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**HIERARCHY
AND POWER
IN THE HISTORY
OF CIVILIZATIONS**

Selected Papers



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**I. Alternativity in Cultural History: Heterarchy and Homoarchy as
Evolutionary Trajectories**

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CONTEXTUAL CONSTRAINTS ON STATE STRUCTURE

Introduction

This paper outlines how variable success at transmitting environmental and other cultural knowledge from generation to generation influences governmental forms (Crumley 1993, 1994, 1995, 2000, 2001). Heterarchy is introduced in the context of complexity research, followed by a closer look at the characteristics of hierarchical and heterarchical authority structures. This is followed by a brief introduction to the later European Iron Age; the relationships among environmental knowledge, polity structure, and societal values; and finally the role of surprise in state societies.

Complexity in Human Societies

Human organization, by measures of adaptability and interactivity, is arguably the most complex category of self-organizing system known. From earliest human societies to the present day, individual creativity and collective flexibility have met with success. The importance of biological diversity has a correlate in human societies: the toleration of difference in individuals and groups and of variety in circumstances increases societal choice and offers a reserve of alternative solutions to problems. Organizational flexibility--in economic, social and political realms--enables societies to adjust to changed circumstances.

Although there exist several useful vocabularies for discussing the organizational characteristics of society, the twentieth century was dominated by one: the framework of band, tribe, chiefdom and state (Service 1971). Using this framework, anthropologists were willing to attribute considerable flexibility to bands and tribes, but much less to stratified society (chiefdoms and states). The difference was seen primarily in terms of increasing order, manifest in hierarchies of power and their concomitant systems of communication. Yet although hierarchical organization characterizes many aspects of state power, hierarchy alone does not capture the full range of state organizational relations.

Heterarchies of power--coalitions, federations, leagues, associations, communities--are just as important to the functioning of many states as they are to more egalitarian groups (bands and tribes). Furthermore, as the September 11, 2001 events demonstrate, power flows in many channels (Samford 2000)

and can manifest entirely outside the framework of state hierarchies and beyond their control. In self-organization terminology, this is termed *chaos* or surprise (Crumley 2001).

To clarify the grammar of the political aspect of social formations, a colleague and I have distinguished among several relations of domination (Crumley and Marquardt 1987:610ff.). Power is the ability to achieve desired goals, with or without the consent of all persons affected. Authority refers to the capacity of individuals to influence events as a result of widely recognized knowledge, prestige, or position. Power and authority cannot long endure in the absence of some degree of legitimation, however. Legitimacy implies sanction by custom, law, or consensus. Control integrates and coordinates power, authority, and legitimacy, and is exercised either to precipitate or prevent certain outcomes or to regulate access to certain resources. All people enter into multiple relations of domination and dependence, and all have power at some scale or scales, if only through forcing others to act. Control may then be distinguished from power, authority, and legitimacy and reserved for relations of domination that draw on the values underlying enduring social formations.

Hierarchy (the classic, pyramidal organizational form commonly found in government and business) is a structure composed of elements that on the basis of certain factors are subordinate to others and may be ranked (Crumley 1979:44, 1987b:158). In a control hierarchy each higher level exerts control over the next lower level; the US court system and the army are control hierarchies. By contrast, disturbances at any level in a scalar hierarchy (referring only to the size of the conceptual field) can affect any other scales (Crumley 1995b:2). This is because in control hierarchies, individuals and groups with authority and those with responsibility are isomorphic; thus information and the means of communicating it become commodities to be hoarded (e.g., literacy). In scalar hierarchies, for better or worse, elements at all scales are in communication with elements at all other scales. A scalar hierarchy of many types of systems, ranging from the simplest (static, mechanical) to the most complex (language, self-consciousness) make up a holistic world (Fleener and Pourdavood 1997; Jantsch 1982:349; Mingers 1995).

Another way of conceiving of this meshwork of systems is as a heterarchy, broadly defined as the relation of elements to one another when they are unranked or when they possess the potential for being ranked in a number of different ways, depending on conditions (Crumley 1987b:158). Power, understood from a heterarchical perspective, is counterpoised and linked to values, which are fluid and respond to changing situations. This definition of

heterarchy and its application to social systems is congruent with Warren McCulloch's research into how the brain works.

It was McCulloch, a strong influence on the self-organizing systems theorist Kauffman (1993, 1995:preface xx), who first employed heterarchy in a contemporary context (McCulloch 1945). He examined independent cognitive structures in the brain, the collective organization of which he terms heterarchy. He demonstrates that the human brain is not organized hierarchically but adjusts to the re-ranking of values as circumstances change. The heterarchical structure of individual and collective memory may be a chief means by which human societies address change and the inevitable conflicts that arise.

For example, an individual may highly value human life in general, but be against abortion rights and for the death penalty (or vice versa). The context of the inquiry and changing (and frequently conflicting) values (Cancian 1965, Bailey 1971, Crumley 1987b) mitigates this logical inconsistency and is related to what Bateson (1972) terms a "double bind." Priorities are re-ranked relative to conditions and can result in major structural adjustment (Crumley and Marquardt 1987:615-617). McCulloch's "nervous nets," source of the brain's flexibility, is a fractal (same structure at a different scale) of the adaptability of fluidly organized, highly communicative groups. His work reminds us that it is quintessentially human to make nimble cognitive leaps among scales.

McCulloch's insight about the autonomous nature of information stored in the brain and how parts of the brain communicate revolutionized the neural study of the brain. It also solved major organizational problems in the fields of artificial intelligence and computer design (Minsky and Papert 1972). What McCulloch realized was that information stored in bundles as values in one part of the brain may or may not be correlated with information stored elsewhere, depending on the context; in computer terminology, subroutine A can subsume ("call") subroutine B and vice versa, depending on the requirements of the program. Rather than the "tree" hierarchy of the first computers, those today use an addressing (information locating) RAM system that is heterarchical, more like a network or matrix. Query your search engine for heterarchy and you will find sites that address its role in business, society, technology, and values.

Societal dilemmas in which values are in conflict may be resolved by achieving a novel, transcendent state that either ranks competing values relative to one another (hierarchy) or does not allow them to be definitively ranked (heterarchy). At each successive level of integration and over time, new ordering principles come into play (e.g., conflict or inutility leads to suspension of old forms; Jantsch 1982:348) that draw upon a store of knowledge (preservation of useful elements) and new information (communication) to

provide creative solutions to challenges (transcendence of older forms). In the creation of these novel forms societies retain near-term flexibility, although there is of course no guarantee that the novel form is more stable than the old (Crumley 2001) or that fundamental tensions will not otherwise appear (surprise). For example, revitalization movements such as the Ghost Dance or Christianity seek transcendence through individual and collective rededication based on both new information and the retention of selected old values (the “born again” phenomenon, also termed mazeway reformulation; Wallace 1970).

In summary, heterarchies are self-organizing systems in which the elements stand counterpoised to one another. In social systems, the power of various elements may fluctuate relative to conditions, among the most important of which is the degree of systemic communication. The addition of the term heterarchy as a descriptor of power relations in so-called complex societies (Crumley 1979, 1987b, 1995b) is a reminder that there exist in every society forms of order that are not hierarchical, and that interactive elements in complex systems need not be permanently ranked relative to one another. Although a heterarchical (“democratic”) form of order has long been recognized in smaller (“simpler”) societies, it has been rejected as an appropriate organizational form for states. I argue that it is both impractical and inaccurate to exclude such a fundamental adjustment mechanism from the characterization of more populous political forms. The more successfully a society consolidates power and melds distinct hierarchies (e.g. religious, political, economic) into hyperhierarchy or hypercoherence, the less flexibility there is in dealing with surprise.

