, consisting of all elements which formed it in this way, and not differently, of these parts and of this size. This distinguishes one man from another...”<sup>24</sup>

The position of this Lebanese writer who solves the problem of being on cultural “border-line” and upholds the advantages of “multiform” personality because he sees in it a possibility to become that very “bridge” connecting various peoples (which the first French-speaking Maghribians tried to build) is similar to the writings of the Kabyl Djura. She was the first to say boldly that “the wealth of today’s France consists of many and varied people living there.”

This “bridge” has been built and various peoples march toward one another along it, filling the treasure-trove of world culture with the fruits of their cultures. But while removing the boundaries between these varieties, and freeing man from the feeling of his “being on the border-line”, would not this “bridge” lead to the gradual merging of cultures into an “average single whole?” When French-language Maghrib literature had painful “scars” of cultural merging, it was natural, because that pain *reminded of the natural roots* and, paradoxically, determined the specific features of emerging literature... But, perhaps, there can be many “*different roots*”?

There is no question as to whether we should get rid of this “border-line” which not only draws cultures closer together, but also disunites them; this border-line may disappear altogether in the process of globalization. How should we preserve the “roots” which Malek Haddad, among others, remembered? Without them the Tree of Literature will have neither leaves nor fruit, it will not give the “blissful shadow” in which man will come back to life after tiresome wanderings in the sands of spiritual wilderness and the boundless ocean of endless hopes, in search of “far-off shores”, which can hardly be discerned in the misty horizon, hiding the outlines of the Ideal World Order.

---

#### Notes:

1. Прожогина С.В. Рубеж эпох – рубеж культур (Проблемы типологии литературы на французском языке в странах Северной Африки). – М., 1984. [Prozhogina, S.V. “The Boundary of Epochs – The Boundary of Cultures (Problems of Typology of Literature in the French Language in North African Countries).” Moscow, 1984.]

2. On the formation of the trends of “separation” from French literature in works by European writers who lived in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia *see* the chapter “From Colonial to National Literature” in the volume “Literature of Algeria” in the book “History of Literatures of the Maghrib Countries” (in three volumes). Moscow, 1993.

3. These phenomena are described in the work by *Е. Деменцевой* «Быть арабом во Франции» М., 2006. [*Dementseva, E.* “To Be Arab in France.” Moscow, 2006.]

4. For more details see: “Le roman colonial.” P., 1982.

5. *Déjeux, J.* “La littérature maghrébine d’expression française.” P., 1979; *Dzhugashvili, T.Ya.* “Algerian French-language Novel.” Moscow, 1976; *Nikiforova, I.D.* “African Novel.” Moscow, 1977; *Прождогина С.В.* Франкоязычная литература стран Магриба. М., 1973 и др. [*Prozhogina, S.V.* “French-language Literature of the Maghrib Countries.” Moscow, 1973, etc.]

6. For more details see: *Прождогина С.В.* Магриб: франкоязычные писатели 60–70 гг. 1980; Для берегов отчизны дальней... М., 1992; главу «Поэзия на французском языке в томе «Литература Марокко» («История литератур стран Магриба» М., 1993). [*Prozhogina, S.V.* “Maghrib: French-language Writers of 1960s-1970s.” Moscow, 1980; “For the Shores of the Far-off Motherland...” Moscow, 1992; chapter “Poetry in French” in the volume “Literature of Morocco” (History of Literatures of Maghrib Countries”. Moscow, 1993), etc.]

7. *Assia Djebar.* “Le blanc de l’Algérie.” P., 1995; *Долгов Б.В.* Исламистский вызов и алжирское общество. М., 2004; *Прождогина С.В.* Любовь Земная (Концепт Родины в творчестве франкоязычных магрибинцев). М., 2004, гл.: «Мертвый язык» как язык настоящего времени? [*Dolgov, B.V.* “Islamic Challenge and Algerian Society.” Moscow, 2004; *Prozhogina, S.V.* “Earthly Love (Concept of the Motherland in Works by French-speaking Maghribians).” Moscow, 2004. Chapter “The Dead Language” as a Language of the Present Time.]

8. On this subject see: «Пустыня как литературное пространство», в кн. «Московское востоковедение». М., 1997. [“The Desert as a Literary Realm” in the book “Moscow Studies of the Orient”. Moscow, 1997, pp. 482-509.]

9. The new “wave” of French-language prose and poetry, which emerged in Algeria and Tunisia in the 1980s, largely repeated many themes and styles of outstanding writers of the 1950s-1970s. Young Francophiles (M. Dib, Z. Berfas, X.-X. Khajaja, H. Tengur, A. Ledjemi, A. Chaïbi, F. Hashemi, S. Gelluz, and others) mainly turned to historical or lyrical subjects, and also description of everyday life, although one could trace subjects of the new socio-political reality in their works.

10. For more details about “women writers” literature of Maghrib see: *Fontaine, J.* “Les écrivains tunisiennes.” Tunis, 1992; *Gontard, M.* (sous la direction). “Le Récit féminin au Maroc.” P., 2005; *Ahlem Mosteghanemi.* “Algérie. Femmes et écritures.” P., 1985.

11. See: *Прождогина С.В.* Восток на Западе. – М., 2003, гл. I. [*Prozhogina, S.V.* “The East in the West.” Moscow, 2003, vol. 1.]

12. *Malek Haddad.* “Les Zéros tournent en rond.” P., 1961. Quotations translated by me (S.P.).

13. Characteristically, this image of “shadow” is used by Maghrib authors as an image of the Motherland quite often (see, for example, *Dib, M.* “L’Ombre gardienne” (collection of verses by M. Dib. P., 1961.

14. See about M. Feraoun the book by *Джугашвили Г.Я. и Никифоровой И.Д.* Алжирский франкоязычный роман... [*Dzhugashvili, T.Ya. and Nikiforova, I.D.*

“Algerian French-language Novel”]; *Мартыановой И.Б.* «Творчество Мулуда Ферауна». М., 1988. [*Martyanova, I.B.* “Works by Mouloud Feraoun.” Moscow, 1988], and also the chapter Традиция предания смерти как основа продолжения жизни? [“Tradition of Death as the Foundation of Continued Life”] (about Feraoun’s novel “The Earth and the Blood”) in the book by *Прождогина С.В.* Любовь Земная... [*Prozhogina, S.V.* “Earthly Love...”]

15. M. Dib’s selected works can be found in a book in Russian translation published in 1989, as well as his trilogy “Algeria” (“Big House”, “Weaver’s Trade”, “Fire”) translated and published in 1958-1964, a collection of his stories and verses (Contemporary Algerian poetry), М., 1977. About the writer’s work see: *Прождогина С.В.* Между мистралем и сирокко М., 1998; От Сахары до Сены. М., 2001 и др. [*Prozhogina, S.V.* “Between Mistral and Sirocco.” Moscow, 1998; “From the Sahara to the Seine.” Moscow, 2001.]

16. For more details about A. Memmi see: *Прождогина С.В.* Магриб: франкоязычные писатели...; Для берегов Отчизны дальней... и др. [*Prozhogina, S.V.* “Maghrib: French-language Writers...”]; “For the Shores of the Far-off Motherland...”]

17. About works by Kateb Yacine see the monograph by *Jaqueline Arnaud.* “Kateb Yacine.” P., 1985.

18. About Mouloud Mammeri see Forewords to his novels translated into Russian: “Opium and a Stick,” “The Forgotten Hill,” “When Justice Sleeps,” “Crossing.” For Berberological Studies and Translations see: *Mouloud Mammeri.* “Les poèmes de Si Mohand.” P., 1965; “L’ahelli du Gourara.” P., 1984.

19. *Leila Sebbar*, half Algerian half French in the novel “Le silence des Rives” P., 1983; the Algerian *Malika Mokkadem* in the novel “Les hommes qui marchent”. P., 1990; the Arab *Souad Belhaddad* in the book “Entre deux ‘je’.” P., 2001, and others expressed this “requirement” to move and settle as the need for the *self-assertion* of the individual, recognizing his or her belonging to “different” shores, different civilizations and cultures.

20. About the work of Assia Djebar see the “Foreword to the book of her selected works in Russian translation published in 1990,” as well as *R. Landa’s* Foreword to the novel “Les enfants du Nouveau monde”. Moscow, 1965.

21. *Djura.* “La saison des narcisses.” P., 1993. For more details about her see: *Прождогина С.В.* Между мистралем и сирокко..., гл. «Музыка во льду». [*Prozhogina, S.V.* “Between Mistral and Sirocco.” Chapter “Music in the Ice”.]

22. For more information about the work by Arabs see *Прождогина С.В.* Восток на Западе... [*Prozhogina, S.V.* “The East in the West,” and also *Michel Larond* Autour du roman “beur.” P., 1990.]

23. Russian translation of fragments from that book can be found in *Крылова Н.Л., Прождогина С.В.* Метисы: кто они? М., 2004. [*Krylova, N.L., Prozhogina, S.V.* “Metisses: Who Are They?” Moscow, 2004.]

24. *Amin Maalouf.* Les identités meurtrières. P., 1998. Quotation from that publication, pp. 7-11.

## THE ETHNO-LINGUISTIC SITUATION IN TANZANIA\*

*Nelli Gromova,*  
D.Sc. (Linguistics),  
Head of Department,  
Moscow State University

In contrast to other African countries, Tanzania is a zone of linguistic convergence: all four autochthonous linguistic families of Africa – Afroasiatic, Semito-Hamitic (Cushitic), Niger-Congo (Bantu), Nilo-Saharan (Nilotic), and Khoisan (Sandawe and Hadza) are represented there. This convergence is a result of historical shifts, settlements and movements of various groups of the indigenous African population and new arrivals. At present Tanzania is inhabited by more than 120 different ethnoses (we don't mean the non-Africans – Arabs, Indians, Europeans, and others), who differ in their history and culture, the socio-economic development level, demographic indices, the degree of participation in the country's life, etc. Before discussing the characteristics of the present ethno-linguistic situation in the country, it would be necessary to look at its historical roots.

The Khoisan languages which are now spoken by an insignificant number of people were widespread more than 5,000 years ago over a vast territory of the African continent, from modern Sudan to the southern tip of Africa. A great many of these languages and people who spoke them were later swallowed by other ethnoses, and at present there are only two Khoisan ethnoses in Tanzania speaking Sandawe and Hadza. Sandawe (Sandaui, Sandawi, Sandwe) are spoken by about 70,000 people<sup>1</sup>, Hadza (Hatsa, Hadzape, Hadzabe, Kindiga, Tindiga, Kangeju) are spoken by only 1,000 people. The bulk of the Khoisan population live in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa, several groups of it can be met in Zambia, Angola and Zimbabwe.

People speaking the Cushitic languages, branches of Afroasiatic languages, appeared on the territory of Tanzania more than 2000 years ago and occupied the entire northern part of modern Tanzania, right up to the Iringi in the South. The Cushites were land-tillers and cattle-breeders, and they came from the territory of Ethiopia and Somalia, having ousted or absorbed the Khoisan population. In turn, the Cushitic languages were later influenced by the Bantu languages, and at present there are only six ethnoses of Cushitic origin living in central Tanzania. The biggest of them is the one speaking the Iraku language (Iraqw, Mbulu) and numbering about 400,000 people. Other Cushitic languages spoken by some 20,000 each are Burunge

(Bulunge, Mbulungi, Burunga, Iso), Alagwa (Chasi, Wasi, Waasi), Gorowa (Gorwaa, Fiome, Ufiomi). Some researchers believe that, perhaps, the Aasax languages (Asa, Aramanik, Dorobo, Ndorobo) and Kwadza (Ngomwia) have practically disappeared. For instance, in the 1970s there were only four men and one woman who spoke the Kwadza language.

The Nilotic languages which are a branch of the Nilo-Saharan family migrated to the territory of modern Tanzania from the banks of the Nile also about 2000 years ago. The first two waves of Nilotes speaking the South-Nilotic and East-Nilotic languages settled on the territory between Lake Victoria and Mt. Kilimanjaro. The Nilotic languages include such widespread ones as Datoga (Datooga, Tatoga, Taturu, Mangati) which are spoken by 200,000 people, Maasai (Masai, Massai, Maa) – 400,000 in Tanzania and 600,000 in Kenya, Luo – 150,000 to 200,000 people who moved about 100 years ago to the eastern shore of Lake Victoria from Kenya, where there are more than three million of them. Other Nilotic languages are rather rare: the languages of the Kalenjin group (Akie, Aramanik) are spoken by about 5,000 in Tanzania, whereas there are over three million in Kenya and 150,000 in Uganda speaking them. The Ongamo (Ngasa, Shaka) language is spoken by only up to 300 people.

Finally, the last group of migrants, and the most numerous one, is the Bantu who moved to the territory of modern Tanzania from Cameroon about 2000 years ago. The Bantu people were engaged in land cultivation, cattle breeding, hunting and fishing, they were acquainted with making iron and found themselves in more favourable economic and technological conditions, as compared to other ethnoses, which enabled them to dominate in the region, having submitted or swallowed up a number of ethnoses, having borrowed from them certain specific features of their languages and cultures. Thus, the Bantu people prevail on Tanzanian territory. The non-Bantu languages have been preserved in the form of small enclaves in the regions of Singida and Arusha. At present 95 percent of the Tanzanian population speak the Bantu languages (*Batibo* 2000: 5-7).

The most widespread Bantu language not only in Tanzania, but in the whole of Africa is Swahili spoken by about 100 million people (as the native, first or second language). Other large Bantu communities in Tanzania are Sukuma spoken by up to five million people, and also Nyamwezi, Chaga, Haya, Gogo, Makonde and Tumbuka (each of these ethnoses exceeds one million). Ha, Nyakyusa, Hehe and Nyaturu are close to one million. The Nilyamba, Luguru, Bena, Shambala, Mwera, Asu (Pare) ethnoses are about 500,000 each. At the same time Tanzania is inhabited by very small ethnic Bantu groups, for example, Segeju (7,000), Daisu (5,000), Degere (one to two thousand). Several Bantu languages of the last century have disappeared from the linguistic map of Tanzania: such languages as Ware, and others. There is no information concerning rare languages (Kabia, Ruri, Nindi, Taita).

\* First published in *Этнографическое обозрение*. – М., 2007. – № 2. – С. 54-59. [*Etnograficheskoye obozreniye*. Moscow, 2007, No. 2, pp. 54-59.]

