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On the cover page / На обложке:

A part of the monument to Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere in Dar es Salaam,
The United Republic of Tanzania / Фрагмент памятника Учителю Джулиусу
Камбараре Ньерере в Дар-эс-Саламе, Объединенная Республика Танзания
(photograph by Dmitri M. Bondarenko / фотография Д.М. Бондаренко)

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PANEL I
GREAT LEADERS OF DECOLONIZATION:
MWALIMU JULIUS KAMBARAGE NYERERE
CENTENNIAL PANEL

Sengulo Albert Msellemu

Dar es Salaam University College of Education, Tanzania

Mwalimu Nyerere, One of the Political Beacons of Africa

Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere, He loved to be called Mwalimu. Mwalimu is a teacher in Swahili and he was really a teacher by profession. There is no doubt that Mwalimu loved his Africanness. He was a founder of pan-Africanism as he defined it. He loved the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, which he engineered. He was really a pan-Africanist, believed in African unity in whatever form it might be. In whatever he stood for, he stood firmly in whatever he believed in. He was a statesman. He was a leader. He gave us an example how to become a leader. Even in the Cold War where he became a leader of his own country. He was among the founders of the then OAU. He was among the founders of the Non-Aliened movement. Lastly, he was the President of the South-South Commission. In general, as we see it, Tanzania was very lucky to have a leader like Mwalimu. He left us with ambiguous legacy.

Nelli V. Gromova
Lomonosov Moscow University, Russia

Julius Kambarage Nyerere, the “Father” of Both the Nation and the Language Policy of Tanzania

In Tanzania, the question “Is there a single Tanzanian nation?” is answered in the affirmative, and the Swahili language plays an integrating role in the multiethnic environment of Tanzania. The undoubted merit in solving the large-scale tasks of nation-building on a socio-cultural basis belongs to the first President of Tanzania, J.K. Nyerere.

More than 20 years have passed since his death in 1999, but every year on October 14, the people of Tanzania celebrate this day, paying their tribute to the memory of the Father of the Nation (*baba wa taifa*), the Teacher (*mwalimu*) and the Founder of the state (*muasisi wa taifa*), who always emphasized the role of the Swahili language in creating the cultural and national identity of the country.

In 2021, commemorative events were timed to coincide with the end of the national Torch of Freedom (*mwenge wa uhuru*) relay, which reminds the people of Tanzania of their duty to protect freedom, unity and peace, as bequeathed by J. Nyerere. During the 23 years of his tenure as head of State, J. Nyerere managed to create a “melting pot” in the country, in which more than 120 autochthonous ethnic groups united into a single Tanzanian nation based on the Swahili language.

Currently, the official language of Swahili is used as the language of instruction in primary schools, in educational institutions for adult education, in teacher training colleges, as a subject in secondary schools and universities. All major communication areas are also served by the Swahili language. It is the official language of the African Union (AU), the East African Community (EAC), the East African Legislative Assembly, and the official language of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Moreover, in November 2021, by the decision of the UN, July 7 was declared Swahili Language Day in the world and will be celebrated annually at the international level along with six other official languages of the UN. This means that Swahili takes Africa out of its peripheral position in the global world system. And the beginning of such a development of

events was laid by the Teacher, the Father of the nation, the Founder of the state, Julius Kambarage Nyerere.

Н.В. Громова

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**Джулиус Камбараге Ньерере –
«отец» и нации, и языковой политики Танзании**

В Танзании на вопрос «Есть ли единая танзанийская нация?» получают утвердительный ответ, и интегрирующую роль в полиэтничной среде Танзании играет язык суахили. Несомненная заслуга в решении масштабных задач нациестроительства на социокультурной основе принадлежит первому президенту Танзании Дж.К. Ньерере.

Прошло более 20 лет после его кончины в 1999 году, но ежегодно 14 октября народ Танзании отмечает этот день, отдавая долг памяти Отцу нации (*baba wa taifa*), Учителю (*mwelimu*) и Основателю государства (*muasisi wa taifa*), который всегда подчеркивал роль языка суахили в создании культурно-национальной идентичности страны.

В 2021 году памятные мероприятия были приурочены к окончанию национальной эстафеты «факела свободы» (*mwenge wa uhuru*), который напоминает народу Танзании о его обязанности защищать свободу, единство и мир, как завещал Дж. Ньерере.

В течение 23 лет пребывания на посту главы государства Дж. Ньерере удалось создать в стране «плавильный котёл», в котором все более 120 автохтонных этносов сплотились в единую танзанийскую нацию на основе языка суахили.

В настоящее время государственный язык суахили используется как язык преподавания в начальной школе, в учебных заведениях для обучения взрослых, в педагогических колледжах, как предмет в средней школе и университетах. Все основные коммуникативные сферы также обслуживаются языком суахили. Он является официальным языком Африканского Союза (АС), Восточноафриканского сообщества (ВАС), Восточноафриканской

законодательной ассамблеи, официальным языком Сообщества развития Юга Африки (САДК). Более того, в ноябре 2021 года по решению ООН дата 7 июля объявлена Днем языка суахили в мире и будет отмечаться ежегодно на международном уровне наряду с шестью другими официальными языками ООН. Это значит, что суахили выводит Африку из её периферийного положения в глобальной мировой системе. А начало такому развитию событий было положено Учителем, Отцом нации, Основателем государства Джулиусом Камбараге Ньерере.

Alexander Kavina

St John's University of Tanzania, Dodoma

**60 Years After, Analysis of the Neglected Ideas
of Nyerere in the Age of Globalized Tanzania**

This year Tanzania marks 60 years since the attainment of independence from the British colonial masters, and have also marked two decades since the demise of the father of the nation, late Julius Kambarage Nyerere. In commemorating two decade after his passing away, there are significant changes that has been witnessed both positive and negative. It is undeniable fact that many of his ideas which seemed worthwhile during his reign and few years after he stepped down from leadership have been neglected, and as we enter deeper into globalization era it is clearly evident that many of his ideas would have helped Tanzania if they were not neglected. This paper attempts to highlight Nyerere immense contribution to Tanzania society socially, politically, morally and also make an analysis of the neglected ideas of Julius Nyerere after two decades of his demise and what could be done to restore his ideas in a time where there seems to be a great need of his ideas to be practically used.

Yulia D. Vorotilova
Yaroslavl State University, Russia

Kwame Nkrumah and Pan-African Symbolism

Ghana in the 1950s was a kind of a laboratory for creating pan-African symbols. Regional African cultural codes became pan-African identity markers: Kwame Nkrumah began to wear kente cloth, as the Ashanti chiefs did before, signaling the start of tradition that still exists. Feodosia Oko, inspired by the flag of Ethiopia, created the national symbols of independent Ghana, which formed the basis of many other African flags and the pan-African movement in general. Typically, historiography links this process to Ghana's leader and one of the brightest politicians of the decolonization era in Africa – to Kwame Nkrumah.

In November 1947, Dr. Ebenezer Ako Adjei invited his friend, a successful and respected scientist, Kwame Nkrumah, to lead a new political party – United Gold Coast Convention, with a view to achieving the country's independence. However, the leaders of this party themselves, mostly wealthy businessmen and lawyers, were of the view that the organization had not yet reached such a level of legitimacy to gain the support of the masses. Kwame Nkrumah did a great job, including strikes, boycotts and demonstrations, and in 1952, he became Prime Minister of the Gold Coast.

Local chiefs opposed any proposed measures and changes, not just because of their traditional conservatism, but also out of fear of losing the privileges the colonists gave them. This created a cohort of powerful chiefs, who saw the threat of a group of young nationalists, calling for equal rights in gender and social status and, accordingly, found themselves in opposition to Nkrumah. Most of the cocoa plantations were based in "chiefdoms" and the rich farmers, the owners of these plantations, were opposed to equating them with the poorer strata.

In May 1952, dissatisfied members of the Nkrumah's party formed their own organization, The Ghana Congress Party, which united the conservative intelligentsia. It was headed by Kofi Busia¹. He was the

¹ Smertin Yuri. Kwame Nkrumah. International publishers, New York. 1987. p. 52.

person who, together with his wife, first appears in public dressed kente cloth (the traditional dress of the Gold Coast chiefs). After a short time, on July 21, 1952, Kwame Nkrumah, who had previously preferred an exclusively suits, for the first time appears at an official event dressed in kente cloth. It was a monster C.P.P. rally at the West End Arena in Accra and the first in a series of meetings which would lead to the creation of a United States of West Africa under one Federal Government².

So, the real PR-battle for African symbols began, in which the winners attributed their “invention” to themselves, but at the same time have worked hard to promote them and to gain global recognition.

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Кваме Нкрума и panaфриканская символика

Гана в 1950-е годы была чем-то вроде лаборатории по созданию panaфриканских символов. Региональные африканские культурные коды превращались в общеафриканские маркеры идентичности. Например, премьер-министр Кваме Нкрума стал носить одежду кенте, как это делали вожди народа ашанти, дав начало традиции, существующей по настоящий день. Феодосия Око, вдохновившись флагом Эфиопии, создала национальную символику независимой Ганы, легшей в основу многих других африканских флагов и всего panaфриканского движения. Как правило, в историографии этот процесс связывается с лидером Ганы и одним из самых ярких политиков эпохи деколонизации Африки – Кваме Нкрумой.

В ноябре 1947 года Эбенезер Ако-Аджей пригласил своего друга, успешного и уважаемого ученого, Кваме Нкруму, возглавить новую политическую партию – Объединённый конвент Золотого Берега, поставивший себе целью достижение независимости страны.

² Daily Graphic Cold Coast. Published by the Proprietors, West African Graphic Co, Ltd at Brewery Road. Accra. July, 23. 1952. Pg. 1.

Однако, сами лидеры этой партии, преимущественно богатые бизнесмены и юристы, придерживались мнения, что организация пока не достигла такого уровня легитимности, чтобы получить поддержку у широких масс. Кваме Нкрума провел огромную работу, включавшую забастовки, бойкоты и демонстрации, и в 1952 году он получил должность премьер-министра Золотого берега.

Местные вожди были против любых предлагаемых мер и изменений не только из-за своего традиционного консерватизма, но еще и из страха потерять привилегии, которые давали колонисты. В этой связи образовалась когорта влиятельных вождей, которые видели угрозу в группе молодых националистов, взывавших к равным правам в половых и социальных статусах и, соответственно, оказавшихся в оппозиции Нкруме. Большая часть какао-плантаций базировалась именно в «вождеских» районах и, богатые фермеры, владельцы этих плантаций, были против уравнивания их с более бедными слоями. Именно эта сила исторически и была носителем тех культурных традиций, из которых были взяты африканские символы.

В мае 1952 года еще и недовольные члены партии Нкрумы образовали собственную организацию – «Партию конгресса Ганы», которая объединяла консервативную интеллигенцию. Ее возглавил Кофи Бусия³. Именно он, вместе со своей женой, впервые появляется на публике в одежде кенте – традиционной одежде вождей Золотого берега. Спустя небольшое время, 21 июля 1952 года уже Кваме Нкрума, который до этого предпочитал исключительно костюм-тройку, впервые появляется на официальном мероприятии в одежде кенте. Это был грандиозный митинг в Вест-Энд Арена в Аккре и первая из множества встреч, которые состоятся для создания Объединенных Штатов Западной Африки под единым федеральным правительством⁴.

Так началось настоящее пиар-сражение за африканские символы, в котором победители приписали их «изобретение» себе, но вместе с этим и провели огромную работу по их популяризации и общемировому признанию.

³ Smertin Yuri. Kwame Nkrumah. International publishers, New York. 1987. p. 52.

⁴ Daily Graphic Cold Coast. Published by the Proprietors, West African Graphic Co, Ltd at Brewery Road. Accra. July, 23. 1952. Pg. 1.

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The Role of Kwame Nkrumah and Samir Amin in Creation of the Theory of Neocolonialism

In 1960s, Ghana's first president, Kwame Nkrumah, formulated the definition of neocolonialism as the preservation of the West's collective economic domination over the newly independent former colonies. This was facilitated by the metropolitan division of the continent into dozens of administrative districts in order to better govern. To overcome this situation and counter the "vertical" integration with transnational corporations imposed on Africa, he put forward the idea of creating a pan-African political and economic organization.

The basis of the association ("horizontal" integration) was to be industrialization, primarily in those sectors where it is possible to produce their own finished products for gradual substitution of western-made goods by them⁵. Concrete measures to achieve true economic independence included the expansion of inter-African trade and the introduction of import substitution with the prospect of enhancing regional cooperation on the continent. The ideas of K. Nkrumah to overcome neocolonialism, including through the construction of "African socialism", were warmly supported by a number of politicians, primarily the leaders of Senegal (S. Touré) and Tanzania (J. Nyerere).

The scientific substantiation of the concept of neocolonialism and strategies for overcoming it was carried out by well-known Africanists, primarily the economist Samir Amin. In 1957–1963 he cooperated with the Ministries of Economy of Egypt and Mali, since 1963 he worked in Institut Africain de Développement Économique et de Planification, IDEP (in 1970-1980 - Director). In 1980-2018 he was President of the International Association of Intellectuals of Africa, Asia and Latin America "Third World Forum" (Dakar, Senegal). S. Amin consistently criticized global capitalism, which unlimitedly exploits the countries of the periphery, protested against the atomizing society and dividing people of the excessive

⁵ *Kwame Nkrumah*. Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. 1965.

influence of the market⁶. He always stressed that the analysis of internal contradictions in the development of the world economic system, the African continent and countries makes it possible to foresee social changes, ways and opportunities for development⁷.

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Роль Кваме Нкрума и Самира Амина в создании теории неокOLONИализма

В 1960-е гг. первый президент Ганы сформулировал определение неокOLONИализма как сохранение коллективного внешнеэкономического господства Запада над получившими независимость бывшими колониями. Этому способствовало проведенное метрополиями дробление территории континента на десятки административных районов в целях более эффективного управления. Для преодоления этой ситуации и противодействия навязываемой Африке «вертикальной» интеграции с транснациональными корпорациями К. Нкрума выдвинул идею создания панафриканской политической и экономической организации.

Основой объединения («горизонтальной» интеграции) должна была стать индустриализация, прежде всего в тех секторах, где возможно производство собственной готовой продукции с целью постепенного замещения ею товаров западного производства⁸. Конкретные меры по достижению подлинной экономической независимости касались расширения межафриканской торговли и введения импортозамещения с перспективой налаживать расширяющееся региональное сотрудничество. Идеи по преодолению

⁶ *Amin S. L'impérialisme et le développement inégal (1976); Amin S. Obsolescent Capitalism (2003), etc.*

⁷ *Strategies pour le future de l'Afrique. Programme de recherches dirige par Samir Amin. UNITAR-CODESRIA, juillet 1980.*

⁸ *Kwame Nkrumah. Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. 1965.*

неоколониализма, в том числе путем построения «африканского социализма», были горячо поддержаны рядом африканских политиков, прежде всего лидерами Сенегала (С. Туре) и Танзании (Дж. Ньерере). Научным обоснованием концепции неоколониализма и стратегий его преодоления занимались известные африканисты, прежде всего экономист Самир Амин. В 1957–1963 гг. он сотрудничал с министерствами экономики Египта и Мали, с 1963 г. работал в Африканском институте ООН по экономическому развитию и планированию (1970–1980 гг. – директор), в 1980–2018 гг. был президентом Международной ассоциации интеллектуалов Африки, Азии и Латинской Америки «Форум третьего мира» (Дакар). С. Амин последовательно критиковал глобальный капитализм, эксплуатирующий страны периферии, протестовал против атомизирующего общество и разъединяющего людей чрезмерного влияния рынка⁹. Он всегда подчеркивал, что анализ внутренних противоречий развития мировой экономической системы, Африканского континента и отдельных стран позволяет предвидеть социальные изменения, пути и возможности развития¹⁰.

⁹ *Amin S. L'impérialisme et le développement inégal* (1976); *Amin S. Obsolescent Capitalism* (2003).

¹⁰ *Strategies pour le future de l'Afrique. Programme de recherches dirige par Samir Amin. UNITAR-CODESRIA, juillet 1980.*

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Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi's Impact on the Position of Indians in South Africa

Indians first arrived in South Africa in the middle of the 17th century. A large influx of Indians to Africa occurred after the outbreak of the US Civil War, when Britain's supply of cotton stopped and Indians were the ones who were attracted to the plantations in South Africa. They signed official contracts providing a free transfer back to India or a grant of land in South Africa, after which the Indian population only continued to grow. The next major wave of migration began already with Gandhi's arrival in Pretoria in 1893.

Traditionally, racism is associated with Afrikaners, but Indians also had to face discrimination in South Africa, even though Queen Victoria had promised Indians equal rights in 1858.

Upon arriving in South Africa, Gandhi began to fight vigorously against racism towards Indians from the white population, he began his fight for equality and justice. It was then that Gandhi first applied the policy of non-violent resistance, otherwise known as satyagraha, as a means of struggle. Gandhi adhered to satyagraha from the beginning of 1906. In 1906, a law came out that required all Indians to obtain registration by providing fingerprints, which equated them with people suspected of committing a crime.

The Satyagraha has paid off – on June 30, 1914, after a mass march of Indians from one province to another (which was forbidden by law) and long negotiations, a document was signed by which the most offensive laws to Indians were abolished.

In conclusion, Mohandas Gandhi's influence on the Indian's situation in South Africa cannot be downplayed. Many African leaders also note the importance of satyagraha, which Gandhi developed and pioneered in South Africa.

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Влияние Мохандаса Карамчанда Ганди на положение индийцев в Южной Африке

Мохандас Карамчанд Ганди в период с 1893 по 1914 гг. провел в Южной Африке, где возглавил борьбу за права индийцев против дискриминации со стороны белого населения.

Впервые индийцы прибыли в Южную Африку еще в середине 17 века. Большой приток индийцев в Африку случился после начала гражданской войны в США, когда у Великобритании прекратились поставки хлопка, и индийцы стали привлекаться на плантации в Южную Африку в качестве рабочей силы. С ними заключались официальные договоры с предоставлением бесплатного трансфера обратно в Индию или гранда на землю в Южной Африке, после чего индийское население только продолжало расти. Следующая крупная волна миграции началась уже с приездом Ганди в Преторию в 1893 году.

Традиционно расизм ассоциируется с африканерами, однако индийцам также приходилось постоянно сталкиваться с дискриминацией в Южной Африке, даже несмотря на то, что еще в 1858 году королева Виктория пообещала индийцам права наравне с остальными гражданами Британской империи.

Прибыв в Южную Африку, Ганди начал вести активную борьбу против расизма по отношению к индийцам со стороны белого населения, он начал борьбу за равенство и справедливость. Именно тогда Ганди впервые применил политику ненасильственного сопротивления, иначе – сатьяграха, в качестве средства борьбы. Ганди придерживалась сатьяграхи с начала 1906 года. Именно тогда вышел закон, который требовал всех индийцев получить регистрацию путем предоставления отпечатков пальцев, что приравнивало их к лицам, подозреваемым в совершении преступления.

Сатьяграха принесла свои плоды – 30 июня 1914 г. после массового шествия индийцев из одной провинции в другую (что было запрещено законом) и длительных переговоров было подписан

документ, по которому наиболее оскорбительные законы в отношении индийцев были отменены.

Таким образом, нельзя принижать влияние Мохандаса Ганди на положение индийцев в Южной Африке. Многие африканские лидеры также отмечают важность сатьяграхи, который Ганди разработал и впервые применил именно в Южной Африке.

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Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela in the Collective Memory

Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela is an icon of the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. He passed away on December 5th, 2013. His life is marked by several events that show his courage, sense of sacrifice that drew the attention of several generations across the world. What is his place in the collective memory today? How do people remember him and in what terms? This study aims at appraising this character in the collective memory almost a decade after his death. The research will consist of a documentary search, the design of a questionnaire to be administered to a sample of interviewees and the analysis of the collected data.

PANEL II
LEADERSHIP AND POWER IN
PRECOLONIAL AND COLONIAL AFRICA

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Precolonial Bantu Concepts of Power: The Tensor as Method

Despite the call to decolonize African studies, remarkably little is known of internal cultural processes driving precolonial history. This paper proposes the tensor as a method to discern endogenous political centralization in east and central Africa. I distinguish five steps.

Firstly, fieldwork on rituals and linguistic data on the Bantu concept of *kum* indicate that power in the region has a fourfold medicinal basis combining divination (D) and initiation (I), magic (M) and association (A).

Secondly, structuralist reanalysis of ethnographic studies reveals that the split of this DIMA tensor informed local changes towards centralization: kingship arose as chiefly power was no longer mitigated by divination and initiation, but narrowed to magic and hierarchical association.

Thirdly, the split tensor also altered enthronement rituals in the 20th century, our data show.

Fourthly, the DIMA tensor collapsed under exogenous, colonial centralization which combatted the impure practice of magic. People's democratic access to invisible power was undermined.

Fifthly, in precolonial times, the witch-finding movements temporarily did such undermining, albeit with cyclical recurrence.

To conclude, the tensor is a method to synthesize dramatic events such as the epidemic and ecological disaster of 400-600 CE as well as new institutions such as initiatory networks to explain the regional primacy of medicine (the safeguarding of life) over governance. Might scholars anno 2021 be willing to thus reconceive politics?

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African Kingdoms in Sub-Saharan Africa with Special Reference to Monomotapa, Buganda and Kongo Kingdoms

Over the centuries, many African Kingdoms have existed before the partition of Africa by the colonial powers. The power of these kingdoms rested on their organization, their socio-economic development and their wealth. Thus, this paper attempts to analyze in depth the political, socio-economic aspects which have contributed to the emergence of these kingdoms in sub-saharan Africa. This paper also casts light on the following questions: how did the kings of Monomotapa Kingdom make an extensive trade network? Why did Buganda kingdom develop during the reign of Kabaka Mutesa I? Did the Bantu tribes contribute in the emergence of Kongo Kingdom?

The kingdom of Monomotapa is one of the most extraordinary political entities in southern Africa before European colonization. The location of this kingdom is in the south of central Africa, more precisely in Zimbabwe, between the rivers of the Zambezi and the Limpopo. The extensive trade network made this kingdom one of the most important trading regions during the medieval period. The main trading partners were gold, iron, copper, tin, cattle, and also cowries. Imported items included glassware from Syria, and ceramics from China. The kingdom of Monomotapa or Great Zimbabwe was an important commercial and political center.

The Kingdom of Buganda, one of the vassals of the Kingdom of Bunyoro in present-day Uganda, emancipated itself under the leadership of its ruler who bore the title of *kabaka* in the 19th century. Located in a region of fertile soil, bordered to the east by Lake Victoria, the Baganda came into contact with Muslim traders from the island of Zanzibar trading ivory for cotton. In the second part of the 19th century, the first European explorers were welcomed there by the king – Kabaka – Mutesa II.

In equatorial Africa, the Bantu kingdoms, by their organization and their cultures, had made the admiration of Europeans. The kingdom of the Congo is undoubtedly the best known thanks to the accounts of the Portuguese and its political, socio-economic organization and its cultures.

Its kings converted to Christianity through contact with the Portuguese. It was one of the most famous African kingdoms from the 15th to the end of the 17th century. Its rulers, starting with Alfonso I (1505-1543) who treated as equals with the king of Portugal, helped to make their kingdom known.

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**The Sultan of Zanzibar, Tippu Tip and Local Chiefs:
Key Figures of the 19th Century Arab-Swahili Slave Trade in
European Written Sources and the Views of Modern Tanzanians***

From the middle of the 19th century the significance and political role of Arab migrants in East Africa became especially important: that is the time of the boom in ivory trade and partly related slave trade. The Omani Arabs, along with the Arabized Swahili, played a leading role in the caravan trade: besides caravan supplies and trade of itself, they also were the main providers of firearms. The Arab-Swahili slave trade influenced almost all the aspects of political, economic and social life of local peoples. For the local leaders, allies of the Arabs, it was very important to have modern firearms, because it had critical impact on the balance of power in the region and relations with neighbors. The European view of the Arabs is interesting for it touches upon the problem of the formation and functioning of group representations and the perception of "the others", the different ones, as underdeveloped: very often this is the view of the "civilizing enlighteners" on the "retarded slave traders". Colonization for the sake of fighting the slave trade and slavery (in the European understanding, which is very much at odds with the East African reality) is the leitmotif of many narratives. The paper is focused on the stories about key figures of the 19th century Arab-Swahili slave trade. It is prepared with the use of two kinds of sources: the memoirs and travel essays of European travelers and the views of modern Tanzanians on those events, based on the results of field researches, conducted by authors in 2018–2021.

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**Султан Занзибара, Типпу-Тип и местные вожди:
главные фигуры арабо-суахилийской работорговли XIX в.
в европейских письменных источниках
и представлениях современных танзанийцев***

С середины XIX в. значение и политическая роль арабских переселенцев в Восточной Африке стала особенно важной: в регионе начался бум торговли слоновой костью, а затем (частично и параллельно) – рабами. Оманские арабы, наряду с арабизированными суахили, играли в караванной торговле ведущую роль: они не только снаряжали караваны и непосредственно вели торговлю, но и были главными поставщиками огнестрельного оружия. Арабо-суахилийская работорговля оказала влияние практически на все аспекты политической, экономической и социальной жизни местных народностей; наличие у того или иного местного правителя, союзника арабов, современного огнестрельного оружия критически влияло на политическую расстановку сил в регионе и его отношения с соседями.

Изучение взаимоотношений и взаимовлияний внутри треугольника «африканцы – арабы – европейцы» на восточноафриканском материале представляет собой очень масштабную и интересную задачу. Взгляд европейцев на арабов интересен тем, что затрагивает проблему формирования и функционирования групповых репрезентаций и восприятия другого, отличного, как отсталого: очень часто это взгляд «цивилизующих просветителей» на «отсталых работорговцев». Колонизация ради борьбы с работорговлей и рабством (в европейском его понимании, очень сильно расходящемся с восточноафриканской реальностью) – лейтмотив многих европейских нарративов.

В докладе будут рассмотрены сведения о ключевых фигурах арабо-суахильской работорговли XIX в., содержащиеся в двух группах источников: в мемуарах и путевых заметках европейских путешественников, которые описывали собственные впечатления об увиденном; и в представлениях современных танзанийцев по данным полевого исследования, проводившегося авторами с 2018 г.

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The Role of Indian Diaspora Leaders in the Struggle for Independence of Kenya and Tanzania

This study examines the activities of the Indian diaspora in the anti-colonial movement in Kenya and Tanzania. The participation of Indians in the struggle for independence of Kenya and Tanzania is viewed through the actions of the most prominent representatives of the diaspora, including Pranalal Shet, Chanan Singh, Fitzval de Sousa, Pio Gama Pinto, Mahan Singh, Ahru Ram Kapila, A. H. Jamal, K. L. Javeri, M. Rottansi, and A. M. Jivanji. The periodization of relations between Indians and Africans is provided in the paper, as well as the participation of African Indians in such political parties and movements as Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), United Tanganyika Party (UTP), East African Indian National Congress (EAINC), Gadar Party and Kenya Labor Union (LTUK) is investigated.