Characteristics of Authority Structures: Hierarchies and Heterarchies

White (1995:118) provides a useful scheme for understanding continua in the various organizational dimensions of complex societies. For both hyperhierarchical states and those more heterarchically organized, White characterizes individual rules for behavior, gender relations, economy, social status, conflict resolution, social ideology, the political relation between leaders and followers, and temporal dynamics. To this I wish to add an examination of the contrasting conditions of decision making (Crumley 2001) and clarify a single link: the relation between administrative structure and environmental stability and change.

Hierarchical polities. Administrators in strong hierarchies (hypercoherent authoritarian states termed hyperhierarchies) have the following advantages. Due to a clear decision making chain, they respond well to fast-developing

crises (e.g., military attack, insurrection). Because the rules and responsibilities are known to all, political interactions among decision makers are few and formalized, and political maintenance of the system is low. Administrative hierarchies are equipped with powerful security forces that can successfully defend the state perimeter and suppress internal dissent.

Hierarchical polities are at a disadvantage because data-gathering techniques, tied to the pyramidal decision-making framework, slow the arrival of some kinds of information (especially subversive activity) at the apex of the pyramid and necessitate the formalization and elaboration of internal security forces. Decisions are rapid and expedient but they are not necessarily popular; popular dissatisfaction is high and there must be considerable investment in coercion and/or chicanery. In any event, security costs are high.

Heterarchical polities. Administrators in heterarchically organized polities are treated to good quality information from many sources within and outside of the decision-making lattice. For the most part, decisions are fair and reflect popular consensus. Decision makers hear of a variety of solutions to problems. Because heterarchies are more likely to value the contributions of disparate segments of the community (women, ethnic groups, etc.), the society as a whole is better integrated and the workforce is proud and energized.

Heterarchical polities are at a disadvantage because consensus is slow to achieve, increasing the time it takes to make a decision (but see below). Decision makers must engage in interpersonal dialogue with constituents, which requires considerable time and energy investment and constant maintenance. The cacophonous voices and choices a decision maker hears complicate the search for workable solutions.

Tradeoffs. The greater a group's involvement, the greater the range of response choice and the more inclusive the consensus, but the response time is slower and long-range planning is more difficult. Spontaneity, polyvalent individuality linked to achieved status, inclusive or counterpoised definition of state power, and flexibility are valued in heterarchies; hierarchies value rule-based authority, rigid class lines linked to ascribed as well as achieved status and rank, a control definition of state power, and the status quo. Of course, state democracies exhibit characteristics of both, which explains in part why they are more stable than authoritarian states.

An Application: the Later European Iron Age

I would like to call attention to several features of the archaeology of pre-conquest Iron Age society that illuminate economic, political, and social life and allow the foregoing framework to be applied. The first half of the Iron Age

(ca. 800-450 BCE), termed Hallstatt, is reminiscent of the earlier Bronze Age and characterized by the control of trade with the Mediterranean by warrior elites. The second half (ca. 450-52 BCE), termed La Tène, appears to have democratized trade and moved toward representative government (Crumley 1974, 1987a; Wells 1980, 1984).

For the reader's sake and my own, I eschew an exhaustive survey of the Iron Age and focus on trends widespread in pre-conquest continental northwest Europe (see Note) and on the polity I know best: the Aedui, a later Iron Age state that inhabited what is now Burgundy, in east-central France (Crumley 1987a, 1995a, 2000, 2001; Crumley and Marquardt 1987). It was in the course of study of this polity and broader European trends that I began to question the wisdom of applying central place theory to archaeology and the presumed identity of social with spatial hierarchies (Crumley 1976, 1977, 1979). I was compelled to find an alternative to the prevailing theories of state power. Intrigued by research in computer design, of which my colleague Marquardt had made me aware, I began to investigate the implications of heterarchy for the study of society.

Diversification of production and its political, social, and spatial decentralization enabled later Iron Age peoples to adjust to environmental uncertainty. The territory of the Aedui, like much of Europe, is extremely heterogenous, with considerable variation in elevation, topography, soils, and vegetation. The sources of wealth in the Aeduan economy took advantage of this natural mosaic through a particularly diverse commercial production. Chief among these were stock breeding (horses, cattle, sheep, pigs), metal mining and fabrication, mixed agricultural production, artisanal activities, and the slave trade, leading to import/export within and far beyond the polity including the Mediterranean. Due to their extensive control of riverine and overland routes, this brought the Aedui additional wealth through taxation on routes of trade and protective services. More generally, Iron Age elites engaged in interregional exchange networks maintained through gift-giving, marriage, fosterage, hostage exchange, or dispatching relatives to found other sites (Crumley 1987a). Celts were considered excellent soldiers and they were in high demand for mercenary services throughout the ancient world.

What is interesting (and until recently, contentious) about settlement in the regions beyond direct Classical influence is that Iron Age peoples beyond the Roman provinces were not pre-urban but non-urban (Audouze and Buchsenschutz 1989, 1992). The long scholarly argument over the history of European urbanization has been resolved; the archaeological record of hill forts, called oppida, is now seen to show great diversity in size, function, and

population. In general, some were polity centers that, while they did not have huge permanent populations, nonetheless served to physically aggregate political, economic and religious activities (e.g., Bibracte; see Goudineau and Peyre 1993); others were simply fortified animal pens. The great fairs of early medieval Europe, which were distinct from local markets and served long-distance trade, may echo portions of this pattern (Allix 1922; Crumley 1976:68). In any event, the urban Mediterranean model did not appear until after the Roman Conquest.

Most Iron Age peoples (including elites) resided in individual homesteads and small hamlets. While some artisans lived and worked in commercial centers along trade routes and in hill forts often located at the headwaters of several drainages, others were independent. Ehrenreich (1995) demonstrates that iron metallurgy – a sophisticated technology of central commercial importance and a cornerstone of community spirituality—was under individual, domestic control, rather than that of elites. Another key element of the Aeduan economy was the horse: members of every class of Aeduan society had a hand in horse raising, training, tending, or utilization as transportation and an engine of war. This economic focus on the horse is mirrored spiritually in widespread veneration of the Aeduan regional deity, the horse goddess Epona, by every class of society. Sole member of the Celtic pantheon to be embraced by the Romans, her roots stretch far back into Indoeuropean prehistory. Her transfunctional nature—maternal/agrarian goddess, patroness of arts and crafts (notably the arts of war) and protectress of horsemen and horses, from cavalry and charioteers to commercial wagons and racing sports—ensured her survival in post conquest Gaul and even in Rome itself, both under her Gaulish/Aeduan name and in conflation with Minerva (Caesar BG 6; Crumley 1987a; Oaks 1987). It is by means of their broad utility that regional deities expand their purview, and in this case economic specialization mirrors broadly held convictions in the ancient world.

Iron Age architecture was in wood, not stone, and very little monumental architecture (the “council house” at Emain Macha in Northern Ireland is an exception) has been found apart from Mediterranean-influenced temples late in the period. Some sites have elaborate walls and gates (e.g., Bibracte), but the bulk of archaeologically recovered structures are domestic or funerary. If Classical authors are to be believed, much ritual practice took place outdoors, in sacred groves hung with the gore of sacrifice.

While Iron Age archaeologists have the advantage of contemporary accounts by Classical writers, they must also be wary not to privilege the colonial written word over the indigenous archaeological record. Iron Age

traditions of transmission were proudly oral and aural, not pre-literate but militantly non-literate, although Greek or Latin characters sometimes appear on Celtic coinage. Caesar suggests that thereby they encouraged the cultivation of memory and kept the information from becoming common property (Caesar 6:13). An important form of communication was visual; the later Iron Age La Tène style, executed on tools, weapons and adornment, is a powerful expression of a widespread cosmology, and the work of Celtic artisans was held in high regard in the ancient world. Filled with fantastic, almost Modernist animals and mathematically intricate knots and mazes, the La Tène style is artistically second to none.