Researchers of the ethno-linguistic situation in Tanzania unanimously note its unique feature consisting of “the motley ethno-linguistic composition of the country, which not only did not prevent, but also contributed to, the formation of one of the local languages – Swahili becoming the lingua franca ensuring interethnic contacts, the language of the colonial administration and primary education, and ultimately, the official language of the state” (Языковая ситуация...1975: 49 [Language Situation... 1975: 49]).

It should be remembered that during the precolonial period children received elementary education in their own local ethnical language. During the German colonial administration, when standard schools were opened, the problem of a common language and a uniform educational system of school education came to the fore. Swahili was chosen as such a language, because it was freely recognized by other ethnoses. It became a prestigious language and retained its position as such when the Germans were replaced by the British colonialists.

At present Swahili plays an important role, as before, in the country's life, although a struggle has been going on between Swahili and English at all communicative levels, above all, in the sphere of education. The latter is the decisive sphere determining the country's future. Historically, although Swahili has the status of the official language and about 90 percent of people in the country speak it, Swahili is the main teaching language only at primary schools. Children of non-Swahili ethnic groups find no difficulties when starting to go to school, inasmuch as it is the second language and is widespread in the family and society. At middle schools and schools of higher learning teaching is conducted in English (with the exception of certain subjects, like Swahili grammar and literature, social sciences, etc.). All scholars, local and foreign, recommend Swahili to be used at all levels of education for the sake of preserving national self-identification and cultural traditions. In practice, however, it turns out that 94 percent of school and university students are unable to read and understand educational literature and fiction in English, which, naturally, results in a lower level of education (Qorro, 1996).

Apart from primary education, Swahili is also the language of everyday contacts between people, the language of the radio, TV and the press, scientific literature and fiction, the language of the lower and higher bodies of power, in other words, the sphere of its use is boundless. Swahili is a dynamically developing language which has the necessary terms for using it in the system of higher education, the high-tech sphere, etc. Swahili is so successfully competing with English at all levels that various proposals have been put forward to regard English not as the official language of Tanzania, but as a foreign one and be studied as such in schools (Rubagumya, 1994). Swahili is widely spoken outside Tanzania, in all countries of East and Central Africa bordering on it. The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted a resolution in 1986 (true, it has not been implemented to this day) about using Swahili as the main lan-

guage of contacts on the African continent (Ryanga, 1999: 21). At present Swahili is the working language of the African Union. The conferences devoted to Swahili (for instance in Dar es Salaam in 2000 and 2005) have repeatedly issued appeals to the governments of East African countries, the countries of the Great Lakes region and other states in Africa to use Swahili as the single language for the whole of Africa and suggested ways for accomplishing this task.

With Swahili and English (although the latter is mainly used by not more than 15 percent of the population) dominating the linguistic situation, other, “rare” languages of Tanzania are used quite seldom. As a rule, they are languages for interethnic contacts. The UNESCO conferences have repeatedly adopted recommendations about the need and expediency to use native languages in the system of education. Indeed, man has the right to preserve and develop his language, children acquire knowledge considerably easier and faster in their native language, but such decision in polyethnic Tanzania would mean the introduction of 120 local languages in the system of education, which would be unfeasible economically. The Tanzanian government is often accused of ignoring the development of local, “small” ethnoses and their languages. But in its view, it would be improper and unrealistic to spend large sums in this sphere. Tanzanian linguists believe that the policy of ignoring “small” languages in this way has a number of historical premises: a) having gone through tribal and religious enmity, Tanzanians have realized that their strength lies in unity, and for this purpose the country should have a single political course, common aims and one common language; b) when, after winning independence, the time has come to choose a single official language of the state, Swahili has already been the language of broad interethnic contacts, and its elevation to the status of the official language has not provoked any opposition on the part of other ethnoses; c) apart from the problems of supporting and developing “small” languages, the state has more urgent tasks, such as health protection, the development of agriculture, infrastructure, and many others (Mkude, 1999: 22).

In the present conditions many ethnic languages are doomed to extinction. The life of a language is expressed in its use in the country's political, cultural and socio-economic life. However, it is only the languages of the national, international and interethnic status that survive. The remaining languages do not interest society, they exist within the boundaries of just one ethnos, young people are not anxious to teach their offspring these ethnic languages, preferring a language of a wider sphere of communicative functioning, that is, Swahili (Ibid.).

Such situation is well demonstrated by the materials of the scholarly expedition of the Institute for African Studies, RAS, to Tanzania in April-May 2005. (The author of this article was one of its members). One of the interviews dealt with the interethnic situation in the country. Particularly, atten-

tion was paid to the ethnic and national origin and affiliation of the interviewed person. "Does the Tanzanian nation exist, and if it does, what are its distinctive features? Do you regard yourself African, Tanzanian, or representative of a definite ethnos?" The answers to these questions were practically similar (the interview was conducted in Swahili). Here are some of the typical answers:

"Yes, the Tanzanian nation does exist, because whether one is Gogo or Luguru, or someone else by origin, it's not so important, because we all speak Swahili" (Truck driver, 39, Gogo from Dodoma).

"Yes, there is the Tanzanian nation, and we are all united by the Swahili language. I am Tanzanian and it is both my national and ethnic affiliation, because my parents come from different ethnoses: my father is Ha from Kigoma, my mother is Tutsi from Burundi, but they talked in Swahili with each other and it is my native tongue. I don't know the mother tongues of my parents" (Teacher, 55).

"We are a single nation, Tanzania, which began to form from 1961, when we won independence. We all have one language – Swahili" (Secretary, 30, ethnically from Dar es Salaam).

"Doubtless, there is the single Tanzanian nation which began to be formed during the period of the struggle for independence. It was then that people began to realize and feel that they were a single nation which should win freedom. They began to realize that there were not Chaga, Ruri, or Sukuma, but they were Tanzanians. And now you will see in the hotel registry books only one word – 'Tanzanian'. Each Tanzanian feels part of a single, common nation, irrespective of his ethnic origin. We have a common language, common ideology and one aim" (Professor, Ruri, 59).

"At present, the process of the formation of a single nation is going on which was largely due to the 'Ujamaa' policy, that is, reliance on our own forces. Perhaps, one could notice a manifestation of tribalism in some rural districts, but there is none in cities. Quite often, in families with parents from different ethnoses, children speak only Swahili. This language ousts ethnic languages which are spoken only in villages and deal mainly with narrow local subjects" (Translator, Nyaruanda, 54).

"Of course, there is the single Tanzanian nation. I live in Zanzibar, but was born on the Island of Pemba. However, I don't separate myself from continental Tanzanians. We are a single nation and speak one common language – Swahili" (Waiter of Zanzibar origin, 24).

"Yes, there is the single Tanzanian nation. There can be certain drawbacks and misunderstandings regarding the nationalities question, but we are one as a single family. We are united by the Swahili language and proud of our country. There is no ethnic discrimination and the number of mixed marriages is growing. One of my daughters is married to a Haya, another to a Chaga. What then are their children?!" (World War II veteran, Sukuma, 81).

In essence, the opinion of most Tanzanians is concentrated in the following answer: "*The Tanzanian nation has been formed and it will develop. The Swahili language is its unifying factor. Ethnic origin or affiliation plays no role, mixed marriages are more and more frequent. My children and grandchildren do not speak the Nyamwezi language, but only Swahili. It looks likely that ethnic languages will be forgotten in the future. This will only strengthen the Tanzanian nation.*" (Director of the National Library, 60). He does not deplore the death of ethnic languages, regarding it a natural, even favourable process.

Although, for the sake of justice, one should make note of answers expressing worry over trends to ethnic division and a strengthening of nationalistic tendencies.

"One can talk of a single nation only from a political point of view. Politicians speak of the solidarity and unity of the people almost daily, but these are only political declarations, not the real state of affairs. The policy of the first government headed by Julius Nyerere was aimed at the creation of a single nation. People did not mention their ethnic origin or affiliation in documents. But since the 1990s the situation has changed: people began to pay more attention to their ethnic origin. In our university in Dar es Salaam students form their own ethnic unions or societies: for instance a Society of Students from Tabora. But this is not a regional society, it is one of the students of the ethnos Nyamwezi. A person wishing to take one or another government post puts forward his candidacy in his own ethnic district. For example, if a Chaga puts forward his name in Tabora, he will not be voted for... This is why it seems to me that we are returning to tribalism, and this worries me a good deal" (Professor, Kimbu, 53).

Answers to the question "Who are you?" were more varied as compared to those about the unity of the nation as Tanzanians see it. The following three are the most indicative:

"If I see a snake or if it bites me I'll cry in Nyamwezi, but I am both Tanzanian and African" (Director of the National Library, 60).

"First of all, I'm Tanzanian and African. My parents belong to the ethnos Yao, it is not indigenous, but came to the country from Malawi and Mozambique. I was born in Tanzania and am real Tanzanian" (Manager, 32).

"The answer to the question 'Who are you?' depends on where I am asked. I am Tanzanian, in a wider sense I am African, and in a narrow sense I am Ruri" (Professor, 59).

Thus, the ethno-linguistic situation in Tanzania is characterized by a definite predominance of Swahili and its wide use in all key functions of the communicative sphere. The languages of the relatively big ethnoses, such as Sukuma, Nyamwezi, Haya, and some others, which are still wide-



spread in definite regions are not in a precarious situation as the languages of small ethnoses, which can disappear in the not-so-distant future under the impact of the mobility and dynamics of the modern Swahili language. The death of just one language deals an irreparable blow at human culture. This is also true of the ethnical component. Young people often do not know ethnic languages and ethnic culture, despite the fact that the latter preserves ethnical character.

In this connection it would be appropriate to recall the attempts to revive the culture of small northern ethnoses undertaken in Canada, Sweden and other countries. Young people try to learn the languages of their grandparents, their skills, habits and hobbies (for instance, the ability to make garments and ornaments of skins, leather and furs, play national musical instruments, etc.). There is no government policy in Tanzania aimed at the preservation of ethnic cultures. The Ministry of Culture encourages the activities of various ensembles performing folk songs and dances, but they are few and far between. In the opinion of one of the persons interviewed, the Ministry of Culture *“should exert every effort to revive and develop Tanzanian culture, inasmuch as a nation can only be identified through its own culture, and without it a nation is simply dead”* (Professor, Nyamwezi, 54). He was seconded by another participant in the interview, who believes that *“Tanzanians were successful in one aspect: they have one common language – Swahili. As to the cultural sphere, it is not so: each ethnos has its own culture. And we should now study these cultures in order to bring out the elements which would be combined in a single Tanzanian culture on the basis of ethnic cultures Gogo, Nyakyusa, Hehe, and others.”* (Assistant director, Gogo, 56). Perhaps, by doing so Tanzania will succeed, to a certain extent, in solving the difficult problem of “the death of a language” in a polyethnic state.

#### Literature:

Языковая ситуация в странах Африки. – М., 1975 [The Language Situation in African Countries. Moscow, 1975.]

Batibo, 2000 – Batibo, H.M. “The Linguistic Situation of Tanzania” // *Lugha za Tanzania. Languages of Tanzania* /Eds. K. Kahigi, Y. Kihore, M. Mous. Leiden, 2000.

Mano, Sands, 2002 – Mano, J.F., Sands, B. “The Languages of Tanzania.” A Bibliography. Goeteborg, 2002.

Mkude, 1999 – Mkude, D.J. Ujenzi wa demokrasia na sera ya lugha nchini Tanzania: Kiswahili/Kiingereza dhidi ya lugha za jumuiya ngodondogo // *Kiswahili katika elimu*. Dar es Salaam, 1999.

Qorro, 1996 – Qorro, M. Matumizi ya Kiswahili, Kiingereza kufundishia: Wanaotoa maoni hawajafanya utafiti // *Rai*. 1996. Desemba 5-11.

Rubagumya, 1994 – Rubagumya, C.M. Language Values and Bilingual Classroom Discourse in Tanzania Secondary Schools // *Language, Culture and Curriculum*. 1994. No. 7/1.

Ryanga, 2002 – Ryanga, S. “The African Union in the Wake of Globalization: the Forgotten Language Dimension” // *KISWAHILI*. Juzuu 65. 2002.

Whiteley, 1969 – Whiteley, W. “Swahili. The Rise of a National Language.” London, 1969.

---

#### Notes:

1. Here and further the data on the numerical strength of people speaking a language are cited from the work of Mano, Sands, 2002.

## TONAL SYSTEMS OF THE MANDE LANGUAGE: A SURVEY

**Valentin Vydrin**, D.Sc. (Philology),  
Head of the African Centre at the Peter  
the Great Museum of Anthropology  
and Ethnography (Kunstkamera)

During the last two or three decades we have been observing impressive progress in the study of Mande tonal systems. Quite recently, publications calling tonality of one or another Mande language in question were possible; today it is clear that practically all languages of the group are tonal; exceptions (which will be mentioned below) are rare and marginal. But if we consider their tonal systems, a great deal of variability will be found as far as the number of tonemes, their functions, rules of surface tonal realizations, and tonal domains are concerned. At the present stage of study, it is too early to advance a true reconstruction of the tonal system of the Proto-Mande.<sup>1</sup> Meanwhile, tonal reconstructions of some sub-groupings within the Mande family are within reach, and they have been done for some of the groups.<sup>2</sup> Comparative analysis at the subgroup level provides rich data for hypotheses on the characteristics of the Proto-Mande system and, on the other hand, on the processes that may have brought forth the current diversity.

It should be mentioned that the descriptions available use different systems of tone marking. To maintain them in this survey would make understanding difficult. For this reason, the International Phonetic Alphabet marks will be used:

a) Level tones:

b)

Name of the tone	Letter mark	2-level systems	3-level systems	4-level systems	5-level systems
Extra-high	EH			ẽ	ẽ
High	H	é	é	é	é
Middle	M		ē		ē
Low	L	è	è	è	è
Extra-low	EL			ě	ě

6) Contour tones:

ẽ – rising tone (R), è – falling tone (F). In the languages where two rising tonemes are distinguished, ẽ is used for the mid-rising (MR) tone. In the languages distinguishing two falling tones, è is used for the mid-falling (MF) tone. The floating low tone is marked as e` (Lfl) and the floating high tone as e' (Hfl).

Let us survey the tonal systems of the languages whose tonal descriptions are available group by group.