The influence of M. Gandhi's ideas on political movements in Kenya and Tanzania is also considered. In Kenya, the principles of non-violence were supported by Harry Tuku, who condemned the Mau Mau uprising and called for peaceful methods of struggle. The first president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, also advocated peaceful protests.

Comparing Indian living in Kenya and Tanzania, some common features can be identified. During colonial times, Asians occupied an intermediate position between whites and blacks, but they were also discriminated against by colonizers. The first organizations of Indians emerged to fight for their rights was associated with the promotion of only their economic interests. The leaders of these organizations had little concern about the plight of Africans and criticized moderately the metropolis. The 1930s and 1940s saw growing African-Indian cooperation with political demands. After the independence, the Indians were awarded ministerial and parliamentary seats in Tanzania and were the closest advisers to the first Kenyan leaders.

In conclusion, it should be mentioned that the attitude towards the Indian contribution to the independence of Kenya and Tanzania is

ambiguous in Africa. African nationalists in every possible way underestimate and belittle their role in the liberation struggle; they prefer to consider the Indians as pro-colonial elements and express populist slogans about the redistribution of property. However, there are exceptions when Asians are perceived as their own. For example, in 2017, Indians in Kenya were recognized as the 44th tribe of the country, which officially confirmed the importance of the diaspora in the life of the country.

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Роль представителей индийской диаспоры в борьбе за независимость Кении и Танзании

В данном исследовании изучается активность индийской диаспоры в антиколониальном движении в Танзании и Кении. Участие индийцев в борьбе за независимость Кении и Танзании рассматривается через призму деятельности наиболее выдающихся представителей диаспоры: Пранлал Шет, Чанан Сингх, Фицваль де Соуза, Пио Гама Пинто, Махан Сингх и Ахру Рам Капила, А. Х. Джамал, К. Л. Джавери, М. Роттанси и А. М. Дживанджи. Приводится периодизация взаимоотношений между индийцами и африканцами, а также исследуется деятельность представителей диаспоры в политических партиях и движениях: Африканский национальный союз Танганьики (TANU), Партия Объединенной Танганьики (UTP), Восточноафриканский индийский национальный конгресс (EAINC), партия Гадар и Профсоюз труда Кении (LTUK).

Отдельно исследуется влияние идей М. Ганди на политические движения в Кении и Танзании. В Кении принципы ненасилия были поддержаны Гарри Туку, который осуждал восстание Мау-Мау и призывал к мирным методам борьбы. За мирные протесты также выступал первый президент Танзании Джулиус Ньерере.

Сравнивая положение индийцев в Кении и Танзании, можно выделить общие черты. В колониальное время азиаты занимали

промежуточное положение между белыми и черными и подвергались дискриминации. Возникновение первых организаций индийцев для борьбы за свои права было связано с продвижением только своих экономических интересов. Лидеры этих организации мало было озабочены положением африканцев и придерживались умеренных позиций в отношении метрополии. В 30-40-х годах XX наблюдается появление сотрудничества между африканцами и индийцами и выдвигаются политические требования. А после получения независимости индийцы получили министерские портфели и парламентские места в Танзании, были ближайшими советниками руководства Кении.

В заключении хочется сказать, что отношение к деятельности индийцев неоднозначное в Африке. Африканский националисты всячески недооценивают и принижают их роль в освободительной борьбе предпочитают считать индийцев поборниками колонизаторов и высказывают популистские лозунги о переделе собственности. Но есть и исключения, когда азиатов воспринимают за своих. Например, в 2017 году индийцы в Кении были признаны 44-м племенем страны, что официально закрепило значимость диаспоры в жизни страны.

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Alfred Lewis Jones:

The Russian Project of the “Uncrowned King of West Africa”

Alfred Jones had many regalia, received during his lifetime. He was even compared to Cecil Rhodes, but the biggest was the title "Uncrowned King of West Africa", described by W.T. Stead. In the national memory he remembered as a “Banana – Jones”, because of his promotion company for bananas as daily food, and criticism in the press due to high prices on airline tickets, where he’s been a monopoly carrier for years. He is most known for being one of the imperialists, a prominent business leader, a shipowner, a consul of the Belgian Congo in Britain, “father” of the Liverpool and its university with an extraordinary story of success. However, despite his wide fame at the beginning of the last century, now Alfred Jones - a little-known figure even in British historical circles. There are only a couple biographies dedicated to him, including an extensive work of Peter N. Davies.

Looking at files in the University of Liverpool archives and Sir Bernard Pares’ personal funds at SSEES, I have stumbled upon another part of Alfred Jones' life. He can be called a «block of genesis», starting point in motion a chain of events that would lead to the pro-Russian turn in British society. In the last years of his life, Alfred Jones faced German competition in West Africa and he decided to strike back – he started investing in Russian researches. It was a project to expand into the Russian market, which, at the beginning of the XXs, was considered a German fiefdom in commercial circles.

As a result, this has created a first school of Russian studies in England, exchange of visits Duma – Parliament and quick changes of mood in British society: from the Cold War of 1905 to the rapprochement of 1907-1914.

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Альфред Джонс:

русский проект «некоронованного короля Западной Африки»

У Альфреда Джонса было много прижизненных регалий. Его сравнивали даже с Сесилом Родсом, но самым громким был титул «некоронованного короля Западной Африки» (слова «короля репортеров» начала XX в. Уильяма Стеда). В народной памяти он запомнился популяризацией бананов как повседневной пищи (за что получил прозвище Банана-Джонс) и критикой в прессе из-за высоких цен на билеты в Западную Африку, где он был на протяжении многих лет монопольным перевозчиком. В историю же он вошел как империалист и выдающийся викторианский бизнесмен, судовладелец, консул Бельгийского Конго в Британии, «отец» Ливерпуля и его университета с удивительной историей успеха. Однако, несмотря на широкую известность в начале прошлого столетия и внушительный мемориал в Ливерпуле, на данный момент Альфред Джонс – малоизвестная личность даже в британских исторических кругах. Ему посвящено всего пара биографий, среди которых, правда, есть обстоятельная работа Питера Дэвиса.

Разбирая документы в архиве Ливерпульского университета и личный фонд Бернарда Пэрса в SSEES, я наткнулся на еще одну, до этого неизвестную, сторону жизни Альфреда Джонса. Его, в значительной мере, можно назвать «блоком генезиса», начальной точкой цепочки событий прорусского разворота в британском обществе. Столкнувшись с германской конкуренцией в Западной Африке в последние годы жизни, Альфред Джонс решил нанести ответный удар - начал инвестиции в русские исследования. Это был проект по широкомасштабному выходу на российский рынок, который в начале XX в. считался германской вотчиной в коммерческих кругах. В итоге, это привело к созданию первой школы русских исследований в Англии (бабушке нынешней SSEES), обмена визитами Дума-Парламент и невероятно быстрой перемене настроений в британском обществе – от холодной войны 1905 года к сближению 1907–1914 гг.

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Documents from Russian Archives as a Source on the History of the Liberation Movements in Southern Africa in the 1960s

In the history of the liberation movements in southern Africa, there are still many "blank spots" that are caused by a number of circumstances. Many documents, which refer to the period of the birth and formation of anti-colonial movements, have not survived to this day. Many archival documents remain classified, primarily those related to the provision of assistance to the Soviet Union anti-colonial movements. Therefore, one of the key tasks for researchers remains the introduction of new archival documents into scientific use, which allows to restore bit by bit the history of not only the Cold War on the African continent, but also the African countries themselves, which gained independence in the second half of the 20th century. The particularity of the relations between the Soviet Union and the countries of southern Africa in the 1960s was that the USSR did not have diplomatic relations with any of the countries in the region. Relations were built mainly through giving the assistance to the national liberation movements that fought against Portugal in Angola and Mozambique, the apartheid regime in South Africa and the rule of the white minority in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). This also determines the main specificity of the distribution of documents among archival funds - most of them are kept in the funds of the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (the fund of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the State Archives of the Russian Federation (funds of the Soviet Solidarity Committee of Asian and African Countries, the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries).

Documents open to researchers allow to trace how the relations with the anti-colonial movements in southern Africa were built, what kind of Soviet aid, except the military supplies, was provided and what difficulties the Soviet leadership faced when it has been choosing their main allies in the region. As the documents show, that basically depended on the factors of politico-ideological nature, the prospects of one or another movement from the point of view of Soviet representatives, the evaluation of their

organizational viability and activity. Important influence also had the recommendations of the South African and West European communist parties, which greatly facilitated or, on the contrary, became an serious obstacle on the way to obtaining the Soviet aid.

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Документы российских архивов как источник по истории освободительных движений Юга Африки в 1960-е гг.

В истории освободительных движений Юга Африки до сих пор остается еще немало «белых пятен», что вызвано рядом обстоятельств. Многие документы так и не сохранились до наших дней, что в первую очередь относится к периоду зарождения и становления антиколониальных движений. Остаются засекреченными многие архивные документы, прежде всего, связанные с оказанием Советским Союзом помощи антиколониальным движениям. Поэтому одной из ключевых задач для исследователей остается ввод в научный оборот новых архивных документов, что позволяет по крупицам восстанавливать историю не только Холодной войны на Африканском континенте, но и самих африканских стран, получивших независимость во второй половине XX века. Особенность взаимоотношений Советского Союза со странами Юга Африки заключалась в том, что в 1960-х гг., за исключением Замбии, получившей независимость в 1964 г., у СССР не было дипломатических отношений ни с одной из стран региона. Отношения строились в основном по линии помощи национально-освободительным движениям, боровшимся против Португалии в Анголе и Мозамбике, и против режима апарtheid в ЮАР и правления белого меньшинства в Южной Родезии (Зимбабве). Этим обусловлена и главная специфика распределения документов по архивным фондам – большинство из них хранятся в фондах РГАНИ

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Открытые для исследователей документы позволяют проследить, каким образом выстраивались отношения с антиколониальными движениями Юга Африки, какой характер носила советская помощь (без учета военных поставок) и с какими сложностями сталкивалось советское руководство при выборе своих приоритетных союзников в регионе. Как свидетельствуют документы, это во многом зависело от причин политико-идеологического характера, перспективности того или иного движения с точки зрения советских представителей, оценки их организационной состоятельности и активности. Большую роль также играли рекомендации со стороны Южноафриканской и западноевропейских коммунистических партий, что значительно облегчало или наоборот становилось непреодолимым препятствием на пути получения советской помощи.

PANEL III
LEADERSHIP AND POWER IN
NON-STATE CULTURES OF AFRICA

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**Challenges in the Integration of the Platfontein San
in South Africa between 1990 and 2003**

This research is a narrative case study that explores the controversy in the history surrounding the Platfontein San. During the South African Border War, the San soldiers joined the South African Defence Force in their fight against African liberation movements in Angola and Namibia. In the early 1990s, when independence of Namibia was inevitable, the San soldiers and their families were evacuated to a military base in South Africa, however, the latter was also on the threshold of transformation. Amidst the immense changes in South Africa, the fate of the small San community became to be uncertain and insecure. One of the biggest problems of integration was finding a place to settle. In their quest for a new settlement, the San people experienced different racial, socio-economic and cultural problems inherent in South Africa. Eventually in 2003, they permanently settled to a new area called, Platfontein.

I argue that the resettlement project adopted by the government was rather a “quick fix” decision than an integrated solution. As a result, the ill-thought resettlement project will determine many chronic socio-economic problems of the Platfontein community. This research reveals the key factors that either favoured or hindered the San community’s integration in South Africa between 1990 and 2003. The main source of information was relevant archival records as well as informal interviews with traditional leaders and members of the Platfontein San community (in 2018 and 2019).

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**Learning from the Indigenous Communities:
A Case of Esihlengi in Vryheid, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa**

Indigenous communities have preserved knowledges that could address some modern challenges. However, these knowledges are often misunderstood and misinterpreted because of the Western methods that are employed when studying indigenous communities. It is in this context that we can appreciate the call to decolonise methodologies. This paper discusses experiences from the field to show other ways of studying indigenous communities to such an extent that their knowledges are understood in their own accord. More salient is the role of indigenous researchers who have innate skills that are critical in making sense of these knowledges. It is argued in this paper that decolonising methodologies requires a decolonial turn where researchers move away from the Western methods and pay serious attention to indigenous systems that are central in the preservation of knowledges and these are: languages, cultural practices and belief systems.

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Kinship Relations, Leadership, and Power in Complex African Societies: Towards the Transnational Free Movement Initiatives

The contemporary political boundaries in the African continent were uniformly inherited by the African leaders during the waves of decolonization except few cases of secession that led to the creation of new internal boundaries. Although secession is not always linked to new boundaries as evident in other regions such as the former Soviet republics leaving the Soviet Union, Ireland leaving the United Kingdom, Algeria leaving France and recently, the United Kingdom leaving the European Union, worth noting is critical transitions in regional political governance systems that is not bound to the imaginary political boundaries. The political boundaries in Africa were introduced by the European countries based on the General Act of the Berlin Conference on West Africa of 1885. These boundaries continue to exist as embodiment of political leadership and power in Africa, including the new imperial economic power. On the other side, the libertarian views on transnational free movement of people and money in Europe continue to raise ethical concerns in the globalizing world – the growing polarization between the so-called First World and Third world countries. Important is the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development of 1992 that requires governments to duly support their cultural identity, political interests and cooperate in preserving the social-ecological system that span political boundaries. In response to the Rio Declaration, most African leaders commissioned the transboundary natural resource management systems that led to the protection of migratory species, scenic landscapes, and water bodies that transcend political boundaries. This paper seeks to establish the importance of kinship relations, traditional leadership, and political power in the protection of cultural identity while preserving the social-ecological systems that span the political boundaries in Southern Africa. – the case study of South Africa, Botswana, and Lesotho.

**The Role of the Guurti in the History of Somaliland:
From a Factor of Resilience to a Source of Destabilization**

The reasons for the success of the unrecognized state of Somaliland in the thirty-year-long process of building an effective governmental structure are often seen in its hybrid political system that in fact is a combination of modern democratic patterns and traditional clan institutions¹¹. The central element of this system is one of the houses of the Somaliland's parliament – the House of Elders (the Guurti) which was created in order to include traditional leaders in the system of state institutions, not so authoritative for the population.

In this paper the author is going to investigate the transformation of the Guurti's role in the state-building process in Somaliland and prove that the institutionalization of this traditional structure within the framework of the system of state power has led to the disappearance of its original stabilizing functions and has turned it into an institution that to some extent puts the political stability of Somaliland at risk.

Guurtis as councils of elders were used to resolve conflicts between Somali clans as early as in the pre-colonial period. And at the stage of the Somaliland clans consolidation into a single limited by the state framework conglomerate they played a decisive role acting as peacemakers who lay the foundations for further relations between clans (in other words, performing their traditional function): it was clan leaders' conferences when the key decisions on the Somaliland's independence and its internal organization were taken thus providing legitimacy to the new state institutions.

However, reorganization of the council of elders into a permanent state body has distorted the foundations of its functioning, which leads to emergence of sources of tension in modern Somaliland society. As the author will demonstrate, the following factors can be called the reasons for that: first, giving the Guurti some untypical credentials such as legislative

¹¹ Marleen Renders. Consider Somaliland: State-Building with Traditional Leaders and Institutions. Leiden, 2012. – P. 23.

power, which is not included in the traditional duties of clan leaders and is widely disputed nowadays; second, excessive “politisation” of the Guurti – due to the absence of a law regulating the process of renewing the Guurti composition, its members have not been changed since the 1990s. Simultaneously, the ties between the Guurti members and their clans are gradually weakening and the leaders themselves are trying to demonstrate their loyalty to the central political course. It leads to the loss of the Guurti’s traditional legitimacy and, what is more, makes the Guurti an instrument for implementing measures that are profitable to other authorities, but unpopular in society.

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Роль гуурти в истории Сомалиленда: от фактора устойчивости к источнику дестабилизации

Причины успеха непризнанного государства Сомалиленд в выстраивании за 30 лет своего существования достаточно эффективной структуры государственного управления, некоторые специалисты видят в гибридной политической системе¹²: сочетании современных демократических практик с сохранением традиционных клановых институтов. Причем, центральным элементом гибридной политической системы является одна из палат парламента Сомалиленда – Палата старейшин (гуурти), посредством которой традиционные лидеры были встроены в структуру привнесенных государственных институтов.

В данном докладе автор рассмотрит трансформацию роли гуурти в процессе государственного строительства Сомалиленда, доказав, что институционализация данной традиционной структуры в рамках системы государственной власти привела к утрате ей своих

¹² Marleen Renders. Consider Somaliland: State-Building with Traditional Leaders and Institutions. Leiden, 2012. – P. 23.

изначальных стабилизирующих функций, превратив в институт, скорее, ставящий политическую устойчивость Сомалиленда под угрозу.

Советы старейшин гуурти использовались для разрешения конфликтов между сомалийскими кланами еще в доколониальный период. И на этапе консолидации кланов Сомалиленда в единый ограниченный рамками государства конгломерат именно они сыграли решающую роль, выполняя свою традиционную функцию – миротворцев, закладывающих основу дальнейших взаимоотношений между кланами: именно на конференциях клановых лидеров были приняты ключевые решения о создании и устройстве Сомалиленда, обеспечив новым государственным институтам легитимность.

Однако преобразование совета старейшин в постоянно действующий на государственном уровне орган привело к искажению основ его функционирования, что ведет к возникновению источников напряженности в современном Сомалилендском обществе. Как будет продемонстрировано автором, причиной этого стали следующие факторы: во-первых, наделение гуурти нехарактерными для него полномочиями – законодательными, что не входит в традиционные обязанности клановых лидеров и в настоящий момент широко оспаривается; во-вторых, излишняя «политизация» гуурти – в силу отсутствия закона, регламентирующего процесс обновления состава гуурти, его члены с 1990-ых гг. не переизбирались, при этом связи между ними и их кланами постепенно слабеют, сами же лидеры, опасаясь потерять свои позиции, стараются демонстрировать лояльность по отношению к центральному политическому курсу. Это ведет к утрате гуурти своей традиционной легитимности, а также делает гуурти механизмом продавливания выгодных для других органов власти, но непопулярных в обществе мер.

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**The Role of Tribal Institutions in Strengthening Charles Taylor's
Political Leadership at the First Stage of the Civil War in Liberia
(1989–1991)**

The ties of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (that started a civil war against the incumbent Samuel Doe regime in 1989) and the Front's leader Charles Taylor to the tribal hierarchy and initiation societies became one of the foundations to the movement's legitimacy at the initial stage of the conflict. After NPFL's first clashes with government forces the rebel movement was able to significantly increase the number of its fighters due to influx of ethnic Gio and Mano supporters previously oppressed by the Doe regime. Gio and Mano tribal leaders were not included in the system of state patronage and therefore were interested in cooperation with the NPFL. It was the support of the leaders and local male initiation societies of the Poro that attracted several thousand new fighters to the cause and the overall success of the NPFL uprising.

Poro societies in Nimba County also organized a complex initiation process for NPFL fighters that helped strengthen the organization's legitimacy among Liberian population. The cooperation between the NPFL and the Poro societies in Nimba County was caused by long-term problems that these structures had with representatives of the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups. In addition, the elders of the Gio and Mano collaborated with the NPFL in order to ensure their own control over the rebel organization as the later occupied most of the country's interior in the initial months of the war.

Given the following split in the NPFL in 1990 and the departure of a significant part of the Gio and Mano fighters together with the breakaway faction as well as the increasingly widespread mobilization of marginalized youth into the ranks of the NPFL seeking to get rid of the restrictions imposed by the tribal elders, the basis of cooperation between the traditional institutions and the rebels proved unstable. After the initial successes Taylor became an independent power player within the framework of the Liberian military-political situation and no longer needed

traditional institutions to back him up, and the power of traditional structures itself was sharply reduced as ensuing nationwide chaos. Nevertheless, their support for Taylor at the initial stage of the conflict had decisive influence on his emergence as the most influential Liberian politician of that era.

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**Роль племенных институтов в усилении политического лидерства
Чарльза Тейлора на первом этапе гражданской войны в Либерии
(1989–1991 гг.)**

Связи Национального патриотического фронта Либерии, в 1989 г. начавшего гражданскую войну против действовавшего режима Сэмюэля Доу, а также лидера Фронта Чарльза Тейлора с представителями плесенной иерархии и инициационных обществ стали одной из основ легитимности движения на начальном этапе конфликта. После первых столкновений НПФЛ с правительственными силами повстанческое движение смогло резко увеличить количество своих бойцов за счет представителей народностей гио и манго, притеснявшихся Доу. В частности, это произошло потому, что вожди гио и манго не были включены в прежнюю систему государственного патронажа и потому были заинтересованы в сотрудничестве с НПФЛ. Именно поддержка вождей и местных мужских инициационных обществ поро предопределила приток нескольких тысяч новых бойцов и общий успех восстания НПФЛ.

Общества поро в графстве Нимба также организовывали сложный процесс инициации для бойцов НПФЛ, что способствовало укреплению легитимности организации среди либерийского общества. Сотрудничество между НПФЛ и обществами поро в графстве Нимба было вызвано долгосрочными проблемами, которые сложились у этих структур с представителями этнических групп кран и мандинго. Кроме того, старейшины гио и манго, сотрудничали с НПФЛ с целью обеспечить собственный контроль над повстанческой организацией,

занявшей в первые месяцы войны большую часть территории страны.

Учитывая дальнейший раскол в НПФЛ в 1990 г. и уход значительной части бойцов гио и мано вместе с отделившейся фракцией, а также все более широкую мобилизацию в ряды НПФЛ маргинализованной молодежи, стремящейся избавиться от ограничений, навязанных старейшинами, основа сотрудничества между вождями и повстанцами оказалась неустойчивой. Тейлор после успехов первых месяцев войны стал самостоятельным сильным игроком в рамках либерийской военно-политической ситуации и более не нуждался в традиционных институтах власти в той мере, в какой они были необходимы на начальном этапе войны, а сама власть традиционных структур резко сократилась в результате возникшего в стране хаоса, однако оказанная ими Тейлору поддержка на начальном этапе конфликта оказала решающее влияние на его становление в качестве наиболее влиятельного либерийского политика той эпохи.

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**The Covid Pandemic and the Disappearance of
Local Healing Methods in Africa: A Deliberate Attempt
to Silence Indigenous Healing Methods in Tanzania**

The COVID-19 pandemic is impacting the global community in many ways. Since its outbreak many people have lost their lives and the economies of the world have significantly been affected due to the closure of countries borders. That have affected trade and production. In an attempt to combat the disease people in different countries have tried to devised various methods of healing themselves including wearing masks, social distancing and closing their borders and the recent discoveries of vaccines. There has been also coordinated efforts through engaging public and service providers in preventive measures in each country. The governments of the world are also doing the same in cooperation with the international health agencies such as the WHO. Since the report of the first COVID case in Tanzania, the government took deliberate measures to combat the disease by closing schools, and mobilizing Tanzanian to observe the WHO guidelines as well as using local healing methods. It is however, very unfortunate that since the outbreak of this pandemic, that local initiatives by each government and local communities to combat the pandemic are silenced by international agencies and powerful health actors. It is the purpose to this study to look at ways local people in Tanzania have since then using to combat diseases, what has gone wrong with the local healing methods with regard to the COVID pandemic and what can be done to avoid the interference of powerful health actors and international health agencies into local initiatives.

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**Traditional Way of Life Does Not Preclude from
Awareness about COVID-19: The Case of the
Maasai Adolescents from Ngorongoro Conservation Area**

There is hardly any doubt today, that COVID-19 pandemic is a threat to humankind. Numerous studies provided evidences that power distance along with measures taken by government for prevention of pandemic are among the major factors associated with stress and anxiety of population during pandemic. In this presentation we are testing to what extend the young Maasai living in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA) have been about COVID-19 after the serious changes in Tanzania's official attitudes for COVID-19. The interviews with 195 school children (133 males and 62 females), mean age of 14.2 y., were collected in June 2021. Our data suggest that all children were coming from traditional Maasai families, given the following information. The mean number of wives for fathers of children were 2.4 (ranged from 1 to 20), mean number of siblings was 5. Households owned around 33 cows, and 72 shagoats. Majority of children (73.8%) were engaged in pasturing. 66.2% of respondents were never being outside NCA. Majority of children were aware of current pandemic (only 7.2% of children never heard of COVID-19). 76.8% of respondents reported were extremely scared of getting COVID-19. However, 95.4% of children were not able to answer the question about the protection measure against COVID. Few respondents suggested that prophylactics should include facial masks, washing hands, isolation inside households, and using bush medical plants.

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PANEL IV
AFRICAN WOMEN AS LEADERS

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Women and Political Leadership in Post- Colonial Tanzania

In March 2021, Honorable Samia Suluhu Hassan sworn in as a first female president of Tanzania after the sudden death of former President John Magufuli. Presidency, the highest political position in the country, is a celebrated milestone for a woman to run an office which was dominated by men since independence. This achievement signifies the efforts of women to participate in political positions in different historic periods in Tanzania. Throughout the making of their careers they have been facing social, political and economic challenges which hinders their participation in political leadership. Global and local changes have always been responsible in shaping and positioning the role of women in political leadership. Efforts to elevate women into different positions as their male counterparts cannot be glossed over. Women efforts and participation in political leadership have not skipped the pens of historian and non-historians. There have been enormous scholarly writings in different historical periods addressing women efforts, participation, challenges and modality of political leadership in Tanzania. Basing on such context, this paper intends to trace the efforts of production of knowledge about women and political leadership in Tanzania. The paper utilizes the published and unpublished literature as well as reports on women and political leadership.

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**The Participation of Women Farmers in the
Implementation of Ujamaa Policy during the Reign of
President Julius Kambarage Nyerere in Tanzania, 1970s-80s**

Ujamaa Policy is one among the various policies implemented during the period of Julius Kambarage Nyerere's leadership in Tanzania. According to the government, the main purpose of Ujamaa Policy was to settle people together in villages to facilitate the supply and distribution of social services like water, health, and transportation to the citizens. This went hand in hand with the easing communal works in those villages as well as the collection of government taxes and other charges. One of the features of Ujamaa villages was the communal farming. Each village was supposed to organise a farm for the benefit of all the participants. This paper analyses the participation of women farmers in the communal farms in Ujamaa villages in Tanzania. Different collaborations between government organs and other classes of people which interacted with women farmers' labour in agriculture in various aspects, such as taxation of agricultural products, distribution of land, seeds and of fertilizers to women, are discussed in relation to women farmers' agricultural work.

The paper makes use of research data collected from Southern Highlands of Tanzania in 2014 and 2015. The findings shows that although the Ujamaa Policy together with their implementations by different stakeholders, practitioners and other classes of people, aimed at mounting the country's economic and social welfare, they surprisingly resulted into some historical fundamentals that worked for the dynamics of women farmers in Tanzania in varied ways. Furthermore, the participation of women farmers in the implementation of Ujamaa Policy at various levels and stages had brought significant historical transformations for women farmers. This is particularly demonstrated by the development of women's confidence regarding their contribution to the economy in terms of decision-making, organization of the society, and managing the available resources.