Proud keepers of this complex oral and practice-based tradition were the druids, living receptacles of collective knowledge. Drawn from the aristocratic classes, druids transmitted important judicial, political, and religious information to the next generation of aristocratic youth in schools they attended for as long as twenty years (Crumley 1974; Haarhoff 1958). Classical society was fascinated with Celtic moral philosophy, which held that there is an afterlife and the soul is immortal. Cyril of Alexandria ranks druidic philosophy among the most distinguished of the ancient world, including that of Egypt, Assyria, Persia, and India (1868-77); Diogenes Laertius reports that many thought the study of philosophy began among these “barbarians” (1950: *Vitae* I.1, I.5).

While it may have had an earlier Iron Age history of kingship (Crumley 1974, 1987a; Oaks 1987), the Aeduan polity had several democratic features by the later Iron Age, including governance by a senate and the annual election of a chief magistrate. Unlike their peers in Classical society, women could both inherit wealth and hold office, even that of druid. Caesar tells us that once a year the druids of all Gaul met near present-day Chartres to adjudicate interpolity grievances and other complicated matters. I have argued elsewhere that the Aeduan sociopolitical formation (and that of at least some other Iron Age polities) was a state democracy with political parties, a complex class structure, and governance based not on kinship but the patron-client relation (Crumley 1974, 1987a, 1995a).

In my work I have paid particular attention to the patron-client relation, which I define in terms of roles. The patron offers economic assistance and the protection from legal and illegal authority, while the client offers labor, demonstrations of esteem, information on the machinations of others, and the promise of political support. I have studied the evolution of this pivotal political relation beginning with its quite flexible form in Celtic Gaul (1974, 1987a) and subsequent transformations, first into a more formal Roman system and later as

the more rigid and oppressive medieval lord-serf configuration (1987a:416ff.). The Celtic patron-client relation may be distinguished from both the Roman and medieval by its spirited defense of the right to negotiate reciprocity and the freedom of clients of all classes to change patrons. The implication of this relation among the Celts is that patrons gained and retained clients through personal characteristics of fairness, charisma, and effectiveness. Individual pride and vanity were strong personality traits, and military prowess and personal reputation were much valued. Dietler explores the importance in Celtic society of drinking and feasting, and its remarkably clear manifestation in the archaeological record (1990); patrons would have recruited labor, flattered clients, and repaid debts in this manner.

In summary, critical examination of archaeological and literary evidence indicates that Iron Age polities shared sophisticated philosophical, artistic, and juridical traditions, a complex class system, and heterogenous commercial and personal networks that extended far beyond polity boundaries. Settlement, governance, and social classes were spatially dispersed rather than concentrated; individuals, families, and political parties drew their power from a variety of resources; and at least some polities were states that, if regarded fairly, were characterized by more features we think of as democratic than obtained in ancient Greece (Arnold and Gibson 1995; Small 1995). It was this non-conformity with the standard argument and evidence for state power that led me to develop the idea of heterarchy.

Environmental Knowledge and Polity Structure

Celtic elites established horizontal interregional exchange networks through gift-giving and by dispatching relatives to found other sites and act as nodes of information collection. Many aspects of the economy were not under elite control; elites minimally interacted with the larger regional economy but were dependent upon it. There was skilled occupational specialization in workshops with high-volume, surplus production. Corporate groups formed when access to and control of important resources was restricted, and when resources were freely available they disintegrated into component nuclear families; in this regard they mounted local-level resistance against centralized, hierarchical power.

Particularly intriguing is evidence of systemic change over time which appears to have plunged Europe into a Dark Age. Beginning ca. 300 B.C., Western Europe experienced diminishing water resources, deforestation, and the loss of soil fertility, leading in some areas to abandonment. Over a period of roughly 600 years, the Roman state vanquished its Iron Age foes, moved from

Republic to Empire, then steadily disintegrated. Ultimately, the increasing demands on available resources by urban populations crashed the system. This pivotal period in the history of the West offers a powerful illustration of the relation between climate and society, organizational structure and long-term (*longue durée*) history, and perhaps even religion and ecology.

Three major high pressure systems characterize the climate of northwest Europe: the Atlantic (Greenland high), the continental (Siberian high), and the Mediterranean (Azores high). Throughout Western Europe, from ca. 300 B.C. to A.D. 250, the climate was Mediterranean--warm, dry, and unusually stable. The usually volatile climate of the continent was less variable than at any time since the middle Holocene. Climatologists refer to this period as the Roman Climatic Optimum (RCO) (Denton and Karlen 1973), when the Azores high pressure system dominated the entirety of Western Europe. During this time, the relatively narrow zone of overlap (*ecotone*) between temperate northern climatic and biotic regimes (Atlantic/ continental and semiarid Mediterranean) moved far to the north of its average twentieth-century position in southern France; vineyards flourished in England.

For Rome, the conquest of new lands and the dominance of a stable, warmer, and drier Mediterranean climatic regime over Western Europe created new sources and locales of wealth production; for example, new consumers and newly-feasible growing regions expanded the wine and olive industries. This led to the expansion of certain forms of labor (e.g., slavery and debt-servitude), and to the imposition of more hierarchical forms of authority (Crumley 1987a, 1994; Clavel-Lêveque 1989). The climatic stability of the period meant that extreme weather events that usually characterized northwest Europe were absent, harvests were regular and abundant, and the growing alimentary needs of the population of Rome and other Imperial cities could be met. Industrial-scale farms, called *villae* and *latifundia*, grew specialized cash crops for urban markets. Entire regions (*provincia*) were consecrated to the production of specific goods for the huge urban market (Mommesen 1968).

For obvious reasons, the end of this halcyon period destabilized the Roman economy, but an equally critical factor was the diminished ability of the hyperhierarchical Roman authority structure to adjust to less predictable circumstances (Crumley 1993, 1994, 1995a). We may now contrast the ability of rigid hierarchies (such as that of the Roman Imperial state) and more fluid heterarchical state organizations (in place in climatically variable northwest Europe before the Roman Climatic Optimum and which persisted on the fringes of the Empire) to respond effectively to unforeseen conditions. It is likely that climatic conditions worsened precipitously, not gradually, in the second century

A.D. (Bryson and Murray 1977). There would have been increasing instances of crop failure (due to late spring frosts and/or cool, damp summers characteristic of the temperate European pattern) and ruin at harvest (hailstorms) or upon storage (blight).

Much was invested in the agricultural harvest in the European provinces: it fed burgeoning urban populations, was a source of wealth for elites and financed their career aspirations, and, at a more visceral level, mirrored the spiritual as well as the literal health of the Empire. The deities of the earth, harvest, and fertility (Tellus Mater, Juno, Hera, Ceres/Demeter, Artemis, Diana), along with those of weather and the elements (the sky, thunder) and war (Jupiter/Zeus, Athena), figured prominently in public worship (Vanderbroeck 1987; Wistrand 1979). The so-called Capitoline Triad is composed of Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva (state deities of the sky, fecundity, and crafts/wisdom respectively). A temple dedicated to the Triad (whose origins are pre-Greek, Etruscan, Minoan, perhaps even Indo-European) was begun in the first year of the Republic (510 BCE). It was located on one of the seven hills of Rome that served as both citadel and religious center.