1. **Manding.**<sup>3</sup> On the superficial level, there is a great diversity of tonal realisations from one variant to another, which is produced by multiple rules of surface tone realization. Under this diversity, there is a rather homogeneous underlying structure, which can be reconstructed for the Proto-Manding: two tone levels, downdrift; two tonemes, H and L-H. The domain of a toneme is a word: the tone of the first component of a compound word assimilates tones of the other components (the same is true for some types of syntagmas<sup>4</sup>). Suffixes have no tones of their own and are assimilated by the tone of the stem. A great majority of words belong to one of two tonal classes: high throughout (H, H-H...) or low-high, or rising (L-H, L-L-H, L-H-H...).

Less than 10% of stems have other ("minor") tonal patterns which are characterized by their instability (especially from one dialect to another), practically all these stems are nouns.<sup>5</sup>

The only grammatical tone is the tonal reference article (floating low-tone suffix); it appears in the centre of the Manding area (Bamana, Maninka, the majority of Jula variants), while on the periphery (Mandinka, Xasonka, Kagoro, Worodugu, Marka-Dafin, Mau) it corresponds to a segmental morpheme -o. It is evident that in the Proto-Manding, the article was also segmental.

In some of the languages and dialects (Konya, Many, Jula of Ojenne, Marka-Dafin cluster) tones are inverse (L and H-L major tonemes). As a rule, a stem belongs to the same tonal class (in other words, it carries the same toneme) in all Manding variants; exceptions are relatively rare.

Some North-Western Manding languages tend to develop an accent against the tonal background. The beginning of this process can be observed in Kagoro [Vydrine 2001]; a more advanced stage of the establishment of accent is described by Denis Creissels [1982] for Mandinka. In the latter language, this process triggered a profound modification of the entire prosodic system which is quite different from the Bamana type.

The Mau language represents a special case. According to Creissels [1982b], it has four tonal classes (in other words, four tonemes): H (*búú* 'leaf'), H-Hfl (*búú* 'fog'), L-H (*kàwà* 'shoulder'), L-Hfl (*kàwà* 'cloud'). In some contexts the floating tone is realized as an extra-high tone of the last syllable of the stem or of the following syllable. It follows from Creissels' description that Mau is the only Manding language that has no downdrift.

This author has come to the conclusion that the distinction of the four tonal classes has no correspondence in other Manding variants: both H and H-Hfl types correspond to the high-tonal class of the core Manding languages, and both L-H and L-Hfl correspond to the L-H (rising) tonal class. I presume that this modification of the tonal system of Mau may result from the strong influence of the Kila-Dan substrate which can be attested at all the levels of the Mau language system, especially at the phonetic one. In

general, it would not be an exaggeration to say that Mau is a Manding language with the South Mande phonology.

Within the **Mokole** subgroup, only one language has a comparatively good description, Koranko [Kastenholz 1987]. Its tonal system is rather close to the core Manding type. My field data for the other languages of the subgroup (Mogofin, Kakabe, Lele) testify to the same.<sup>6</sup>

2.1. **Soso (Susu)**. There are many similarities to the tonal system in Manding: two tone levels and downdrift; second component of a compound word or a determinative syntagma loses its tone which is replaced by a low tone (or H-L, if the final tone of the first component is high) [Grégoire 1978]. There are however some important points of difference:

a) it is a moraic language; “heavy” syllables (CVV, CVN) carry two tones. So, the tonal domain in this language cannot be a word, and the neutralization of tones of non-initial words in nominal syntagmas should probably be interpreted as an imposition of a grammatical tone, rather than as a simple assimilation by the tone of the first component;<sup>7</sup>

b) there is a clear distinction between verbal and nominal stems as far as the number of tonal classes is concerned. Verbs have the same two classes as in Manding, H and LH. Nouns have at least three major tonal classes (H, LH and HL) of words containing only “light” syllables, and many more, if words with “heavy” syllables are taken into account<sup>8</sup> [Touré 1994, 49-57];

c) verbs change their tones in some contexts, which can probably be regarded as a grammatical tone [Creissels 1992].

2.2. **Jallonke/Yalunka**. The only description available of the dialect spoken in Mali is the one by Denis Creissels [ms.]. The system seems to be close to that of Soso at the underlying level, and the divergences in the rules of superficial tonal realizations do not exceed those among Manding variants.

In the Jallonke dialect the Fuuta-Jallon tones seem to have disappeared [F. Liupke, personal communication],<sup>9</sup> which seems to be a unique documented case within the Mande family. This can undoubtedly be explained by the strong influence of the surrounding Fulaphone population (cf. “toneless Bamana” spoken by Maures and Fulbe in Mali as their second language).

3. **Soninke** [Diagana O. 1984; Rialland 1990; Rialland 1991; Creissels 1991; Creissels 1992]. The tonal domain seems to be a word or a morpheme. There are two tonal levels and downdrift.<sup>10</sup> There are two tonal classes of monosyllabic words (H, L-H) and three classes of disyllabic words (H-H, L-H, H-L, the latter being attested only in verbs), as well as five classes of trisyllabic words (H-H-H, L-L-H, H-H-L, H-L-H, L-H-L). There is no difference in behaviour between “light” and “heavy” syllables. In nominal compact syntagmas, rules of tonal assimilation are more complicated than in Manding languages or Soso: the non-initial component loses its lexical tone only when the first component begins with a high tone;

if the syntagma-initial tone is low, the second component maintains its tone [Rialland 1990, 68-72].

Another grammatical function of tone is the following: a verb under negation or after the temporal subordinate marker *gà nã* loses its lexical tone and assumes a low tone [Creissels 1992]. The second grammatical function of the low tone is to mark the possessed noun group after a possessor pronoun [Rialland 1990, 73].

Although Annie Rialland singles out a “high-tone accent” in Soninke, what she means seems to be not a true accent, but a way of describing a word-final “automatic” high tone.<sup>11</sup> As for the “conventional” dynamic accent, it seems to be missing in Soninke.

Unfortunately, no description of tonal systems of any of the languages of **Boso (Hainyaxo, Sorogama/Jenaamaa, Teyaxo, Tiema Cewe), Samogo (Banka-Jowulu-Duun-Dzuun-Seenku), Jogo-Jeri** clusters is available.<sup>12</sup>

4. **Vai**<sup>13</sup> has two tonal levels; modulated tones are interpreted as combinations of high and low. A striking difference from other West Mande languages is the absence of downdrift. Welmers describes Vai tone as belonging to a syllable, but this interpretation does not correlate with the fact that the same tonal patterns are found on monosyllabic and disyllabic stems. The analysis of his data leaves space for a different interpretation: the domain of a toneme seems to be a word (or probably a foot). Four tonal lexical classes are attested,<sup>14</sup> H(-H), H-L, L-H, L(-L). The latter class is not available among verbs and underrepresented among nouns.<sup>15</sup> The L-H pattern changes to L-L before the high tone [Welmers 1976, 40-41], just as in Bamana and many other Manding variants. In compound nouns formed according to the most current model, lexical tones of non-initial components are neutralized: they assume a H-L pattern, if preceded by a L-H stem (the latter being transformed into L-L), or L-L in all other cases.

*bàŋ-kpɛ* ‘wine (*kpɛ*) of piassawa palm (*bàŋ*)’,

*kɔŋ-kàl* ‘woodcarver’ (*kɔŋ* ‘tree’, *kàl* ‘man’).

In other words, the low tone marks the second component of the syntagma, but it can be overlaid by the high tone reported from the preceding syllable (in the same way as was described for Soso).

Otherwise nominal and adjectival stems tend to maintain their lexical tones in a greater number of contexts than in the Manding languages.

The low tone has another grammatical function: it marks the imperative and citation form of verbs replacing their lexical tones.

**Kono**, being closely related to Vai, diverges from the latter in at least one important aspect: it has a downdrift [Welmers 1976, 148], like practically all the Manding languages. Unfortunately, I don’t have a detailed description of the Kono phonology.

4. **South-Western Mande (SWM)**. It is the only branch within the Mande family for which an explicit attempt of tonal reconstruction has been

undertaken [Dwyer 1973]. Data of one of these languages, Mende, became the starting point for establishing the autosegmental phonology, and in the ensuing discussion the main aspects of its tonology have been highlighted.

Proto-SWM seems to have had a downdrift. The domain of toneme was, most probably, a word or a morpheme.<sup>16</sup>

As for the Proto-SWM nouns,<sup>17</sup> David Dwyer [1978a; 1978b] reconstructs the following tonal classes (tonal patterns of monosyllabic and disyllabic words):

1. *cV́, cV́cV́*
2. *cV̌, cV̌cV̌*
3. *cV̌, cV̌cV̌*
4. *cV́cV̌* or *cV́cV̌*.
5. *cV̌cV̌*.

Taking into account the great statistical predominance of the classes 1 and 2 (about 90% of all Proto-SWM stems reconstructed by Dwyer), this author concludes that they were the only classes inherited from the previous stage. According to him, classes 4 and 5 emerged at the Proto-SWM level through borrowing,<sup>18</sup> and class 3 includes fossilized nominal compounds [Dwyer 1978a, 185-191].

There are however some reasons to be skeptical about these conclusions. Certain arguments against the borrowed character of the entire class 5 have been formulated in [Vydrine 1994]. The claim that classes 3 and 4 do not have cognates in “Northern Mande” can also be easily refuted, cf.:

**SWM** \**káli* or \**káli* [Dwyer 1978b] (class 4) hoe –

**Soso** *kéri*, **Jallonke** *kéri*, **Vai** *ká’i*.

**SWM** \**fánkân* or \**fánkâ* (class 3) force, **Mende** [Innes 1969] *fākâ/vaka* n energy, vigour; vi brace oneself (to pull a heavy weight), exert oneself, **Looma** (Woye-Birasu dial.) *fanga/Banga*, **Kpelle-Guinea** [Leger 1975] *hvanga/vanga* n good health; energy, vigour; ardour, fervour –

**Soso** [Lacan 1942; Friedländer n.d.] *fange* n force; power; fortune; advantage, **Jallonke** [Creissels 1988] *fàngá* n force, power

**P.Manding** \**fánká*, **Mandinka** [Creissels et al. 1982; W.E.C. 1995] *fánka* vi be rich; be powerful; prosper, **Jaxanka** *fanka/o*, **Xasonka** *fanga*, *fánka*, **Kagoro** *fàngá* n force; power, **Maninka** *fánká*, *fǎa* n force, strength; might, power, **Bamana** *fàngá*, *fǎgǎ*, **Bamana** (Sikasso) *fàngá*, *fǎa* n force, strength; might, power; administration, authorities, **Marka-Dafin** *pǎa*

**Soninke** [Galtier, Dantioko, Dramé 1979, Smeltzer & Smeltzer 1997] *fanka/ø*, pl. (East) *-nu*, (West) *-o* n power, **Bobo** [Le Bris, Prost 1981] *fàngā* (a borrowing from Manding?)

**Dzuun** [Traoré 1998] *fààn*

**San** [Platiel 1974, 137] *pǎǎ*

**Dan** (Gweta dial.) *fǎǎ*, **Wan** *pǎǎ* vi be able, vt dominate, command.

**SWM** \**kŌmā(ŋ)* (class 3) ‘niggard’, **Mende** [Innes 1969] *kŏmā/goma* vi be mean, eat without sharing; refuse to smb. (sth. – *hū*), **Bandi** [Heydorn 1940-41] *kŏwà/?*, **Bandi** [Grossmann et al. 1991] *kūwǎ/?* adj mean, not generous; n niggardliness, **Looma** (Gizima, Wuboma) *koma/woma* n meanness, unwillingness to share food, **Kpelle-Guinea** [Leger 1975] *kuwaŋ/guwaŋ*, *kuwoŋ/guwoŋ* adj be mean; vi fail to offer a gift to –

**Soso** [Lacan 1942; Friedländer n.d.] *kuma* adj niggard; vi be niggard; vt refuse to share one's goods with; n niggardliness, **Jallonke** [Creissels 1988] *kúamá* vi be niggard

**Bamana** *kúmaníyá (?) rare* vt deprive smb. unlawfully (of – *lá*)

**Soninke** [Smeltzer & Smeltzer 1997] *kuma/-na (?)* vt deprive smb. (of – *ŋa*), prevent (from – inf.), **Bobo** [Le Bris, Prost 1981] *kúmā*, *kŏmā* vt deny smb. (sth. – *nā*), refuse to smb. (sth. – *nā*).

This does not question Dwyer's reconstruction of the Proto-SWM tonal system, but invalidates his further proposals concerning the Proto-Western reconstruction.

Unfortunately, Dwyer does not attempt to reconstruct, at the Proto-SWM level, a dynamic accent (which is quite possible on the basis of Bandi and Kpelle data) and does not consider the differences in tonal behaviour of light and heavy syllables (and Looma provides strong evidence for the importance of opposition of syllable types for the tonology, cf. [Vydrine 1989]). Meanwhile, these factors may be crucial in resolving some of the problems he tackles in his publications.

In all the SWM languages the lexical tone of the second component of a compact syntagma (“compound noun”) is neutralized; it is replaced by a low tone, which is further modified through the influence of the final tone of the first component. This situation can be reconstructed at the Proto-SWM level.

**4.1. Mende**, according to Dwyer [1978a, 185], has developed four new tonal classes: 6. *cV́cV́*, 7. *cV́cV̌*, 8. *cV̌cV́*, 9. *cV̌cV̌*. Although representing less than 10% of the Mende vocabulary, these classes question the validity of the thesis that the tone domain in Mende is a word. According to Dwyer, they “show no consistent cognates with other SWM languages, even the close dialects, Bandi and Loko.”