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**Women Leadership in Politics and Aviation in Tanzania.
An Analysis on Sustainable Power, from the
Colonial Past to the Present of Decoloniality**

From Bibi Titi Mohammed to Susan Mashibe, or from *resistance to colonial power*, as a symbol of social change to *aviation*, as a symbol of re-enactment of power, this analysis is a comparative exploration into the two entrenched fields of politics and aviation, from the perspectives of women leadership. Through a qualitative overview of some contents, narratives and facts, mirroring the leader status of women in Tanzania, the principal aim is to gather elements for the definition, analysis and contextualization of a *sustainable power*, that existed before and suffered changes during the years after decolonization.

Focusing but not limiting the research area to the examples of TANU women leaders, such as Bibi Titi Mohammed, or to Susan Mashibe, the first woman in Tanzania to hold either an FAA certified commercial pilot and an aircraft maintenance engineering qualification, this presentation proposes a theoretical contribution on the sustainable power, linked to the concepts of self-recognition, self-care, emotional leadership and power, that are effectively used in contemporary narratives and epistemologies of the Global South. The approach is not from under the umbrella of feminism but highlights the active conceptual role of the women in the theoretical frame of sustainable power definition, conducted on the path of meanings and interconnections between the politics and aviation in relation to the territory, the community and the individual, so finally shaping the *sustainable leadership*, one of the pillars of sustainable power.

The proposition is conceptual and inductive, the conclusions being taken on a political – philosophical terrain linked to the image and symbols of mobility translated in the meanings of aviation, from a colonial / decolonial perspective, opening new paths for further research.

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First Female President in African History

The 24th President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, is not only a prominent politician. She is a world-class economist and 2011 Nobel Peace Prize laureate (with Leiba Gbowie). A grassroots women's peace movement, where she was one of the leaders, managed to stop the brutal, years-long civil wars, about which Liberians said that no one remembered when they began, and no one believed that they would ever end.

In 2005, after winning the presidential elections, she inherited a country devastated and ravaged by civil wars. She has managed to stabilize economic development, get the national economy out of a permanent crisis, establish infrastructure, attract large foreign investment, and ultimately achieve impressive economic growth. With an excellent basic economic education - Harvard University, the University of Colorado and Madison Business College (USA) – during the two presidential terms provided by the constitution, she managed to triple the country's GDP, achieve a \$ 4.6 billion write-off of Liberia's foreign debt and a sixfold increase in the state budget... If not for the outbreak of the deadly Ebola hemorrhagic fever epidemic that broke out in 2014–2015, the mortality rate of which was up to 90% and which erased all the economic gains of the previous decade, provoking an outflow of investors and a reduction in the number of foreign trade partners, then Liberia would be one of the most dynamically developing countries of the continent. But the vaccine against it became available only from the end of 2019 – the beginning of 2020.

The country highly appreciated the activities of E. Johnson-Sirleaf in the presidency. At the end of her term in 2018, she was awarded The Prize for Political Leadership in Africa, which included \$ 5 million. She is a holder of many state awards, honorary doctorates from 17 universities. She is currently a member of various international economic, financial and public organizations, President of the Liberian Bank, vice President of City Bank, etc. For her decisive and strict character, she is often compared to the "iron lady". But, as a rule, successful career growth for women of all continents does not lead to the strengthening of family and personal life.

In 2009 her autobiography *This Child Will Be Great* was published.

With these words, an elder in her grandfather's village predicted her future about 70 years ago.

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Первая женщина-президент в истории Африки

24-й президент Либереи Элен Джонсон-Серлиф не только выдающийся политический деятель. Она экономист высочайшего мирового уровня и лауреат Нобелевской премии мира 2011 года (совместно с Лейбой Гбови). Массовому женскому миротворческому движению, где она была одним из лидеров, удалось остановить жестокие многолетние гражданские войны, про которые либерийцы говорили, что никто не помнил, когда они начались, и никто не верил, что они когда-либо закончатся.

В 2005 году, победив на президентских выборах, она получила в наследство страну, опустошенную и разоренную гражданскими войнами. Ей удалось стабилизировать экономическое развитие, вывести народное хозяйство из перманентного кризиса, наладить инфраструктуру, привлечь крупные иностранные инвестиции и в итоге добиться впечатляющего экономического роста. Имея прекрасное базовое экономическое образование – Гарвардский университет, Университет Колорадо и Бизнес-колледж Мэдисона (США), – за два президентских срока, предусмотренных конституцией, ей удалось втрое увеличить ВВП страны, добиться списания \$4,6 млрд внешнего долга Либереи и шестикратного увеличения государственного бюджета. Если бы не разразившаяся в 2014–2015 годах вспышка смертоносной эпидемии геморрагической лихорадки Эбола, летальность которой составляла до 90% и которая стерла все экономические завоевания предыдущего десятилетия, спровоцировав отток инвесторов и сокращение числа внешнеторговых партнеров, то Либерея была бы одним из наиболее динамично развивающихся государств континента. Но вакцина от нее стала доступна лишь с конца 2019 – начала 2020 гг.

Страна высоко оценила деятельность Э. Джонсон-Серлиф на

посту президента. По истечении срока ее полномочий в 2018 году она была награждена *The Prize for Political Leadership in Africa*, который включал в себя \$5 млн. Она – кавалер многих орденов и государственных наград, почетный доктор наук 17 университетов. В настоящее время является членом различных международных экономических, финансовых и общественных организаций, президентом Либерийского банка, вице-президентом Сити-банка и пр. За решительный и строгий характер ее часто сравнивают с «железной леди». Но, как правило, успешный карьерный рост для женщин всех континентов не приводит к укреплению семейной и личной жизни.

В 2009 году опубликована ее автобиография *This Child Will Be Great*. Этими словами около 70 лет назад ей предсказал будущее старейшина в деревне ее деда.

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Women Stepping into Leadership Vacuum: A Case of Winnie Mandela

Winnie Mandela was a household name in South Africa during the country's dark days of heavy state repression. Her name was not only confined to SA but claimed its reach on the continent and beyond among the proponents of liberation of Africa and the global anti-apartheid movement. For over 30 years, she lived a life hardship not of her own making but the apartheid state's. It was this hardship that hardened her resolve and she rose above her own suffering, stood in the gap of the leadership void that emerged at the time and she became to voice of the silenced. Her leadership through defiance kept the home front against apartheid active. Winnie Mandela emerged to be the hope of the struggle against apartheid and remained popular among the downtrodden masses of the country who always saw her as the one leader who stood with them. Her enemies tried to silence her with the same methods that succeeded on others, but she proved to be different, and like a phoenix she always rose, an act which earned her the title of the "Mother of the Nation" by those who adored her courage and defiance. When the government unbanned the political parties in the 1990s' she led the ANCWL from 1993 to 2003, served longer as the ANC Member of Parliament in the National Assembly in a post-apartheid South Africa and served as a Deputy Minister for a short-while.

This paper argues that Winnie Mandela stepped into the political leadership vacuum at the critical time that such leadership was needed. Winnie Mandela showed courage and defiance in her leadership against the system that was meant to break her, she courageously kept the hopes of freedom in "our lifetime" slogan alive.

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**Women, Leadership and Development in Africa:
Maryam Babangida and Joyce Banda's Examples**

Research findings on development studies have shown that men, more than women, are credited with the growth and development of their various societies. In fact, most discussions on development projects and their relevance to the community are predominantly premised on cases of the male gender while observable contributions of women are either brushed aside or a flash in the pan. The contributions of African women in leadership positions have not, like those of men, been equitably beamed by scholars. Though African history is rift with extra-ordinary women who, through inherent potential and hard work, instigated lofty programmes which have translated into improved conditions of living for their fellow humans yet, women continue to experience inequitable and imbalanced reporting and/or documentation of their development projects. Therefore, in analyzing the leadership role of the female gender and their involvement in development projects in Africa, this study x-rays the examples of two heroines, Maryam Babangida and Joyce Banda, from Nigeria and Malawi respectively. It discusses the leadership roles, programmes, and contributions of these women to the development of their countries and Africa in general. The study demonstrates that women, like their male counterparts, have contributed immensely to societal growth and development, and that they are relevant agents of positive change. In its conclusion, the study posits that, for meaningful development, women alongside men should be mainstreamed into the policy/decision making processes of the various sectors of the Nigerian and Malawian states, and elsewhere in Africa. It also submits that more research on and adequate documentation of the contributions of women should be of great concern to scholars.

PANEL V.
***LEADERSHIP AND POWER IN AFRICA:
NATIONAL AND REGIONAL ASPECTS***

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**Leadership and New Media in
North African Countries during the Arab Spring**

The newest methods of communication and interaction, including the use of the latest information technologies, are gradually penetrating into various spheres of society, including political one. During the anti-regime demonstrations of the Arab Spring in North African countries, new media declared themselves (for the first time with such force) not only as an effective instrument of political activity within one country, but also as a way to synchronize the wave of protest within the entire region or even in the world. scale. They not only demonstrated the ability to instantly disseminate information, but also provided ample opportunities for feedback, as well as dramatically reduced mobilization costs. As a result, in conditions of low trust in the authorities, a significant part of communications (primarily opposition) about power relations was transferred to the virtual sphere, in fact becoming inaccessible to government censorship.

These processes give rise to a communication format in which there are no clearly expressed ideological attitudes and recognizable leaders. Perhaps it is this feature of modern fitna that most distinguishes it from traditional protests. Faced with an unusual format of protest activity, the authorities, accustomed to dealing with the old-style opposition with its more or less charismatic leaders and relatively clear ideological programs, simply do not have time to reorganize and, as a result, begin to make mistakes.

The reasons for such errors lie primarily in the spontaneity of what is happening, when the streets of cities in a matter of days or even hours are filled with crowds of people. Being completely unprepared for such a turn of events, the authorities, which had easily suppressed previous protest

actions, fell into panic and were unable to adequately assess the degree of danger posed by the protesters, significantly overestimating it.

The fitna paradox is that the first to declare war are not the protesters, but the authorities. The crowd is waiting, giving the authorities a chance to find a way out of the situation and not daring to cross the invisible line that separates the lawful collective protest from the lawless rebellion. It is the power that overestimates the threat posed by the crowd that transcends the boundaries of what is permitted and resorts to force. But even more paradoxical is the fact that the authorities use force at the most inopportune moment for this.

Why are the authorities not ready for such manifestations of fitna and wrongly assess the threat posed by the protesters, making fatal mistakes? The fact is that the authorities, accustomed to completely control information flows in the so-called traditional media (television, radio, press, etc.) in most cases underestimate the mobilization potential of new media. The latter, however, are not only able to instantly disseminate information, but also provide ample opportunities for feedback and sharply reduce mobilization costs.

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Лидерство и новые медиа в странах Северной Африки во время событий Арабской весны

Новейшие способы коммуникации и взаимодействия, в том числе с использованием новейших информационных технологий, постепенно проникают в различные сферы жизни общества, в том числе политическую. Во время антирежимных выступлений Арабской весны в странах Северной Африки новые медиа заявили о себе (впервые с подобной силой) не только как об эффективном инструменте политической активности внутри одной страны, но также и как о способе синхронизации протестной волны в рамках всего региона или даже в мировом масштабе. Они не только продемонстрировали способностью мгновенно распространять

информацию, но и обеспечили широкие возможности для осуществления обратной связи, а также резко снизили мобилизационные затраты. В итоге в условиях низкого доверия к власти значительная часть коммуникаций (в первую очередь оппозиционных) по поводу властных отношений переносится в виртуальную сферу, фактически становясь недоступной для правительственной цензуры.

Указанные процессы порождают такой формат коммуникации, при котором отсутствуют отчетливо выраженные идеологические установки и узнаваемые лидеры. Пожалуй, именно эта черта современной фитны в наибольшей степени отличает ее от протестов традиционного типа. Столкнувшись с непривычным форматом протестной активности, власть, привыкшая иметь дело с оппозицией старого образца с ее более или менее харизматическими лидерами и относительно четкими идеологическими программами, просто не успевает перестроиться и, как следствие, начинает допускать ошибки.

Причины таких ошибок кроются прежде всего в спонтанности происходящего, когда улицы городов в считанные дни или даже часы наполняются толпами людей. Будучи совершенно не готова к подобному повороту событий, власть, без особого труда подавлявшая прежние акции протеста, впадает в панику и оказывается не в состоянии адекватно оценивать степень опасности, исходящей от протестующих, существенно завышая ее.

Парадокс фитны заключается в том, что войну первыми объявляют не протестующие, а власть. Толпа выжидает, давая власти шанс найти выход из положения и не решаясь перейти ту незримую грань, которая отделяет законный коллективный протест от незаконного мятежа. Именно власть, переоценившая исходящую от толпы угрозу, переступает границы дозволенного и прибегает к силе. Но еще более парадоксальным является то, что власть применяет силу в самый неподходящий для этого момент.

Почему же власть оказывается не готова к подобным проявлениям фитны и неверно оценивает угрозу со стороны протестующих, допуская фатальные для себя ошибки? Дело в том, что власть, привыкшая полностью контролировать информационные потоки в так называемых традиционных СМИ – телевидении, радио, прессе и т.п., – в большинстве случаев недооценивает

мобилизационный потенциал новейших медиа. Последние же не только способны мгновенно распространять информацию, но и обеспечивают широкие возможности для осуществления обратной связи и резко снижают мобилизационные затраты.

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Leadership, Power and Public Perception in Algeria and Sudan against the Backdrop of Protest Movements

2019 was a decisive year for North African politics, marked by unexpected profound changes in Sudan and Algeria. In these two countries presidents who had been ruling for decades were quickly overthrown by military coups that occurred against the backdrop of mass protests.

These changes marked a new development stage for the political systems of Algeria and Sudan. Ousting old rulers was far from the only change – there was a new pressing issue of finding balance between three major players in the political arena: the army, civilian officials and the “Street” which initiated a widespread protest movement.

A significant role in the modern development of Algeria and Sudan is played by mass protests which did not subside after regime change but continued to call for a complete renewal of the political system and the ousting of previous political elites. The Army plays a crucial role in both Sudan and Algeria – it was a military coup that led to regime change in both countries, and after these coups the military was not willing to reduce its political influence, as evidenced by continuing power struggle between civilian and military leaders. At the same time, the “Street” continues to support civilian leaders, expressing its distrust of the army.

Military leaders therefore employ different methods to build their relationship with the public while retaining political power. Whereas in Sudan the military resorted to violence and harsh repressive measures from the very beginning of the demonstrations, which later turned into coups against the transitional civilian government, in Algeria the clashes were not so violent. The Algerian military seeks to create a “civilian façade” for the government instead of openly coming to power while gradually introducing restrictive measures against the Hirak movement.

This paper will focus on the relationship between civilian and military leaders, as well as public perception of contemporary political processes in Sudan and Algeria.

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Лидерство, власть и общественное мнение в Алжире и Судане на фоне протестных движений

2019 год внес значительные изменения в политический ландшафт Северной Африки – в Алжире и Судане, двух странах, где президенты правили десятилетиями, сменилась власть в результате военных переворотов, произошедших на фоне массовых политических выступлений.

Эти перемены обозначили новый этап развития политических систем Алжира и Судана. Кроме необходимости реорганизации государственных институтов, остро встал вопрос выстраивания отношений между тремя важнейшими игроками на политической арене: армией, гражданскими чиновниками и “арабской улицей”, инициировавшей широкое протестное движение.

Значительную роль в современном развитии Алжира и Судана играют массовые социальные протесты, которые не утихли со сменой власти, а продолжили добиваться полного обновления политической системы. Как в Алжире, так и в Судане сохраняется определяющая роли армии – именно её действия привели к смене режимов в обеих странах; военные стремятся сохранить каналы влияния на общество и не готовы снижать свою политическую активность. Вместе с тем “арабская улица” продолжает поддерживать гражданских лидеров, выражая свое недоверие армии – и армии приходится выстраивать новую модель взаимодействия с общественностью на фоне требований оппозиции.

Вектор, который выбирает армия в ходе этого противостояния, обусловлен рядом факторов, в том числе сплоченностью протестного движения и историческим характером взаимодействия армии с государственными институтами. Если в Судане военные с самого начала демонстраций прибегали к насилию и жестким репрессивным мерам, а позже – открытым попыткам переворота против переходного гражданского правительства, то в Алжире столкновения не носили столь ожесточенного характера. Алжирские военные действуют через

создание “гражданского фасада”, а не открытый приход ко власти – и постепенно вводят ограничительные меры, направленные против движения Хирак.

Отношениям гражданских и военных лидеров, а также реакции общественности на современные политические процессы в Судане и Алжире, и будет посвящен данный доклад. Будет произведен сравнительный анализ политических систем, сложившихся в Алжире и Судане после нового витка массовых протестов.

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The Factor of Political Leadership in Relations between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt

Over the past 150 years, the relations between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt have experienced the successive periods of friendship and hostility. These relations were influenced by a variety of factors, including the internal political situation in the countries concerned, their economic interests, their religious heterogeneity, as well as the role of external forces.

But what was the role of the personalities of the countries' leaders in the development of their relations? Although much attention has been paid to the study of the ties between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt, especially with reference to the current crisis of the Renaissance Dam, the factor of the personalities of their leaders has not yet become a subject of study. Therefore, this study aims to fill this gap – that is, to find out what role the leaders of Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt played in the development of ties between their countries and how their personal relationships influenced the situation in inter-state relations.

The study touches upon such milestones in the history of relations between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt as the Mahdist uprising, civil wars in Ethiopia and Sudan, territorial disputes of Ethiopia and Sudan, as well as of Sudan and Egypt, the crisis of the Renaissance dam.

The study relies primarily on statements and interviews by the leaders of the 3 countries, on their correspondence, as well as on memoirs.

It can be concluded that due to the specifics of the political regimes in all three countries, their leaders have always had a very significant influence on decision-making process in interstate interaction, they often pursued a policy in which, at their own discretion, sharply changed the course towards their neighbors. This was also due to personal relationships with their colleagues – the leaders of neighboring states. However, all this manifested itself mainly in tactical dimension. If we look at the policies of countries towards each other in general, over tens and hundreds of years, we can see a clear political succession. Therefore, we can conclude that the

influence of the leaders was primarily in the styles and methods of conducting foreign policy, but the interests of the countries remained quite similar regardless of who was in power at the moment, therefore, their relations in the strategic perspective were determined primarily by state interests, not by subjective factor of the leader's personality.

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**Фактор личности политических лидеров
в отношениях Эфиопии, Судана и Египта**

На протяжении последних 150 лет отношения Эфиопии, Судана и Египта представляют из себя постоянную череду периодов дружбы и вражды. На эти отношения оказывали влияние самые разные факторы, среди которых можно выделить внутривнутриполитическую ситуацию в рассматриваемых государствах, их экономические интересы, их религиозную гетерогенность, а также роль внешних сил.

Но какова была роль личностей лидеров 3 стран в развитии их отношений? Хотя исследованиям связей Эфиопии, Судана и Египта, особенно ввиду нынешнего кризиса плотины Возрождения, уделено довольно большое внимание, фактор личности их лидеров ещё не становился предметом изучения. Поэтому в данном исследовании ставится цель восполнить этот пробел – то есть выяснить, какую роль лидеры Эфиопии, Судана и Египта играли в развитии связей между своими странами и как их личные отношения влияли на ситуацию в отношениях межгосударственных.

В исследовании затронуты такие вехи в истории взаимоотношений Эфиопии, Судана и Египта как Махдистское восстание, гражданские войны в Эфиопии и Судане, территориальные споры Эфиопии с Суданом и Судана с Египтом, кризис плотины

Возрождения.

Исследование опирается в первую очередь на заявления и интервью лидеров трёх стран, на их переписку, а также на мемуарную литературу.

По результатам можно сделать вывод, что в силу специфики политических режимов во всех трёх странах их лидеры всегда имели очень значительное влияние на принятие решений касательно межгосударственного взаимодействия, зачастую они проводили политику, в рамках которой по своему собственному усмотрению резко меняли курс в отношении своих соседей, в том числе это было связано и с личными симпатиями и антипатиями к своим коллегам – лидерам соседних государств. Однако всё это проявлялось в основном в тактических аспектах. Если посмотреть на политику стран в отношении друг друга в общем, на протяжении десятков и сотен лет, можно увидеть явную преемственность. Поэтому можно заключить, что влияние лидеров заключалось в первую очередь в стилях и методах ведения внешней политики, но интересы у стран оставались довольно похожими в независимости от того, кто в данный момент находился у власти, поэтому их отношения в стратегической перспективе определялись в первую очередь государственными интересами, а не субъективным фактором личности лидеров.

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**The Center-Periphery Narrative of
Power Struggle in Sudan, Past and Present**

The economic and political dominance of the center and the marginalization of the periphery have perhaps been the main features of Sudan's political life. Khartoum and its suburbs are an enclave with a large population, a significant portion of which has high and middle incomes. This metropolitan area is surrounded by provinces that are noticeably lagging behind the center in their economic development. The center possesses tremendous political power, a vast layer of professionals and a significant contingent of skilled labor, as well as a historically established political culture with strong liberal traditions. The periphery is not only poor, but also an object of political suppression and economic exploitation.

The “greed” of the central elite has been destabilizing Sudan for decades. Dissatisfaction with the marginalization of the periphery and its exclusion from decision-making processes is shared by most non-Arab traditional leaders in the country. In a historical perspective, the conflict “center-periphery” has led to two civil wars with the South, conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan and Red Sea provinces. After the 2019 military coup and the collapse of the military-Islamist regime, the military and the opposition in Khartoum reached a power-sharing agreement among themselves, excluding not only Islamists, but also non-Arab tribes, as has happened many times in Sudan's history. On October 25, 2021, with the support of non-Arab opposition and militias, the military staged a new coup in Sudan, canceling the previously agreed scenario of political transit. It seems that the unresolved “center-periphery” conflict is becoming the main obstacle to the completion of the process of socio-political transformation of Sudan's power structure and society and the achievement of political stability in the country.

Коллизия «центр-периферия» как фактор борьбы за власть в Судане в прошлом и настоящем

Экономическое и политическое доминирование центра и маргинализация регионов – едва ли не главная особенность политической жизни Судана как в прошлом, так и настоящем. Хартум и его пригороды представляют собой анклав, в котором сосредоточены довольно многочисленные группы населения, значительная часть которого обладает высокими и средними доходами. Столичный район окружен провинциями, заметно отстающими от центра в своем экономическом развитии. Центр обладает огромной политической властью, обширной прослойкой профессионалов высокого класса и значительным контингентом квалифицированной рабочей силы, а также исторически сложившейся политической культурой с сильными либеральными традициями. Периферия же не только бедна, но и является объектом политического подавления и экономической эксплуатации, то есть даже в мирное время она оказывается в убытке.

«Жадность» центральной элиты является одним из ключевых факторов, дестабилизирующих Судан. Недовольство отстраненностью периферии от участия в процессе принятия политических решений, осуществляемом центральным правительством, разделяется большинством неарабских традиционных вождей на Западе, Юге и Востоке страны. Еще большее разочарование они высказывают по поводу деятельности традиционных политических партий. Хотя некоторые члены центрального правительства признавали недопустимые масштабы маргинализации суданской периферии, они рассматривали ее лишь в качестве фактора социальной нестабильности, а не повода к экономическим и политическим реформам.

В исторической перспективе коллизия «центр-периферия» привела к двум гражданским войнам между Севером и Югом Судана, конфликтам в Дарфуре, Южном Кордофане и Красноморской провинции. После военного переворота 11 апреля 2019 г. и крушения

тридцатилетнего военно-исламистского режима военные и оппозиция в Хартуме договорились между собой, исключив из политического процесса не только исламистов, но и неарабские племена, как это и происходило много раз в истории Судана. 25 октября 2021 г. при поддержке неарабских племенных ополчений и дарфурской вооруженной оппозиции военные совершили в Судане новый переворот, перечеркнувший ранее согласованный сценарий политического транзита в стране. Представляется, что неразрешенность коллизии «центр-периферия» становится главным препятствием для завершения процесса социально-политической трансформации суданской власти и общества и достижения политической стабильности в стране в целом.

Menelik II – the Greatest Political Heritage of Ethiopia

There are few politicians in the history as Menelik II who evoked so many contradictory feelings: love and hate, the creator of the modern Ethiopia and the cruel possessor who conquered with fire and sword many Ethiopian peoples.

Menelik III (baptismal name Sahle Maryam) is the son of Negus of Shoa Haile Melekot. On November 3, 1889 he was crowned Negus Negast (King of Kings) and Emperor of Ethiopia. His reign is a milestone in Ethiopian history.

As the result of many envious campaigns Menelik expanded the territory. Many territories were incorporated by military conquest. He rightfully considered the founder of Ethiopia in the modern borders.

Menelik was also recognized as a brilliant commander. He led Ethiopian troops against Italian invaders. In the struggle with Italians he united rulers of many kingdoms with their armies. Their soldiers from many ethnic groups: Amhara, Oromo, Gurage, Harari, etc. were named “Abyssinians”. Following a decisive victory at the battle of Adwa on the 2nd of March 1896 sovereignty of Ethiopia was recognized by European states. This was expressed in terms of diplomatic relations with many foreign states.

The strengthening of Ethiopia was the aim of Menelik II.

The main signposts of modernization were put in place. There was a great change in the system of land relations: the land for the first time ceased to be property of the monarch and could be sold and purchased.

The country was divided into provinces with the governors appointed by Emperor. They replaced local rulers.

The strengthening of the central power allowed to reform the army. To maintain it a new tax was introduced. The transfer of the army to the state maintenance was a step forward on the way of creating permanent army.

The first Cabinet of Ministers and the post of the Prime Minister were established to help in the administration of the Empire. The changes concerned also the legislature. The territory was divided into six regions

each of which has 12 independent judges.

The Bank of Abyssinia was established as well as mail and telephone systems.

Not long ago a country devastated by numerous feudal wars and strifes thanks to the talent and activity of the Emperor Menelik II became a united political entity.

Without any exaggeration it is possible to call Menelik II the greatest political heritage of Ethiopia.

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Менелик II (17 августа 1844 г.– 12 декабря 1913 г.) – величайшее политическое наследие Эфиопии

Мало в истории политических деятелей, которые бы вызывали столь противоречивые чувства: любовь и ненависть, создатель современной Эфиопии и жестокий завоеватель, огнем и мечом покоривший многие эфиопские народы.

Менелик II – (в крещении Сахле Мариам) – отпрыск древней Соломоновой династии. Сын правителя Шоа Хайле Маликота. 3 ноября 1889 г. был коронован как «Негус Негас» («Царь Царей») и император Эфиопии под именем Менелика II. Его правление является вехой в истории Эфиопии.

В результате завоевательных походов Менелик подчинил огромную территорию и законно считается создателем Эфиопии в ее современных границах.

Менелик вошел в историю и как блистательный полководец. Славу ему принесла успешная борьба против итальянских колонизаторов и прежде всего победа в битве при Адуа 2 марта 1896 г. Искусный военачальник он сумел объединить правителей многих княжеств в борьбе с иноземцами, они участвовали со своими армиями. А это были представители оромо, гураге, харари и других этнических групп. Они воевали под именем «абиссинцы». Эфиопия отстаивала свою независимость и была признана во всем мире. Были установлены дипломатические отношения со многими государствами.