It was inadmissible for Roman administrators of either the Republic or the Empire to fail to carry out their ritual duties to the Triad, principal deities of weather and agrarian abundance. The success or failure of the harvest was, however, less critical during the Republic for two reasons. Not only would poor harvests have been uncommon during the Roman Climate Optimum but also because agricultural failure, like military defeat, would have been seen as the will of heaven, elite administrators would not have been held personally accountable.

The first two centuries of Imperial rule (mid-first century B.C. to mid-second century A.D.) were relatively prosperous, and the deified Emperors embodied divine will on earth. But beginning in the mid-second century A.D., Optimum climatic conditions began to deteriorate. The swift onset of agrarian collapse levied economic and social costs and challenged sacred imperial authority. To account for widespread economic failure, Roman emperors were forced to reinterpret traditional religion or to embrace the mystical religious traditions of the eastern Mediterranean. Beginning with Aurelian (A.D. 215-275), who imported the Persian worship of the Unconquered Sun, the search culminated with Constantine's (A.D. 285-337) conversion to Christianity. Thus was fate safely transferred back into the hands of deity, open to petition but possessing a decision-making logic that was unknowable and not subject to critique.

While this was an acceptable solution to responsibility for the Roman elite, it was cold comfort to the population of Burgundy and other parts of colonized Europe. Warmer, more stable conditions had stimulated investment far to the north in grain monocropping and agrarian products of Mediterranean origin (grapes, olives). As long as climatic conditions were stable, the attenuated economy was viable; when at the end of the warm, stable Optimum period climatic conditions again became variable, key elements of the diverse Iron Age economic and social adaptation had been swept away (Crumley 1993, 1995a). Within the first hundred years of Empire, indigenous elites were coopted into provincial government and military services and druidism was discouraged, then formally outlawed as a threat to the Roman state. The sacred groves were razed, and the immense druidic traditions of natural and human history were lost. As for the common people, they soon felt keenly the loss of a deep knowledge of place stretching back perhaps as far as the Neolithic. The old provinces, increasingly on their own, attracted people from north and east of the Roman perimeter—Burgunds, Franks, Ostragoths—with economic traditions more intact. They encountered a population no longer schooled in the environment as a system, less knowledgeable and self-reliant, and serfdom was born.

State Power and a Heterarchy of Values

The renewal of state authority through ritual performance is a complicated matter. Annexation and conquest behoove states to encompass varieties of belief, but alternative belief systems pose various dangers to the state and so must be deftly managed (e.g., through a syncretic state religion), severely discouraged, or eradicated. State democracies (that is to say, states in which officials are elected) offer a particularly paradoxical version of state ideology, employing a rhetoric featuring the indeterminacy of power and authority while maintaining the condition of control. The appearance of broad participation in state affairs is carefully fostered by means of public religious observances and the celebration of social contracts (e.g., constitutions) that emphasize their democratic (heterarchical) features. Thus inequities inherent in all states, while in theory obvious to all, are masked in practice by an ideology of equality coupled with elite dedication to public service. Demonstrated through veneration of a syncretic faith combined with icons of the nation-state, these public acts legitimate both elite practitioners and the states they serve.

Personal ambition--exuberant self-advocacy cloaked in pious modesty--also plays an important legitimating role, welding individual life goals with the long-term maintenance of the state. The reinterpretation of traditional

cosmologies is particularly effective, offering new readings that legitimate both individuals and class hierarchy as a part of the natural world. Elite responsibility to society then consists of correct ritual practice, thereby assuring maintenance of the benevolent contract of deities with mortals and the support of artistic and other activities of public enrichment.

In summary, state power can be seen as a dynamic tension between hierarchical and heterarchical features which are present at every spatial and temporal scale. Both forms of organization are tied to core societal values, and a state cosmology must have sufficient flexibility to support reinterpretation as circumstances change. Elite administrators have fundamental responsibilities to their society to reduce risk in key systems (hence the focus on fertility and the forces of nature in the Roman Triad). Elite ambition favors vertical consolidation of power, but popular support is won through celebration of the collectivity; otherwise the maintenance of order becomes expensive.

Complexity in State Societies

Theories of self-organization and chaos give us a new, nonlinear, dialectical way to think about human biological and cultural evolution, and especially the formation of the state (Gumerman and Kohler 1994; Haken 1983; Harvey and Reed 1996; Kiel and Elliott 1996; Schieve and Allen 1982; Scott 1991). At each successive level of integration, new ordering principles come into play (**suspension of old forms**) (Jantsch 1982:348), drawing upon a store of knowledge (**preservation of some elements found in the old forms**) and providing creative solutions to new challenges (**transcendence and transformation of older forms**).

Another fundamental issue is the assumption in the decentralized pattern that “in times of stress, kinship groupings may fuse into larger units...[and] fission [occurs] when the threat is alleviated” (Iannone 2002:69; see Fox 1988, Fox et al. 1996). While many historic and contemporary examples of this pattern may be found, there exists just the opposite tendency at other scales of analysis. In using an example from Roman times that combines *longue durée* history with event- and actor-based chronicle and cyclic patterns (Anderson 1994) in which knowledge loss and environmental change co-occur (conjuncture), I have argued that in uncertain times the sharing of information and flexible authority structures reduce risk by increasing available information to decision makers and multiplying solutions. In any event, the “crux of the problem therefore becomes the exploration of how the processes of decentralization and centralization fluctuated over time and space and...why

these temporal-spatial oscillations occurred” (Iannone 2002:71; see also King and Shaw, 2004).

States are, relative to other social formations, relatively unstable. If states are considered complex dissipative systems in the new terminology, societal forces and environmental conditions would vary over time (and space) while state structure adjusts and endures. Interesting contemporary research on complex systems suggests the proposition that states have identifiable "basins of attraction," taking more hierarchical forms in environmentally stable periods, more heterarchical forms in periods of surprise. As Gunn (1994) notes, the more varied the history of acquired knowledge about a region's episodic climate, the more ably novel and extreme environmental conditions can be withstood. A long period of stability permits both the consolidation of power (hyperhierarchy) and the eventual loss of information and structure that enable less salubrious times to be endured (Hassan 1994). While marked environmental change is only one means by which surprise is introduced, it can be (given reduced flexibility) a powerful force in precipitating widespread systemic change. In theory, democracies (states with both hierarchical and heterarchical elements) would be the most stable form, except that even in them inequality of wealth, lack of cooperation, rigid ideology, and corruption introduce grave threats to stability (Midlarsky 1999).

The tension between order and chaos—or in this discussion, between democratic and authoritarian power—is the source of systemic creativity (that is, the potential of the system to change its parameters completely and become more richly networked). However, systems near chaos are subject to surprise. The human species and even individual human lives are all examples. The particular "surprise" examined here has been that of environmental change, but many other possibilities present themselves: invasion, disease, and the like.

In summary, while hierarchy undoubtedly characterizes power relations in some state societies, there are myriad coalitions, federations, democracies, and other examples of shared, counterpoised, heterarchical state power; all state systems have some heterarchical elements, just as all egalitarian societies have some relations that are hierarchical (e.g., age). Yet while the democratic principle is enshrined in many state constitutions (for example executive, legislative, and judicial “checks and balances” in the U.S. constitution), many other forces determine the degree to which democratic ideals are realized (e.g. activities of the current U.S. Executive have short-circuited checks and balances). As sources of societal power diversify, markets expand, and belief systems and ethnicities multiply, more rigid hierarchies are unable to control disparate forms of social communication and are thus unable to contain chaotic

systemic behavior. The result is systemic administrative collapse, whether through revolution or slow disintegration. Administrative hierarchies most often err in assuming the primacy of the uppermost scale of governance, declaring their hegemony over other realms and scales. Yet far-reaching change can be generated at any scale, and the true dialectic may be between history and surprise.