However, even among the 4 sample words representing these classes in his paper, two have such cognates, which may testify to their reconstruction at the Proto-SWM or even more profound level:

**Mende** *gŋné* cat (class 9), **Bandi** [Grossmann et al. 1991] *gŋne* (tone is to be verified!) cat –

**Dan-Gweetaa** *gwǎ-ná* cat.

**SWM** \**nǎfóló* or \**nǎfólóŋ* ‘wealth’, **Mende** [Innes 1969] *návó* (class 6) n money, **Bandi** [Grossmann et al. 1991] *nǎhóló* n money, **Looma**

(Gizima, Vekema) *naBolo* n wealth, **Looma** (Gizima, Weima) *naBolo*(g) n wealth, **Looma** (Koluma) [Post 1967] *navolo* n wealth; money

**Soso** [Lacan 1942; Friedländer n.d.] *nafuli* n money; wealth, **Jallonke** [Creissels 1988] *nààfulú* n wealth

**P.Manding** *\*nàafólo*, **Mandinka** *nàafulu* n wealth, **Xasonka** *nàfulu* n wealth; livestock; cash money, **Kagoro** *nàfulu* n wealth, **Maninka** *nànfólo* n wealth, **Bamana** *nàfólo* n wealth

**Soninke** [Galtier, Dantioko, Dramé 1979, Smeltzer & Smeltzer 1997] *naaburi/e*, pl. *-u* n wealth, riches; livestock, **Tieyaxo** [Guide bozo 1982] *nafolo* n wealth

**Bobo** [Le Bris, Prost 1981] *nàfòrō* n wealth

**Dzuun** [Traoré 1998] *nàfórō* n wealth

**Dan-Gweetaa** *nòð* n wealth.

Mende has a downdrift and downstep. Tones of the second member of a noun syntagma (or compound) are neutralized and replaced by low tones (if the initial components end with a low tone) or by H-L (if the initial components end with a high tone). Words of classes 2 and 5 can be distinguished only in the position of the initial component of a noun syntagma.

**4.2. Loko** [Dwyer 1973]. The main difference from Mende lies in the syllable-final *-u*, which has been maintained in Loko in a “hidden” form and lost in Mende. As a result, tonal classes 1 to 4 are split in Loko into two subclasses each.

**4.3. Bandi.** If we ignore English and Krio borrowings, this language has the same 5 classes as in Proto-SWM, split into two subclasses each, which are distinguished by Dwyer with indexes *-w* and *-s* (correspondingly with or without final *-(ŋ)*). An important peculiarity of this language, in relation to Mende and Loko, is Dwyer’s Low Tone Spread Rule: the underlying low tone extends to the next syllable, if the latter has historically a high tone. Another feature of Bandi is the presence of a dynamic accent [Dwyer 1973], which, at the present stage of the language, is no more automatic (tone-conditioned) at the surface level.

The tonal system of Bandi, which is rather intricate on the surface, was a subject of more recent publications by Rodewald [1989] and Mugele, Rodewald [1991]. As far as these authors disagreed with David Dwyer in their analysis, their arguments are worth special consideration. Let us examine the main points of the discussion.

a) The inventory of tonal classes in Bandi. Rodewald and Mugele’s objections to Dwyer’s interpretation (“word-initial low tones as a result of the influence of the nominal morpheme *\*ŋ-*”) are understandable: their approach is primarily synchronic, evidence from related languages is of secondary importance to them. Unfortunately, these authors fail to consider Dwyer’s very convincing argumentation based on the correlation between the dynamic accent and the tone. According to Dwyer, Bandi nouns in their quotation forms (i.e., with the nominal morpheme *\*ŋ-* added) systemati-

cally place the stress on the low-tone syllable preceding a high-tone syllable. This allows Dwyer to suppose that, at the underlying level, a high tone should correspond to the superficially stressed low tone, the latter being a result of a Low Tone Spread Rule. In fact, Rodewald [1989, 21] notes that the superficial realisation of Dwyer’s underlying types LH (e.g., */pèlè/* ‘house’) and LLH (*/pàhàá/* ‘woman’), although LH in both cases (*/pèlè/*, *pàhà*) “differ in phonetic pitch,” and this difference is clearly perceived by Bandi native speakers: “the high tone of the stem for ‘woman’ is phonetically slightly higher than the high tone of the stem for ‘house’.” Rodewald’s explanation is somewhat confusing; he fails to clarify what phonological interpretation should be given to this “slightly higher” tonal realization. But Dwyer already gives this interpretation: in the word for ‘house,’ the first (low-tone) syllable is stressed, while in the word for ‘woman,’ it is the second syllable. A combination of the high tone with the stress produces the phonetic effect of a “slightly higher tone.”

When taking into account this evidence, it becomes clear that Dwyer’s underlying tones reflect reality better than the interpretation advanced by Rodewald and Mugele. The notation of the latter authors could be accepted on the condition that the placement of the stress is systematically indicated; Dwyer’s tonal notation is therefore more economical.

Another source of information on Bandi tones is an unpublished dictionary compiled by Lutheran missionaries; a copy of this dictionary was very kindly presented to me by one of the authors, Rebecca Grossmann [Grossmann et al. 1991]. Unfortunately, the dictionary lacks any introduction, but an analysis of its data reveals that the notation of tones follows Rodewald’s principle, with some unsystematic modifications. In other words, the surface, and not underlying, tones are marked (which makes impossible to distinguish between Dwyer’s classes 1w and 3w). Nouns are systematically given with the definite article *-i*.

The following table presents the correspondences between Dwyer’s and Rodewald’s tonal classes, together with the respective forms from the Bandi dictionary.

Dwyer [1973]	Rodewald [1989]	Bandi Dictionary [Grossmann et al. 1991]
<b>1w cv́cv́</b>	LH ( <i>pèlè</i> ‘house’, <i>tèé</i> ‘chicken’)	LHi, Lí ( <i>pèléi</i> , <i>tèi</i> )
<b>1s cv́cv́ŋ</b>		LHngi
<b>2w cv́cv́</b>	(L)L ( <i>pèlèé</i> ‘road’, surf. <i>pèlè</i> )	LLí
<b>2s cv́cv́ŋ</b>	LLH ( <i>màsáá-ŋ</i> )	LLngí
<b>3w cv́cv́</b>	LLH ( <i>pàhàá</i> , surf. <i>pàhá</i> )	LL ( <i>pàhái</i> ), LHi ( <i>kòndái</i> )
<b>3s cv́cv́ŋ (= 2s)</b>		LLngi ( <i>ngálingí</i> )

*4w cVcV (= 1w)	LH	LH/HH ( <i>kàlìi/yàlìi</i> ‘hoe’)
*4s cVcVj (= 1s)		
5w cVcV	(L)L (?)	LLi ( <i>mbòlòí</i> ‘hat’)
5s cVcVj		LHi ( <i>mbèléngi</i> ‘trousers’)
6s cVcVj	LLH (?)	LHi ( <i>kòfingi</i> ‘coffee’)
7w cVcV	HL	LH ( <i>dàlà<sup>19</sup></i> ‘dollar’)
	(H)H ( <i>kéké</i> ‘dog’, <i>kpó</i> ‘platform’)	HHi, Li ( <i>kéke</i> ‘dog’, <i>kpòngi</i> ‘platform’)
	LHL ( <i>miyâ</i> ‘banana’, <i>glàásí</i> ‘glass’, <i>siméndí</i> ‘cement’)	

In [Rodewald 1989], all Dwyer’s classes are differentiated, except for (probably) 5w. Dwyer’s classes 1 and 2, 3w and 5w are not differentiated in the Bandi dictionary. The context of differentiation between 2w, 3w and 5w-words is a nominal compound (syntagma) where the word in question occupies the initial position. After a 2w-word, the tone of the next word will be LH(L): *kàlì vòlòí* ‘old snake.’ After a 3w-word, the tone of the following word is high: *pàhà vòlòí* ‘old woman.’ After a 5w-word, LL: *bèlè vòlòí* ‘old trousers’ (apart from this, the words of the 5w class have the stress on the first syllable, while those of the 2w and 3w classes have the second syllable stressed).

Rodewald’s HH class is not clear. According to this author, it consists of only four words (apart from those given in the chart, these are *gbó* ‘type of animal’ [red patas monkey? – V.V.; however, given as *gbòngí* in the Bandi dictionary] and *tòlò* ‘sunbird’ [in the Bandi dictionary it is transcribed as *tòlòngí*]). However, in reality, they seem to be more numerous. Cf. some words from the Bandi dictionary: *báhí* ‘yellow colour,’ seemingly also *búlu* ‘trumpet.’ These exceptional cases should be verified for their tones.<sup>20</sup>

Rodewald’s main argument against Dwyer’s interpretation of underlying tonal classes seems to be the tonal behavior of the verb *tukpe/lukpe* ‘push’: Rodewald and Mugele believe [1991, 114-115] that this verb, presented as *lùkpé* in various contexts, should be interpreted by Dwyer as belonging to the class 1 (HH). Further on, they reject this assumed interpretation by providing examples like *sùwàí lùkp’é* ‘push the animal,’ where the downstepped H of the last syllable is evidence of an underlying L of the first syllable of *tukpo*.

These arguments cannot be accepted for two reasons. Primarily, Dwyer’s analysis concerns only nouns, and it is methodologically incorrect to project his conclusions onto verbs in order to reject the results of such a projection. Second, the underlying tone of the verb in question can by no means be HH: the corresponding stem in Mende is marked in [Innes 1969]

as *tùkpá* (which may correspond to Dwyer’s *tùkpǎ* or *tùkpā*), in Kpelle it is marked as MM (*tūā*) in [Winkler 1997] and as FF (*tūāŋ*, an irregular tone) in [Leidenfrost, McKay 1973]. Therefore, if we project Dwyer’s tonal classes onto the verbs, this verb should belong in Bandi, most probably, to the 3s class.

Generally speaking, we observe a decrease in the importance of tonal oppositions in this language, which is compensated by the establishment of functional relevance of the dynamic accent.

**4.4. Looma.** The tonal system of this language has undergone very important changes in relation to the Proto-SWM state reconstructed by David Dwyer. First of all, tones in Looma are “inverted”: the high tone corresponds to the low tone of other SWM languages, and vice-versa<sup>21</sup>. Second, the domain of a High Tone Spread Rule is a whole word (while in Bandi, the domain of the corresponding Low Tone Spread Rule is one syllable only), for which reason a great majority of nouns and transitive verbs have a uniform high tone in their quotation form. In fact, their lexical tones appear only in some restricted contexts. Such an evolution resulted in a decrease in the relevance of the tonal oppositions at the underlying level too: in the Gbunde dialect, according to David Dwyer [1973], three of the four original tonal classes do not differ any more and have an underlying low tone.

My analysis [Vydrine 1989] of Wesley Sadler’s [1951] data from the Gizima dialect, although insufficient for establishing a clear picture of the situation of tones,<sup>22</sup> revealed some features left unnoticed by Dwyer.<sup>23</sup>

The most interesting of these is the fact that in Looma there is a difference in tonal behaviour between light and heavy syllables. Heavy syllables in this language are those that have a long vowel or preceding a “fortis” (occlusive, unvoiced) or “instantaneous” (*ɓ*, *β*) consonant.<sup>24</sup> They tend to prevent the high tone from spreading further to the right. When a word has only light syllables, the High Tone Spread Rule imposes a high tone on all the tones until the end of such word or until the end of a compact syntagma.

Another conclusion is that verbal tonal classes are different from the nominal tonal classes. However, the situation is not clear enough because of the often unsystematic character of the data available.

**4.5. Kpelle.** This language has preserved the Proto-SWM system (as reconstructed by Dwyer) almost unchanged.<sup>25</sup> The only innovation worth mentioning is a low tone split: the Proto-SWM low tone is reflected as a low tone in the words of class 5 and in the final segment of a falling toneme, and as mid everywhere else.

It should be mentioned that the only two classes distinguished by the new tonal opposition (Low vs. Mid) are 2 and 5. But precisely these classes, at the same time, are differentiated by another feature, namely, the dynamic accent: class 2 words have no accent and class 5 words have their first syllable stressed [Dwyer 1973; Welmers 1962].<sup>26</sup> This circumstance

makes another interpretation possible: the stress, and not the tone, can be considered the main material component of the opposition of these two classes. An additional feature of the high tone is the “falsetto voice” phonation [Welmers 1973].<sup>27</sup>

According to Welmers [1962, 87], Kpelle has no downdrift, except for the utterance-final position; in reality, it is most probably the phenomenon of “phrase-final lowering” rather than a true downdrift. Elimination of the downdrift can be considered a side-effect of the process of tone-splitting and phonologization of the dynamic accent in this language.

The tone-bearing unit in Kpelle is undoubtedly a word, which was emphasized by William Welmers [1962, 85-89].

**5. Bobo** [Le Bris, Prost 1981] has 3 register tones. Most probably, the third tone is an innovation (resulting from the restructuring of a system with downdrift to a system without downdrift). There are 4 contour tones, all are attested on single-more syllables: high-low, mid-low, low-high, low-mid. There seems to be an accent. Grammatical tones are very much present in the verbal conjugation.

**6. Boko** has a system which is interpreted by Ross Jones [1998] as consisting of four superficial and three underlying tones: the extra-low tone is not attested on nouns or adjectives; the low tone is not attested on verbs or adverbs, and in nouns it appears on final syllables only. However, all four tones are contrasted in pronouns, which is evidence of the fact that, at the present stage of the language, all four tonemes are established in the language. The tonal domain is a syllable; there is no downdrift or downstep.

The grammatical function of tone is well present. Verbs in the Perfect assume an extra-low tone, and disyllabic verbs do not have final extra-low tone other than in Perfect. In nouns and adjectives, the final low tone becomes extra-low if followed by a noun, adjective, or quantifier within a NP (which is a striking contrast to the situation in SWM and other West Mande languages where grammatical tones always mark the second member of a noun syntagma). Generally speaking, combinatory tonal changes in this language are predominantly regressive. The nine series of personal pronouns are differentiated mainly by tones (although the tones can be traced back to former segmental predicative markers).

There is a statistical correlation between unvoicedness and the extra-high tone: 84% of monosyllabic verbs with an extra-high tone have unvoiced initial consonants, which is probably evidence of the fact that the proto-language did not have as many tones and that voiced consonants produced a tone-depressor effect (cf. below the division concerning the Guro language). The current Boko 4-level system could have been established through tone-splitting and elimination of the opposition between tone-depressor and non-tone-depressor consonants.

According to Jones, stress is irrelevant.

In **Busa and Bokobaru** [Jones 1998], three tones are contrasted. The low-mid tone in Boko corresponds to the low tone in Busa, and the mid-high corresponds to the high tone in the final position in Bokobaru.

**7. San-Sane** [Platiel 1974] has 3 register tones, the tone domain is a syllable. Surface contour tones can be interpreted as combinations of register tones. There is no downdrift. There is a floating high tone in San representing a copular verb “to be.” Platiel supposes (from the Maka dialect evidence) that the middle tone is an innovation and that the previous system had only two tones. There seems to be no accent, although weakening of the first vowel in the CVV sequences can be interpreted as evidence of the stressed second syllable in a foot.