Менелик целенаправленно осуществлял ряд мер по укреплению эфиопской государственности.

В условиях полиэтнического государства важна была национальная политика. Менелик II выступал за равноправие всех религий. Основными чертами национальной политики Менелика были веротерпимость и ассимиляция.

Заслуга императора в политике модернизации страны. Важное значение имели изменения в поземельных отношениях. «Декрет купле и продаже земли» означал радикальные изменения в традиционной системе землевладения. Впервые в истории Эфиопии земля переставала быть священной собственностью монарха, а становилась предметом купли-продажи.

Была проведена административная реформа: местные правители заменялись чиновниками, назначаемыми императором. Вся страна была разделена на провинции, во главе которых находился назначаемый губернатор. Административная реформа сыграла важную роль в консолидации эфиопского государства.

Усиление центральной власти на местах позволило перейти к военной реформе. Система постоя была заменена введением налога на содержание армии. Перевод армии на государственное содержание был шагом вперед по пути создания постоянной армии.

Была проведена реформа государственного управления: впервые в истории Эфиопии был создан кабинет министров и пост премьер-министра. Изменения касались и судопроизводства: территория станы была разделена на шесть районов, в каждом из которых закон представляли 12 судей. Они не подчинялись местным правителям.

Были созданы Банк Абиссинии, почтовая служба, телефонная и телеграфные системы.

Еще недавно разрозненная, раздираемая феодальными междоусобицами страна благодаря деятельности Менелика превращалась в единый политический организм.

Императора Менелика II без всякого преувеличения можно назвать величайшим политическим наследием Эфиопии.

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The Role of Emperor Haile Selassie I in Accelerating Integration Processes on the African Continent

The process of decolonization of African countries, the active phase of which fell on the late 1950s – early 1960s, raised the question of the need to create some kind of integration association on the continent. This, in the opinion of many Africans, could become an important step towards gaining full economic and political independence. The role of the individual in the creation of integration associations in Africa cannot be denied, however, along with the most famous figures such as K. Nkrumah, G. Abdel Nasser, many other Africans have played an important role in promoting the ideas of Pan-Africanism. In this regard, the purpose of the article is to identify the role of Emperor Haile Selassie I in accelerating the integration processes on the African continent, as well as to analyze the significance of his decisions in the process of creating the Organization of African Unity.

By 1961, there were two main groups – Brazzaville (which later became Monrovia) and Casablanca. The members of these associations had different opinions on a number of key issues, which created the appearance of the impossibility of their rapprochement and the creation of a single integration association. Ethiopia adhered to a neutral position, but Emperor Haile Selassie I, with the active assistance of Foreign Minister Ketem Yfuru, decided to start active work to create a united African union. A series of meetings held in 1962 allowed the Emperor of Ethiopia to secure the holding of the next meeting of African heads of state in Addis Ababa in 1963. As a result, on May 25, 1963, the creation of the Organization of African Unity was announced. So, we can conclude that Emperor Haile Selassie I played an extremely important role in reconciling the two rival groups of African countries, thereby accelerating integration in the African continent.

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Роль императора Хайле Селассие I в ускорении интеграционных процессов на Африканском континенте

Процесс деколонизации африканских стран, активная фаза которого пришлась на конец 1950-х – начало 1960-х годов, поставил перед лидерами наиболее сильных государств региона вопрос о необходимости создания какого-либо интеграционного объединения на континенте. Именно это, по мнению многих африканцев, могло стать важным шагом на пути обретения их полной экономической и политической независимости. Роль личности в создании интеграционных объединений в Африке не может отрицаться, однако наряду с наиболее известными деятелями, такими как К. Нкрума, Г. Абдель Насер, важную и иногда недооцененную роль в продвижении идей пан-африканизма сыграли и многие другие африканцы. В связи с этим целью статьи является выявление роли императора Хайле Селассие I в ускорении интеграционных процессов на Африканском континенте, а также анализ значения его решений в процессе создания Организации африканского единства.

Первые шаги на пути создания крупного африканского интеграционного объединения были сделаны еще в 1958 году, когда была создана «Конференция народов Африки». В течении следующих лет прошло довольно большое количество встреч и конференций, на которых обсуждались возможные пути создания интеграционного объединения. На всех наиболее важных встречах была представлена Эфиопия, в том числе и в лице императора Хайле Селассие I. К 1961 году сложилось две основных группы – Браззавильская (позднее ставшая Монровской) и Касабланкская. Члены этих объединений имели различное мнение по ряду ключевых вопросов, что создавало видимость невозможности их сближения и создания единого интеграционного объединения. Эфиопия придерживалась нейтральных позиций, однако император Хайле Селассие I при

активном содействии министра иностранных дел Кетема Йфру принял решение начать активную деятельность по созданию единого африканского союза.

Ряд переговоров, проведенных в 1962 году, позволил императору Эфиопии добиться организации в 1963 году очередной встречи глав африканских государств в Аддис-Абебе. В итоге 25 мая 1963 было объявлено о создании Организации африканского единства. Итак, можно сделать вывод, что император Хайле Селассие I сыграл чрезвычайно важную роль в примирении двух соперничавших групп африканских стран, тем самым ускорив интеграцию на территории Африканского континента.

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Power Struggles in Ethiopia: Implications of the Tigray Conflict for Peace and Security in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa

This paper explains that power struggles between the Ethiopian Federal government led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the Tigray Peoples' Liberation Front which had governed Ethiopia's northern Tigray region for 27 years before Ahmed became Prime Minister in 2018; are the root cause of the Tigray conflict which started in November 2020. The conflict is estimated to have left thousands of people dead and displaced more than 2 million people from their homes. According to the United Nations, there are reasonable grounds to believe that all parties to the conflict violated international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law; and that war crimes and crimes against humanity have allegedly been committed. The paper examines the implications of the Tigray conflict for peace and security for Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa region. It asserts that the conflict threatens to affect United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions in the Horn of Africa region, as Ethiopia has been one of the largest contributors to peacekeeping missions, particularly in Somalia. The conflict also affects the effective fight against Al-Qaeda in Somalia by an African Union (AU) Force; and threatens to create a massive and destabilising refugee crisis for the region. The paper argues that the appointment of three high-level envoys by the AU in November 2020; the appointment of a commission to investigate alleged war crimes in May 2021; and the appointment of former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo as a special envoy to the Horn of Africa region in August 2021; all point to a commitment by the AU to solve the crisis in Tigray and find "African solutions for African problems." It concludes that as the Ethiopian government has rebuffed all peace efforts by the AU, the AU may need to consider intervention as provided for in article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act.

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**Leadership on Governance and Development in Tanzania:
A Missing Link?**

Governance and leadership concepts are like the two sides of the same coin. Leaders adopt and adapt styles of governing either due to their charisma or incidences of the environment. Leadership is a catalyst to economic prosperity through mechanisms of mobilizing followers to achieve the intended objectives. Tanzania at independence declared three eminent enemies which a newly born state was to fight. The enemies are ignorance, diseases and poverty. The tools to fight these enemies were advanced namely, land, people, good politics and quality leadership. Since, the independence government in 1961 to 2021, the leadership in all phases has been endeavoring to promote development in order to eliminate the three enemies and improve the living standards of the communities. However, the bumps to achieve leadership factor in governance and development seem to be a puzzle. Through the documentary review, this paper has found out that, quality leadership in particular at the grassroots is a critical factor to promote governance and development. The paper concludes that for governance and sustainable development to be realized in Tanzania, investment in enhancing leadership qualities is a must do.

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**Lessons from the Past:
Towards Credible General Elections in Some Selected Countries**

This article focuses on the lessons that can be drawn from the previous general elections in Russia, Tanzania and Nigeria, with emphasis on the role of electoral observer/monitoring groups in ensuring a credible general election. Relying on secondary sources of data, such as journal articles, reports, and textbooks, as well as qualitative content analyses to achieve the objective of the paper. The article shows that the role of observer/monitoring groups often serves as a boost to the integrity, confidentiality, and creditability of the Russia, Tanzania and Nigeria general election. The groups also serve as mediators during an electoral dispute, as well as providing support mechanism, and plays the role of watchdog in detecting electoral fraud. The paper found that lack of wider coverage, accessibility, suspicious and bias remains obstacles to the group. Thus, the paper concludes that activities of the electoral observer/monitoring groups would further ensure the integrity and creditability of the general election in Russia, Tanzania and Nigeria if the obstacles hindering their duty is quickly resolved.

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Nation-building in a Multicultural World: Three African Countries Compared*

In the form the nation-state is known until now, it formed in Europe and North America in the Early Modern time and flourished in the 19th and 20th centuries, being adequate to realities of the world of industrial capitalism and cultural nationalism. However, other trends, related to super-intensive globalization and post-industrialism, are dominating in the world nowadays. At present, the Western states have to depart from the classical concept of the nation and seek solutions to a completely different problem – of supporting their citizens' unity at preservation of cultural diversity brought by migrants from all over the world in recent decades. Under the current circumstances, it should not be ruled out that post-colonial states, most of which are multicultural initially due to their unique history of formation, can find themselves in an advantageous position, if they abandon attempts to build nations according to the outdated classical Western pattern.

While irreversible globalization is associated with Modernity started in the West half a millennium ago, nation-building in contemporary post-colonial countries shows that globalization is by no means equal to Westernization, and that Modernity as a historically specific type of society and culture, splits into multiple modernities. The theoretical analysis is proved by comparison of the evidence from three post-colonial African states: Tanzania, Zambia, and Uganda. Although today, Tanzania is closer than Zambia and Uganda (as well as most other African countries) to formation of the nation in the classical Western sense, the author admits that the global trend towards multiculturalization of nations may become no less advantageous for countries like Zambia and Uganda. However, it is emphasized in the paper that proper leadership based on an ideology of multicultural nation is a necessary prerequisite for realization of these favorable conditions.

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Нациестроительство в мультикультурном мире: сравнительный анализ трех стран Африки*

В наше время государства Запада вынуждены отходить от классической концепции нации как культурно целостной общности и искать решения проблемы поддержки единства своих граждан при сохранении культурного многообразия, принесенного в последние десятилетия мигрантами со всего мира. В современных условиях нельзя исключать, что постколониальные государства, большинство из которых поликультурно изначально вследствие уникальной истории образования, окажутся в предпочтительном положении, если откажутся от попыток строительства наций по устаревшей классической западной модели. В то время как необратимая глобализация ассоциируется с модерном (Новым временем), начавшимся на Западе пол тысячелетия назад, нациестроительство в современных постколониальных странах показывает, что глобализация никоим образом не синонимична вестернизации, а модерн как исторически обусловленный тип общества и культуры распадается на множество модернов.

Проведенный нами анализ процесса становления наций в трех постколониальных государствах Африки – Объединенной Республике Танзании, Республике Замбии и Республике Уганде – показал, что вследствие лучших исторических предпосылок на сегодняшний день Танзания ближе, чем Замбия и Уганда (и вообще большинство стран субсахарской Африки) подошла к сложению нации как общности сограждан, приверженных единым базовым ценностям, обладающих единой культурой и идентичностью поверх локальных и частных – этнических, региональных, конфессиональных и т.д. – культур и идентичностей с их системами ценностей, и для которых лояльность одному для всех них национальному государству первична по отношению к обусловленным ими различиям. В Замбии и Уганде же локальные идентичности, особенно трибальные и этнические, намного более значимы, чем в Танзании. Однако с учетом глобальной

тенденции мультикультурализации, особенно явно проявляющейся сегодня на Западе, не является ли более перспективным положение не Танзании, а Замбии и Уганды (и постколониальных стран, подобных им, коих большинство)?

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Charitable Work of the Ismaili Imam in East Africa as a Source of Political Influence

The Ismaili Imam is a supranational entity of 15 million adherents of the Shiite branch of Islam, headed by the direct descendant of the fourth righteous Caliph Karim Aga Khan IV.

Despite the religious basis of their identity, the Ismaili are convinced that Islam should not force its followers to neglect worldly affairs. On the contrary, the Ismaili define improving the quality of people's lives, regardless of their spiritual preferences, as one of the main tasks of righteous Muslims. As a religious minority in more than 25 countries around the world, the Ismaili communities have many projects of their own. Secular education, eradication of poverty, medicine, agriculture, ensuring gender equality – in these and many other areas, civil society institutions created by the Ismaili operate, among which the Aga Khan Development Network stands out for the scale of its activities. By annually investing about \$ 100 million in charity, this network actually acts as a full-fledged actor in international relations, bound by cooperation agreements with the governments of sovereign states. So, since 2015, the Ismaili Imam has had a permanent headquarters in Lisbon, founded at the initiative of the Portuguese authorities.

East African countries: Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda are one of the most representative regions that demonstrate how the work for the common good of society allows the Ismaili to expand their influence. Without declaring their commitment to certain political forces, representatives of the Ismaili Imam form their own image, which favourably distinguishes them as active supporters of a progressive approach to solving problems recognized by the world community in 2015 after the proclamation of sustainable development goals. For example, in Africa, the Ismaili are among other things contributing to job creation and food security for vulnerable groups of people.

On balance, today – when in many Western societies Islam is associated primarily with numerous crises – analyzing the mechanisms of successful public diplomacy of the Ismaili and how the associated charity

allows them to assert their political leadership seems to be a relevant research task. In addition, the analysis of Ismaili's activities in East Africa will help Russian diplomats in shaping a long-term political strategy in the region.

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Благотворительная деятельность Исмаилитского Имамата в Восточной Африке как источник политического влияния

Исмаилитский имамат – это наднациональное объединение 15 миллионов сторонников шиитской ветви ислама, которое возглавляет прямой потомок четвёртого праведного халифа Карим Ага-Хан IV.

Несмотря на религиозную основу идентичности, исмаилиты убеждены, что ислам не должен вынуждать своих последователей пренебрегать мирскими делами. Напротив, улучшение качества жизни людей безотносительно к их духовным предпочтениям исмаилиты рассматривают как одну из основных задач праведных мусульман. Будучи религиозным меньшинством более чем в 25 странах по всему миру, исмаилитские общины осуществляют множество собственных проектов. Светское образование, борьба с бедностью, медицина, сельское хозяйство, обеспечение гендерного равенства – в этих и многих других сферах действуют созданные исмаилитами институты гражданского общества, среди которых масштабами деятельности выделяется Сеть Ага-Хана по развитию. Ежегодно вкладывая в благотворительность около 100 миллионов долларов США, данная сеть фактически действует как полноценный актор международных отношений, связанный соглашениями о сотрудничестве с правительствами суверенных государств. Так, с 2015 года Исмаилитский Имамат имеет постоянную штаб-квартиру в Лиссабоне, основанную по инициативе португальских властей.

Страны Восточной Африки: Танзания, Кения, Уганда, Руанда – это один из самых показательных регионов, который демонстрирует,

как работа на благо общества позволяет исмаилитам утверждать своё влияние. Не декларируя приверженности определённым политическим силам, представители Исмаилитского Имамата формируют свой собственный имидж, который выгодно выделяет их как активных сторонников прогрессивного подхода к решению проблем, признанных мировым сообществом в 2015 году: после провозглашения целей устойчивого развития. Например, в Африке исмаилиты помимо всего прочего способствуют созданию новых рабочих мест и повышению уровня продовольственной безопасности уязвимых слоёв населения.

Таким образом, сегодня – когда в массовом сознании многих западных обществ ислам ассоциируется прежде всего с многочисленными кризисами – рассмотрение механизмов успешной общественной дипломатии исмаилитов и того, как связанная с этим благотворительность позволяет им утверждать своё политическое лидерство, представляется актуальной исследовательской задачей. Кроме того, анализ деятельности исмаилитов в Восточной Африке поможет российским дипломатам при формировании долгосрочной политической стратегии в регионе.

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African Singapore: Rwanda under Paul Kagame

The author focuses on Rwandan significant achievements and growth points, as well as the main development challenges and their prerequisites. The economic indicators of the small, landlocked East African country over the past decade has shown considerable advances in education system, information technologies and political stability. We should note that over the past decade GDP per capita has been growing at an average annual rate of 7.5%. Since 1994 Rwanda has witnessed the first recession in a pandemic period – GDP fell by 3.4% in 2020.

Nowadays Rwanda aspires to become a middle-income country by 2035 and a high-income country by 2050. President Paul Kagame seeks to turn today's Rwanda into an African Singapore, which a state in ruins after the genocide could only dream of. In the article, the author dares to draw parallels between the Singapore system and Kagame's mission. Success of an Asian business hub can be generally attributed to the three factors: its geographic location, political stability, and ease of doing business. "The father of the Rwandan economic miracle" aims to strengthen these very positions.

Following discussion with civil society, NGOs and the private sector, Vision 2020 was released in 2000. The success strategy is based on six "pillars": nation, state, people, infrastructure, business and agriculture. Despite the fact that not all the Vision 2020 initiatives were implemented, Rwanda has already adopted the Vision 2050. The author thoroughly analyzes the reasons for the failure of Vision 2020 and the fundamental differences between the plans.

In addition to the challenges associated with the coronavirus, Kagame faces the issue of the chosen model efficiency due to high poverty rate, acute dependence on foreign investment and loans, low income and savings, and violations of political rights and freedoms.

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Африканский Сингапур: Руанда при Поле Кагаме

Автор статьи фокусируется на значительных достижениях Руанды и точках роста, а также основных трудностях для дальнейшего достижения прогресса и их причинах. Экономические показатели небольшой по территории, не имеющей выхода к морю восточноафриканской страны за последнее десятилетие демонстрируют значительные успехи в развитии системы образования, освоении информационных технологий и достижении политической стабильности. Заметим, что в среднем в период до 2020 г. валовой внутренний продукт (ВВП) на душу населения рос в среднем на 7,5% в год. Признаки рецессии с 1994 г. наблюдаются впервые в сложный для всей мировой экономики период пандемии - ВВП упал на 3,4% в 2020 г.

В настоящее время Руанда стремится перейти в статус государств со средним уровнем дохода к 2035 г. и с высоким уровнем дохода к 2050 г. Президент Поль Кагаме видит своей основной целью превращение современной Руанды в африканский Сингапур, о чем находящаяся в руинах после геноцида страна могла только мечтать. В своей статье автор смеет приводить параллели между системой Сингапура и миссией Кагаме. Успех Сингапура как делового центра можно в целом объяснить тремя факторами: географически выгодным положением, политической стабильностью, а также доступностью и легкостью ведения бизнеса. "Отец руандийского экономического чуда" ставит задачу по усилению именно этих позиций.

Для достижения поставленных целей еще в 2000 г. в результате консультаций с обществом, НПО и частным сектором была выпущена программа Vision 2020: стратегия основывается на шести "столпах": нация, государство, люди, инфраструктура, бизнес и сельское хозяйство. Несмотря на то, что не все инициативы были воплощены в реальность, Руанда вслед за первой стратегией одобрила план развития Vision 2050. Автор последовательно анализирует причины

неудач в реализации Vision 2020 и фундаментальные отличия между планами.

Определенно, кроме вызов, связанных с распространением коронавируса, перед Кагаме встает вопрос неэффективного характера выбранной политической и экономической модели ввиду высокого уровня бедности, острой зависимости от иностранных инвестиций и заимствований, низкого уровня доходов и сбережений, а также ограничений политических прав и свобод.

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Should South Africans Commemorate Smuts?

Jan Smuts, Prime Minister 1919–24 and again 1939–48, is one of the most paradoxical figures in South African history. Boer Freedom Fighter during the South African war (1899–1902), he played a major role in negotiating surrender and peace, subsequently viewing Boer interests as best served by pursuing a (white) South African nationalism within the British Empire. He was the chief architect of Union in 1910; as deputy prime minister to Louis Botha, he was to split Afrikaner nationalism when South Africa declared for Britain in the war against Germany in 1914. During the First World War he led South African forces against Germany in South-West Africa and Tanganyika, before serving in the British war cabinet from 1916–18. Subsequently, he became one of the foremost proponents of the League of Nations and the erection of an international architecture to prevent a recurrence of global war. When this failed, he again split Afrikanerdom by taking South Africa into the Second World War in 1939, and then played a major role in the establishment of the United Nations and was the principal author of its Declaration of Human Rights. Yet ironically, because the human rights he was advocating were denied to Black South Africans at home, what might have been his greatest international triumph proved to be his greatest international humiliation.

Today, while many historians laud his record of international statesmanship, he is widely reviled for the limitations of his domestic record. He showed no mercy to striking workers, black or white. Tolerant of the Cape franchise for qualified blacks, he was a staunch believer in ‘trusteeship’ and white supremacy. Although liberal in his personal beliefs, as a politician he consistently opted for pragmatism over principle if ‘racial issues’ were to get in the way of his political ends. Nonetheless, many historians continue to regret his defeat by the National Party by the 1948, pointing to reformist potentialities which emerged in South Africa during the Second World War, and which conceivably, might have placed the country on a different trajectory had they endured.

Smuts remains a highly contradictory figure, yet along with Nelson Mandela is the only South African leader to have been celebrated

internationally. This fact alone poses enormous challenges to how contemporary South Africans should view him today.

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Zimbabwe: Political Leadership and Influence in the Context of Social Perceptions: An Empirical Research (2010)

The study was conducted in 2010, during the celebration of the 30th anniversary of Zimbabwe's independence. There was a crisis of power in the country. The purpose of the study is to determine the specifics of the social perceptions of respondents – followers of political opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai (Movement for Democratic Change, MDC) and followers of leader Robert Mugabe, then President of Zimbabwe, leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) party. Ideas about the optimal foreign strategic partner for Zimbabwe were studied. Is the split at the level of political leaders and political parties accompanied by a split in society? Does this process affect social attitudes, respondents' vision of the country's development path and geopolitical prospects?

To implement these research objectives, a questionnaire survey was conducted according to the author's methodology of E.Kharitonova. Respondents from two Universities in Zimbabwe were interviewed: the University of Harare and the University of Gweru. These two universities are actually located on the territories of the warring parties. Harare is the official capital of Zimbabwe, the territory of influence of President Robert Mugabe and the leader of the ruling ZANU PF party. The President has proclaimed and is implementing the strategy of "Steps to the East" and limiting the influence on the country from the "Anglo-Saxon" world. Bulawayo city, where Gweru University is located– is the zone of influence of opposition leader Morgan Richard Tsvangirai and his Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party. The opposition is oriented towards Western values and is interested in close cooperation with the Western world. The opposition receives financial support from the "Western World".

The questionnaire is based on ideas about five attitudes regarding the choice of a foreign partner: setting on a "special path" and limiting external influences, including in the form of foreign financial flows; setting on new technologies and modernization of the economy with the help of a

potential business partner; setting on a long-term strategic partnership with the partner state; setting on donor support from a foreign business partner; setting on Western business standards and integration into the World economy.

The poll showed what a partner the supporters of leader R. Mugabe wanted, and what a partner the supporters of the opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai preferred. Statistically significant differences in the obtained data were revealed.

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**Зимбабве: политическое лидерство и влияние
в контексте социальных представлений.
Опыт эмпирического исследования (2010 год)**

Исследование проводилось в 2010 году, в дни празднования 30-летия независимости Зимбабве. В стране наблюдался раскол и кризис власти. Цель исследования – определить специфику социальных представлений респондентов-последователей политического лидера оппозиции Моргана Цвангираи («Движения за демократические перемены», MDC) и последователей лидера Роберта Мугабе, в то время Президента Зимбабве, лидера партии "Зимбабвийский африканский национальный союз – Патриотический фронт" (Zanu-PF). Изучались представления относительно оптимального иностранного стратегического партнера для Зимбабве. Сопровождается ли раскол на уровне политических лидеров и политических партий расколом в обществе? Отражается ли этот процесс на социальных установках, на видении респондентами пути развития страны и геополитических перспектив?

Для реализации этих задач исследования был проведен анкетный опрос по авторской методике Е. Харитоновой. Опрошены респонденты из двух Университетов Зимбабве: Университета Хараре и Университета г. Гверу. Эти два университета, фактически, находятся на территориях противоборствующих сторон. Хараре – официальная столица Зимбабве, территория влияния Президента страны Роберта

Мугабе и лидера правящей партии ЗАНУ ПФ. Президентом провозглашена и реализуется стратегия «Шагов на Восток» и ограничения влияний на страну со стороны «англо-саксонского» мира. Город Булавайо, где расположен университет Гверу, – зона влияния лидера оппозиции Моргана Ричарда Цвангирай и его партии «Движение за демократические реформы» (MDC). Оппозиция ориентирована на западные ценности, стремится к тесному взаимодействию с западным миром и получает от него финансовую поддержку.

В основу анкеты положены представления о пяти установках, касающихся выбора Зимбабве иностранного партнера: установка на «особый путь» и ограничение внешних влияний, в том числе в виде иностранных финансовых потоков; установка на новые технологии и модернизацию экономики с помощью потенциального делового партнера; установка на долгосрочное стратегическое партнерство с государством-партнером; установка на донорскую поддержку со стороны иностранного делового партнера; установка на западные деловые стандарты и интеграцию в мировую экономику.

Опрос показал, какого партнера хотят сторонники лидера Р.Мугабе, и какого партнера предпочитают сторонники лидера оппозиции Моргана Цвангирай. Выявлены статистически значимые различия в полученных данных.

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**Leadership and Power in the Struggle
against Apartheid in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s**

This paper will consider the role of leadership in the struggle against apartheid in the crucial decades of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. It will contrast the diplomatic leadership style of O.R. Tambo, who held together the African National Congress in exile, with the often divisive leadership of Sam Nujoma of SWAPO. Arguably, however, Nujoma, as commander in chief of SWAPO's armed wing, was a more successful military leader. In the Frontline States Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere showed impressive leadership. Then in the 1980s there was scope for a new kind of leadership to emerge within South Africa in the United Democratic Front and the Mass Democratic Movement. From his jail, Nelson Mandela began from the mid-1980s to show remarkable leadership, without any formal power he was able to begin engaging with the apartheid regime and preparing the way for the negotiated settlement of the early 1990s, which meant the end of formal apartheid. The paper will analyse these different leadership roles and weigh their significance.

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The Need of Parliamentary System of Governance in the Multiethnic-Multipartite Côte d'Ivoire

People of Côte d'Ivoire like many people from different African countries after independence did not choose the mode of governance of the country taking into account the ethnic and cultural mosaic.

Reason for this situation was the absolute power of her leader Felix Houphouet Boigny and the need for postcolonial control by the metropole in the country.

Indeed, if the first three decades of independence of Côte d'Ivoire was successful and recognized as an "Ivorian Economic Miracle" (Le miracle ivoirien) on the one hand, since 1990s, it started a new era of instability due to many reasons such as the 1990s world economic crisis; the death of Felix Houphouet Boigny in 1993 and the arise problem of succession; military push 1999; civil war from 2002 and the division of the country in the North under the control of rebels and South under official power; the postelection oral crisis of 2010 and unconstitutional contested 3rd mandate of the acting President Alassane Ouattara.

These aforementioned crises brought their origin from the problem of national identity due to the national multiethnic and cultural population. These reasons are considered fundamentals raising the question of multicultural and multiethnic modes of governance of the country.