Note. Celtic identity, both ancient and contemporary, is the subject of considerable current debate (e.g, Wells 2001). Although I am aware of and sympathetic to this questioning of Classical authors' interest in or ability to distinguish among Iron Age peoples, for the sake of brevity I sometimes use "Celtic" in lieu of "Iron Age" or "Iron Age peoples."

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ON SOME FORMS OF HIERARCHICAL SYSTEMS

The origin of social inequality has traditionally been one of the most debated issues in human prehistory studies and social anthropology of pre-state societies. The word "origin" itself implies that the scholar takes it for granted that during some period in early human evolution inequality did not exist. Indeed, prehistoric human communities were often believed to be egalitarian, and relationships within them were characterized in terms of "social equality". Yet ever since the beginning of studies in social evolution, certain scholars, such as Maine or Westermarck, have a priori regarded inequality as inherent in "human nature". Recent studies in sociobiology and primate ethology have unambiguously demonstrated that all our "closest relatives" have a more or less marked hierarchy of ranks and that humans have likely inherited some forms of hierarchical relationships, i.e. social inequality, from their animal ancestors (Winterhalter and Smith, 1992, pp.3-23; Fitzhugh, 2000, pp.103-117; Butovskaya, 1999; 2002). Therefore, as has been stated by a number of authors, although in different ways (e.g.: Burch and Ellana, 1994, pp. 219-221; Schweitzer, 1998, pp.1-2; 2000, pp.123-132), we should search not for the origin or roots of social inequality, but rather for factors that might have caused a specific form or type of social inequality and for mechanisms which might have shaped specific structural features of hierarchical social systems in human communities. We should also inquire into the reasons underlying the development of truly egalitarian¹ social systems. Doubtless, egalitarianism is characteristic of some human communities but it should by no means be postulated a priori (e.g. Artemova, 1991; 1993; 2000; 2003; Schweitzer, 1998; 2000; Kazankov, 2000). It is a product of specific evolutionary processes in a no lesser extent than various forms of social inequality are.

Social scientists (Marxists and non-Marxists alike) have tended to link the evolutionary processes whereby social inequality is structured with material production and property relationships. It is less common to relate them to ideology, especially religion (Wason, 1998; Wason and Baldia, 2000). Usually, a single model or mechanism underlying these processes is regarded as the original or the primary, be it "delayed-return", the activity of "aggrandizers" or whatever (Woodburn, 1980; 1982; 1988b; Clark and Blake, 1994). My assumption is that various types or manifestations of social inequality were

shaped by vastly different factors. Different mechanisms of structuring or institutionalization of hierarchical systems could have acted in parallel within the same culture (or society) or could have been specific to particular cultures in particular periods and under particular circumstances. They could have been rooted in material production and property relationships as well as in other factors.

For example, in some Melanesian societies one may find simultaneously: 1) delayed- return as a characteristic feature of the subsistence mode, one which, according to Woodburn, inevitably brings about institutions of status hierarchy and structured inequality in property relations; 2) the activity of "aggrandizers" (bigmen in this case), stimulating, according to Clark and Blake, the development of the same institutions; and 3) complicated ceremonial practices, also producing ranking of status or authority positions. While the society of the Chukchi reindeer herders conforms to the "delayed-return model" and the "accumulation of wealth model", some Australian hunter-gatherer societies only support the "ceremonial status differentiation model". In my opinion, the latter case is especially interesting from the theoretical standpoint. It demonstrates – in the purest and least complicated form – one of the main types of formal social inequality that is spread all over the world: inequality based on, and triggered by, a phenomenon which I describe as *monopolization of socially important information*². Its basic meaning is that certain social groups or individuals monopolize special skills and occupations (often closely related to ideology and significant for the entire society) and thereby obtain a special (high) social status.

I had described these phenomena among the Australian Aborigines in traditional context in several previous publications (Artemova, 1991; 1993; 2000; 2003; 2004). Now I will only summarize briefly its general pattern.

1. Considerable differences in social status existed between *men and women*.

Only men, as a rule, functioned as both formal and informal leaders. Only men, with rare exceptions, could be magicians, sorcerers, or healers. Men controlled totemic cults as well as other religious practices. The material and ideological constituents of rituals (songs, myths, dances, sacred objects, and totemic sites), too, were concealed from women and any violation of respective prohibitions was liable to severe punishment, including death.

2. Difference in social status also existed between men, who made up the group of "*elders*", on the one hand, and all the remained men, on the other. Also, it seems that, at least in some parts of Aboriginal Australia, not all the mature or elderly men were granted membership of this group, which for that

reason cannot be regarded as just an age group. To join it, the man had to conform to specific conditions. One man could get qualified much earlier than another.

The "elders" accumulated considerable authority both in religious affairs and in everyday life. They also enjoyed privileges during the distribution of certain kinds of food (especially valued food) as well as in matrimonial relationships, particularly in matchmaking. According to Keen's description of traditional Yolngu society in northeastern Arnhem Land, "control of religious knowledge had been a key element in the political economy of marriage, country, and ceremony. There was a direct link between religious prerogatives and power..." (Keen, 1997, p. 300).

3. Among the elders, there were men of special individual status: ritual leaders, custodians, or guardians of sacred objects and totemic centers, sorcerers and "native doctors".

4. A crucial element of all this system was the initiation rite whereby special secret/sacred knowledge was imparted to the individuals. Only men who had passed at least the primary stages of the initiation rite and had absorbed some esoteric knowledge concerned with religious cults gained authority over women and adolescents. The "elders" were men who had passed all or nearly all stages of the initiation rite. However, certain aspects of religious knowledge were reserved for particular types of religious leaders. "Professional" magicians, sorcerers and "native doctors" also acquired special esoteric information during the special initiation rites. In some sense, the initiation rite divided the people into several status categories. The entire ideological legacy, too, was divided into several sections, some of which were accessible to everybody, while others were reserved for those belonging to specific status categories.

5. The secrecy of esoteric knowledge was guarded by numerous elaborate taboos, and also by means of a special method which could be termed prescribed or sanctioned misinformation. Those who had passed the initiation rites and had gained some knowledge of secret affairs deliberately conveyed to outsiders false ideas about the esoteric sections of their culture. This deception, in contrast to ordinary lies, was regarded as necessary and considered to be proper since it was viewed as a prerequisite of success in magic rites and totemic cult rituals. Being prescribed and sanctioned by religion, deception was a means of maintaining and enhancing the social supremacy of those who practiced it and, in some situations, even a means of psychological compulsion since the uninitiated had to obey the initiated.

6. All this structural status differences were *marked symbolically*. The higher ranks allowed having special *names* or a sort of titles, to wear special decorations or ornaments (very often — on the *head* or round the *waist*). Then some ineradicable marks or scars on the *body* were common. Especially those on the *penis*, like circumcision or subincision.

In Russian ethnological literature there were repeatedly drawn parallels between the so-called primeval hierarchical systems, on the one hand, and spontaneous hierarchical internal structures of the so-called extreme³ groups, on the other hand. By the term “extreme groups” they mean closed social formations, very often organized violently or compulsively. The most common examples — male associations in prisons or work camps and typical army subdivisions of the Soviet Union or modern Russia. As the examples of primeval systems various Secret male societies, such as those of Western Africa and Melanesia, or age classes of East African peoples, or age groups of the Australian Aborigines were used. As a rule, such a comparisons were limited to the external or exterior aspects of the phenomena and particularly to the semantic similarities, which sometimes are really striking.