**8. South Mande (SM)** have a great variety of models. It can be presumed, with all necessary precaution, that the Guro system is the closest to the Proto-SM tonal system and displays some trends that can explain the directions of evolution in other languages of the subgroup.

**8.1.** The tonal system of **Guro** is very peculiar, which explains the great difference in its interpretations by specialists. In the very first description by Benoist [1969], three level tones were established: low, middle, and high. The next publication [Grégoire 1976] added the contour tones, LM, MH, ML, to this list, and it was remarked that the level tones are partly in complementary distribution. Another interpretation was advanced by Le Saout [1979],<sup>28</sup> who analysed the complementary distribution of “level” tones in details: initial voiced consonants are compatible with middle and low tones, and the other initial consonants (voiceless, sonorants, implosives) allow only middle and high tones. This distribution does not concern the contour tones (according to Le Saout, there are two, rising and falling). This situation allowed Le Saout to establish two level tonemes, High and Low, whose realization depends on the initial consonants, the voiced consonants being tone-depressors.

During further analysis it was established that Le Saout’s model does not reflect the entire reality. It turned out that within the system of personal pronouns, the three level tones are opposed, regardless of the type of initial consonant (or its absence). It can be interpreted as follows: in the system of the Guro language, high, middle, and low tonemes should be considered as opposed; their complementary distribution is valid, with certain restrictions, only outside the system of personal pronouns [Vydrine 2003].<sup>29</sup> Guro seems to be in the process of tone-splitting through phonologization of the former allotones.

Another factor influencing the tonal realization is the quality of vowel: high vowels tend to cause a higher realization of tones.

There is a phrase-final lowering of tone in Guro.

The segmental basis of a toneme in Guro is a metric foot, i.e. a one- or two-syllabic unit characterized by a high degree of internal integration:

apart from a single tone, it is consolidated by vocalic and consonantal harmony and by dynamic stress.

In a disyllabic foot, either the first or the second syllable can be stressed. The choice seems to be conditioned by the vocalic type: if the second vowel of a foot is higher than the first, the first syllable is stressed; in the other cases, the second syllable is stressed. The unstressed syllable is reduced (up to complete disappearance of the vowel). The phenomenon of dynamic accent in Guro is yet to be studied in depth in relation to its conditioning by other factors, its functions, and modification of the stress position in the phrase.

Grammatical tones are very important in the aspectual and temporal system of Guro; the tones mark syntactic relations within the noun phrase as well.

8.2. **Yaure** [Hopkins 1982] is the closest relative of Guro, there is some degree of mutual intelligibility between these two languages. It is even more interesting in this respect that Yaure has four level tonemes which correspond more or less regularly to the level tonemes of Guro. Here are the correspondences (examples are given of artificial syllables containing alveolar consonants and vowel *a*):

Guro *tā, lā* – Yaure *tā, lā*, sometimes *tā̃, lā̃*.

Guro *tā, lā* – Yaure *tà, là*, sometimes *tā̃, lā̃* and *tā̃, là̃*.

Guro *dā* – Yaure *tā̃*, sometimes *tā̃ ~ tā̃*.

Guro *dā* – Yaure *tā̃* or *tā̃*.<sup>30</sup>

It is evident that Guro voiced consonants regularly correspond to the voiceless ones in Yaure. It is most probably the devoicing of consonants that resulted in definitive phonologization of allotones of level tonemes in this language.

Hopkins argues in favour of the bi-tonemic character of modulated tones in Yaure, and her argumentation sounds convincing. The tonal domain in this language is a syllable. Grammatical tones are important in the verbal paradigm. There are numerous combinatory changes of tones in a sentence.

So, in spite of the genetic closeness of both languages, the tonal systems of Guro and Yaure are quite different from the typological viewpoint.

8.3. **Tura**<sup>31</sup> has four register tones (three tones in one of the dialects, *Bɔɔ*) [Bearth 1971]. The domain of tone is a syllable (in Bearth's terminology, a more), but a larger unity, namely a foot, plays an important role in the tonal organization of a word and an utterance. Foots can be of the following types: CV, CVV, CṼ, CVLV, CVLṼ, CVVV, CVṼ (the latter type is represented by a single example). The tonal behaviour of a disyllabic foot has the following particularities distinguishing it from a free combination of syllables:

a) although each syllable of a foot can have its own toneme, the tone of the non-initial syllable cannot be higher than the tone of the initial syllable;

b) when in the position of the second member of a noun syntagma, the tone of the entire foot is changed to extra-low (*tā̃j* 'law' – *pēē tā̃j* 'village law'). In the same position, a noun which does not represent a single foot changes the tone of the first syllable only (*yō̃j* 'lemon' – *pēē yō̃j* 'village lemon').

Tonal grammemes are very richly represented in the aspecto-modal and aspecto-temporal verbal system, and also in the paradigms of personal pronouns. The dynamic accent is absent ([Bearth 1971], confirmed by Dmitri Idiatov's analysis), which proves that a foot can be, at least in Mande languages, a real operational unit even in the absence of stress.

8.4. **Dan** demonstrates a great dialectal variety as far as the inventory of tonemes is concerned. Western dialects have three level and two contour tones (Mid-Falling and "Assimilating-Falling"); eastern ones have four to five level tones and a variable number of contour ones [Flik 1977] (for further details, see [Erman 2008]). The Gweta dialect, apart from five levels, has three contour tones, all of them falling (mid-falling, high-falling, and extra-high-falling; among these, only the high-falling is relatively frequent, the other two are marginal).

Tones have some grammatical functions. In the Gweta dialect, an extra-low tone of the verbal stem marks the factative, the same tone on the nominal stem is a mark of the second member of certain types of syntagmas. In western dialects, the Assimilating-Falling tone serves the same purpose.

8.5. **Gban** has 4 register tones and 2 contour tonemes (both are rising: EL-EH and EL-H) [Le Saout 1973]. The domain of tone is a syllable. The foot is most the probably relevant, but this assumption needs extra verification.

Tones have very important grammatical functions. Together with segmental and sub-morphemic features, they form a complex and at the same time elegant paradigm incorporating the entire pronominal and verbal morphology [Zheltov 2005].

8.6. The tonal systems of other SM languages (**Mano**, **Wan**, **Mwan**, **Ben**) more or less represent combinations of the features present in the Guro, Yaure, Dan, and Tura systems.

9. A question arises: which type should be regarded as original, i.e., closest to the Proto-Mande?

Before a thorough reconstruction of the Proto-Mande is done at all the levels, any suggestion will be hypothetical. As a hypothesis, I would advance the following provisions.

The Proto-Mande system might have had two tone levels, with a foot as the domain of toneme. The number of tonemes could be at least three (H, LH, HL). It is too early yet to conjecture about the existence of accent or stress in the Proto-Mande, but it does not seem improbable. Grammatical tones can be interpreted as innovations in most cases, but there are at least two tonal morphemes which can supposedly be referred to the Proto-Mande



level: a low tone as a marker of the second member of a determinative noun syntagma (like in Vai, Soso, most of SWM, Tura, Dan, and partly Soninke), and a low tone on the verbal stem as the marker of the tense.<sup>32</sup>

The extension of the tonal domain in Manding languages (Bamana, Jula, Maninka) to the word (or syntagma) seems to be an innovation. It can be considered a shift toward the accent-type system, Mandinka being an out-spoken case.

Meanwhile, the Mande languages provide rich evidence against the widely accepted opinion that the coexistence of tone and accent in a single language is in itself evidence of the disappearance of tones: cf. the Bobo, Guro, Kpelle, and, probably, San cases where accent coexists with multitone systems. Such coexistence can probably be reconstructed for the Proto-Dan. Reduction of unstressed syllables is most probably responsible for the current monosyllabism in the major dialects of Dan.

In “monoethnic” languages, there is a strong tendency toward the transformation of two-tonal systems into polytonal. In this process, real factors are of great importance. The mechanisms for multiplying the number of tones may be the following:

a) tone-splitting in languages with tone depressor consonants through the merger of voiced and voiceless, probably also of implosive consonant phonemes (esp. the Guro-Yaure case; probably Boko);

b) emergence of new register or contour tones through the merger of floating grammatical tones (Kpelle, Boko);

c) tonal differentiation through monosyllabization, according to the following (simplified) model: CVCV > CVV > CV > CV or CV, and the like.

## References

- Bearth 1971 – Thomas Bearth. *L'énoncé toura*. Norman (Oklahoma): S.I.L., 1971, 481 p.
- Bearth 1980 – Thomas Bearth. Is there a universal correlation between pitch and information value? – In : Gunter Brettschneider, Christian Lehmann (eds.) *Wege zur Universalienforschung: Sprachwissenschaft-licher Beiträge zum 60. Geburtstag von Hansjakob Seiler*. Tübingen: Narr, pp. 124-130.
- Bearth, Zemp 1967 – Thomas Bearth, Hugo Zemp. The phonology of Dan (Santa) // *Journal of African Languages*, vol. 6, part 1, pp. 9-29.
- Benoist, 1969 – J.-P. Benoist. *Grammaire gouro (groupe mandé – Côte d'Ivoire)*. Lyon, «Afrique et Langage», No. 3, 101 p.
- Creissels 1982a – D. Creissels. *Ton et accent en mandinka* // Paper presented to the Leiden Colloquium. Ms. 15 p.
- Creissels 1982b – D. Creissels. Notes d'enquête sur le système tonal du maoukan (parler Manding du Maou) // *Cahiers ivoiriens de recherche linguistique*, 11, pp. 77-100.

Creissels 1987/88 – D. Creissels. Esquisse du système tonal du korokan // *Mandenkan* 14-15 (Paris), pp. 81-106.

Creissels 1988 – Denis Creissels. Liste lexicale provisoire du dialonké de Faleya mise à jour en oct.-nov. 1988 (ms)

Creissels 1991 – Creissels, Denis. Remarques sur le système tonal du soninké // *Linguistique africaine*, 6, pp. 129-134.

Creissels 1992 – Creissels, Denis. Quelques précisions sur la tonalité du verbe soninké // *Linguistique africaine*, 8, pp. 79-90.

Creissels ms. – Denis Creissels. Règles de réalisation tonale et structure des syllabes en dialonké de Faléya. 13 p. (ms.)

Creissels, Grégoire 1993 – Denis Greissels, Claire Grégoire. La notion de ton marqué dans l'analyse d'une opposition tonale binaire: Le cas du mandingue // *Journal of African Languages and Linguistics*, 14, pp. 107-154.

Creissels et al. 1982 – Creissels D., Jatta S., Jobarteh K. Lexique Mandinka-Français // *Mandenkan*, 3, 207 p.

Diagana O. 1984 – Ousmane M. Diagana. *Le parler soninke de Kaedi (Mauritanie)*. *Syntaxe et sens*. Thèse de Doctorat, Univ. de R. Descartes, Paris, 3 vols., 1025 p.

Dwyer 1973 – David J. Dwyer. *The comparative tonology of Southwestern Mande nominals*. Michigan State University, Ph.D., 278 p.

Dwyer 1978a – David J. Dwyer. What sort of tone language is Mende? // *Studies in African Linguistics*, 9 (2), pp. 167-208.

Dwyer 1978b – David J. Dwyer. Idiosyncratic, suprasegmental processes in Mende // *Studies in African Linguistics*, 9 (3), pp. 333-343.

Dwyer, 1981 – David J. Dwyer. Loma, a language with inverted tones. // *Anthropological Linguistics*, 23 (9), pp. 436-442.

Erman 2008 – A.B. Эрман. Тональная система языка дан-бло // *Африканский Сборник – 2007*. СПб: Наука. С. 345-354. [Tonal system of the Dan-Blo language // *African Collection – 2007*. St. Petersburg: Nauka, pp. 345-354.]

Flik 1977 – E. Flik Tone glides and registers in five Dan dialects // *Linguistics*, 201, La Haye: Mouton, 1977, pp. 5-59.

Friedländer n.d. – (Marianne Friedländer.) *Lexique Susu-Français*. Rep. de Guinée : Service Alphabétisation et Education des Adultes, 88 p.

Galtier, Dantioko, Dramé 1979 – (Gérard Galtier, Makan Dantioko, Zeïdi Dramé.) *Lexique Soninké-Français*. Bamako : DNAFLA, 100 p.

Grégoire H. 1976 – H.C. Grégoire. *Étude de la langue gouro (Côte-d'Ivoire)*. *Phonétique – Phonologie – Enquête lexicale*. Université Paris III, Thèse de IIIe cycle, 1976. 521 + 221 p.

Grégoire C. 1978 – Claire Grégoire. La tonalité des mots composés et celle du présent progressif en soso // *Journées d'études, Langues et linguistique manding*. Orcemont, 5-7 Juillet 1978, vol. 1, pp. 75-86.

Grossmann et al. 1991 – (Rebecca Grossmann et al.). *Bandi Dictionary*. Institute for Liberian Languages – Lutheran Bible Translators, (November 1991), 111 p. (ms.)

Guide bozo 1982 – *Guide de Transcription et Lexique Bozo [Tieyaxo sawanan-baana yee a xarabuye]*. Bamako : DNAFLA, 127 p.

Heydorn 1940-41 – R.W. Heydorn. Die Sprache der Bandi in nordwestlichen Liberia // *Zeitschrift für Eingeborenen-Sprachen*, Bd. XXXI, H. 2, SS. 81-114 (1940), H. 3, SS. 188-217 (1941).

Hopkins 1982 – Bradley Hopkins. Etude tonologique du yaouré // *Cahiers ivoiriens de recherches linguistiques*, 11. Abidjan, 1982.

Innes 1969 – Gordon Innes. *A Mende-English Dictionary*. Cambridge University Press, 155 p.

Jones 1998 – Ross M. Jones. *The Boko/Busa Language Cluster*. LINCOM studies in African linguistics 30. München – Newcastle: LINCOM Europa, 353 p.

Kastenholz, 1987 – R. Kastenholz. *Das Koranko. Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der Nord-Mande-Sprachen*. Dissertation. Universität zu Köln, 345 S.

Konoshenko 2008 – M. Konoshenko. Tonal systems in three dialects of the Kpelle language // *Mandenkan* 44, 2008, pp. 21-42.