This paper proposes the Parliamentary mode of governance for Ivorian multicultural and multiethnic society.

To achieve our purpose, historical, legal and analytic methods are used. The historical method allowed us to give the chronology of the political system and governance of the country from the 1960s to 2020. The legal method permitted the analysis of the legal instruments, particularly different constitutions from independence until now. The analytical method consists of the analysis of the evolution of different transformations that occurred in the country from the 1960s to 2020.

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Understanding the Classic Strategy of Leadership and Power Struggle in Nigeria: Its Pros and Cons

Nigeria is a multi-ethnic country and one of the African countries characterized by numerous developmental challenges that are traceable to the leadership strategies of leaders (past and present) involved in the governing and administering of the country. One of the leadership strategies used in Nigeria to maintain leadership and power is the classic strategy. The term classic strategy implies an inconsiderately exploration or utilization of ethnic divides, religious affinity and educational level and social class as political tools to build a competitive advantage over other contenders during an election or in the administration. Unfortunately, the classic leadership strategy has generated a lot of issues for power struggle and secessionist movements in the current Nigerian leadership situation yet, little or no studies have investigated its trends and implications in the Nigerian political landscape. This study, therefore, aimed at understanding the classic strategy of leadership and power-struggle in the contemporary Nigerian political landscape using the experience of political scientists and selected grass root politicians in the Southwest region, Nigeria. The study anchored on rational choice and power-struggle theory for theoretical guide. The study employed descriptive and exploratory research designs with quantitative (questionnaire) and qualitative (interview) data. The study revealed that the classic strategy is a weapon used by self-centred leaders who aim at stirring up powerful tribal or religious sentiments among the populace to gain access to a leadership position. The study also established that the frequent use of classic strategy by past and present leaders in Nigeria has resulted in a lack of visionary leadership, conflict over resource control, social disorganization, poverty, militancy and insecurity. In conclusion, the study recommended that leaders shun classic strategy and unhealthy power play by political leaders to promote socio-economic development, good governance, peaceful co-existence and security in Nigeria.

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**Social, Cultural and Geographical Considerations as
Determinants of Governmental Power Equations
in Fourth Republic Nigeria**

The study examines the extent to which social, cultural and geographical considerations determine governmental power equations in Fourth Republic Nigeria. Three (3) research questions and three hypotheses were answered and tested in the study, respectively. The design of the study was correlational, with the population as the 774 Local Government Areas in Nigeria. These Local Government Areas have 774 Chairmen and Chairmen of Caretaker Committees, from which 387 (50%) were selected as sample, using the simple random sampling technique. Respondents of the study responded to 2 sets of instruments. These were the 21-item Social, Cultural and Geographical Considerations Scale (SCGS) and the 8-item Governmental Power Equations Inventory (GPAI), designed by the researchers in the modified 4-point Likert scale model with reliability indices of 0.84 and 0.89, respectively. Simple regression was used in answering the research questions while z-test associated with simple regression was used in testing the hypothesis at 0.05 level of significance. The findings of the study show that, social, cultural and geographical considerations determine governmental power equations in Fourth Republic Nigeria and that there are significant determinations of social, cultural and geographical considerations on governmental power Equations on Fourth Republic Nigeria. Consequently, the study concluded that, social, cultural and geographical variables play strong roles in determining governmental power equations in fourth Republic Nigeria. Recommendations made are that, stakeholders should come out with appropriate parameters when using these variables in determining governmental pendulum.

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Coupvolutions as Mechanism of Political Transformations in Western Africa and Sahel

Arab Spring led to the growth of socio-political instability not only in the Middle East and Northern Africa, but around the world. At the same time, events in Egypt even led to the birth of brand-new term in political science – *coupvolution*, which unites the characteristics of *revolution* and *coup*. The concept of coupvolution means a revolutionary event, which has mass protests against the current power and the activation of revolutionary movement at the first stage, and then, at the second stage, military takes the scene and acquires control over the situation by conducting a coup. Such an approach to describe political change was first used to describe Egypt's events (firstly in 2011, then in 2013). Both cases had a first stage of public dissatisfaction followed by protests and demonstrations on Tahrir square, while in the endgame Egyptian military intervened in the process. In 2011, the Minister of Defence Mohamed Tantawi stated that the army would not participate in dispersing the demonstrators, thus, he provoked the resignation of Hosni Mubarak. And in 2013, the Minister of Defence Abdel Fattah el-Sisi declared the dismissal of president Mohamed Morsi and the suspension of the Constitution.

Coupvolutions are not exclusive to Egypt. Similar events can be noticed in other regions of the world. Despite the fact that the term appeared to describe Egyptian events, similar processes are characteristic not so much for Northern Africa, but for Sub-Saharan Africa (the biggest spread they have in countries of Western Africa and Sahel). The examples are events of 1991 and 2010s in Mali, Niger in 2009-2010, Burkina Faso in 2014 and 2018-2019 in Sudan. By initial estimations for the last 30 years there were at least 10 such events in Western Africa and Sahel (the last two are, for instance, coups in Sudan in October 2021 and in Guinea in September 2021, while Mali experienced three coups in the last decade). Counting failed coup attempts increases the number significantly. At the same time, political science has yet to explain the factors of such concentration, and it is attempted in this study. Therefore, the main task of

the study is to find factors, which enable for this type of regime transformation to be the most widespread in the regions of Western Africa and Sahel.

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Кувалюции как механизм политических трансформаций в странах Западной Африки и Сахеля

Арабская весна привела к росту социально-политической нестабильности не только в странах Ближнего Востока и Северной Африки, но и по всему миру. В то же самое время события в Египте даже привели к появлению совершенно нового политологического термина – «кувалюция» (*coupvolution*), сочетающего в себе черты, с одной стороны, революция (*revolution*), а, с другой, военного переворота (*coup*). Концепт кувалюции означает революционное событие, в котором на первом этапе проходят массовые акции протеста против действующей власти и мобилизуется революционное движение, а на втором этапе на первый план выходят военные, которые берут ситуацию в свои руки и устраивают военный переворот. Данный подход к описанию процесса смены политической власти впервые был применен событий в Египте (сначала 2011 года, а затем и 2013 года). В обоих случаях первый этап недовольства сопровождался массовыми протестами и демонстрациями на площади Тахрир, а на заключительном этапе в революционный процесс вмешивались египетские военные. В 2011 году министр обороны Мухаммад ат-Тантауи объявил о том, что армия не будет участвовать в разгоне демонстрантов, спровоцировав тем самым отставку президента Хосни Мубарака. А в 2013 году министр обороны Абд аль-Фаттах ас-Сиси объявил об отстранении президента Мухаммада Мурси от власти и приостановлении действия конституции.

При этом кувалюции происходили не только в Египте. Аналогичные события можно зафиксировать и других регионах мира.

Несмотря на то, что сам термин появился для описания египетских событий, подобные события были характерны не столько для арабского мира, сколько для субсахарской Африки (наибольшее распространение они получили в странах Западной Африки и Сахеля). В качестве примеров можно привести события 1991 года и 2010-х годов в Мали, 2009-2010 годов в Нигере, 2014 года в Буркина-Фасо, 2018-2019 года в Судане. По предварительным подсчетам за одни только последние 30 лет в Западной Африке и Сахеле произошло не менее 10 таких событий (последние два, например это переворот в Судане в октябре 2021 и переворот в Гвинее в сентябре 2021, а в Мали за последние десять лет было сразу три переворота). Если также учитывать неудачные попытки переворотов, то число значительно увеличивается. При этом на данный момент политическая наука так и не объяснила факторы этой концентрации, что предпринимается в данном исследовании. Таким образом, главной задачей данного исследования является выявить факторы, способствующие тому, что данный тип трансформации политического режима является наиболее распространенным именно в регионе Западной Африки и Сахеля.

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Revolutionary Events in Three Countries of the Sahel (1960–2021): Preliminary Analysis

We offer a preliminary analysis of the revolutionary events in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. It is shown that the postcolonial history of Mali is extremely rich in revolutionary events. The analysis makes it possible to single out four national separatist and two armed Islamist insurgencies. In addition, in the postcolonial history of Mali, two rather specific revolutionary events are found, belonging to a type that is quite typical for the countries of North-East and West Africa. To designate them, it seems possible to use the concept of "coup-volution" (stemming from the combination of the words "coup" and "revolution") as a general term denoting a rather specific type of revolutionary processes, when the revolutionary mass mobilization at the first phase is accompanied by a military coup in the second phase of the revolutionary process; at the same time, in the course of this revolution, many of the requirements of the participants in the first phase of the couvolutionary process are realized. To designate the military coup of the second phase of the couvolutionary process, a rather apt designation has been proposed – "endgame coup". In the history of Mali, two revolutions can be identified – the 1991 democratic revolution (which can be seen as part of the Fifth revolutionary wave of the 20th century) and the 2020-2021 revolution (which can be considered as part of the Third revolutionary wave of the 20th century). At the same time, the last revolutionary event can no longer be attributed to the number of democratic revolutions.

The analysis of the postcolonial history of Niger makes it possible to single out two national-separatist and two armed Islamist insurgences. In addition, the postcolonial history of Niger reveals one analogue of the revolution (which can be considered as part of the Fifth Revolutionary Wave of the 20th century) and one "couvolution" (2009–2010). The quasi-revolutionary episode (with a pronounced influence of the center-peripheral dissonance effect) of February 2021 and the attempted military coup in March 2021 are also analyzed as an indicator of the possibility of new couvolutionary events.

The postcolonial history of Burkina Faso is also rich in revolutionary events. During this period of the country's history, two rather specific revolutionary events (1965–66 and 2014) of the couvolutionary type are revealed. In addition, in Upper Volta / Burkina Faso, a pronounced analogue of the revolution is recorded – the Sankarist revolution of 1983–1987, as well as the revolutionary episode of 2011, directly related to the events of the Arab Spring. The analysis carried out also makes it possible to single out two armed Islamist insurgences.

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Революционные события в трех странах Сахеля (1960–2021 гг.): предварительный анализ

Дан предварительный анализ революционных событий в Мали, Нигере и Буркина-Фасо. Показано, что постколониальная история Мали исключительно богата на революционные события. Проведенный анализ позволил выделить четыре национально-сепаратистских и два исламистских революционных выступления. Кроме того, в постколониальной истории Мали обнаруживаются два достаточно специфических революционных события, относящихся к типу, достаточно характерному для стран Северо-Восточной и Западной Африки. Для их обозначения представляется возможным использовать понятие «куволюция» (coup-volution – от сочетания слов coup и revolution) в качестве общего термина, обозначающего достаточно специфический тип революционных процессов, когда революционная массовая мобилизация на первой фазе сопровождается военным переворотом на второй фазе революционного процесса; при этом в ходе данного переворота реализуются многие требования участников первой фазы куволюционного процесса. Для обозначения военного переворота второй фазы куволюционного процесса предложено довольно удачное обозначение – «эндшпильный переворот» (endgame coup). В истории Мали можно идентифицировать две куволюции – демократическую революцию

1991 года (которую можно рассматривать как часть Пятой революционной волны XX века) и куволюцию 2020–2021 годов (которую можно рассматривать как часть Третьей революционной волны XX века). При этом последнее революционное событие к числу демократических революций уже отнести никак нельзя.

Проведенный анализ постколониальной истории Нигера позволил выделить два национально-сепаратистских и два исламистских революционных выступления. Кроме того, в постколониальной истории Нигера обнаруживается один аналог революции (который можно рассматривать как часть Пятой революционной волны XX века) и одна «куволюция» (2009–2010 гг.). Также анализируются квази-революционный эпизод (с выраженным влиянием эффекта центр-периферийного диссонанса) февраля 2021 г. и попытка военного-переворота марта 2021 г. как индикатор возможности новых куволюционных событий.

Достаточно богата на революционные события и постколониальная история Буркина-Фасо. В этот период истории страны обнаруживаются два достаточно специфических революционных события (1965–66 и 2014 гг.) куволюционного типа. Помимо этого, в Верхней Вольте / Буркина-Фасо фиксируются ярко выраженный аналог революции – Санкаристская революция 1983–1987 гг., а также революционный эпизод 2011 года, прямо связанный с событиями Арабской весны. Проведенный анализ также позволяет выделить два вооруженных исламистских революционных выступления.

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**The Question of Sovereignty and the Problem of Terrorism in Africa:
The Case of Mali**

The Malian crisis is very complex in the sense that it is surrounded by ambiguities. It has an internal dimension and affects the sovereignty of Mali, whose territorial cohesion is threatened, but it also raises concerns over much of the Sahel and West Africa. It is therefore a double-sided crisis: an institutional dimension since the coup d'état that caused the fall of President Amadou Toumani Touré, aggravated by the capture of the north of the country by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). But this crisis is made more difficult to resolve by the multiplicity of actors and groups involved in it, in particular the elements of AQIM (Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb). Recently, the birth of MUJAO (movement for unity and Jihad in West Africa) gave the conflict a sub-regional dimension fueling all fears of instability in West Africa. The central issue that will come up in all aspects and angles of approach to the conflict remains the viability of the African state as well as the clash between the principle of sovereignty and the transnationality of non-institutional actors. This is why a political analysis of the Malian situation would not be complete without taking this dimension into account as well as the new questions raises, particularly in terms of human security and foresight on sub-regional stability.

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Young Generation of the Senegalese Political Elite and Current Government in the Context of Events in March 2021

In the context of the unstable and conflict development of the countries of the African continent, the role of a political leader is of particular importance.

The effectiveness of government and political leadership is determined by their legitimacy and support from broad strata of the population. And the institution of elections is one of the main mechanisms of the legitimacy of a political leader.

The problem of a change of power or a "third term" occupies an important place in this mechanism. Often, limiting the powers of the president to two terms leads to the desire to cancel it as an exception.

In an era of a changing world, the charismatic elements inherent in the institution of power itself do not depend on the personal traits of the ruler. Charisma is generated not so much by his personal qualities as by the masses led by him.

The political crisis in Senegal in March 2021 showed the deep dissatisfaction of the masses, primarily young people, from the authoritarian methods of government of President McKee Sall, from his desire to suppress any opposition. Just like under his successor A. Wade, justice in the country is still not independent, it is subordinate to the executive branch. The two most influential parties in Senegal were stripped of their candidates for the top post in the last 2019 elections.

Currently, the main opponent of M. Sall in the public space remains the PASTEF party, led by Usman Sonko, a young politician who took third place in the 2019 elections. He is very popular among young people who see him as an alternative to M. Sall in the 2024 elections.

The dramatic events of March 4–8, 2021, which caused an outbreak of unprecedented violence, were associated with the arrest of U. Sonko on an unproven charge of rape (he is now at large, under judicial control). He is considered a "victim of a conspiracy" to be excluded from political competition ahead of the next presidential election. The figure of the leader of PASTEF has become a symbol of the unification of those dissatisfied

with Sall's policies.

The events of March 4–8 have shaken the image of Senegal as a “model of stability on the continent”. They pushed opposition politicians and civil society organizations to create the M2D (Movement for Democracy) coalition, which should counterbalance authoritarian methods of government and prevent M. Sall from being re-elected for a third term. Senegal has one of the most active networking communities in Francophone Africa. The global acceleration of information transfer will increasingly lead to self-improvement of the means of self-organization of young people who support their leader.

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Молодое поколение сенегальской политической элиты и действующая власть в контексте событий марта 2021 г.

В условиях нестабильно-конфликтного развития стран Африканского континента роль политического лидера приобретает особое значение.

Эффективность власти и политического лидерства определяется их легитимностью, поддержкой широких слоев населения. А институт выборов является одним из главных механизмов легитимности политического лидера.

Проблема смены власти или «третьего срока» занимает важное место в этом механизме. Нередко ограничение полномочий президента двумя сроками приводит к желанию в виде исключения его отменить.

В эпоху меняющегося мира харизматические элементы, присущие самому институту власти, не зависят от персональных черт правителя. Харизму порождают не столько его личные качества, сколько руководимые им массы.

Политический кризис в Сенегале в марте 2021 г. показал глубокую неудовлетворенность масс, в первую очередь молодежи, от авторитарных методов правления президента Макки Салля, от его стремления подавить любую оппозицию. Как и при его преемнике

А. Ваде правосудие в стране по-прежнему не является независимым, оно подчиняется исполнительной власти. Две самые влиятельные партии Сенегала были лишены на последних выборах 2019 г. своих кандидатов на высший пост.

В настоящее время главным оппонентом М. Салля в публичном пространстве осталась партия ПАСТЕФ во главе с Усманом Сонко, молодым политиком, занявшим третье место на выборах 2019 г. Он очень популярен среди молодежи, которая видит в нем альтернативу М. Саллю на выборах 2024 г.

Драматические события 4–8 марта 2021 г., вызвавшие вспышку небывалого насилия, были связаны с арестом У. Сонко по недоказанному обвинению в изнасиловании (сейчас он на свободе, под судебным контролем). Его считают «жертвой заговора» с целью исключения из политической конкуренции перед следующими президентскими выборами. Фигура лидера ПАСТЕФ стала символом объединения недовольных политикой Салля.

События 4–8 марта пошатнули образ Сенегала, олицетворявшего «модель стабильности на континенте».

Они подтолкнули оппозиционных политических деятелей и организации гражданского общества к созданию коалиции М2Д (Движения в защиту демократии), которое должно стать противовесом авторитарным методам правления и не допустить переизбрания М. Салля на третий срок.

Сенегал имеет одно из самых активных сетевых сообществ во франкофонной Африке. Глобальное ускорение передачи информации все больше будет приводить к самосовершенствованию средств самоорганизации молодежи, поддерживающей своего лидера.

PANEL VI
LEADERSHIP AND POWER IN AFRICA: GENERAL ASPECTS

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**The Powers That May Be:
Post-Colonialism and Epistemologies of Power in Africa**

Ever since the institutionalization of their colonial-era predecessors, many African nations have maintained the notion of the secular state that had been implemented by European colonizers. Within this modernist framework, any involvement of religious concepts and/or institutions in the political realm represents an illegitimate, pre-modern infringement on the democratic state. With more recent post-colonial critiques challenging taken-for-granted claims of a universally rational, secular modernity, formerly primitivized cultural formations that evaluate political leadership in cosmological terms gain new momentum as genuinely alternative definitions of legitimate power.

This paper focuses on epistemologies of power in contemporary Malawi. Based on ethnographic field research between 2004 and 2020, it argues for a postcolonial re-evaluation of local conceptualizations of power and legitimacy that de-exoticizes – and de-exceptionalizes – cosmological conceptions of hierarchy and leadership in Africa, contextualizing them instead within larger global debates on divinely appointed presidents, righteous leadership, and the (im)morality of power and wealth. As sophisticated idioms of investigation, contestation, and critique, Malawian discourses on the cosmological frameworks that underlie social realities of power provide a deep insight into larger social concerns of social inequality and disenfranchisement, oppression and liberation, good leadership and the abuse of power.

Post-Colonial Tropical Africa: Tenets of Political Leadership

Nowhere in the world do individual countries reflect so much the character of their presidents as in Africa. Which becomes of a country often depends entirely on who its president is. A new politician comes into the office, and the country may start moving in a completely different direction. While African countries were headed by "first generation" leaders – "fathers of the nation", the nature of their leadership, despite the dictatorial habits typical of many of them, was not called into question at all, although their leadership in some cases was accompanied by relatively fast economic development and in other cases led to the economic downturn and aggravation of the socio-political situation. Yet from the second half of the 1960s, in many countries military coups became the main mechanism for a change of leadership, and the problem of political leadership rose to its full potential.

The difference between African rulers and Western political leaders lies in the creation (involuntary – due to a strong charisma, or deliberate – to strengthen their grip on power) of the image of the head of state as the "father of the nation", "great leader", "great warrior", "wise man", "teacher", etc. Indeed, this attitude of citizens towards the rulers contributed to the legitimization of their regimes. This was partly due to the traditional respect for elders and heads of families, the cult of ancestors, the deification of the leader, and not even of the leader himself – after all, he might not have any "divine" qualities and terrorize his own citizens – but of his "position". However, many leaders were forced – in order to strengthen their position and legitimize the regime – to artificially create a cult of their personality, because they lacked charisma and public trust necessary for its natural appearance.

In the post-colonial period, African countries faced many objective problems: the imbalance of economic development, the "tradition – modernity" dichotomy, the need to strengthen political sovereignty and to gain credibility in the international arena, etc. Many problems arose as a result of the actions of the rulers, who, of course, were influenced by their environment and external pressure, but were not prisoners of these

pressures and interfered, sometimes resolutely, in public life, achieving success and making mistakes. Therefore, some countries weak in terms of resources showed amazing successes in the political and socio-economic spheres, while rich and promising ones were caught in wars and conflicts. From the point of view of establishing or destroying order, the actions of political leaders were often more important than any other factors.

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Socio–historical Roots of Postcolonial Elites in Africa

It has long been accepted that most modern African states originated in the colonial era: they were thoroughly “sequenced” over the past few decades. However, the societies, which make and re–make them, and particularly their elites, present a more complex problem. The nature and origins of post-colonial elites remain obscure and elusive. There are many reasons for this: the multiplicity and diversity of the types of elites, political correctness taboos, and the predominance of social identity stereotypes based on non–African realities, to name just a few.

On the basis of East African material the proposed paper looks into the major factors which defined the specific nature of colonial elites at their birth, in the early years of colonisation, and which contributed to their consolidation during the colonial era. It discusses the social design of African societies at the point of independence and the directions in which post-colonial developments have taken its elites. The paper shows the overarching importance of evolving continuities in the mode of functioning of social mechanisms in African societies from precolonial conditions to modernity.

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Africa in the Face of Neoliberal Globalization

After three centuries of slave exploitation, and a century of colonial domination, Africa is struggling to find a way towards economic and political development for the benefit of its people. The hard-won independence, no offense to the revisionists, continues to be formal. The sovereignty of young African States over their (wealth) natural and mineral resources still remains in most cases a pipe dream. The former colonial powers continue to have an almost exclusive monopoly on the resources of the majority of African countries accentuated by neoliberal globalization following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the USSR.

This neoliberal globalization and its corollary of market dictatorship comes after Third World countries in general and those of Africa in particular were subjected to structural adjustment programs of the IMF and the World Bank in the 1980s. of the last century. The consequences of these structural adjustment programs (SAPs) on already fragile economies have been the disintegration of our societies and the weakening of our states barely emerging from colonial domination. Africa's relations with the Western world in light of this observation are unbalanced and subordinate relations between the former and the latter.

As if these scourges which plague Africa's present were not enough, the European Union has found a more insidious and cynical formula for confiscating the future of the continent through the economic partnership agreements (EPAs). These famous agreements make Africa a simple supplier of raw materials to the economies of European countries to the detriment of its own development.

Faced with the catastrophic situation that is that of the black continent, one must ask what should be the attitude of the political elite? What should be the role of the intelligentsia in our different states? And finally, what mode of development is suitable for Africa?

The alternative available to us today for the rapid and harmonious development of the continent undoubtedly lies in breaking with the economic and political model imposed by the West. This break must take place at three levels. The first and most important is the breaking of the

colonial pact which still binds many African countries to their former metropolises. The rejection of the status quo predominant in Africa – Europe relations must lead to the full assertion of our sovereignties.

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Emerging Leadership in Africa: Challenges, Prospect and Road Ahead

Africa is passing through an interesting phase of its development and its leaders now have to play a very transforming and crucial role in meeting the emerging challenges. The emerging leaders should strive to find a happy outlet through which the African continent would be able play a role at the forefront of the world stage. A new kind of leaders have to evolve, who are capable of facing up to a number of challenges such as fragmentation of the region, history and knowledge, relaying the foundations of a modern State, The advancement of democracy and human rights and the pursuance of new conditions for reconciliation and freedom, and sustainable development. It is critical that new leadership measures up to tackle and address the emerging challenges in African continent.

In this paper, I will explore to formulate a pan-African leadership development strategy to devise a framework in which leaders use their influence, skill and guidance to facilitate beneficial social, political and economic change in their communities.

The paper will examine the relevance and efficacy of Africa for Africa through collaboration and leadership within a community from traditional post-colonial development model to a more democratic and participative model of development. Rather than bringing in “experts” from the “developed world”, the paper will analyse and recommend for African wisdom, acknowledging the strengths and contributions of all participants and partners. In this context, the paper will also draw experiences from Indian, Tanzanian and Russian leadership and power structure.

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Leadership Challenges in Africa

Africa continues to face serious development challenges despite recent record growth rates. Such challenges as dependency, corruption, underdeveloped infrastructure and production sectors, and leadership and governance are some of the impediments to Africa's quest for sustainable and equitable development. Explaining such development challenges has continued to elude scholars. However, after so many years of independence, the debate is increasingly focusing on Africa's leadership as good explanation for its poverty and underdevelopment.

The African continent is still facing serious challenges of development regardless of leadership changes. Dependency in Africa introduced corruption, fraud, underdeveloped infrastructure, poor leadership, and unsustainable development. Under development in Africa is mostly caused by the type of leaders that are elected to take leadership positions in Africa. This paper argues that the current poverty and underdevelopment of Africa have much to do with enabling conditions created by African leaders.

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**Towards the Typology of Political Systems:
Post-Soviet Countries and Africa**

In this paper, I am going to present a sort of comparative analysis of political systems (party systems and the systems of leadership and power) in Africa and the post-Soviet states (PSS). In both cases, building modern political systems was attempted in line with the Western model, since the alternative Soviet model had been compromised. However both in Africa and PSS we can hardly find any political system which really fits the “Western” model: “Conservative” / “Labour”, “the Republicans” / “the Democrats”, “the Christian Democrats” / “the Social Democrats”, with a simplified substantive difference: more economic freedom, more dynamic economy – in case of the former; greater social guarantees, less social tension – in case of the latter (with regular alternations as a guarantee of the balance of interests). Instead of changing “left” / “right” parties (blocks) we see quite different varieties: multiparty systems when one party always wins, political systems oriented to a certain personality, political struggle of the “parties” oriented to the external “patrons”, ethnically / religiously / regionally oriented political systems. At the same time, “The End of History” promised by Francis Fukuyama has not come to the “Western” world either: the balanced system of society underwent the severe pressure of new factors, and, to a great extent, due to the influence of the “third” world problems which became the important factor in the internal political life of the “West”. In this presentation, I am going to typologize the political systems of Africa and PSS (pointing out both common and different traits) and to discuss the reasons of failure in attempting (often rather purposeful) to copy the systems which seem to have been working in the West, at least for a certain time. I am trying to avoid simple (and rather popular nowadays) answer based on “civilization” distinctions, and the drawbacks of the “evolutionist” approach by using the notion of the “multistage heterogeneity”, offered by Nikolay Girenko.

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**“African Archetype” is the Key to
Understanding the Revolutionism of the East**

Historical progress of society since the time of the bourgeois revolutions of the 18th-19th centuries closely related to the concept of "revolution". In the East (Periphery), socialist and national-liberation revolutions of the first half of the 20th century were replaced by «color» revolutions, the slogans of which, borrowed from Western political cultures, in fact, turn into their opposite, which leads to the next revolutionary explosion under similar slogans.¹³

A revolution is an objective pattern of the historical dynamics of the East, which cannot be understood based on the approaches existing in science, formed materials of the analysis of Western revolutions. It is necessary to develop a concept of «peripheral development» (modernization), a characteristic feature of which is the decisive role of the impact of an external factor (Western cultures) on traditional society.