For example, “extreme groups” of modern Russian army — carefully studied and described by Bannikov (2002), — represent self-replicating rigidly stratified associations. A sort of initiation rite, often accompanied by various painful tests or ordeals, is the obligatory condition of passage from the low strata to the high ones. Members of particular stratum have a sort of title, such as ‘*young*’ — those belonging to one of the low strata, or ‘*grand fathers*’ — those belonging to one of the high strata. Status differences are *marked symbolically*. The *head*, the *waist* and the *penis* are the crucial points of differentiation: how to wear the garrison cap, how to turn the star on the cap, how to wear the soldier belt, how to manipulate with the belt shield, and so on. All these things are regulated and ritualized in detail. For example, the belt shield of those who reached the highest stratum should be sharpened and polished and the belt itself — regarded as the symbol of one’s life essence — must be worn very loosely — just on the penis. Such norms are extremely numerous and keen. Many are of the kind unsuitable for description in public.

Ethnologists often tend to discuss various similarities and even coincidences between modern (definitely created anew, independently, relatively recently) and traditional forms of ritualized behavior in terms of so called archaic syndrome, which means something mysterious, dense, primitive, reappearing like phoenix from the ashes of the immemorial times. According to such an approach, the conditions or the reasons of reappearing or the renewal of this ‘archaic syndrome’ are connected with the situation of deep cultural and

socio-economical crisis, which Russia did experienced recently and still experience now (Samoilov,1990; Bannikov,2002).

However, the problem seems to be much more complicated. Perhaps, crisis situation proclaims itself only in those ugly, cruel, perverted morals and manners, which accompany spontaneous hierarchical structures in the army or penitentiary institutions.

Not the idea of ‘archaization of mentality’, nor the notion of ‘archetypes’ really help us to understand the phenomena under consideration (cf. Bannikov, 2002, p.21; p.130-186). For the structures of this type had been formed and still are emerging again and again in quite various situations and times, in different parts of the World, in quite diverse circumstances, including economical, political, cultural ideological conditions. For all their variety such structures are characterized not only by initiation rites and certain semantic features⁴ in common, not only by the relations of subordination-superordination, but also by the whole set of ideological phenomena and behavioral practices, which we here call monopolization of socially important information and sanctioned misinformation. Who owns the knowledge, owns the world.

We can find these phenomena in secret male society Duk-Duk (Banks Islands) of the beginning of XX century, in typical mediaeval Russian monastery or catholic European monastic order, in Russian aristocratic mason lodge of the beginning of XIX century, in modern English privileged male schools, in numerous powerful criminal organizations or in small bands of Moscow street hooligans, or in the former Soviet Communist Party, especially in its Central Committee, which became famous of countless secrets and constant misinformation of all the rest in society, as well as in army subdivisions, described by Bannikov.

For all the wretchedness, poverty or absurdity of the information, which is monopolized by the members of the high strata, the very fact of monopolization is obvious. And if we would consider the soldier’s contingent not separately, but in combination with the officers, which in reality are included into the whole structure and act in consent with the dominant stratum of the soldiers, — then we would be forced to acknowledge, that the concealed information and sanctioned misinformation are of the extremely important significance for the whole our society. It is necessary to mention, by the way, that the exoteric versions of events happening in the army — as any exoteric versions intended to misinform the outsiders — don’t shine with refinement and diversity but are quite unpretentious. That is because the ‘devotees’ are convinced of their superiority (at least, of their power). Say, they declare now here, now there that a soldier had killed a group of companions in arms,

including some officers, whereupon shot himself, and that the reason for such an accident had been a letter from home informing him of his bride's infidelity. They think the community 'will swallow' such a version. The community has no choice! We will make them to 'swallow' everything!

To be fair, it is necessary to say that Bannikov, while searching for the explanation of the essence of the analyzed structures, was oscillating to some extent between the "archaic syndrome" on the one hand, and, on the other, the idea, quoted from Kabo. I also will quote Kabo's statement. He wrote:

"I think that structures common for all human beings lie in the basis of this phenomenon, the same structures both in space and in time. Exactly these structures produce in different human groups and in different times certain universal phenomena of social relations and spiritual life — phenomena, which bring together modern and ancient cultures" (Kabo, 1990, p.111).

This approach seems to be much more profound than the idea of "archaic syndrome". But single "*but*", however, exists. Certainly, the hierarchic systems of this type tend to recur in time and space due to some common socio-psychological factors (cf.: Artemova, 1990). But these socio-psychological factors *are not the same for every human community*, and hierarchic social structures, which reproduce themselves due to these factors, *are not universal*.

Bannikov repeatedly quotes curious soldiers' utterances which show their belief that in irregular dominant relations featuring Russian army only their perverted forms are wrong, but amateur division into "junior" and "senior" itself is correct, useful and necessary to people (as well as relations of subordination within this system). I'll allow myself to respond in somewhat humorous mode. The division of such kind and all corresponding to it – if we consider not crisis and ugly conditions but regular ones – is necessary not to people, but to *males* only.

Besides African female secret societies, which are likely to be direct imitation of male ones, we fail to remember any female organization of closed secret corporative character with inner hierarchy, relations of dominance, rites of initiation, monopolization of information and sanctioned misinformation. Of course, to be confident, one needs special research. But even now it's evident that overwhelming majority of organizations of such a type develops either in entirely male groups or in those ones where males are prevalent. They develop during male activity, they respond to some deep psychological needs of males – males, united (no matter, voluntary or violently) into groups. Such groups may be extreme or non-extreme. But they emerge not everywhere and not always.

Let's remember Dostoyevsky's "The House of the Dead". Nothing like that is described there. Kabo, who had been imprisoned in Stalin's times, had

not experienced anything of that kind. Many other GULAG prisoners also do not report of self-replicating hierarchical structures, there is also no any information about such structures in Guberman's reminiscences about one of the Soviet work-camps (Guberman, 1991) of 1980s. Being one of the compilers of "The History of Pre-revolutionary Russia in Life-journals and Memoirs" (vol. 1-4, 1977-1980), I had to read through numerous writings of Russian exiles and political prisoners of XIX-XX century's frontier. There I also did not find any information about self-replicating hierarchical structures. As far as I know there were also no such structures neither in the army of pre-revolutionary Russia nor in Soviet army before the World War II or during that war. The same is also true about many Russian and Soviet male boarding schools (in contrast, for example, to many British ones).

If we set ourselves a task to understand why in some occasions such structures develop in male groups and in some they do not, we will probably succeed in a number of cases. But for different cases different explanations will be worked out. For example, presumably, at the time of Dostoyevsky penal servitude was not so strictly separated from the whole society as Soviet prisons/work-camps and Soviet/Russian army units were and are. There were no rigid restraint such structures need. In Stalin's camps such "separation" took place. But the regime (quite powerful one) was not interested in prisoners' self-replicating organization at all. It had power and line to impede this. If these explanations are wrong, then let somebody look for better ones. There is one thing of higher importance: even if we remain in the framework of one culture we will not be able to make - that is my deep belief - conceptual judgments which would explain all the cases of existence or absence of phenomena in question in seemingly analogous circumstances. So what can be said about different cultures?

But there exist cultures in which not only women, but also even men do not develop hierarchical structures at all. At least nothing like that was found in those cultures (for instance, among the !Kung, the Mbuty, the Batek, the Palyan and some other hunters and gatherers). I think, special research would allow to indicate a number of cultures, which lack of hierarchical closed corporations of predominantly male membership, lack of monopolization of socially important information, lack of sanctioned misinformation and which are *not hunter-gatherer cultures*. But such a research would lead neither to *unified* explanation of the reasons of the absence of such structures nor to determination of conditions in which they necessarily must develop. Powerful and prestigious closed corporations, which monopolize certain social knowledge, may or may not develop in societies with the same subsistence or production mode (or

belonging to the same socio-economic formation). However, such corporations may exist in societies of vastly different types, specifically those differing with regard to subsistence mode and economic level, whatever typology is used: among foragers or among shifting agriculturists as well as in modern industrial societies divided into classes or in those which attempted to eradicate classes and private property, like it happened in the Soviet Union. The Communist Party as a whole and its Central Committee in particular provide an excellent example.