Kuznetsova N. 2007 – N. Kuznetsova. Le statut fonctionnel du pied phonologique en gouro // *Mandenkan* 43, 2007, pp. 13-45.

Lacan 1942 – Ph. Lacan. *Grammaire et dictionnaire français-soussou et sous-sou-français*. Bordeaux–Conakry–Kindia, 404 p.

Leben 1973 – W. Leben. *Suprasegmental phonology*. Doctoral dissertation. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Le Bris, Prost 1981 – P. Le Bris, A. Prost. *Dictionnaire bobo -français, précédé d'une introduction grammaticale et suivi d'un Lexique français – bobo*. Paris, SELAF, 415 p.

Leger 1975 – Jean Leger. *Dictionnaire guerzé (kpele.wo)*. (Nzerékoré). 289 p.

Leidenfrost, McKay 1973 – Theodore E. Leidenfrost, John S. McKay. *Kpelle–English Dictionary. Part One*. Totota: Kpelle Literacy Centre, 65 p.

Le Saout 1973 – J. Le Saout. *Etude descriptive du Gban : phonétique et phonologie*. Paris : LACITO.

Le Saout, 1979 – J. Le Saout. *Notes sur la phonologie du Gouro (zone de Zuénoula)*. Nice : C.E.P.L.A.N. 76 p.

Mugele, Rodewald 1991 – Robert Mugele, Michael Rodewald. Aspects of Bandi Tonology // *Studies in African Linguistics*, 22 (1), pp. 103-134.

Platiel 1974 – Suzy Platiel. *Description du parler Samo de Toma, phonologie-syntaxe*. Thèse de Doctorat d'État. Paris : Université René Descartes.

Prost 1967 – A. Prost. *La langue Lìghma. Esquisse grammaticale suivie de textes et d'un glossaire*. Université de Dakar, Documents linguistiques, No. 13, 168 p.

Rialland 1990 – Annie Rialland. La structure du système tonal soninké // *Linguistique africaine*, 5, pp. 49-76.

Rialland 1991 – Annie Rialland. A propos de la prosodie du soninké : réponse à Denis Creissels et réflexions sur la valeur explicative des analyses // *Linguistique africaine*, 7, pp. 117-124.

Rodewald 1989 – Michael K. Rodewald. *A Grammar of Bandi and Mende Tone*. M.A. Thesis, Arlington: University of Texas, 125 p.

Sadler 1951 – Wesley L. Sadler. *Untangled Loma*. Baltimore, 465 p.

Smeltzer & Smeltzer 1997 – Smeltzer, Brad & Smeltzer, Susan. *Lexiques Soninké-Français. Index Français-Soninké*. Bamako. 242 p.

Touré 1994 – A. Touré. *Éléments de description de la langue soso*. Thèse de Doctorat. Université Stendhal-Grenoble III, 311 p.

Traoré 1998 – Paul Solomiac (ed.). Ali Traoré, Fabé Traoré. *Dzùùngoo dzuon tsúnfyèè pàn ko à sebeun'n kur'la. Lexique orthographique dzùùngoo-français*. Ouagadougou: SIL, 120 p.

Vydrine 1989 – V. Vydrine. Tonal system of Looma language // *Mandenkan* 18, 1989, pp. 81-96.

Vydrine 2003 – V. Vydrine. La phonologie gouro : deux décennies après Le Saout // *Mandenkan* 38, pp. 89-113.

W.E.C. 1995 – *Mandinka–English Dictionary*. Revised Edition. Banjul: W.E.C. International, 366 p.

Welmers 1962 – W.E. Welmers. The Phonology of Kpelle // *Journal of African Languages*, 1 (1), pp. 69-93.

Welmers 1973 – W. E. Welmers. *African Language Structures*. Berkeley – Los Angeles – London: University of California Press, 488 p.

Welmers 1976 – W. E. Welmers. *A Grammar of Vai*. Berkeley – Los Angeles – London: University of California Press.

Winkler 1997 – E. G. Winkler. *Kpelle-English Dictionary, with English-Kpelle Glossary*. Bloomington: Indiana University, 101 p.

Zhelotov 2005 – A. Zhelotov. Le système des marqueurs de personnes en gban : Morphème syncrétique ou syncrétisme des morphèmes? // *Mandenkan* 41, 2005, pp. 23-28

---

## Notes:

1. It should be noted that a segmental reconstruction of the Proto-Mande is also yet to be done.
2. I mean, first of all, the reconstruction of the tonal system of the Proto-South-West Mande nouns by David Dwyer [1973].
3. Bibliography of the Manding tonology is very rich. Among the many titles, I'll mention only [Creissels, Grégoire 1993], which proposes an alternative interpretation of the tonal system.
4. This allows us to say that the domain of toneme is a compact syntagma rather than a word. An alternative interpretation is possible (and preferable): all compact syntagmas can be considered phonological words (but not necessarily “lexical words”).
5. I presume that at least some of these “minor” tonal patterns may result from fusion of an archaic noun class prefix, cf. [Vydrine 1994, 84]. These patterns tend to be unstable from one dialect to another.

6. In 2007-2008, Alexandra Vydrina undertook a study of Kakabe. She has come to the conclusion that the tonal system in this language is declining: tones are distinguished in the initial words of each utterance, but are neutralized in the final words. Otherwise it is similar to the core Manding tonal systems.

7. Or as a combination of both processes.

8. Most of the nominal tonal classes that cannot be regarded as just variants of H, LH and HL seem to be underrepresented in the Soso vocabulary, and the percentage of loanwords in most of these classes is extraordinarily high. They can probably be compared with “minor tonal classes” in Manding.

9. Friederike Lüpke’s dissertation “A grammar of Jalonke argument structure” appeared in 2005; in the introduction, the author deals with the problem of non-existence of tones in this language.

10. Ousmane Diagana [1984] speaks about three tones, but this results from not taking into account the downdrift.

11. I am not going to delve here into the discussion, though very interesting, between Rialland and Creissels on the validity of auto-segmental methodology for the Soninke data.

12. In 2007, a voluminous dissertation about the Dzuun language was defended by Paul Solomiac. It includes a description of the tonal system.

13. The only description of the tonal system of this language available is the one by William Welmers [1976, 29-35].

14. In other words, there are four tonemes in Vai.

15. “In nouns, low(-low) may well be confined to innovated forms and a few monosyllabic relational nouns or particles” [Welmers 1976, 32]. However, I have found among Welmers’ examples some well attested Mande stems, such as *jëndà* ‘spindle’ and *làà* (evidently, *là’à* < *\*làlà*) ‘paddle’.

16. In Leben’s autosegmentalist terms, it was a “suprasegmental tone language.” Leben [1973] postulated this for one of the SWM languages, Mende, which was contested by David Dwyer [1978a], who tended to accept this claim, with some reservations, for the Proto-SWM (cf. [Dwyer 1978b]).

17. As for verbs, their tonal behaviour (especially in Bandi and Looma, probably Loko) is less clear and requires a more thorough study.

18. In [Dwyer 1978b, 338-339], an assumption is advanced that the Proto-SWM class 4 has also emerged through composition.

19. This word is given as *dàlá* as the head word, but the form *dálà* is given in a phrase illustration. The former form is probably a misprint.

20. The tonal behavior of these words can be explained by the fact that they cannot, by some reason, add the nominal morpheme *\*ɲ-*. Let us note further irregularities of these words: although *kéke* in Bandi has a variant with a weak consonant, *yeke*, its counterpart in Mende, seems to have a non-alternating strong initial consonant, cf. [Innes 1969, 41]: *bi kekei na* ‘that dog of yours.’ The word for patas monkey in Bandi has a non-alternating voiced consonant, which can be interpreted as a result of the presence, diachronically, of a morpheme that could prevent the regular noun morpheme from being added.

Another explanation is that these words are borrowings, and the tonal behavior of borrowings in all SWM languages, and in Bandi in particular, is often irregular.

21. A phenomenon not unknown in the Mande family: within the Manding branch, “inverted” tones are attested in Jula of Ojenne, Konya, Many, Marka-Dafin. For an attempt at an extralinguistical explanation of the emergence of “inverted” tones in Looma, see [Dwyer 1981]; for an intralinguistical explanation of this phenomenon in Manding, see [Creissels 1987/88].

22. Partly because of my ignorance of the existing literature on the tonology of SWM at that time, and partly due to great loopholes in Sadler’s data. Further progress in this field is hardly possible without considerable field work.

23. More precisely, David Dwyer distinguished between light syllables (CV) and heavy syllables (historically *\*CVɲ*; other types remained unnoticed) in word-final position, but not in the word-initial one.

24. Historically, syllables preceding “fortis” consonants ended on *\*ɲ*, i.e., they were of the CVɲ type. Similar behavior of “instantaneous” consonants, which are phonologically “weak,” is less clear.

25. Both Welmers [1962] and Dwyer [1973] describe class 2 in Kpelle as having a “mid-mid” tonal pattern, but in reality it is realized as MH before mid or low, so that its behavior is very close to that of the class 2 words in Mende or LH-words in Bamana or Maninka. There are no obstacles to interpreting the class 2 in Kpelle as MH.

26. I presume that the word-initial accent in class 5 nouns might be the trace of an archaic nominal prefix.

27. In 2007-2008, a study of the phonetics and phonology of Guinean Kpelle variants was undertaken by Maria Konoshenko. It turns out that the northernmost Gbali dialect has only two tonal levels rather than three (as in all other dialects of Kpelle). Guinean dialects, unlike Librian ones, have rather complex tone spread rules and floating tones [Konoshenko 2008].

28. In fact, H.-C. Grégoire and J. Le Saout worked on the Guro data together. In spite of an earlier publication by Grégoire, there are reasons to believe that Le Saout should be given the merit for discovering the complementary distribution of tones in Guro.

29. One could say that the opposition of the level tonemes within the personal pronoun system may not be sufficient taking into account the quantitative insignificance of the pronouns with regard to the entire vocabulary of the language. However, if we consider the frequency of the pronouns in the text (and not in the dictionary), the proportion is quite different. Apart from this, it should be mentioned that personal pronouns are very central in the grammatical system of Guro, and the fact that the supplementary tonal opposition emerged in this particular segment of the language may not be fortuitous.

For further study of the Guro phonological system, see [Kuznetsova N. 2007].

30. The correspondences Guro *tV*–Yaure *tV*, Guro *dV*–Yaure *tV* usually occur in syllables containing high vowels. This becomes understandable if we take into account the fact that in Guro tones are realized higher on high vowels.

31. I would like to thank Thomas Bearth for his valuable comments and criticism, which allowed me to avoid serious mistakes concerning the presentation of the tonal system of Tura.

32. Thomas Bearth [1980] advances an interesting hypothesis on the semantics of a low toneme (“non-focus information”) in Mande languages and even outside the Mande family. In my opinion, this hypothesis raises several questions:

– it seems strange that “non-focus information,” as opposed to “focus information,” would be specially marked; one would rather interpret the low toneme in such cases as a default marker (for the unmarked member of the opposition);

– if this hypothesis proves to be valid, to which level should this motivation of a low tone be attributed? (Proto-Mande? Proto-Niger-Congo? Proto-Human?) Or is it rather a synchronic universal rule? – but in this case, one would expect more regularity or its manifestation in all human languages.

In any case, Bearth’s idea deserves consideration.

## CONFERENCE REPORT

### FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE “HIERARCHY AND POWER IN THE HISTORY OF CIVILIZATIONS” (Moscow, June 13-16, 2006)\*

*Anastassiya Banshchikova,*  
Research Fellow

*Oleg Kavykin, Ph.D.,*  
Senior Research Fellow

The Centre for Civilizational and Regional Studies, joined by the Institute for African Studies (both in the family of institutions of the Russian Academy of Sciences) and the School of History, Political Science and Law of Russian State Humanities University, held the Fourth International Conference “Hierarchy and Power in the History of Civilizations” in Moscow on June 13-16, 2006. The Institute for African Studies, Russian State Humanities University, and Uchitel Publishing House, Volgograd, supported the Conference financially. The event drew 145 scholars from 32 countries. More than 150 papers were presented at the plenary session and 21 panels. The Conference proceedings, if even in the form of abstracts, were published by the Centre for Civilizational and Regional Studies and the Institute for African Studies as Volume 13 in the Civilizational Dimension series (Beliaev and Bondarenko, 2006, and Savateev, 2006). The proceedings of the event (and the materials of the two previous conferences as well) are also available in full at the website of the Centre for Civilizational and Regional Studies at the address: <http://civreg.ru/>.

The main goal of the Conference was to discuss the phenomena of hierarchy and power, including their spatial and temporal variations. The discussion helped expand the knowledge about the general trends and machinery of social transformations, interrelationship and interaction between social, political, cultural, and economic subsystems of society, and also development of research methodology in anthropology, sociology, history, political economy, philosophy, and other disciplines.

The diversity of the panels that formed the Conference Program may be (even though artificially and arbitrarily) reduced to the panels concerned

---

\* First published in *Social Evolution and History*, Uchitel Publishing House, Moscow, Vol. 5, No. 2, September 2006, pp. 148-155.

with Pre-Modern societies, with Modern and Post-Modern societies, regional, and chiefly theoretical issues.

The first group consisted of several panels deserving to be given attention first.

The panel "Structure of Power and Hierarchy in Genghis Khan's Empire: A Cross-Cultural Perspective" discussed the structure of authority and hierarchy in Genghis Khan's empire, and why Mongols evolved from a small, little-known tribe into a powerful empire. The subjects discussed were as follows: What role did Genghis Khan play in these processes? What were the backgrounds for the rise of the Mongolian and other nomadic empires? What was the basis of Genghis Khan's authority? What were the attributes of the hierarchic structure in the Mongolian and other nomadic empires? Was the Mongolian empire a state or a chiefdom? What was the place of the Mongolian empire in the processes creating world systems?

The task of the panel "Status, Population, and Accusation: Forms of Accusation and Inquisition from Antiquity to the Renaissance" was to identify the specific properties of the concepts of culpability and accusation. It intended to give special attention to the secular and religious conflicts and the interests of members of the population. Its objective was to analyze the variability of perceptions and representations, and interaction of the secular and religious components of these concepts, and also to demonstrate the role of the written and oral forms and conduct of the accusation process, and information available in historical sources for interpreting this phenomena.