As a result, the social-age balance is destroyed, which ensured the dynamic balance (harmony) of the traditional society, thanks to the timely transfer of powerful and prestigious resources to the rising generation. The «ideal type» of society, built on «age classes» in nature, is recorded in Oromo (Ethiopia).

There are cases of «youth revolutions» in African societies of the pre-colonial period, when the elders, contrary to tradition, delayed the transfer of such resources to the younger generation. Also, the rituals of the inauguration of the leader, in which the plot of the forceful seizure of power by the younger from the elders is played up. This African archetype, which ensures a conflict-free transfer of power (prestige) to the rising generation, is represented as a matrix in the modern Eastern society.

In the colonial period, under the influence of Western culture, the social-age conflict is transformed into a conflict between the intelligentsia

¹³ With the exception of states in which the elite who came to power used large-scale violence.

(social youth) and the authorities. The resolution of it led to national liberation revolutions. After decolonization, the conflict shifted to the sphere of the «vertical» of power, which throughout the East is the main integrating force of the state. The overproduction of social youth («unclaimed minds» with diplomas), unable to integrate into the «vertical» to acquire «social usefulness», determines the permanence of the emergence of revolutionary situations («revolution of managers» in the «Arab spring»; «revolution of 40-year-olds» – perestroika in the USSR, etc.).

Eastern revolutions end with «retraditionalization» – a return to the previous forms of social life. The stability of the authoritarian regimes characteristic of the East depends on the ability of the supreme power to regulate the social-age conflict within the «vertical» (Stalin, Mao, Nyerere).

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«Африканский архетип» – ключ к пониманию революционизма Востока

Исторический прогресс социума со времен буржуазных революций XVIII-XIX вв. тесно связан с понятием «революция». На Востоке (Периферии) социалистические и национально-освободительные первой половины XX века столетия сменились революциями «цветными», лозунги которых, заимствованные из западных политических культур, по факту, превращаются в свою противоположность, что обуславливает следующий революционный взрыв под аналогичными лозунгами.¹⁴

Революция – объективная закономерность исторической динамики Востока, которая не может быть понята, исходя из существующих в науке подходов, сформировавшихся материалах анализа западных революций. Необходима разработка концепции

¹⁴ За исключением государств, в которых пришедшая к власти элита применяла масштабное насилие.

«периферийного развития» (модернизации), особенность которого – решающая роль воздействия *внешнего фактора* (западных культур) на традиционное общество.

В результате разрушается социально-возрастной баланс, обеспечивавший динамическое равновесие (гармонию) традиционного социума, благодаря своевременной передаче властных и престижных ресурсов восходящему поколению. «Идеальный тип» социума, построенного на «возрастных классах» в природе зафиксирован у оромо (Эфиопия).

Отмечаются случаи «молодежных революций» в африканских социумах доколониального периода, когда старшие вопреки традиции задерживали передачу подобных ресурсов младшему поколению. Также ритуалы инаугурации вождя, в которых обыгрывается сюжет силового захвата власти младшими у старших. Данный *африканский архетип*, обеспечивающий бесконфликтную передачу власти (престижа) к восходящему поколению в качестве матрицы представлен в современном восточном социуме.

В колониальный период, под воздействием западной культуры, социально-возрастной конфликт трансформируется в конфликт между интеллигенцией (*социальной молодежью*) и властью. Его разрешение привело к национально-освободительным революциям. После деколонизации конфликт переместился в сферу властной «вертикали», которая повсеместно на Востоке является главной интегрирующей силой государства. Перепроизводство социальной молодежи («невостребованных умов» с дипломами), не имеющей возможности встроиться в «вертикаль» для обретения «социальной полноценности» обуславливает перманентность возникновения революционных ситуаций («революция менеджеров» в «арабской весне»; «революция 40-летних» – перестройка в СССР и др.).

Восточные революции заканчиваются «ретрадиционализацией» – возвратом к прежним формам общественного бытия. Стабильность свойственных Востоку авторитарных режимов зависит от способности верховной власти регулировать социально-возрастной конфликт внутри «вертикали» (Сталин, Мао, Ньерере).

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On New Leadership and Power in Islam

One of the most noticeable consequences of the “Arab Spring” was the change of traditional leaders and elites in a number of Arab countries (Egypt, Tunisia), but in the “crisis” countries of the region the process of political and power structures consolidation is still far from complete. New leaders must be ready to lead their states in a situation that is significantly influenced by the geopolitical rivalry for leadership in the region between two political "heavyweights" – Shiite Iran and the "Sunni defender" Saudi Arabia.

The actualization of the Islamic factor in the region has put on the Agenda the issue of power and a leader of a "new type" capable of ensuring the creation of an effective (in terms of entering the global space) and competitive model of sustainable development of the Ummah. Attempts to create an "Islamic state" instead of traditional secular regimes prove that the issue of power ceases to be only a secular political problem, but has a theological understanding and meaning, on the basis of which the fundamental requirements for the personal qualities of Muslim rulers are formed (the ideal type of state, society and person). It is also a problem of building effective relations with Islamic states for the other countries, including the diplomacy sphere.

In addition, the crisis in the public sphere in some Middle East countries has raised the problem of the legal space improving, which, on the one hand, is being strongly influenced by the growing crime in its various manifestations, including terrorist threats, and, on the other, it must be designed to ensure the most favored nation treatment for the reconstruction of "crisis" countries and development of the national economies and business. In the area of internal security, this means the willingness of new leaders to resist the next color revolutions and their ability to mobilize societies for creative purposes.

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К вопросу о лидерстве и власти в исламе

Одним из самых заметных последствий «арабской весны» стала смена традиционных лидеров и элит в ряде арабских стран (Египет, Тунис), но в «кризисных» странах региона процесс консолидации власти в государственных властно-политических структурах пока далек от своего завершения. Новые лидеры должны быть готовы возглавить свои государства в ситуации, на формирование которой заметное влияние оказывает геополитическое соперничество за лидерство и влияние в регионе между двумя политическими «тяжеловесами» – шиитским Ираном и «защитницей суннитов» Саудовской Аравией.

Актуализация исламского фактора в регионе поставила в Повестку дня вопрос о власти и лидере «нового типа», способного обеспечить создание эффективной (с точки зрения вхождения в общемировое пространство) и конкурентоспособной модели устойчивого развития Уммы. Попытки создания «исламского государства» вместо традиционных светских режимов доказывают, что вопрос о власти перестает быть только светской политической проблемой, но имеет теологическое понимание и смысл, на основе которых формируются основополагающие требования к личностным качествам мусульманских правителей (идеальный тип государства, общества и человека). Это также вопрос выстраивания эффективных отношений с исламскими государствами для третьих стран, включая сферу дипломатии.

Кроме того, кризис публичной сферы в ряде стран Ближнего Востока актуализировал проблему совершенствования правового пространства, которое, с одной стороны, испытывает мощное воздействие со стороны растущей преступности в ее различных проявлениях, включая террористические угрозы, а с другой призвано обеспечивать режим наибольшего благоприятствования в целях развития национальных экономик и бизнеса и выхода «кризисных» стран региона из ситуации экономического кризиса. В сфере внутренней безопасности это означает готовность новых лидеров

противостоять очередным цветным революциям и их способность к мобилизации обществ на созидательные цели.

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Politicization of Salafism in Tropical Africa

The main features of Salafism in Tropical Africa are as follows: the creation of communities separated from other Muslims; rejection of traditional forms of veneration for elders and respect for marabouts; rejection of the cult of saints; referring exclusively to the Quran and Sunnah of the Prophet as sources of faith; demonstratively expressed distrust of any (except for Islamic) legal systems; hostile attitude towards tariqahs, which are regarded by the "Puritans of Islam" as innovative and heretical sects that distort the meaning and content of the faith. All world religions, including classical Islam, call for self-improvement, for "work on oneself." The adherents of Salafism are a priori "sinless", their main task is to "correct others." Where such forms of Islam become widespread, their own self-government bodies arise, where property, family and criminal problems are resolved by the leader of the local Muslim community on the basis of Sharia law. Another important principle of the Salafi doctrine in Tropical Africa is jihad, which is interpreted as diligence, diligence, any form of Muslim activity (individual or collective) aimed at following a person along the path of Allah. It is mandatory for absolutely all Muslims. The main political goal is to build an Islamic state in the countries of this region by means of jihad - an armed struggle. The main enemy in the region is not Christians, but representatives of Sufism, who, in the opinion of the Salafis, profess unfaithful and not genuine Islam. Traditional Muslim associations - spiritual orders (tarikats) peacefully coexist with Christians and local rulers, do not want to fight for an Islamic state. Therefore, in order to implement their global project - the creation of the World Caliphate, the Salafis put forward the main task - to oust and destroy Sufi Islam in the region. The political attitudes and programs of Salafi groups are distinguished by the fact that in their teachings, which they regard as the only correct interpretation of Islam, there are two indispensable systemic provisions inherent in Salafism: about takfir (accusation of disbelief - kufr - of all Muslims who disagree with the Salafis) and about jihad, which is presented as an armed struggle, imputed as a duty to every Muslim, against the infidels (kafirs). It should be borne in mind that these

terms are not just evaluative characteristics, but Sharia-legal categories. Their use in relation to a particular Muslim or a group of Muslims presupposes the mandatory application of specific sanctions. Representatives of traditional Islam - Sufism, of course, fall under these sanctions.

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Политизация салафизма в Тропической Африке

Основные черты салафизма в Тропической Африке таковы: создание отделенных от других мусульман общин; отказ от традиционных форм почитания старших и уважения марабутов; отказ от культа святых; обращение исключительно к Корану и Сунне Пророка в качестве источников веры; демонстративно выражаемое недоверие к любым (за исключением исламской) правовым системам; враждебное отношение к тарикатам, которые расцениваются «пуританами ислама» как новаторские и еретические секты, искажающие смысл и содержание веры. Все мировые религии, включая классический ислам, призывают к самосовершенствованию, к «работе над собой». Приверженцы салафизма априори «безгрешны», их основная задача – «исправить других». Там, где получают распространение подобные формы ислама, возникают свои собственные органы самоуправления, там имущественные, семейные и уголовные проблемы решаются лидером местной мусульманской общины на основе норм шариата. Другим важнейшим принципом салафитской доктрины в Тропической Африке является джихад, который трактуется как усердие, старание, любая форма деятельности мусульман (индивидуальная или коллективная), направленная на следование человека по пути Аллаха. Он обязателен абсолютно для всех мусульман. Основная политическая цель при этом – путем джихада – вооруженной борьбы построить исламское государство в странах этого региона. Главный враг в регионе не христиане, а представители суфизма, которые исповедуют, по мнению салафитов, неверный и не подлинный ислам. Традиционные мусульманские объединения – духовные ордены

(тарикаты) мирно сосуществуют с христианами и местными правителями, не хотят бороться за исламское государство. Поэтому салафиты для реализации своего глобального проекта – создания Всемирного халифата выдвигают главную задачу – вытеснить и уничтожить суфийский ислам в регионе. В политических установках и программах салафитских группировок отличаются тем, что в их учении, которое они расценивают как единственно правильную трактовку ислама, присутствуют два неперенных системообразующих, присущих салафизму положения: о такфире (обвинение в неверии – куфр – всех мусульман, кто не согласен с салафитами) и о джихаде, который преподносится как вооруженная борьба, вменяемая в обязанность каждому мусульманину, против неверных (кяфиров). Необходимо при этом иметь в виду, что данные термины – не просто оценочные характеристики, а шариатско-правовые категории. Их использование по отношению к тому или иному мусульманину или группе мусульман предполагает обязательность применения конкретных санкций. Под эти санкции, конечно, попадают представители традиционного ислама – суфизма.

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**“The Fourth Estate” and Establishment of State in Africa:
Mutual Influences of the Media and Political Systems**

Back in 1966, Rosalind Ainslie, in her famous book *The Press in Africa*, wrote that until Africa's control over its own media is undeniable, the battle for complete independence cannot be won.

To establish the independent states required the establishment of the independent media. The question is, from whom and how independent.

The relationship between media systems and political systems, political institutions, regimes form a large part in media studies.

The comparative paradigm was founded on Siebert et al's landmark *Four Theories of the Press* (1956), which were “betrayed its Cold War origins” (Couldry 2005, 308) in the design of its press categories, but credibly argued that a country's press always takes on the “form and coloration” of the social and political structures within which it operates.

Further research of media systems functional patterns in different political context (McQuail, Hallin and Mancini, etc.) were focused primarily to the developed Western countries, had not pay much attention to Africa. Only in 2012 D. Hallin and P. Mancini published a new book that included countries “beyond the Western world” in a comparative analysis of media systems.

African mass media play a key role in nation building and democratisation. The close connection between the media and democracy in Africa alluded to by many authors (Suarez 1996; Tetey 2001) further necessitates the continent's inclusion in comparative media systems analysis. “The media are among the forces that have shaped, and continue to define, the establishment of democracy in Africa,” W. Tetey writes.

Mass media (particular news media) cannot be understood without understanding the nature of the state, the system of political parties, the pattern of relationships between economic and political interests and the development of civil society, among other elements of the social structure.

The paper examines how comparative paradigms could be used in African context and links change in the nature of political systems with

change in media systems.

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**«Четвертая власть» и власть в Африке: как взаимодействуют
и взаимовлияют медиа и политические системы**

В далеком 1966 году Розалинд Эйнсли в своей знаменитой книге «Пресса в Африке» писала, что до тех пор пока контроль Африки над своими собственными средствами информации не будет неоспоримым, битву за полную независимость выиграть будет нельзя.

Создание независимых государств требовало создание независимых СМИ. Вопрос в том, от кого и насколько не зависимых.

Исследования взаимного влияния СМИ и власти, политических режимов, политических институтов и в целом политических систем, занимают большое место в исследованиях медиа. В 1956 году в книге «Четыре теории прессы» (Siebert и др.) были заложены основы нормативного подхода к изучению взаимодействия СМИ и власти. Хотя книга несла на себе печать «холодной войны», она стала отправной точкой в компаративистском анализе различных стран и их медиа систем. Основная мысль была в том, что СМИ (Пресса) имеют «форму и окрас» тех социальных и политических структур, внутри которых они функционируют.

Последующие труды, выявляющие закономерности функционирования СМИ в разных политических системах (McQuail, Hallin and Mancini и др.) обращались в основном к развитым западным странам, не затрагивали Африку. Лишь в 2012 г. D.Hallin и P.Mancini опубликовали новое исследование, включившее страны «за пределами западного мира» в сравнительный анализ медиа систем.

СМИ в Африке играют важную роль и в нации-строительстве, и в построении демократии. Тесную связь между масс-медиа и демократией в Африке отмечали многие ученые (например, Suarez 1996; Tettey 2001), что доказывало возможность и необходимость включения африканского континента в сравнительный системный

анализ. W.Tettey писал, что СМИ в Африке - один из основных факторов, который определяет демократический путь развития.

СМИ (в особенности новостные СМИ) не могут быть поняты без понимания природы государства, системы политических партий, паттернов взаимодействия между экономическими и политическими интересами и развитием гражданского общества, наряду с другими элементами социальной структуры.

В докладе попытаемся рассмотреть, как применимы компаративистские концепции масс-медиа к изучению стран Африки и как изменения в политических системах связаны с изменения систем СМИ.

PANEL VII
LEADERSHIP AND POWER IN AFRICA
IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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**Political Development of Postcolonial Africa:
Differentiation or Integration?**

After the Second World War, an active process of decolonization began. Africa, in which history the era of colonialism took several centuries, gained independence, and African states began to build their new foreign policy. From the year of Africa (1960) to the present, one of its most important areas has become the interaction of African states with each other, the formation of new ties and the active development of multilateral diplomacy, the creation of regional integration associations (for instance, ECOWAS, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) and international intergovernmental organizations (African Union), cooperation in many areas and the implementation of joint projects. At the same time, the opposite trend is observed. After decolonization, some territories were separated and their statehood was formalized (for example, Namibia became independent), there was the rupture of previously existing ties and the reorientation of foreign policy, multiple border conflicts and territorial disputes, ethnic conflicts, which continue to be an important aspect of foreign policy in Africa (internal Ethiopian conflict) .

The paper will analyze both trends in the foreign policy of African countries, provide historical and contemporary examples and make a forecast for the future development of international relations within the African continent (whether integration will be possible, to what extent, whether existing contradictions will prevent this or not). In order to do this, the consequences of the colonial period for inter-African interaction will be considered and its fundamental role in the formation of the political map of Africa and the system of inter-African relations will be proved. The author will also attempt to analyze the role of non-African states in the formation and functioning of political space within Africa at the present stage and

assess its impact on relations between African countries.

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Политическое развитие постколониальной Африки: дифференциация или интеграция?

После Второй Мировой войны начался активный процесс деколонизации. Африка, в истории которой эпоха колониализма заняла несколько столетий, получила независимость, а африканские государства начали строить свою новую внешнюю политику. С года Африки (1960) и до настоящего времени одним из важнейших ее направлений стало взаимодействие африканских государств друг с другом, формирование новых связей и активное развитие многосторонней дипломатии, создание региональных интеграционных объединений (например, ЭКОВАС, Общий рынок Восточной и Южной Африки) и международных межправительственных организаций (Африканский союз), сотрудничество во многих сферах и осуществление совместных проектов. В то же время, наблюдается и обратная тенденция. После деколонизации происходило отделение некоторых территорий и оформление их государственности (например, получение независимости Намибией), разрыв существующих ранее связей и переориентация внешней политики, множественные приграничные конфликты и территориальные споры, этнические конфликты, что продолжает оставаться важным аспектом внешней политики в Африке (внутриэфиопский конфликт).

В докладе будут проанализированы обе тенденции во внешней политике стран Африки, приведены исторические и современные примеры и сделан прогноз будущего развития международных отношений внутри Африканского континента (будет ли возможна интеграция, в какой степени, помешают ли этому существующие противоречия). Для этого будут рассмотрены последствия колониального периода для межафриканского взаимодействия и доказана его основополагающая роль в формировании политической

карты Африки и системы межафриканских отношений. Автором также будет предпринята попытка проанализировать роль неафриканских государств в формировании и функционировании политического пространства внутри Африки на современном этапе и дать оценку ее влиянию на отношения между странами Африки.

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European Concept of the Democratic Leadership in Terms of Integration Experience in Europe and All-African Integration

Integration processes in Europe and in the world can be considered as one of the global reach trends. Experience has proven that in this case economic dimension shall be crucial. In other words, it might be easier and more efficient to solve economic problems being a member of such regional union, than singly. Thus, the issue is a kind of a “cumulative effect” of such cooperation. Moreover, delegation of some part of functions to supranational common European bodies in Brussels by democratic governments and West European countries.

It is thus what European Union has got through the integration.

African aspiration towards unity has got through otherwise and with other purposes. Initially, the very notion of “African unity” formulated in 1963 already in connection with establishment of UAE, first of all had political purposes. Today, with a new round of development of civilization and international policy, African countries further and more clearly formulate the issue of all-continental unity also in the sphere of economy and policy.

It is no secret, that exactly European integration model has the greatest impact on the process of African integration as a pattern... Even today an active economic integration on the European pattern is taking place within the African Union – independent free zones are established in the West, South and East of the continent, it is planned to build up an all-African market. There exists a common African passport already, with establishment of an African currency “afro” on the agenda.

It is however obvious, that some elements of the European experience would hardly be applied in Africa. It is known that already today European leaders hand over the reins of power in own countries to supranational all-European institutions voluntarily. It is obvious that such situation would hardly be suitable for leaders of independent African countries. The power in Africa has traced back to the hard-wired sacral traditions, that’s why hardly anybody of African leaders would decide to give up power voluntarily. The very citizens of the countries which have

had a hard time to develop own all-national identity, would not obviously understand this.

So, it appears, that in real practice the very African integration will be connected with the liberalization of commercial and economic relations, beneficial passport and visa regime, with the whole scope of strategic decisions on key objectives of national policy and economy being left with the existing national governments. All-African institutions will still have a kind of coordinating function, acting to match possible differently vectored positions of representatives of various groups of African countries.

However, in any case this will be a principally new stage in the history of the continent. Today, in global instability of international, political and economic system, the integration aimed at seeking of answers to challenges of the time – is the only proper way for Africa. In the course of such development and movement Africa will, probably, get new leaders good enough to be all-African leaders, capable to bring the continent to leading positions in the sphere of global economy and policy.

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Европейская концепция демократического лидерства в контексте интеграционного опыта в Европе и общеафриканской интеграции

Интеграционные процессы в Европе и мире можно считать сегодня одним из глобальных трендов общемирового характера в мире. Важнейшая роль при этом, как показывает практика, должна принадлежать экономической составляющей. Иными словами решать задачи экономического характера в составе такого регионального союза должно быть проще и эффективнее чем поодиночке. Речь идет таким образом о своего рода «кумулятивном эффекте» от такого сотрудничества. При этом неотъемлемой частью этого процесса была передача демократическими правительствами и лидерами западноевропейских государств части своих функций наднациональным общеевропейским органам в Брюсселе.

Именно таким образом, проходил свой интеграционный путь

Европейский Союз.

Стремление Африки к единству проходило при иных обстоятельствах и с другими целями. Изначально сама идея «африканского единства» сформулированная еще в 1963 году при создании ОАЕ носила в первую очередь политический характер. Сегодня на новом витке цивилизационного и международно-политического развития африканские страны все более явно формулируют вопрос об общеконтинентальном единстве и в сфере экономики и политики.

Не секрет, что именно модель европейской интеграции оказывает наибольшее влияние на процесс африканской интеграции в качестве образца. Уже сегодня в рамках африканского Союза идет активная экономическая интеграция по европейскому образцу – на западе, юге и востоке континента созданы собственные зоны беспошлинной торговли, ставится задача в ближайшее время создать и общеафриканский рынок. Есть здесь уже и единый общеафриканский паспорт, на повестке дня африканская валюта «афро».

При этом очевидно, что некоторые элементы европейского опыта вряд ли смогут быть применены в Африке. Как известно уже сегодня европейские лидеры добровольно отдают «бразды правления» в своих странах наднациональным общеевропейским структурам. Понятно, что подобное положение дел вряд ли устроит лидеров суверенных африканских государств. Власть в Африке восходит к давним давно укоренившимся традициям сакрального характера поэтому расставаться с ней добровольно вряд ли придет в голову кому-либо из африканских лидеров. Не поймут этого безусловно и сами граждане стран с трудом сформировавших за последние годы собственную общенациональную идентичность.

Представляется поэтому, что в реальной практике сама африканская интеграция будет связана с либерализацией торгово-экономических отношений, льготным паспортным и визовым режимом, оставив всю полноту стратегических решений по ключевым направлениям национальной политики и экономики за существующими национальными правительствами. Общеафриканские структуры будут играть по-прежнему лишь некую координирующую роль, служить согласованию возможных разновекторных позиций

представителей различных групп африканских государств.

И тем не менее это в любом случае будет принципиально новый этап в истории континента. Сегодня в условиях глобальной нестабильности всей международно- политической и экономической системы – интеграция во имя поиска совместного ответа на вызовы времени – единственно верный путь для Африки. В процессе этого развития и движения Африка возможно обретет и новых лидеров, достойных общеафриканского статуса, способных вывести континент и на лидирующие позиции в мире в области экономики и политики.

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**The Influence of Political Leadership in Shaping Regional Cooperation
in East Africa**

African countries have gone through initiatives of fostering socio-economic development and unity through regional integrations. Several challenges have been shaping such initiatives. Political leadership constitute one of such challenges. Despite their efforts in sustaining regional cooperation, African leaders have been both a blessing and obstacle towards the survival of such cooperation. This has been also the case with the East African Community. The discussion on this subject is considerably extensive in the literature covering origin, significances, challenges and initiatives. However, a detailed examination on how various political leaders have shaped the survival of the established East African Community is needed. This paper seeks to build on the existing discussion by revealing various political decisions, attitudes, philosophies and practices which have threatened the survival of East African Community. The paper uses both primary and secondary data from oral and written sources.

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Rwanda's Participation in the Process of East-African Integration: Background and Prospects

Rwanda is a small country qualified by the UN as the East-African nation. As for colonial past, this state's history is closely related with what is now DRC, as the territories of both of them, in essence, were under the Belgian rule, and for some time they were parts of one administrative and territorial unit called Belgian Congo. Despite that fact, there are close to no current productive relations between the two nations as concerning integration and especially regional associations. Nevertheless, Rwanda has found its place in the process of East-African integration, where the majority of countries are the ex-British colonies. This statement appeals to Rwanda's entering the East-African Community and, more remarkably, the Commonwealth of Nations in 2009, although the overwhelming majority of the member states are the ex-British colonies, and Rwanda is to hold the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, which shows the nation's dedication towards strengthening cooperation in this association. In this piece the emphasis will be put on analyzing the possible motivation for Rwanda's strengthening collaboration with such countries as Kenya, Tanzania and others. There will be a review provided on economic, geopolitical, cultural, linguistic historic and the other factors. Moreover, the impact of this policy on the economic and social situation in this country will be considered.

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Участие Руанды в процессах восточноафриканской интеграции: предпосылки и перспективы

Руанда – небольшая страна, территориально причисляемая ООН к Восточной Африке. Своим колониальным прошлым это

государство неразрывно связано с современным ДРК, так как территории обоих, по сути, находились под управлением Бельгии, и некоторое время они были единым административно-территориальным образованием в Бельгийском Конго. Тем не менее в настоящее время между двумя государствами практически отсутствуют эффективные отношения по линии интеграции, а именно региональных объединений. Вместо этого Руанда нашла своё место в системах интеграции восточноафриканских государств, колониальное прошлое которых в основном было британским. Речь идёт о вступлении Руанды в Восточноафриканское сообщество в 2007 году, а также, что более примечательно, в Содружество Наций, подавляющее большинство стран-членов которого являются бывшими британскими колониями, в 2009 году, и в скором времени эта страна проведёт встречу глав государств- членов Содружества в Кигали, что говорит о её готовности укреплять своё сотрудничество в рамках этой организации. В этой работе акцент будет поставлен на анализе возможных предпосылок усиления сотрудничества Руанды с такими странами, как Кения, Танзания и другими. Будут рассмотрены экономический, геополитический, культурно-языковой, исторический и иные факторы данного явления. Кроме того, будут представлены перспективы подобной политики Руанды для экономических и социальных процессов в стране.

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The Personal Nature of the History of Foreign Policy of the Republic of South Africa

Foreign policy, like most socio-political phenomena in society, does not happen by itself. It is the result of the actions of the persons who shape and implement it. This study examines the personality of those in leadership, stakeholders who form the strategy of the country's foreign policy, implement it and make decisions.