The existence of powerful closed corporations, which monopolize some important knowledge, often goes along with profound differences in gender status. Because such corporations emerge under vastly different historical and socio-economic conditions, it may be suggested that their existence is intimately connected with socio-psychological phenomena, which transcend the boundaries of cultures, epochs, continents, civilizations, socio-economic formations, etc. Maybe, these corporations are more often monopolized by males (and correlate with low or average status of females) because they largely result from male activities motivated by some intrinsically male psychological needs?

If this is true, then real social equality as a whole and the equality of genders in particular are possible only in egalitarian societies (in the full sense of the term) lacking any institutionalized secrecy. Such societies (which are quite rare even among hunter-gatherers) created (for some yet unclear reasons) special mechanisms of social leveling, preventing usurpation of any important knowledge by separate groups or individuals. Modern democratic movements consciously strive for openness of any socially important information. It looks like that the achievement of social equality inevitably demands deliberate efforts, directed to overcome or suppress some socio-psychological phenomena inherent in "human (at least male) nature".

NOTES

¹ Unlike the authors of some neo-evolutionist studies (Fried 1967; Service 1975) as well as some recent authors (e.g. Schweitzer 1998), I use the term "egalitarian society" in its direct sense: a society in which all the people have equal access to all material and spiritual values of their culture and have equal personal freedom and equal opportunities for decision-making. Respectively, the societies to which this definition does not apply are referred to as "non-egalitarian". The Chukchi or the Eskimo societies are egalitarian in Service's or Schweitzer's sense and non-egalitarian in mine.

² This phenomenon has been discussed in a number of my earlier publications: Artemova, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991, 2003, 2004, etc.

³ Bannikov (2002) uses the English words “regimented societies”, though I am not sure that these words fit better than ‘extreme groups’ do.

⁴ Perhaps, it is worth of noticing, that the similarities in semantics of the phenomena under consideration are the more striking the less complicated the equipment of the people involved is. In other words, the Australian Aborigines in traditional cultural contexts and modern Russian soldiers mark status differences in quiet similar ways because both have few things at their disposal apart of their own bodies and very simple belongings. Catholic European monastic orders and Russian aristocratic mason lodges could allow themselves much more rich and therefore diverse paraphernalia of ritual and status symbolism.

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HIERARCHY AND HETERARCHY IN WORLD HISTORY

This paper will explore the value of the notion of ‘heterarchy’ for the study of world history. It will argue that, though world history (as developed in America) ought to be particularly interested in heterarchical structures, in practice, hierarchical concepts have dominated the discipline. Gradually, however, American world historians appear to be developing concepts that may make it easier to explore the importance of heterarchical structures in human history. The paper will introduce one such approach, based on the notion of ‘collective learning’. It will end by suggesting one reason why historians seem to find it so much easier to use hierarchical rather than heterarchical concepts in their accounts of the evolution of human societies.

Definitional Issues

Carole Crumley’s notion of ‘heterarchy’ (borrowed from McCulloch’s work on the human brain) is a reminder that hierarchy is not the only, or even the most important structural principle in complex systems such as human societies.¹ For students of human history, it is a reminder that we should not assume an automatic correlation between complexity and hierarchy. If something as complex as the human brain can be organized non-hierarchically, perhaps we should also be looking for non-hierarchical organizational structures in human history. In archaeology, at least, it has been relatively easy to show how, particularly in early complex societies, hierarchical and non-hierarchical structures seem to appear in parallel to each other rather than as steps in an evolutionary sequence.²

But what exactly is the difference between hierarchy and heterarchy? To avoid insinuating extraneous value judgements, it might be helpful to think of

¹ See Carole L. Crumley. Three Locational models: An Epistemological Assessment of Anthropology and Archaeology. *Advances in Archaeological Method and Theory*. M.B. Schiffer, ed., New York: Academic Press, pp. 141-73; and Carole L. Crumley (1987). A Dialectical Critique of Hierarchy. *Power Relations and State Formation*. T.C. Petterson & C.W. Gailey, eds. Washington, D.C.: American Anthropological Association, pp. 155-59.

² See, for example, Richard Baum (2004). Ritual and Rationality: Religious Roots of the Bureaucratic State in Ancient China. *The Early State, its Alternatives and Analogues*. L.E. Grinin et. al., eds. Volgograd: Uchitel’, p. 204.

hierarchy as a way of ranking components of a system by their efficacy. Clear causal rankings can be said to exist in a complex system where most of the causal arrows leading from one entity to another are pointing in the same direction. The sun supplies the earth's biosphere with energy, not the other way around. In this sense, we can say that there is a causal hierarchy; the sun could exist without the earth's biosphere, but not the other way around. Similarly, the causal arrows that lead from modern governments to individual citizens are powerful and clear; there are causal arrows going in the opposite direction, but for each individual they are weak. So we can say there is a hierarchy in which the President of the United States is more powerful than me. Slavery presents one of the clearest and most familiar examples of a relationship in which most of the causal arrows point one way. Where the causal arrows point in many different directions, it is hard to prove the existence of hierarchy. This seems to be the case in studies of the human brain (though nothing rules out the possibility that we will eventually detect causal arrows that do allow us to identify significant causal hierarchies within the brain), as well as in many complex feedback systems such as those studied in ecology. It is also true in the study of commercial relations and international relations. Pick several businesses of roughly equal size, or several members of the United Nations of similar influence, and the causal arrows between them may point in many different directions. It is relations of this sort that can usefully be described as heterarchical. As these examples suggest, hierarchy and heterarchy can be thought of as the two ends of a spectrum, with many intermediate positions in between. In even the most hierarchical of political relationships, those at the bottom can occasionally make a huge difference, for example through terrorism or assassination; while even the most democratic of political systems contains significant hierarchical elements.

This means that complex systems of many kinds (including human societies) can be understood fully only if we are aware of non-hierarchical as well as hierarchical structures. All forms of complexity appear to imply both vertical and horizontal linkages, structures that imply rankings and structures that do not. The notion of symbiosis in biology is such a concept, referring, as it does, to a whole range of complex relationships from those of prey and predator to those of domestication and mutuality. (Which is the dominant species on earth? Humans or lawn grass?) These remarks are a reminder that neither hierarchy nor heterarchy exist as such; they are conceptual tools that we need to explore different aspects of complex systems. Indeed, whether we see hierarchy or heterarchy depends, in part, on our perspective, because different types and scales of analysis may yield very different insights. If an ecologist sees a fox

eating a rabbit it may seem natural to describe the relationship in hierarchical terms. But the ecologist may also choose to see the same event within a larger perspective in which it is clear that a decline in rabbit populations will eventually lead to a decline in fox populations. Here, both rabbits and foxes appear as subordinate elements in a larger, heterarchical, ecological system. In studying a modern democracy, the difference in power between individual citizens and particular governments is colossal; here we have a clear hierarchy, a difference in power greater than ever before in human history. But study the voting mechanisms of a modern democracy, and we may be persuaded that all citizens are equal. This suggests that hierarchy and heterarchy may be different sides of the same complex entity when it is studied in different ways or from different angles. The value of the notion of heterarchy is that it forces us to look more systematically for heterarchical elements in social structures in which their existence has too often been ignored.