The session of the panel "The Ruler and the Socio-Cultural Norm in the Ancient and Medieval World" covered a number of micro-historical studies of several basic themes: the phenomenon of hierarchy as a means of society's (self) organization, redistribution of activities and competences (both nominal and real) between the rulers, on the one hand, and society as a whole, on the other hand, especially with respect to the problem of how social norms are maintained, modified, and introduced. The panel had a complicated, and rewarding, task to identify and understand nominal and real limits of a ruler's rights and possibilities. In this respect, ancient and medieval civilizations share some specifics: it is precisely at these stages of socio-cultural development that newborn hierarchies are involved in the creation, manipulation, and use of norms most closely and in various ways; this area is, however, deliberated, comprehended, and developed eagerly enough, but society (unlike that in the modern period) usually does not codify or regulate the relevant conflicts; it only defines the preferred guidelines for behavior in situations when it deals with these conflicts, but it does not create a system of specific and formalized mechanisms, institutions, or rules for conflicts to be resolved.

The thematic scope of the panel "The Structure and Legitimization of Power in Ancient Societies of Northeast Africa, and the Near and Middle

East" included evidence from societies belonging to a single *Kulturkreis*. The panel's reach extended to the area's ancient history, up to its early medieval period, including the time after the Macedonian conquest when the area became a formative zone of syncretic Hellenistic civilization (*circa* 3rd century B.C. to 3rd century C.E.). Such chronological and territorial boundaries enabled the panel to study a vast variety of interrelations between societies of different types (all forms of social evolution in Diakonoff's typology plus classic Greek city-states) and their respective ideologies and cultures in building and legitimating political structures.

The second group, too, had a number of significant panels.

The panel "Hierarchy and Power before and after Revolutions" dealt with various types of state systems in which distribution of power had always been the key issue. Various roles of different classes and strata either in supporting or opposing the ruling power, which, in its turn, may have some relation to a particular context of social and economic power, were discussed.

The panel "Modern Mass Media and the Public Domain: New Challenges and Opportunities for Democracy" was dedicated to the public sphere and public spherules; the modern mass media in maintaining the institutions of civil societies and democracy; public discourses, their competition and hierarchical relations. The following issues were discussed in particular: What kind of public sphere can exist under increasing influence of the state and of the economic interests on the mass media? How can the elitist character of the public sphere be overcome? Does the progress of communications give new opportunities to people to overcome limitations and deficiencies, even social norms and social control? Many point out that the new mass media are revolutionizing the nature of discourse. The crucial question is: Do people receive more information now than they did before? Do we have more zones for public discourse than we had before? Are there any new possibilities for broad and unlimited freedom of expression, including criticisms of the authorities?

Participants in the panel "Transitions, Transformations, and Interactions of Hierarchical Structures and Social Networks in the Late 20th and Early 21st Centuries" examined the transference of a fraction of power functions from hierarchical structures to social networks; the institutionalization of subcultures and their subsequent transformation from network organizations into hierarchical structures; the pathways for hierarchies and networks to be transformed; the complimentary principle in the functioning of networks and hierarchical structures; and global and local trends in the formation and transformation of hierarchical structures and social networks.

The third group was made up of five panels, also with a broad reach.

The subjects of the panel "Anthropology of Europe: The Limits of Political Centralization" was defined in the panel agenda as follows: "Will the identities of each composite part and those common for the whole of

Europe compete or coalesce? What is the socio-cultural character of the centre in Brussels and how does the periphery feel about the relationship between it and the centre?" Both politicians and ordinary citizens have to face the issue of further expansion of the European Union towards the East, which seems to display serious cultural challenges (Turkey, Ukraine, Croatia, Georgia, etc.). Increasing realization of differences in political culture, which include the electorate's behavior, attitudes toward the authorities, populism and charisma, and a host of other attributes, make the need to analyze the potential for amalgamation and emergence of pan-European values and attitudes ever more imperative.

The panel "Cosmopolitanism, Globalism, and Nationalism: (Un)Stable Identities in the Former Soviet Union and Former Yugoslavia" explored ideologies and everyday practices shaping the cosmopolitan, global and nationalist identities in the two post-socialist regions characterized by recent state breakdown and multiple state-rebuilding, and ethno-nationalist violence: former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia. The goal is to analyze the sources and background of vigorous cosmopolitan or transnational(ist) (or "anti-parochial") cultural associations and movements in the two areas, while also analyzing politico-institutional obstacles and theoretical limitations for recognizing them as advantageous forms of group identity and proto-urban association or ideological discourse.

Participants in the panel "Europe as a Political and Cultural Entity: Dialogue of Civilizations or Civilization of Dialogue?" analyzed the current enlargement of the European Union. The issue had two dimensions: political and cultural. Dealing with both or any of the aspects suggested choosing one of the two lines of reasoning: Europe may be considered either as a field of interaction of a number of civilizations or as one though internally highly diversified civilization. Finally, do the frontiers of Europe as a political and cultural entity coincide with the continent's geographical borders?

Participants in the panel "Power and Ideology in the Northern Maya Lowlands" explored the roles of ideologies in the past in structuring and legitimizing power, the nature of political organization, and the purpose of the economy in socio-political processes. While the past and present occupants of the Northern Lowlands are commonly referred to as the "Maya," this name belies the cultural diversity in the region, and the enormous amount of cultural changes that took place during the approximately 2,500 years covered by studies of the region. One area in which these changes are most evident is that of ideologies, which were continuously manipulated by a series of powers within the region, starting from the first kings through Spanish colonial times to the present. Even in those places where writing does not exist, archaeologists have been able to rely upon architecture, art, and the distribution of relatively common artefacts in order to make inferences about the cosmological programs of particular factions.

Aspects of ancient symbolism and cosmology, alongside religious ritual, illustrating the resilient nature of local populations in confrontation with foreign dominance were discussed.

The objective of the panel "The Cossack Communities, Identity and Power on the Eurasian Expanse in the 16th to 20th Centuries" was the history of the Cossacks, predominantly in the context of events in a separate region (Ukraine, the Caucasus, Siberia, or the Far East), or in the context of military or socio-economic history. The main purpose of the panel was to gather papers on the history of the Cossacks given in the mainstream of the civilizational approach and with regard to the regional factor, implying the researchers' focus on the interrelationship between the individual or community and the state, on the specifics of culture (in the ethnographic and civil-national sense) and psychology, on spatial and symbolic geography, etc., within the chronological frameworks from the formation of stable Cossack communities in the 16th century to the 20th century, the period when the Cossacks existed in different linguistic and cultural milieus (in the Soviet Union and in emigration), and experienced revival in the post-Soviet states.

The panel "Hierarchy, State, and Civilization in the History of Africa" analyzed the dynamics of relations between the state, traditional institutions, and network communities in Africa during colonial and post-colonial periods, and at present. The aims of the panel were to explore traditional forms of social and political hierarchy in Africa and analyze the functioning of these forms in the circumstances of modernization.

The fourth group consisted of the following panels:

The panel "Human Rights in the History of Civilizations" focused on exploring how the economic, political and socio-cultural factors influenced the concept, definitions and the emergence of human rights in history and civilization. The panel participants dealt with the power strategies and ideological models that play a key role in setting limits to the understanding and exercising of human rights in different civilizations.

The panel "Interpreting Violence: Confessional, National, Generational, and Personal" set out to analyze, on the one hand, relations between faith and violence, and, on the other hand, interpretation of violence at different national levels. Elements combined in the two parts are related to the interpretation of violence from generational and personal angles. These are the examination of imagined wars in Russian conservative utopias, the phenomenon of denunciation in Stalinist Russia, the Great Terror in the Gulag, and the formation of state and political institutions in Russia and the Soviet Union alternately through consent and coercion, respectively.

The panel "Networked Cultures: Negotiating Cultural Difference in Contested Areas" aimed at discussing the dynamics and potentials of newly emerging socio-political network structures and the ways in which they reconceptualize socio-political organization through innovative forms of spa-

tial practice. It dealt with contemporary spatial practices characterized by location and dispersion of contributors, participants and spectators, by fragmentation and multiplication, and shifting of perspectives from dominant centralities to networked peripheries, clandestine economies, and virtual sites. By doing this, the panel intended to question the ways in which the local is reinstalled as a new sphere of activities that can only be understood through its network of relationships with other localities.

The panel "Power and Identity in Multicultural Societies" was set up to deal with power and ethnicity interactions in the political practice of contemporary multiethnic states and quasi-states. The following issues were to be discussed: the problem of ethnic groups as agents of law; collective rights of substantiated ethnic groups versus an individual's right to a free choice of ethno-cultural identity; political practice of ethnic process optimization in multicultural states; forms of realization of an individual's ethno-cultural identity in multicultural states; the ways of ethnicity depoliticization and deethnization of politics in multiethnic societies; paradigms of contemporary ethnological science and ideological substantiation of ethno-cratic regimes' legitimization; and ethnic models of power legitimization in political practice of contemporary states and quasi-states.

The panel "Social and Historical Dynamics: Patterns, Trends, Mechanisms, and Mathematical Models" was to discuss both the further ways to introduce scientific methods into the study of history, and the specific results achieved in this area by now. The panel addressed issues of the general theory of social evolution and its applied aspects. Special attention was devoted to mathematical models of historical processes.

The panel "Power, Theory and Evidence in African, Ancient, and Modern Slavery" examined power and hierarchy in African, ancient, and modern (United States) slave societies, with particular focus on issues of authority and ideological hegemony and of challenges to power expressed through various forms of rebellion and resistance, including revolts of slaves and social banditry. Theoretical issues involved in comparing slave systems across time and place and in situating literary expression in relation to historical evidence were also examined.

Philosophers, anthropologists, historians, and political scientists gave a number of interesting papers at the sessions of the "Free Communication" panel. This panel was divided into two subpanels concerned with pre-modern and modern societies. Their problems varied from cultures of the Neolithic to current foreign policy of the USA.

To sum up, the Fourth International Conference "Hierarchy and Power in the History of Civilizations" (like the two previous conferences) was notable for its interdisciplinary makeup: anthropologists, historians, archeologists, philosophers, economists, political scientists, and experts in many other fields took part in its proceedings. The Conference organizers are right regarding this issue essentially important for achieving a breakthrough

in understanding the phenomenon of "hierarchy and power." It is also worth noting that contacts between scholars from different countries and various schools of thought are another important condition for achieving this breakthrough, a condition that was fulfilled at the Conference, too.

## References

Иерархия и власть в истории цивилизаций. Тезисы докладов 4-й международной конференции на англ. яз. (Москва, 13–16 июня 2006 г.) / Отв. ред. Беляев Д.Д., Бондаренко Д.М. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2006. – 185 с. [Hierarchy and Power in the History of Civilizations. (Fourth International Conference). Abstracts (in English) / Ed. by Beliaev, D.D. and Bondarenko, D.M. – Moscow: Institute for African Studies, RAS, 2006. – 185 p.

Иерархия и власть в истории цивилизаций. Тезисы докладов 4-й международной конференции на англ. яз. (Москва, 13–16 июня 2006 г.). – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2006. – 36 с. [Hierarchy and Power in the History of Civilizations. (Fourth International Conference). Abstracts (in English). – Moscow: Institute for African Studies, RAS, 2006. – 36 p. (additional issue).

# **SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON AFRICAN STUDIES PUBLISHED RUSSIA IN 2003–2007**

*Ivanov An.,*  
Senior Research Fellow,  
Institute for African Studies, RAS

**2003**

1.	Аннотированная библиография Марокко. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2003. – 491 с.
2.	Африка во внешнеполитических приоритетах России. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2003. – 128.
3.	Африканская интеграция: социально-политическое измерение. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2003. – 145 с.
4.	Библиография книг, брошюр и статей по Африке, опубликованных в СНГ в 2001; Сост. Иванов А.Н. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2003. – 78 с. – (Труды Ин-та Африки РАН. «Справочно-библиографическая серия». Т. 6). [Bibliography: Books, Pamphlets and Articles on Africa Published in the CIS Countries in 2001. Reference and Bibliographic Series. Vol. 6. Compiled by Ivanov, An. / RAS. Proceedings of the Institute for African Studies. – Moscow, 2003. – 78 p.]
5.	Библиография книг, брошюр и статей по Африке, опубликованных в СНГ в 2002; Сост. Иванов А.Н. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2003. – 103 с. – (Труды Ин-та Африки РАН. «Справочно-библиографическая серия». Т. 7). [Bibliography: Books, Pamphlets and Articles on Africa Published in the CIS Countries in 2002. Reference and Bibliographic Series. Vol. 7. Compiled by Ivanov, An. / RAS. Proceedings of the Institute for African Studies. – Moscow, 2003. – 103 p.]
6.	<b>Васильев А.М.</b> Африка – падчерица глобализации. – М.: Изд. фирма «Восточная лит-ра» РАН, 2003. – 263 с.
7.	<b>Винокуров Ю.Н.</b> Демократическая Республика Конго. Власть и оппозиция. – М.: Изд. фирма «Восточная лит-ра» РАН, 2003. – 286 с.
8.	<b>Вишневский М.Л.</b> «Рах-Americana» и страны Африки. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2003. – 262 с.
9.	<b>Высоцкая Н.И.</b> Эволюция национализма в Тропической Африке. XX век. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2003. – 176 с.