2021 marks the 27th anniversary of the first non-racial general elections in South Africa. During this period, it became clear that South Africa was consistently following the course chosen in 1994, which completely changed the political system and social structure of the country. Developing democratic institutions in the domestic arena, the new South African government has made adherence to international law, active participation in international cooperation, and human rights and freedoms noted in the defining principles of its foreign policy. South Africa has entered the new millennium as a state integrated into all global processes, but at the same time an independent player in the world arena with its own position, which often runs counter to the policies of leading world powers.

Considering that the foreign policy of South Africa started with the time of Cecil Rhodes, who shaped the country's international and regional relations until 1910, passing through a whole series of leaders of the country, such as Jan Smuts, Hendrik Verwoerd, Pik Botha, who tried to conduct the international policy of South Africa in the conditions existing in the country deep racial stratification, exploitation, segregation, and then apartheid, until they came to be replaced by Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, Thabo Mbeki and others, who in the period since 1994 tried to overcome the international isolation of their country and build its foreign policy in the new realities, you can see the transformation of foreign policy steps and strategies depending on the views and beliefs of South African leaders.

The main objective of this study is to examine the formation of South African foreign policy during the historical development of this country from the perspective of personality of its leaders. The relevance of

the chosen topic is characterized by the intensification of Russia's foreign policy towards the African continent in recent years, as well as by the importance of South Africa for the restoration of the lost Russian political and economic positions on the continent. South Africa is a strategically important for Russia, for further development and strengthening of bilateral and multilateral economic and political relations.

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Личный характер внешнеполитической истории Южно-Африканской Республики

Внешняя политика, как и большинство социально-политических явлений в обществе не происходит сама по себе. Она является результатом действия лиц, ее формирующих и претворяющих в жизнь. Спецификой данного исследования является изучение личности-политика, формирующей стратегию внешнеполитического курса страны, осуществляющий ее и принимающей решения.

В 2021 г. исполнилось 27 лет с момента проведения первых всеобщих нерасовых выборов в ЮАР. За этот период стало окончательно ясно, что Южная Африка последовательно следует выбранному в 1994 г. курсу, полностью изменившему политическую систему и общественное устройство страны. Развивая демократические институты на внутренней арене, новое правительство ЮАР сделало определяющими принципами своей внешней политики следование международному праву, активное участие в международном сотрудничестве, права и свободы человека. В новое тысячелетие ЮАР вошла государством, интегрированным во все глобальные процессы, но вместе с тем и самостоятельным игроком на мировой арене, имеющим собственную позицию, зачастую идущую вразрез с политикой ведущих мировых держав.

Рассматривая внешнюю политику ЮАР начиная с Сесилия Родса, который формировал международные и региональные отношения страны до 1910 года, проходя целую череду лидеров

страны, таких как Ян Смэтс, Фредерик Фервуд, Оливер Тамбо, Пик Бота, старавшихся вести международную политику ЮАР в условиях существующей в стране глубочайшего расового расслоения, эксплуатации коренного населения, сегрегации, а затем и апартеида, до пришедших им на смену Нельсона Манделы, Табо Мбеки и др., которые в период с 1994 пытались преодолеть международную изоляцию своей страны и выстроить ее внешнюю политику в новых реалиях, можно увидеть трансформацию внешнеполитических шагов и стратегии в зависимости от взглядов и убеждений лидеров ЮАР.

Основной задачей данного исследования стало изучение формирования внешней политики ЮАР на протяжении исторического развития этой страны в ракурсе её лидеров. Актуальность выбранной темы характеризуется активизацией в последние годы внешней политики России на африканском направлении, значимостью ЮАР для восстановления утраченных российских политических и экономических позиций на континенте. ЮАР представляет собой стратегически важный регион для РФ, что обуславливает необходимость дальнейшего развития и укрепления двусторонних и многосторонних внешнеэкономических и внешнеполитических отношений.

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Sustainable Development Goals as the Basis of Russia's Strategy to Return to Africa and Its Competitive Advantage in the Struggle for Leadership on the African Continent

The situation on the African continent following Russia's withdrawal from Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s can be characterized as a growing international rivalry that continues to attract new participants. The US, China, India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and many other states, including Estonia, are seeking to take their place under the African sun. In view of the fact that during the stalemate period in Russian-African relations new powerful actors with their specific competitive advantages have appeared on the continent, Russia's «return» to Africa appears at the present time a difficult task.

Russia's success in defending and promoting its national interests in the context of the struggle for leadership on the African continent may be determined by a publicly articulated strategy based on the Sustainable Development Goals, developed by the UN General Assembly. One of the strengths of such a strategy is that the SDGs have the status of a widely supported concept in Africa and are well integrated with other strategic dominants: «Agenda 2063» and the principle «African problems - African solutions». Another strategy created on the SDGs' basis advantage is its alignment with Russia's interests on the African continent, as it will contribute to:

A) Expansion of exports to the African continent of goods and services whose production takes into account the priorities of the Russian economy. Africa, with its ever-growing middle class, is a promising market. Under the auspices of sectoral development assistance initiatives aimed at achieving the SDGs, Russia can increase the supply of grains and food (Goal 2), arms (Goal 16), software (Goal 9), equipment (Goal 9), medicines (Goal 3), education (Goal 4) and health services (Goal 3).

B) The formation of a political environment favourable to Russia in Africa, support by African States for Russia's role as an independent centre of power in the polycentric world order being created, and the settlement of disputed issues in favour of Russia. As a champion of the SDGs

achievement, Russia will receive the support of African Governments.

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Цели устойчивого развития как основа стратегии возвращения России в Африку и её конкурентное преимущество в борьбе за лидерство на африканском континенте

Ситуацию на африканском континенте, сложившуюся после ухода России из Африки в конце 80-х – начале 90-х годов прошлого века, можно охарактеризовать как нарастающее международное соперничество, продолжающее привлекать новых участников. США, Китай, Индия, Бразилия, Саудовская Аравия и многие другие государства, включая с недавнего времени Эстонию, стремятся занять своё место под африканским солнцем. Ввиду того, что в период застоя в российско-африканских отношениях на континенте появились новые мощные акторы, имеющие свои специфические конкурентные преимущества, «возвращение» России в Африку представляется в настоящий момент многотрудным делом.

Фактором успеха России в деле защиты и продвижения своих национальных интересов в условиях борьбы за лидерство на африканском континенте может стать публично артикулированная стратегия, имеющая в качестве своей основы Цели в области устойчивого развития, разработанные Генеральной ассамблеей ООН. Одной из сильных сторон подобной стратегии является тот факт, что ЦУР имеют статус широко поддерживаемой в Африке концепции и хорошо сочетаются с другими стратегическими доминантами: «Повесткой 2063» и принципом «африканским проблемам – африканские решения». Другим преимуществом стратегии, созданной на основе ЦУР, предстаёт её соответствие интересам России на Африканском континенте, поскольку она будет способствовать:

А) увеличению экспорта на африканский континент товаров и услуг, в производстве которых задействованы приоритетные направления развития российской экономики. Африка с её постоянно

растущим средним классом представляет собой перспективный рынок. Под эгидой отраслевых инициатив содействия развитию, направленных на достижение ЦУР, Россия может расширять поставки зерна и продуктов питания (Цель 2), оружия (Цель 16), программного обеспечения (Цель 9), оборудования (Цель 9), лекарств (Цель 3), образовательных (Цель 4) и медицинских услуг (Цель 3).

Б) формированию благоприятной для России политической конъюнктуры в Африке, поддержке африканскими государствами роли России как независимого центра силы в создаваемом полицентричном миропорядке, разрешению спорных вопросов в пользу России. Выступая как поборник достижения ЦУР, Россия получит расположение правительств африканских стран.

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Russia in Africa: A View from China

The African continent is attracting more and more attention from external actors. The reasons for this are seen in view of a number of factors: 1) a significant number of developing countries; 2) rich reserves of natural resources; 3) important geopolitical routes. The relevance of the research topic is associated with the increasing attention from foreign states to Africa, the formation of contours of confrontation and competition between traditional and new players on the continent. The reasons for the increasing competition are justified by the changing realities of the international and domestic agendas, the new positioning of the PRC, the Russian Federation, the United States and other foreign states on the African continent.

The PRC, being a key external player on the African continent, pays great attention to the activities of traditional and new players in Africa. Russia is no exception. The PRC, of course, does not consider the Russian Federation as a potential competitor in the region, but, on the contrary, as a partner. Both China and Russia did not pursue a colonial policy in Africa, but, on the contrary, contributed to the countries gaining independence. Both states regard African partners as equals, respect sovereignty, territorial integrity, etc. In 2013, at the BRICS summit in Durban, the PRC and the Russian Federation pledged to support the processes of industrialization and integration on the continent. The parties do not have political differences or structural economic issues on African issues.

For the PRC, energy is a rather attractive area of cooperation with the Russian Federation in Africa. By strengthening dialogue in this area, the Chinese side could evade criticism from the West and accusations of pragmatic reasons for Beijing's interest in dialogue with Africa.

The attention of China is attracted by the summit diplomacy of the Russian Federation, which started in 2019. Beijing views the Russian presence in the region in a positive way.

On the one hand, a rather big uncertainty - a kind of "Newton's bin" – is the interaction between Russia and China in Africa, since the countries are not full-fledged players on the continent.

On the other hand, in view of the growing fragmentation processes,

pressure on the PRC, due to the complication of the Sino-American dialogue, China is interested in support from the Russian Federation and the promotion of the Sino-Russian dialogue in Africa.

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Россия в Африке: взгляд из Китая

Африканский континент привлекает все большее внимание внешних акторов. Причины этому видятся ввиду ряда факторов: 1) значительного числа развивающихся государств; 2) богатых запасов природных ресурсов; 3) важных геополитических маршрутов. Актуальность темы исследования связана с увеличивающимся вниманием со стороны иностранных государств к Африке, формированием контуров противостояния и конкуренции между традиционными и новыми игроками на континенте. Причины возрастающей конкуренции обоснованы меняющимися реалиями международной и внутренней повесток дня, новым позиционированием КНР, РФ, США и других иностранных государств на Африканском континенте.

КНР, будучи ключевым внешним игроком на Африканском континенте, уделяет большое внимание деятельности традиционных и новых игроков в Африке. Россия не является исключением. КНР, безусловно, не рассматривает РФ в качестве потенциального конкурента в регионе, а, напротив в качестве партнера. Как Китай, так и Россия не проводили колониальную политику в Африке, а напротив способствовали получению странами независимости. Оба государства рассматривают африканских партнеров в качестве равных себе, уважают суверенитет, территориальную целостность и т.д. В 2013 г. на саммите БРИКС в Дурбане КНР и РФ обязались поддерживать процессы индустриализации и интеграции на континенте. У сторон нет политических противоречий или структурных экономических вопросов по африканской проблематике.

Для КНР достаточно привлекательной областью сотрудничества с РФ в Африке является энергетика. Благодаря

укреплению диалога в этой области китайская сторона могла бы уйти от критики со стороны Запада и обвинений в прагматичных причинах заинтересованности Пекина в диалоге с Африкой.

Внимание Китая привлекает саммитовая дипломатия РФ, стартовавшая в 2019 г. Российское присутствие в регионе Пекином рассматривается в положительном ключе.

С одной стороны, довольно-таки большой неопределенностью – своего рода “бином Ньютона” – является взаимодействие между Россией и Китаем в Африке, поскольку страны не являются полновесными игроками на континенте.

С другой стороны, ввиду усиливающихся процессов фрагментации, давления на КНР, из-за осложнения китайско-американского диалога, Китай заинтересован в поддержке со стороны РФ и продвижении китайско-российского диалога в Африке.

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The Activities of African Leaders in the Development of Bilateral Cooperation with Kazakhstan

Before independence, Kazakhstan was visited by the heads of state and government of African countries, where the advantage of socialism over capitalism was shown, where there is no racial and ethnic strife, ordinary people are guaranteed the right to work, to receive free education, etc. Thousands of African boys and girls had the opportunity to study at Soviet universities and subsequently a number of them held high party and government posts in their countries. Thus, the Prime Minister of Uganda was George Kosmas Adyebo. Ibrahim Mukiibi was the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of the Interior of Uganda. Sizakele Sighashe, who has repeatedly visited Kazakhstan, became the Director General of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) of South Africa.

In 1967, the first President of Somalia, Abdullah Osman, visited Alma-Ata to get acquainted with the sister city of Mogadishu. He contributed to the further development of this cooperation. President Abdirashid Ali Shermar, who succeeded him, presented the country's highest order "The Great Somali Star" to Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR S.B. Niyazbekov, who visited Somalia at the head of the USSR parliamentary delegation in 1968, for the political and economic assistance provided by the USSR to the African country in the formation of a young state.

During the years of independence, President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev visited Egypt three times and signed a number of cooperation agreements with then President Hosni Mubarak. As a result, NUR Mubarak University was built in Almaty, and in Cairo, with the help of the Kazakh side, the ancient mosque of the descendant of the Kazakh people Sultan Beybars is being restored. The current President of the ARE, A.F. al-Sisi, in Almaty in 2016, agreed with N. Nazarbayev on the development of four main areas in trade and economic cooperation with Kazakhstan - trade, agriculture, tourism and education.

In June 1997, South Africa was visited by the then Minister of

Foreign Affairs, and now President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. An agreement was reached on the development of cooperation between the two countries. Subsequently, the South African manufacturer of military and aerospace equipment "Paramount Group Land Systems" (Paramount Group Land Systems) and the Kazakh company "Kazakhstan Engineering JSC Group" (Kazakhstan Engineering JSC Group) on January 27, 2014 signed an agreement on the construction of a plant for the production of military and civilian equipment. In December 2015, the enterprise was put into operation in Astana.

In recent years, a number of African leaders have visited Kazakhstan, who expressed readiness for bilateral cooperation. Among them are the Presidents of Rwanda P. Kagame, Senegal M. Sall, Zimbabwe E. Mnangagwa.

These examples show that personal contacts at the level of heads of state contribute to the development of bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and African countries.

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Деятельность лидеров африканских государств в развитии двустороннего сотрудничества с Казахстаном

До обретения независимости Казахстан посещали главы государств и правительств стран Африки, где показывалось преимущество социализма над капитализмом, где нет расовой и межнациональной розни, простому человеку гарантированы права на труд, получения бесплатного образования и т.п. Тысячи африканских юношей и девушек получили возможность учиться в советских вузах и впоследствии ряд из них занимали высокие партийные и государственные посты в своих странах. Так, премьер-министром Уганды был Джордж Космас Адьебо. Ибрагим Мукииби был министром иностранных дел и министром внутренних дел Уганды. Сизакеле Сигхаше, неоднократно посещавший Казахстан, стал генеральным директором Национального разведывательного

управления (NIA) ЮАР.

В 1967 году Алма-Ату посетил первый президент Сомали Абдулла Осман, для ознакомления с городом, побратимом Могадишо. Он способствовал дальнейшему развитию этого сотрудничества. Сменивший его президент Абдирашид Али Шермарк вручил высший орден страны «Большая сомалийская звезда» председателю Президиума Верховного Совета Казахской ССР С.Б. Ниязбекову, который посетил Сомали во главе парламентской делегации СССР в 1968 г., за оказанную политическую и экономическую помощь СССР африканской стране в становлении молодого государства.

В годы независимости президент Казахстана Н. Назарбаев трижды посетил Египет и подписал с тогдашним президентом Хосни Мубараком ряд соглашений по сотрудничеству. В результате в Алматы был построен Университет НУР Мубарак, а в Каире с помощью казахстанской стороны восстанавливается древняя мечеть потомка казахского народа султана Бейбарса. Нынешний президент АРЕ А.Ф. ас-Сиси, в Алматы в 2016 году, договорился с Н. Назарбаевым о развитии четырех главных направлений в торгово-экономическом сотрудничестве с Казахстаном – торговле, сельском хозяйстве, туризме и сфере образования.

В июне 1997 г. ЮАР посетил тогдашний министр иностранных дел, а ныне Президент РК Касым-Жомарт Токаев. Было достигнуто соглашение о развитии сотрудничества между двумя странами. Впоследствии южноафриканский производитель военной и аэрокосмической техники "Парамаунт груп лэнд системз" (*Paramount Group Land Systems*) и казахстанская компания "Казахстан инжиниринг JSC груп" (*Kazakhstan Engineering JSC Group*) 27 января 2014 г. заключили соглашение о строительстве завода по производству военной и гражданской техники. В декабре 2015 г. в г. Астане предприятие было пущено в строй.

В последние годы ряд африканских лидеров посетили Казахстан, которые выразили готовность к двустороннему сотрудничеству. Среди них – президенты: Руанды П. Кагаме, Сенегала М. Салл, Зимбабве Э. Мнангава.

Приведённые примеры говорят о том, что личные контакты на уровне глав государств способствуют развитию двусторонних отношений между Казахстаном и странами Африки.

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European Union and African Leaders: Thorny Cooperation

Charismatic and strong African leaders – and a united front of the European bureaucracy. Leaders of nations who have been at the helm for decades – and Eurobureaucrats who are clearly replaced at the end of the agreed period. Their cooperation is almost always a very difficult one, for a variety of reasons.

Story from the past: Tony Blair's handshakes with Muammar Gaddafi, the latter's historic visit to Italy in 2009 along with his traditional marquee, the third EU-Africa summit in Tripoli in 2010, where Gaddafi was co-chair. He once called himself “the king of the kings of Africa”, and in the West he was called very differently - from “Picasso of the Middle Eastern policy” to “the mad dog of the Middle East” (as R. Reagan described him).

Frame change: NATO's invasion of Libya in 2011, the inglorious death of Gaddafi (which many in Africa called a murder), the further disintegration of the country, which also led to the destabilization of the entire Sahel.

A story from the present: even those African leaders who are extolled by the EU are not immune to a shift in attitudes. Thus, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed, in 2019, with the support of the EU, received the Nobel Peace Prize for concluding peace with Eritrea. But in November 2020, an internal conflict erupted in Ethiopia in the province of Tigray. In just a year, the perception of Abiy Ahmed in the European media and political circles has radically changed. From the darling of the international community, he has become one who is stigmatized and condemned. However, it doesn't seem to bother him much.

Another example: Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda, who has been in power for 21 years (since 2000). He played a colossal role in stopping genocide of 1994 and reconciling the country. During the years of Kagame's tenure in power, Rwanda was able to overcome the consequences of a protracted civil war and become one of the most dynamic economies in Africa. During 2000-2017, the country's GDP increased almost fivefold (from 1.7 to 8.4 billion dollars). Under Kagame, Rwanda has become an

example of the brightest good governance' success.

However, the EU's attitude to the leadership of Kagame remains extremely controversial, he is often called almost a dictator. Relations remain not free from various demarches on the part of European countries. In turn, the Rwandan government has a reason to accuse some of European countries of historical involvement in supporting the genocide. Only in 2021, French President E. Macron, during a visit to Rwanda, admitted that France bears a share of responsibility for the fact that it could not prevent the genocide, but was not its accomplice. No apologies were made.

Institutional tension between the African Union and the EU is growing. It is no coincidence that the European Union failed to organize the long-overdue regular summit with the African Union either in 2020 or in 2021.

And the "mini-summit" of the leaders of the European Union and African countries, which was supposed to take place in December 2020, was canceled literally "at the last minute" by the President of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa, the then chairman of the African Union. On the sidelines, it was noted that the cancellation of the videoconference was the result of disagreements on the agenda and format of the meeting. None of the African heads of state, except Ramaphosa, agreed to attend the summit.

All this testifies to the "pitfalls" in the relations between the leaderships of European and African countries and deserves more research attention, to which my report will be devoted.

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Евросоюз и африканские лидеры: непростое сотрудничество

Харизматичные и сильные африканские лидеры – и единый фронт евробюрократии. Вожди наций, стоящие у руля десятилетиями – и четко сменяемые по окончании оговоренного срока еврофункционеры. Их сотрудничество почти всегда выстраивается очень непростым образом, в силу самых разных причин.

История из прошлого: рукопожатия Тони Блэра с Муаммаром Каддафи, исторический визит последнего в Италию в 2009 г. вместе со

своим традиционным шатром, третий саммит ЕС – Африка в Триполи в 2010, где Каддафи был сопредседателем. Он сам однажды назвал себя «королём королей Африки», а на Западе его именовали очень по-разному – от «Пикассо ближневосточной политики» до «бешеного пса Ближнего Востока» (как его охарактеризовал Р.Рейган).

Смена кадра: вторжение НАТО в Ливию в 2011 г., бесславная гибель Каддафи (которую многие в Африке назвали убийством), дальнейший распад страны, повлекший и дестабилизацию всего Сахеля.

История из настоящего: даже те африканские лидеры, которых превозносит Евросоюз, не застрахованы от перемены отношения. Так, премьер-министр Эфиопии Абий Ахмед в 2019 г. при поддержке ЕС получил Нобелевскую премию мира за заключение мира с Эритреей. Но в ноябре 2020 г. в Эфиопии разгорелся внутренний конфликт в провинции Тыграй. Всего за год восприятие Абия Ахмеда в европейских СМИ и политических кругах радикально изменилось. Из любимчика международного сообщества он превратился в того, кого клеймят и осуждают. Однако непохоже, чтобы его это сильно задевало.

Еще один пример: Поль Кагаме, президент Руанды, который находится у власти уже 21 год (с 2000 г.). Он сыграл колоссальную роль, остановив геноцид 1994 г. и примирив страну. За годы пребывания Кагаме у власти Руанда смогла преодолеть последствия затяжной гражданской войны и стать одной из самых динамичных экономик Африки. За 2000-2017 г. ВВП страны увеличился почти в пять раз (с 1,7 до 8,4 млрд долларов). При Кагаме Руанда стала примером ярчайшего управленческого успеха. Однако отношение ЕС к лидерству Кагаме остаётся крайне противоречивым, его часто называют едва ли не диктатором. Отношения остаются несвободными от различных демаршей со стороны европейских стран. В свою очередь, правительство Руанды имеет повод обвинить ряд европейских стран в исторической причастности к поддержке геноцида. Лишь в 2021 г. президент Франции Э. Макрон в ходе визита в Руанду признал, что Франция несет долю ответственности за то, что не смогла предотвратить геноцид, однако не была его соучастницей. Извинений принесено не было.

Нарастает институциональная напряженность между

Афросоюзом и ЕС. Неслучайно, что Евросоюзу не удалось организовать давно назревший очередной саммит с Афросоюзом ни в 2020, ни в 2021 гг.

А «мини-саммит» лидеров Европейского союза и африканских стран, который должен был состояться в декабре 2020 г., был отменен буквально «в последнюю минуту» президентом ЮАР Сирилом Рамафосой, тогда председателем Африканского союза. В кулуарах отмечалось, что отмена видеоконференции стала результатом разногласий по повестке дня и формату встречи. Ни один из глав африканских государств, кроме Рамафосы, не согласился присутствовать на саммите.

Всё это свидетельствует о «подводных камнях» в отношениях руководства европейских и африканских странах и заслуживает большего исследовательского внимания, чему и будет посвящен мой доклад.

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Modern French Policy on the African Continent: Transformations of the Françafrique Model

This paper is devoted to the policy of the Fifth Republic on the African continent and, above all, in the zone of historical French influence, formed in the colonial period. Within the framework of the article, we turn to the analysis of the conditions, prerequisites and mechanisms for the development of cooperation between France and the African states in the context of the implementation of France's national interests, conditioned by both bilateral cooperation and global processes, including global competition for African natural resources. The subject area of the study is represented by three areas, including the foreign policy of France on the African continent, the institutional mechanisms of France's cooperation with African states, as well as models of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the economic and political sphere, for example, in matters of the CFA franc. In the study, we set ourselves the goal of identifying and generalizing the models and ways of realizing the national interests of France on the African continent, including in the context of the development of individual African states, as well as in the impact of globalization processes.

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Современная политика Франции на Африканском континенте: трансформация модели Франсафрики

Объектом исследования нашей работы выступает политика Пятой Республики на Африканском континенте и прежде всего в зоне исторического французского влияния, сформированного еще в колониальный период. В рамках статьи мы обращаемся к анализу условий, предпосылок и механизмов развития сотрудничества Франции и государств Африки в контексте реализации национальных

интересов Франции, обусловленных как двухсторонним сотрудничеством, так и глобальными процессами, в числе которых глобальная конкуренция за африканские природные ресурсы на современном этапе. Основной акцент в работе делается на периоде после 2007 года, что связано с приходом к власти во Франции президента Н. Саркози и интенсификацией глобальной конкуренции за влияние на Африканском континенте, которая активно развивается по настоящее время и повлияла на политику последующих французских правительств Ф. Олланда и Э. Макрона.

Предметная область исследования представлена тремя сферами, в числе которых внешнеполитическая деятельность Франции на Африканском континенте, институциональные механизмы сотрудничества Франции с африканскими государствами, а также модели двух и многостороннего сотрудничества в экономико-политической сфере, например, в вопросах действия франка КФА.

В исследовании мы ставим перед собой цель выявить и обобщить модели и способы реализации национальных интересов Франции на Африканском континенте, в том числе в контексте развития отдельных африканских государств, а также в условиях воздействия процессов глобализации.

Нельзя не отметить, что исследуемая проблематика крайне актуальна, именно в ракурсе изучения французской политики, так как в современной Африке существуют большие французские диаспоры, функционирует более тысячи французских компаний и корпораций, а экономики отдельных стран тесно связаны с экономикой Франции и зависят от нее. Кроме того, нельзя не отметить огромное количество проектов в области безопасности и активное участие Франции в борьбе с терроризмом и сохранении политической стабильности на континенте.

PANEL VIII
LEADERSHIP IN EDUCATION –
EDUCATION FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

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**Leadership and Power in African Institutions: A Synergy
between State Leadership and Library Institutions in Tanzania**

The objective of any institutional leadership system is to ensure that plans and decisions are effectively and efficiently communicated and executed based on its vision and values contributing to the strategic plans and development of the state and overall state leadership. However, state and institutional leadership systems in many African countries are not aligned. There is little information on what can be achieved in terms of quality of institutional leadership and available resources that would propel changes within these institutions which can inform developmental changes at the state level. This opinionated paper examines the areas of alignment between African states' leadership systems and library leadership systems and how library institutions exercises leadership towards gain visibility and its contribution towards the state leadership purpose and values.

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**The Triumph of Mwalimu Nyerere's Vision
of Adult Education in Tanzania, 1967–1985**

Since the colonial period, adult education as part of education has been very vital in the improvement of living standards of many people in Tanzania. Although adult education has been the nature of people's high standards of lives, existing studies have ignored Nyerere's thoughts and initiatives in the advancement of adult education in Tanzania. By drawing on secondary, archival and oral sources, this study uses Nyerere's thoughts of adult education as a window to explore the successful implementation of adult education programmes in Tanzania between 1967 and 1985. The study also assesses the responses of the local people to the implemented adult education agendas and unveils the implication of such responses to their behaviours.