10.	Гендерные проблемы переходных обществ / Составители и отв. ред. Крылова Н.Л., Ксенофонтова Н.А. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2003. – 238 с. – Сер. «Гендерные исследования». Т. 4.
11.	<b>Герасимчук И.В.</b> Международное экологическое сотрудничество на Юге Африки. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2003. – 124 с.
12.	<b>Грибанова В.В.</b> Образование в Южной Африке. От апартеида к демократическим преобразованиям. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2003. – 135 с.
13.	<b>Гущин Е.В., Павлов В.В.</b> Валюты и валютные системы стран Африки. Справочник. Ч. 1. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2003. – 243 с.
14.	<b>Гущин Е.В., Павлов В.В.</b> Валюты и валютные системы стран Африки. Справочник. Ч. 2. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2003. – 229 с.
15.	<b>Журавлев В.Л.</b> Джибути. Справочник. – М.: Изд. фирма «Восточная лит-ра» РАН, 2003. – 192 с.
16.	<b>Иванова О.Я.</b> Коморские острова. Справочник. – М.: Изд. фирма «Восточная лит-ра» РАН, 2003. – 63 с.
17.	Путешествия из России в Марокко (1918-2001) / Автор-составитель Подгорнова Н.П. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2003. – 560 с.
18.	Россия в Африке и Африка в России. («Чтения памяти Д.А. Ольдерогге»). Т. 3. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2003. – 334 с.
19.	<b>Рунов Б.Б.</b> Стратегия развития Африки: новый взгляд на роль знаний и информационных ресурсов. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2003. – 68 с. (Серия: Ученые записки, вып. 25). – 150 с.]
20.	<b>Синицын С.Я.</b> На заре африканской независимости (Из воспоминаний дипломата). – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2003. – 180 с.
21.	<b>Усов В.А.</b> Формирование общего индоокеанского пространства. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2003. – 132 с.
22.	<b>Фитуни Л.Л.</b> Теневой оборот и бегство капитала. – М.: Изд. фирма «Восточная лит-ра» РАН, 2003. – 264 с.
23.	<b>Френкель М.Ю.</b> Африканский национализм как идеология. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2003. – 56 с.
24.	Nomadic Pathways in Social Evolution. – Moscow: RAS. Centre for Civilization and Regional Studies, 2003. – 182 p.
25.	<b>Frenkel M.Yu.</b> African Nationalism as Ideology. – Moscow: RAS. Institute for African Studies, 2003. – 43 p.



# 2004

1.	Африка в воспоминаниях ветеранов дипломатической службы 5(12). – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2004. – 306 с.
2.	Африка: власть и политика. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2004. – 124 с.
3.	Африканистика молодых. Материалы первой всероссийской научной конференции «Школа молодого африканиста» (Москва, 25–27 ноября 2001 г.) / Институт Африки РАН, Санкт-Петербургский гос. ун-т, Саратовский гос. ун-т. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2004. – 189 с.
4.	<b>Баскин В.С.</b> Проблемы развития внешней торговли стран Африки в конце XX – начале XXI в. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН. – М.: Институт Африки РАН, 2004. – 112 с.
5.	Библиография книг, брошюр и статей по Африке, опубликованных в СНГ в 2003; Сост. Иванов А.Н. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2004. – 103 с. – (Труды Ин-та Африки РАН. «Справочно-библиографическая серия». Т. 8). [Bibliography: Books, Pamphlets and Articles on Africa Published in the CIS Countries in 2003. Reference and Bibliographic Series. Vol. 8. Compiled by Ivanov, An. / RAS. Proceedings of the Institute for African Studies). – Moscow, 2004. – 103 p.]
6.	<b>Виганд В.К.</b> Африка. Национальное богатство и международное перераспределение ресурсов. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2004. – 148 с.
7.	Глобальные и стратегические исследования / Отв. ред. Фитунни Л.Л. Вып. 2. – М.: РАН. Ин-т Африки; Центр глобальных и стратегических исследований, 2004. – 208 с.
8.	Иерархия и власть в истории цивилизаций. Тезисы 3-ей международной конференции. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2004. – 256 с.
9.	<b>Крылова Н.Л., Прожогина С.В.</b> Метисы: кто они? – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2004. – 275 с.
10.	Куда идешь, Африка? Историко-политические этюды. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2004. – 193 с.
11.	<b>Лопатов В.В.</b> Экспортно-импортный потенциал стран Африки. – М.: И-т Африки РАН, 2004. – 148 с.
12.	Мужчина и женщина Диалог или соперничество? – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2004. – 200 с. – Серия «Гендерные исследования». Т. 6.
13.	<b>Матвеева Н.Ф.</b> Кения. Справочник. Изд. третье, перераб. и доп. – М.: Изд. фирма «Вост. лит-ра» РАН, 2004. – 160 с.

14.	<b>Никифоров А.В.</b> Аграрное развитие в Африке в условиях хозяйственных реформ / Пегушев А.М. Биографическая справка. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2004. – 159 с.]
15.	<b>Овока Бабатола.</b> Западная Африка во внешней политике Федеративной Республики Нигерия. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН. – 88 с.
16.	<b>Пинг Жан.</b> Глобализация, мир, демократия и развитие в Африке. Опыт Габона / Предисловие Юбера Ведрина. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2004. – 159 с.
17.	<b>Позднякова А.П.</b> Малави. Справочник. Изд. второе, испр. и доп. – М.: Изд. фирма «Восточная литература РАН», 2004. – 176 с
18.	<b>Рощин Г.Е.</b> Внешнеэкономические аспекты регулирования хозяйственного развития стран Африки. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2004. – 48 с. – Серия: Ученые записки Ин-та Африки РАН. Вып. 26.
19.	<b>Садовская Л.М.</b> Становление и развитие парламентаризма в Африке. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2004. – 48 с.
20.	<b>Фахрутдинова Н.З.</b> Исламский фактор в общественно-политической жизни Судана. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2004. – 84 с.
21.	<b>Френкель М.Ю.</b> История Нигерии в лицах. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2004. – 250 с.

# 2005

1.	<b>Абрамова И.О.</b> Арабский город на рубеже тысячелетий (на примере Египта). – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2005. – 255 с..
2.	Африка в начале XXI века. Проблемы экономического развития. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2005. – 250 с.
3.	Африка во второй мировой войне развития. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2005. – 228 с.
4.	Африканский калейдоскоп. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2005. – 142 с. – Серия: Ученые записки Института Африки РАН. Вып.27.
5.	Безопасность Африки. Внутренние и внешние аспекты. Тезисы X конференции африканистов развития / Отв. ред. Васильев А.М. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2005. – 365 с.
6.	Библиография книг, брошюр и статей по Африке, опубликованных в СНГ в 2004; Сост. Иванов А.Н. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2005. – 83 с. – (Труды Ин-та Африки РАН. «Справочно-библиографическая серия». Т. 9). [Bibliography: Books, Pamphlets and Articles on Africa Published in the CIS Countries in 2004. Reference and Bibliographic Series.

	Vol. 9. Compiled by Ivanov, An.N. / RAS. Proceedings of the Institute for African Studies. – Moscow, 2005. – 83 p.].
7.	<b>Витухина Г.О., Онучко В.Г.</b> Республика Мали. Справочник. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2005. – 279 с.
8.	Граница. Рубеж. Переход. Социокультурное пограничье в глобальном и региональном аспектах. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2005. – 102 с.
9.	<b>Ильин Ю.М.</b> Институт Африки (1960-2004 гг.). – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2005. – 186 с.
10.	Институт Африки РАН. Справочник / Составитель Саватеев А.Д. М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2005. – 64 с.
11.	Мадагаскар. Справочник. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2005. – 287 с.
12.	<b>Маценко И.Б.</b> От Лагосского плана до НЕПАД. Эволюция концепции экономического развития Африки. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2005. – 130 с.
13.	Мировой порядок или беспорядок. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2005. – 240 с.
14.	Мусульмане и христиане в современной Танзании. (Труды участников российской экспедиции). – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2005. – 228 с.
15.	Д.А. Ольдерогге и современная российская африканистика. Сер. («Чтения памяти Д.А. Ольдерогге». Т. 5). / Отв. ред. Саватеев А.Д., Следзевский И.В. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2005. – 321 с.
16.	Сакрализация власти в истории цивилизаций. Ч. 1. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2005. – 242 с.
17.	Сакрализация власти в истории цивилизаций. Ч. 2-3. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2005. – 269с.
18.	<b>Синицын С.Я.</b> Оставленные рубежи (из воспоминаний дипломата). 6(17). – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2005. – 212 с.
19.	СССР-Марокко. Политические связи. Т. 1. / Составитель Подгорнова Н.П. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2005. – 483 с.
20.	СССР-Марокко. Дипломатические отношения. Т. 2. / Составитель Подгорнова Н.П. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2005. – 399 с.
21.	Человек на фоне континента. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2005. – 124 с.
22.	<b>Шауро Э.А.</b> Эритрея. Справочник. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2005. 119 с.
23.	Экономические проблемы современной Африки / Сост. и отв. ред. Ксенофонтова Н.А.. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2005. – 126 с. – Серия: Ученые записки Института Африки РАН. Вып. 28.
24.	Russian Academy of Sciences. Institute for African Studies. Reference Book / Compiled by Savateev An. – Moscow, 2005. – 60 p.
25.	Security for Africa: Internal and External Aspects. 10 <sup>th</sup> Conf. of Africanists. Abstracts Book / Vasiliev A. (Editor-in-chief). – Moscow, 2005. – 286 p.

2006

1.	Библиография книг, брошюр и статей по Африке, опубликованных в СНГ в 2004; Сост. Иванов А.Н. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2005. – 99 с. – (Труды Ин-та Африки РАН. «Справочно-библиографическая серия». Т. 9). [Bibliography: Books, Pamphlets and Articles on Africa Published in the CIS Countries in 2004. Reference and Bibliographic Series. Vol. 9. Compiled by Ivanov, An.N. / RAS. Proceedings of the Institute for African Studies. – Moscow, 2005. – 99 p.].
2.	<b>Высоцкая Н.И.</b> Африканская политика Франции (конец XX – начало XXI века). Очерки. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2006. – 168 с.
3.	<b>Демкина Л.А.</b> Некоторые аспекты социально-политического развития общества после 1994 г. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2006. – 155 с.
4.	Иерархия и власть в истории цивилизаций. Тезисы докладов на 4-й Международной конференции на англ. яз. (Москва, 13-16 июня 2006 г.). – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2006. – 185 с.
5.	Иерархия и власть в истории цивилизаций. Тезисы докладов на 4-й Международной конференции на англ. яз. (Москва, 13-16 июня 2006 г.). – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2005. (Дополн. выпуск). – 36 с.
6.	<b>Притворов А.В., Черкасова И.В.</b> Экономические аспекты развития Юга Африки. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2006. – 240 с.
7.	<b>Саватеев А.Д.</b> Исламская цивилизация в Тропической Африке. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2006. – 304 с.
8.	<b>Синицын С.Я.</b> Оставленные рубежи. Из воспоминаний дипломата. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2006. – 334 с.
9.	<b>Скубко Ю.С.</b> Очерк истории южноафриканской живописи. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2006. – 143 с.
10.	<b>Тихомиров Н.К.</b> Региональные конфликты. Проблема Юга Судана. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2006. – 211 с.
11.	<b>Токарев А.А.</b> ФНЛА в антиколониальной борьбе и гражданской войне в Анголе. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2006. – 196 с.
12.	<b>Шубин Г.В.</b> Проблемы развития Демократической Южной Африки (1994-2006 гг.). – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2006. – 227 с.
13.	Экономическая безопасность стран Африки. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2006. – 295 с.
14.	Этничность, толерантность и СМИ. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2006. – 221 с.
15.	Юг Африки. Наследие прошлого и настоящее. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2006. – 235 с.
16.	African Security: International and Regional Problems. – Moscow, 2006. – 135 p.

17.	African Studies in Russia. Yearbook 2002. – Moscow, 2006. – 152 p.
-----	--

## 2007

1.	<b>Абрамова И.О., Фитуни Л.Л., Сапунцов А.Л.</b> «Возникающие» и «несостоявшиеся» государства в мировой экономике и политике. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2007. – 198 с.
2.	Библиография книг, брошюр и статей по Африке, опубликованных в СНГ в 2006; Сост. Иванов А.Н. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2007. – 127 с. – (Труды Ин-та Африки РАН. «Справочно-библиографическая серия». Т. 11). [Bibliography: Books, Pamphlets and Articles on Africa Published in the CIS Countries in 2006. Reference and Bibliographic Series. Vol. 11. Compiled by Ivanov, An. / RAS. Proceedings of the Institute for African Studies. – Moscow, 2007. – 127 p.]
3.	<b>Вишневский М.Л.</b> Американская «империя» в Африке: миф или реальность? – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2007. – 172 с.
4.	<b>Горелик Б.М.</b> Российская иммиграция в Южную Африку. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2007. – 255 с.
5.	<b>Греш С.А.</b> Франкофония в прошлом и настоящем. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2007. – 218 с..
6.	<b>Гришина Н.В.</b> Гендерные аспекты урбанизации. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2007. – 169 с. – «Гендерный сборник» № 7.
7.	<b>Казанков А.А.</b> Лунный заяц, женщина-паук и проблемы сравнительной мифологии. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2007. – 322 с.
8.	<b>Косухин Н.Д.</b> Африка: поиск обновления. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2007. – 237 с.
9.	<b>Кочакова Н.Б.</b> Священный Иле-Ифе: идеализированный образ и историческая реальность. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2007. – 288 с.
10.	<b>Крылова Н.Л., Прожогина С.В.</b> Женщина и чужбина. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2007. – 218 с. – «Гендерный сборник» № 8.
11.	<b>Лопатов В.В.</b> Торгово-экономические отношения России с Африкой в конце XX – начале XXI века. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2007. – 192 с.
12.	Мирохозяйственные связи Африки в контексте внешнеэкономических интересов России. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2007. – 186 с.
13.	Мужчина и женщина. Книга 2. Эволюция отношений / Сост. и отв. ред. Казанков А.А., Ксенофонтова Н.А. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2007. – 332 с. – «Гендерные исследования». Т. 9.
14.	<b>Позднякова А.П.</b> Уганда: преодоление социально-экономического кризиса. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2007. – 132 с.
15.	<b>Притворов А.В.</b> Опыт осуществления проектов развития на

	Юге Африки. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2007. – 192 с.
16.	Проблемы социально-политических и культурных трансформаций африканских обществ в современной отечественной африканистике. Чтения памяти Д.А. Ольдерогге. Т. 6. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2007. – 235 с.
17.	Проблемы развития ЮАР и Зимбабве (сборник статей). – М.: Изд-во «Memories», 2007. – 78 с.
18.	Российско-африканские отношения и образ России в Африке. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2007. – 141 с.
19.	<b>Шубин Г.В., Майданов И.И.</b> Армия и военная промышленность ЮАР. – М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2007. – 310 с.

*Научное издание*

FOR NOTES

**AFRICAN STUDIES IN RUSSIA**  
**Yearbook 2003–2007**

*Утверждено к печати*  
*Институтом Африки РАН*

Зав. РИО *Н.А. Ксенофонтова*  
Компьютерная верстка и дизайн  
*Г.М. Абишевой*

Подписано к печати 10.05.09 Объем 17,4 п.л.  
Тираж 350 экз.  
Заказ № 18

Отпечатано в ПМЛ Института Африки РАН  
123001, Москва, ул. Спиридоновка, 30/1