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**Resilience Indigenization of Human Capital in Tanzania:
Experience from Education for Self-Reliance**

Education for self-reliance formally was one of the famous philosophies in Tanzania used by the government to prepare human capital at school and out of school. The aim of the government was to equip youth of the nation with necessary skills to master their environment and become useful members of the society after completion of certain level of education. The philosophy successfully groomed young people who were well equipped with integrated skills to become good member of society. While success are reported enormously among beneficiaries who range from school leavers to general society, today the philosophy is less prioritized in either of education levels, leading to increase of large part of population with limited knowledge, skills and capabilities of mastering their environment. A resilience indigenization of human capital can still be an ideal means to stockpile human capital across different levels of human development. Using a case study of Kibaha education centre, this paper assesses the contribution of self-reliance education among school and college graduates in developing human capital. The paper takes a look of what was gained, what we ought to be losing and what we expect in future. The case is selected taking care that this was one of the area where a comprehensive structure of practical education was established.

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“Fees Must Fall” and Political Changes in South Africa

The report is devoted to the new and urgent problem of student and youth protests that took place in South Africa from 2015 to 2017, and their impact on the political life of the country. With the advent of “Fees must fall”, some South African students and citizens began to demand the introduction of free higher education. Representatives of such youth organizations as the African Youth Forum, Progressive Youth Alliance, “Fighters for Economic Freedom” by Julius Malema, the Communist Youth League, AfriForum Youth taken an active part in student riots.

The question of free higher education remained relevant throughout 2016-2017. In autumn 2017, President Jacob Zuma presented a project of free higher education. This plan was based on the findings of the Interdepartmental Commission on Overcoming the Crisis in Higher Education (Heher commission). This step, which opponents called “pointless flirtation with voters”, did not help the president maintain his influence. On the ANC conference (December 16-20) a new party leadership was elected. The new leader of the African National Congress was the country's vice-president Cyril Ramaphosa. Jacob Zuma agreed to voluntarily resign only after a discussion in parliament was scheduled for February 15, 2018 to pass a vote of no confidence in him. On February 17, Cyril Ramaphosa outlined his government's program in the “State of the Country Report”, with which the president of South Africa speaks every year. Free higher education since 2018 was announced together with most important points in the plan for a radical transformation of society, proclaimed by Cyril Ramaphosa.

Thus, student riots and “Fees must fall” became a catalyst for a radical solution to the problem of accessibility of higher education in South Africa, and also significantly influenced the changes that took place in the political system of South Africa in 2018.

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Движение «Fees must fall» и политические изменения в ЮАР

Доклад посвящен новой и актуальной проблеме студенческих и молодежных акций протеста, происходивших с 2015 года в Южной Африке, и их влиянию на политическую жизнь страны. С появлением движения *Fees must fall* часть студенчества и сочувствующего им общества стала требовать введения бесплатного высшего образования. Студенческие волнения, прошедшие по всей стране, были поддержаны такими молодежными организациями, как Африканский молодежный форум, Прогрессивный молодежный альянс, «Борцы за экономическую свободу» Джулиуса Малемы, Молодежная коммунистическая Лига, Молодежная группа организации Африфорум.

Вопрос о бесплатном высшем образовании оставался актуальным на протяжении 2016-2017 годов. Осенью 2017 года Джейкоб Зума, бывший тогда президентом, обнародовал проект введения бесплатного высшего образования. Этот план был основан на выводах Межведомственной комиссии по выходу из кризиса в высшем образовании (комиссии Хехера). Этот шаг, который оппоненты называли «беспредметным заигрыванием с избирателями», не помог президенту сохранить свое влияние. На прошедшей 16-20 декабря 2017 года конференции правящей партии АНК было избрано новое партийное руководство. Новым лидером Африканского Национального Конгресса стал вице-президент страны Сирил Рамапоса. Все громче стали звучать призывы к Д. Зуме добровольно уйти в отставку. Но он согласился на добровольную отставку лишь после того, как на 15 февраля 2018 г. было назначено обсуждение в парламенте о вынесении ему вотума недоверия. 17 февраля Сирил Рамапоса изложил программу своего правительства в «Докладе о положении страны», с которым ежегодно выступает президент ЮАР. В ней было заявлено и о введении с 2018 г. бесплатного высшего образования.

Таким образом, студенческие акции протеста и в целом

движение *Fees must fall* стали катализатором радикального решения проблемы доступности высшего образования в ЮАР, а также существенно повлияли на изменения, произошедшие в политической системе страны в 2018 г.

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**The Place of Indigenous African Languages in the New Curriculum:
An African Psychology Case Study**

The role of indigenous African language in teaching and learning in South Africa is something that has been explored widely in higher education. However, these works have only resulted in the usage of these languages only to make Western knowledges intelligible to those whose first language is not English. This paper argues for the need to move beyond this limited usage of indigenous languages as mere translators of Western knowledge. It calls for the usage of indigenous African languages for epistemic purposes. Using a case example of African Psychology, the paper illustrates how language carries its people's knowledges. Demonstrating that the prioritisation of colonial languages in education has cemented the myth that African people have no worthy knowledge from which to draw. This paper illustrates the manner in which language has kept these indigenous African knowledges alive despite the epistemic violence meted against them.

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**National Leaderships Commitments to
Education and Educational Development:
A Discussion on Nigeria and Cameroon in West and Central Africa**

This paper is an academic critique of and analysis on national leaderships commitments to education and educational development with special interest on Nigeria and Cameroun in West and Central Africa. It presents conceptualizations on the tenets of leadership commitment to education and educational development indices. Further, the paper reports the major educational commitments and milestones of post-independence national leaderships, with potency for continuous educational development, with particular emphasis on their planning, implementation, evaluation, problems and prosspects, from Nnamdi Azikiwe / Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (1960–1966) to Muhammadu Buhari (2015 – till date) of Nigeria and Ahmadu Ahidjo (1960–1982) to Paul Biya (1982 – till date) of Cameroun. The scholars observe and aver that, successive national leaderships, in the two nations and sub-regions, show commitments to education and educational development at the levels of pronouncements and documentations and fail short of attaining the prospects at the levels of plannings, implementation and evaluation, as they appear not to muster the appropriate and adequate political will to implement educational programmes, as pronounced and documented. Also, national leaderships commitments to education and educational development appear to suffer setbacks, arising from the challenges associated with policy implementation, changes in global trends in education and educational development, lopsided implementation of educational plans and general policy summersaults. Consequently, it is suggested that, national leaderships should show genuine commitments, when planning educational programmes for implementation and evaluation for the attainment of educational development in the sub-regions.

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An Analysis of Educational Attainments of Nigerian Civilian and Military Leaders: Implication for Political and Economic Development

The study analyses the educational attainments of Nigerian civilian and military leaders, between 1960 and 2020 and their implications for political and economic development in Nigeria. It presents the educational heights of Nigerian leaders from Nnamdi Azikiwe, Tafawa Belewa, Aguiyi Ironsi, Yakubu Gowon, Murtala Muhammed, Olusegun Obasanjo (military), Shehu Shagari, Muhammadu Buhari (military), Ibrahim Babagida, Ernest Shonekan, Sani Abacha, Abdulsalami Abubakar, Olusegun Obasanjo (civilian), Umaru Muss Yaradua, Goodluck Johnathan to Muhammadu Buhari (civilian), it further summarizes that, apart from Goodluck Jonathan who had a Doctorate Degree before assuming the office and Olusegun Obasanjo who got the doctorate, after leaving office, the rest had qualifications considered less in status than the duo. The paper also presents the political and economic milestone of the different leaders and concluded that, levels of educational attainments, do not have much implications for political and economic development but on styles and methods of conducting governmental business in the international arena. The study suggests that, there is need for balance of educational attainments and commitment to the yearnings of the people in handling state administration.

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**Assessing Mother Tongue as Medium of Instruction
for Effective Teaching in Primary School**

The study assesses mother tongue as medium of instruction for effective teaching in primary school. The study adopted a descriptive survey research design. Population comprises of all primary school teachers in Abeokuta South Local Government, Ogun State, Nigeria. A random sampling technique was used to select 10 primary schools teachers in Abeokuta South Local Government, Ogun State, Nigeria. 15 teachers were randomly selected from each of the chosen school to make a total of 150 as sample for study. Instrument for data collection was a 6 item questionnaire on four point scale. Data analysis was done using chi-square statistical tool. The study revealed that mother tongue as a medium of instruction in early childhood classroom is very effective in improving pupils' learning abilities. The result of the research confirmed that there was a direct relationship between the language of instruction used by the teacher and pupils' learning abilities. It is therefore recommended that Nigerian government should address the implementation of the National Policy on Education in the part of language of instruction in early childhood settings more seriously and schools should be made to understand their role as agents in promoting of multicultural Nigerian traditions.

PANEL IX
LEADERSHIP AND POWER IN AFRICA:
SOCIOECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS

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**Leadership is an Engine of Economic Development:
The Covetousness of Pre, During, Post and Neo Colonialisms in Africa**

The continent Africa is richest in natural resources however economically poorly underdeveloped. The prime causes of these scenario rooted from covetousness of pre, during, post and neo colonialisms. This paper intended to examine the role of leadership in revolting economic development of Africa. Dependency theory employed in this paper centered on capital accumulation of colonialists though capitalism system. The results indicate that post-independence African states are colonizers' model. Colonialists in the form of neo-colonialism still continue to exploit Africa's rich resources, as well as its labor to sustain their authority over their own middle- class populations while rewarding African collaborators in leadership positions for subjecting their populations into poverty and desperation. Middle- class obsessions require African resources to generate billionaires out of foreign investors while impoverishing most Africans. These results are typical form of capitalism. Capitalism, including primitive capital accumulation use various strategies includes racism, piracy, slavery, organized crime, bureaucratic corruption (kleptocracy), debt bondage, eminent domain nationalization including privatization, tariffs and taxation, and migrant labor. The paper concludes that colonialism impacted negatively on Africa's economic development. The paper then, suggests that conventional ways should be applied to address Africa's economic development through policies.

Leadership: Prioritizing Africa's Economic Development Goals¹⁵

The socio-economic development of Africa remains quite unstable, due to the remaining problems. Experts outline the key challenges: low level of industrialization, unemployment, poorly developed infrastructure, political turbulence and ongoing conflicts in a number of countries of the macroregion, humanitarian issues, quality of medical and educational services.¹⁶¹⁷¹⁸¹⁹

Active measures are being taken at the international, regional and country levels to eliminate these obstacles from the African agenda. The United Nations (UN) actively takes into account the most acute problems of Africa. For example, the main provisions formulated in the UN Sustainable Development Goals are largely in tune with the challenges facing African states.²⁰

The African Union (AU), in turn, has designated priority areas of work; the African Development Bank has also defined the most significant challenges facing Africa, and both institutions are striving to eliminate not only the negative consequences of the identified problems, but also to completely eradicate the trouble spots.^{21 22}

¹⁵ The article was prepared within the project "Post-crisis world order: challenges and technologies, competition and cooperation" supported by the grant from Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation program for research projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development (Agreement № 075-15-2020-783).

¹⁶ <https://gdc.unicef.org/resource/sub-saharan-africa-key-issues-and-us-engagement> (accessed: 15.11.2021)

¹⁷ <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/09/economic-growth-sub-saharan-africa-challenges-risks/> (accessed: 20.11.2021)

¹⁸ <https://www.afdb.org/en/news/01/28/2019-1407/why-does-africas-industrialization-matter-challenges-and-opportunities-724> (accessed: 26.11.2021)

¹⁹ <https://www.afdb.org/en/the-high-5/improve-the-quality-of-life-for-the-people-of-africa> (accessed: 20.11.2021)

²⁰ <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/> (accessed: 10.11.2021)

²¹ <https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview> (accessed: 14.11.2021)

It is obvious that all the tasks formulated in the Agenda 2063 are to be solved, however, some of them, in our opinion, could be marked as priorities.²³

Within the framework of the report, the author will attempt to rank obstacles and identify one, the removal of which will accelerate the isolation of other problems facing African society.

Finally, the reporter will offer his vision of further intensification of Russia-Africa cooperation, taking into account the results of the study. This is especially relevant in the light of the upcoming second Russia-Africa Summit scheduled for 2022.

In case of successful approbation of the key provisions of the research, the developed recommendations can be used in the work of African regional organizations, government structures of the countries of the continent and the Russian Federation.

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Власть: приоритизация целей экономического развития Африки²⁴

Социально-экономическое развитие Африки остается достаточно неустойчивым, что обусловлено сохраняющимися проблемами в странах континента. К числу основных вызовов эксперты относят: незначительный уровень индустриализации, безработицу, слабо развитый инфраструктурный комплекс, политическую турбулентность и сохраняющиеся конфликты в ряде государств макрорегиона, проблемы гуманитарного характера, невысокое качество предлагаемых медицинских и образовательных

²² <https://www.afdb.org/en/high5s> (accessed: 26.11.2021)

²³ <https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview> (accessed: 14.11.2021)

²⁴ Статья опубликована в рамках проекта «Посткризисное мироустройство: вызовы и технологии, конкуренция и сотрудничество» по гранту Министерства науки и высшего образования РФ на проведение крупных научных проектов по приоритетным направлениям научно-технологического развития (Соглашение № 075-15-2020-783).

услуг.²⁵262728

Для исключения обозначенных препятствий из африканской повестки дня принимаются активные меры на международном, региональном и страновом уровнях. Характерно, что Организация Объединенных Наций в своей работе активно учитывает наиболее острые проблемы Африки. К примеру, основные положения, сформулированные в документе о Целях в области устойчивого развития ООН, во многом созвучны задачам, стоящим перед государствами Африки.²⁹

Африканский Союз (АС), в свою очередь, определил приоритетные направления работы; Африканский банк развития также идентифицировал наиболее значимые вызовы, стоящие перед странами континента, и обе указанные структуры работают над устранением не только негативных последствий обозначенных проблем, но и над полным искоренением их первопричин.^{30 31}

Очевидно, что все сформулированные в Повестке 2063 задачи подлежат решению, однако некоторые из них, на наш взгляд, могли бы быть обозначены в качестве приоритетных.³²

В рамках доклада автор предпримет попытку приоритизировать препятствия и определить одно, снятие которого ускорит решение и других проблем, стоящих перед африканским обществом.

Наконец, докладчик предложит свое видение дальнейшего укрепления российско-африканского взаимодействия с учетом

²⁵ <https://gdc.unicef.org/resource/sub-saharan-africa-key-issues-and-us-engagement> (дата обращения: 15.11.2021)

²⁶ <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/09/economic-growth-sub-saharan-africa-challenges-risks/> (дата обращения: 20.11.2021)

²⁷ <https://www.afdb.org/en/news/01/28/2019-1407/why-does-africas-industrialization-matter-challenges-and-opportunities-724> (дата обращения: 26.11.2021)

²⁸ <https://www.afdb.org/en/the-high-5/improve-the-quality-of-life-for-the-people-of-africa> (дата обращения: 20.11.2021)

²⁹ <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/> (дата обращения: 10.11.2021)

³⁰ <https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview> (дата обращения: 14.11.2021)

³¹ <https://www.afdb.org/en/high5s> (дата обращения: 26.11.2021)

³² <https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview> (дата обращения: 14.11.2021)

результатов проведенного исследования. Это особо актуально в свете запланированного на 2022 год второго Саммита Россия-Африка.

В случае успешной апробации ключевых положений исследования выработанные рекомендации могут быть использованы в работе региональных организаций Африки, властных структур отдельных стран континента и Российской Федерации.

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**Regulatory Impact Assessment in Tanzania:
The Current Practice and Challenges**

Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) systematically assesses the costs and benefits of proposed and existing regulations. Effective RIA implementation leads to the attainment transparency, accountability, proportionality and consistency which are crucial for regulatory compliance and therefore, business growth. Previous surveys on the adoption and practice of RIA in developing countries that included Tanzania showed that these countries fall short of proper implementation of RIA. However, these studies were not in-depth as they focused on a number of countries which vary in economic and political development. Nevertheless, these surveys did not validate their findings with information from the regulated and ordinary citizens. Using both questionnaire and interviews this study therefore gives specific attention to the current practice and challenges of RIA. This study is more enriched as it attempted to gather information from both officials from regulatory agencies, the regulated and representatives of citizens. The study also attempted to fill the knowledge gap given the time lapse between the previous and current study. Findings indicate that there is moderate application of RIA in regulations with considerable fissures. Particularly, RIA is mostly implemented as consultation tool rather than as both a consultation and analytical tool. This has to some extent limited the attainment of regulatory governance. With regards to challenges, the study showed that Tanzania is largely facing similar challenges since the first adoption of RIA over two decades ago. The study recommends the following; First and foremost is political commitment in the use of RIA in all regulations; institutional capacity building in terms of budgets and adequate skilled personnel that can implement business focus groups, surveys and test panels to discuss draft decisions and regulation; effective consultation of stakeholders and use of simplified RIA to ensure proportionality between the merits and demerits of a regulation.

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**Tanzania's (Mis)handling of Covid-19 Pandemic:
The Role of Political Leadership**

Since the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in early 2020, governments around the world have taken various measures to contain its spread. In doing so, the role of the political leadership has been instrumental in determining government response to the pandemic. Despite a global scientific consensus on the Covid-19 preventive measures, varied government responses have resulted in varied results as the pandemic rages on. For poor countries, some of the control measures proved to be too costly to implement. While this is understandable, the denialism and anti-intellectualism that went along with attempts to manage the pandemic is not. Moreover, the absence of strong institutions in these countries meant that response to Covid-19 pandemic highly depended on the 'wisdom' of the political leadership. This was the case in Tanzania where the government response to the pandemic has been a mixed bag of acceptance, denialism, pragmatism and tiptoeing. At the heart of this rollercoaster of approaches, the role of the political leadership had at times contradicted official government position on the pandemic, undermining efforts to contain the virus. This paper analyses the role of the Tanzanian political leadership in its ever-changing position on the pandemic, the latest of which has culminated into embracing the Covid-19 vaccination.

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Power Distance, Individualism-Collectivism Dimensions and Its Association with Anxiety during COVID-19 in Tanzania

The COVID-19 pandemic is far from being over and its consequences for on individual and society level have become more and more evident. In this paper we are going to discuss the effect of COVID-19 restrictions during the first and second wave restrictions on people mental health in Tanzania in relation to power distance and social hierarchy. The self-reported data from 341 participants during first wave of COVID-19 were collected from May to July 2020 and data from 304 participants during second wave of COVID-19 were collected from July to September 2021. Two questionnaires measuring anxiety level were used in this study - the Generalized Anxiety Disorder Scale (GAD-7) and the State Anxiety Inventory (SAI). Sex differences of anxiety levels during COVID-19 were demonstrated. Women reported higher levels of anxiety compared to men. The effects of a set of social indicators on anxiety during COVID-19 were tested as well. Tanzania's GAD-7 and SAI anxiety scores will be examined under cultural dimensions such as individualism / collectivism and power distance. These dimensions may function as protective adaptive mechanisms against the development of anxiety disorders in pandemic situation. In addition, it is proposed to compare the assessments of respondents' anxiety in the first and second waves in relations to changes in official governmental attitudes towards COVID-19.

This research was supported by a grant from the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (project № 20-04-60186).

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**Alternative Authorities, Political Hierarchies and the
Struggle for Power. Negotiating Social Welfare in Namibia**

This paper addresses the question of contested authorities and internal power plays in the context of welfare and income redistribution in Namibia. The issue has been the subject of heated public debates and political disputes for years. Given the fact of overall poverty and large income disparities among the Namibian population, the idea of basic income grants to all citizens appeared thrilling. Finally, a way out of misery and inequality seemed to open, as a genuine African contribution to solve its social and economic problems. When the unconditional Basic Income Grant Project (BIG) was initiated in 2007, it started as a small but well-organized pilot project. Enthusiastically welcomed by a mostly global community, its supporters ranged from international organizations to institutions of civil society, representatives of the Christian Churches, and social scientists who travelled across the globe to present their views on the feasibility of basic income projects. Information quickly spread via the social media and other communication channels, which turned BIG for years into a really “big” deal. However, when it came to the local implementation of policies, the project eventually failed in 2014 after ongoing quarrels over the right strategy of poverty reduction and social justice — not for the lack of financial means or political assertiveness but for the unsolved question over leadership, allegiance, and power. In a highly competitive arena of alternative authorities, the disputes over this relatively small social initiative revealed larger political issues: among them is the perception of legitimacy acknowledged or denied, and the sources of authority which might well be found outside of political processes.

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**The Definition of Insanity:
Freedom of Information and Leading the Regulation of
Africa's Data Sovereignty in the Era of Digital Neo-colonialism**

It is particularly challenging to regulate a rapidly and ever-evolving industry such as information and communications technologies (ICTs). However, the cross-cutting nature of the contemporary ICTs industry possesses fundamental threats in Africa to human rights and, more specifically, the freedom of information and the corollary right – such as freedom of expression. The current industrial revolution led by the collection, processing and storing of citizen data with novel technologies such as artificial intelligence and the internet of things does not seem to serve African people and their challenges. Foreign new-media corporations continuously profit from the trade in African citizen data. Still, these insights are not deployed to better the lives of African people on the continent, neither through governments nor by corporations. Consequently, it is critical to determine a harmonised regulatory approach in Africa that can deliver freedoms to its people that “... seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”. The concept of data sovereignty understood as relating to information, which has been collected, converted and stored in binary digital form, being subject to the laws of the country in which it is located – seems to be the dominant regulatory approach being proffered. However, in recalling Africa's torrent past and the devastating governance challenges post-independence, would such a regulatory approach underpinned by nationalist autonomy combat digital neo-colonialism and deliver on the freedom of information? Firstly, this research critically reflects on the dominant historic African regulatory responses to the influx points of the previous technological, industrial revolution for post-independent African states. Secondly, the contemporary African continental and regional regulatory positions are explored towards interrogating whether African legal instruments such as the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection sufficiently promotes freedom of information in Africa or does it entrench digital neo-colonialism on the continent?

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Constitutional Change and the Rule of Law in Kenya

This paper will examine how the constitutional change process and the subsequent adoption of the 2010 Constitution has affected the rule of law and political governance in Kenya. Scholars will remember that the final adoption of the Constitution was a culmination of a long-drawn-out process which began in the early 1990s. That the process took twenty years to be finalized is itself an indication of the complexity of the challenges that the process had to overcome. It is argued that most of these challenges rest on the infidelity of political governors to the discipline of the rule of law. Well, it is well now over a decade since the adoption of the new Constitution, an opportune moment to assess the benefits of the process itself and its product. It is in this regard that the paper poses the question whether the mere change of constitution can benefit the rule of law in an African context. It will argue that the same challenges that slowed down the process of constitutional change have endured to this day and still pose a great threat to the rule of law in Kenya. Thus, the paper will assess how Kenya has performed using the key indicators of the rule of law (as we know them), interrogate the constitutional aspects that affect the rule of law, and isolate, what in the Kenyan context, remains problematic. This paper is meant to instigate debate and pose questions rather than provide answers *per se*.

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Corruption and the Scuffle for Power in Africa: Implications for Development

This paper asserts that weak institutions and legislation are the root causes of corruption in the African continent. Corruption is endemic and considered the root Africa's problems. Over the years Africa has been considered the poorest continent in the world due to the existence of bad governance. According to the World Poverty Clock, in 2019 about 422 219 339 million people in Africa lived below poverty levels. Most African states have funds which state leaders have allocated for development projects, regrettably such projects seldom materialize, as the funds are illicitly siphoned out of the economy at unprecedented levels. Several African countries have remained underdeveloped due to millions of public funds being stolen, embezzled or misappropriated by those entrusted with political power. It is reported that on average Africa loses about 50 billion worth of money and assets which could be used to enhance national development and improve living conditions of the population. This often results in a situation where the commitment of state to the people are compromised and the underprivileged in society repeatedly bear the brunt of such criminal conduct. This paper asserts that despite the adoption of the African Union's Anti-Corruption Convention and the need for states to criminalize illicit money laundering and acts of corruption, the vice still rages undeterred. It argues that punishments such as imprisonment, public shaming and fines instituted in countries like Uganda, Nigeria and South Africa do not seem to act as adequate deterrents for future offences. The paper advocates for more stringent measures in the form of specialist skills like financial analyst, tax inspectors as well as strengthen the cooperation between these experts and prosecutors. It also underscores the significance of political will in the fight against corruption.

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Institutions of International Justice as Factors of Influence on State Power in Africa

In the mid-1990s, a process of significant change in the role and functions of international justice bodies began. Already acting bodies began to gradually acquire the functions that were outside their competence. In addition, during this period, there was a process of massive creation of new bodies, primarily in the field of international criminal justice. These new bodies were formed in a fundamentally different way from the old institutions. Despite the "international" name of these bodies, they have become, in fact, supranational bodies conducting global policy. The creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has become a major factor in the completion, in general, of the new international justice system. As the practice of the ICC shows, the main goals of this body are: 1) the formation of a new supranational / global law and 2) direct impact on state power. The main target of the International Criminal Court has become the countries of Africa. This is explained by a number of factors, among which is the need for preliminary approbation of the "new global law", for which the African continent has become a testing ground.

The activities of the ICC in 2020-2021 show that the International Criminal Court forms "case law" to exercise its jurisdiction not only in relation to the member states of the Rome Statute of the ICC, but also to states that are not party to this international treaty.

Studying the activities of modern international justice bodies in Africa allows you to better understand the decision-making mechanism of state power in the countries of the continent, both at the level of individual states and at the level of inter-African international organizations.

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Органы международной юстиции как факторы воздействия на государственную власть в Африке

В середине 1990-х годов начался процесс существенного изменения роли и функций органов международной юстиции. Уже действующие органы стали постепенно приобретать «явочным порядком» не свойственные им функции. Кроме того, в данный период произошел процесс массового создания новых органов, прежде всего, в области международной уголовной юстиции. Данные новые органы были сформированы принципиально иным образом, нежели старые учреждения. Несмотря на «международное» название данных органов, они стали фактически наднациональными органами, проводящими глобальную политику. Создание Международного уголовного суда (МУС) стало важнейшим фактором завершения, в целом, системы новой международной юстиции. Как показывает практика деятельности МУС, основными целями этого органа стали: 1) формирование нового наднационального/глобального права и 2) оказание прямого воздействия на государственную власть. Основным объектом деятельности Международного уголовного суда стали страны Африки. Это объясняется целым рядом факторов, среди которых – необходимость предварительной апробации «нового глобального права», полигоном чего и стал африканский континент.

Деятельность МУС в 2020-2021 годах показывает, что Международный уголовный суд формирует «прецедентное право» для осуществления своей юрисдикции не только в отношении государств-членов Римского Статута МУС, но и государств, не являющихся участником этого международного договора.

Изучение деятельности органов современной международной юстиции в Африке позволяет лучше понимать механизм принятия решений государственной власти в странах континента как на уровне отдельных государств, так и на уровне межафриканских международных организаций.

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**The International Criminal Court and Africa:
An Interplay between Politics and Justice**

The establishment of the International criminal court has been welcomed by the international community, many states and Non-governmental organizations, but its jurisdiction has been contested by other states including some of the UN Security Council permanent members. In the first decade of 21st century the African enthusiasm for the ICC has moved into confrontation with it. By focusing its investigations and prosecutions mostly on African situations, the ICC has been accused of bias against African leaders by some commentators and scholars, but others have perceived the ICC activities in Africa as best means to achieve justice for victims of international crimes. It is important to assess how power and justice have influenced the ICC activities in Africa.

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