Hierarchy and Heterarchy in World History

How has the complex dialectical relationship between hierarchical and heterarchical structures been handled within the American discipline of world history, a field that is growing very fast in American Universities and even High Schools?³

As far as I know, the term heterarchy is entirely absent from recent literature on world history. Its absence reflects a certain blindness to the problems that the concept is intended to highlight. Hierarchical concepts are still taken too much for granted within world history, and world history courses are too often taught in ways that assume the existence of hierarchies within and between most human societies. Indeed, most contemporary world history syllabi begin with the appearance of the first agrarian civilizations, just at the point where hierarchical structures began to play a more significant role in human society than ever before.

³ There are numerous text books on world history, and in secondary school curricula the place of world history is now second only to that of American history. 'A majority of states (28) require some type of world history course for graduation from the public high schools. Moreover, according to a National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) transcript, a significant majority of recently graduated high school students studied world history. According to NAEP figures, 59.59% of high school students took a world history course in 1990, 66.72% of students took a world history course in 1994, and 66.41% took a world history course in 1998--figures that represent a 10% growth in only eight years.' Ane Lintvedt. *The Demography of World History in the United States. World History Connected*. 1/1, Nov 2003. [Available at:

<http://worldhistoryconnected.press.uiuc.edu/1.1/lintvedt.html>]

Nevertheless, most scholars writing about world history are also well aware of heterarchical elements in world history, because the field, by its very nature, requires a willingness to move beyond the fundamental hierarchical category used by historians—that of the nation or state. National histories are, almost by definition, dominated by hierarchical structures, as they study how states organize entire nations into complex entities, and how those entities jostle with each other for dominance in highly competitive international environments. But world historians try to look beyond the nation state, so they are more inclined to look at trans-national phenomena such as trade diasporas, trans-cultural exchanges, or migratory movements, where hierarchies may appear less prominent. In his recent survey of the field, Patrick Manning offers an essentially heterarchical description of what world history is about. World History, he argues, “is the story of past connections in the human community. World history presumes the existence of a human community—one riven sometimes by divisions and hatreds but unified nonetheless by the nature of our species and our common experience.”⁴ In their attempts to move beyond the concepts and ways of thinking characteristic of national historiography, world historians have explored a number of different approaches. And during the last half century I think it is possible to identify a slow movement towards more heterarchical concepts and ways of thought, as world historians have slowly moved out of the conceptual field of national historiography. But these shifts have been painful and difficult.

In the USA, William McNeill has been one of the dominant influences on world history thinking, ever since the publication of his classic study, *The Rise of the West*, helped establish the field of world history as a more or less respectable field of historical scholarship.⁵ McNeill was greatly influenced by his mentor, Arnold Toynbee, so it is no wonder that the central category in his work was that of the ‘civilization’. Like Toynbee, he organized his survey around a number of distinct civilizations, large areas united primarily by religion or cultural norms. And civilizations are, of course, profoundly hierarchical structures. However, unlike Toynbee, McNeill, even in his first major work, showed unusual sensitivity to the more heterarchical connections that existed *between* civilizations. In a retrospective essay on his *Rise of the West*, written in 1991, McNeill explores these contradictions well:

⁴ Patrick Manning. (2003). *Navigating World History: Historians Create a Global Past*. New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, p. 15.

⁵ William H. McNeill. (1963; repub. 1991). *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

In retrospect it seems obvious that *The Rise of the West* should be seen as an expression of the postwar imperial mood in the United States. Its scope and conception is a form of intellectual imperialism, for it takes on the world as a whole, and it tries to understand global history on the basis of the concept of cultural diffusion developed among American anthropologists in the 1930's. In particular, *The Rise of the West* is built on the notion that the principal factor promoting historically significant social change is contact with strangers possessing new and unfamiliar skills. A corollary of this proposition is that centers of high skill (i.e. civilizations) tend to upset their neighbors by exposing them to attractive novelties. Less-skilled peoples round about are then impelled to try to make those novelties their own so as to attain for themselves the wealth, power, truth, and beauty that civilized skills confer on their possessors. Yet such efforts provoke a painful ambivalence between the drive to imitate and an equally fervent desire to preserve the customs and institutions that distinguish the would-be borrowers from the corruptions and injustices that also inhere in civilized life.⁶

In later works, McNeill explored biological as well as cultural exchanges between what had previously been thought of as distinct civilizations. Indeed, in his path-breaking study of the spread of disease, he argued that, from an epidemiological point of view, the whole of Eurasia was a single 'ecumene', as early as classical times.⁷ Much scholarship in world history has taken a similar path, exploring themes such as the slave trade, or the history of the silk roads, or trans-national exchanges or religious, artistic and technological ideas. But though such approaches were sensitive to the often heterarchical relations between regions, states and civilizations, they still left the essentially hierarchical notion of civilizations at the core of world historical thinking.

One of the most influential attempts to construct broader concepts that could replace the state or the civilization in world historical scholarship is associated with the neo-Marxist writings of Immanuel Wallerstein.⁸ Wallerstein argued that in the sixteenth century there appeared a single capitalist 'world-system' that linked much of the world through commerce. The concept of a 'world-system' went beyond the notion of single civilizations united by culture, to propose the existence of larger zones, which might be very different culturally but were linked by networks of commerce. Wallerstein saw world-

⁶ McNeill. (1963; repub. 1991), pp. xv-xvi

⁷ W.H. McNeill. (1977). *Plagues and People*. Oxford: Blackwell.

⁸ Immanuel Wallerstein. (1974). *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth century*. New York: Academic Press.

systems as intrinsically hierarchical; they embodied and even created large regional divisions between dominant core areas and subordinate peripheries. Wallerstein was also convinced that there had only ever been one world-system, which appeared in the sixteenth century. However, other scholars have argued that there were earlier world systems, and not all of them were as hierarchical as the capitalist world-system that Wallerstein described. Janet Abu-Lughod has detected a world system in the thirteenth century, Andre Gunder Frank and Barry Gills have identified world systems in the second and even third millennia BCE, and Christopher Chase-Dunn and Tom Hall have described them even in pre-state societies.⁹ Janet Abu-Lughod argued that the Afro-Eurasian world system of the thirteenth century was made up of several regional networks, none of which dominated the entire system. And studies of earlier systems have been equally agnostic on the question of whether world systems are inevitably hierarchical. Often, it seems, hierarchical relations within states and empires were balanced by more heterarchical relations between them.

World systems theory and trans-civilizational approaches to the past widened the frames within which world historians studied world history, but still failed to offer a conceptual framework for human history as a whole. More recently, William and John McNeill have proposed the metaphor of a web as a way of unifying approaches to all eras of human history—the World Wide Web rather than the spider’s web. Their book explores how, in the course of human history, links between different communities have drawn human societies into larger and more complex networks of interrelationships. Not surprisingly, their analysis of the human web is profoundly heterarchical; they see the human web as a complex, evolving structure that sometimes generates hierarchical structures, but also generates many complex structures that are not hierarchical.

A web, as we see it, is a set of connections that link people to one another. These connections may take many forms: chance encounters, kinship, friendship, common worship, rivalry, enmity, economic exchange, ecological exchange, political cooperation, even military competition. In all such relationships, people communicate information and use that information to guide their future behavior. They also communicate, or transfer, useful technologies, goods, crops, ideas, and much else. Furthermore, they inadvertently exchange diseases and weeds, items they cannot use but which

⁹ Janet Abu-Lughod. (1989). *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350*. New York: Oxford University Press; Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills, eds. (1993). *The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?* New York: Routledge; Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall, eds. (1991). *Core/Periphery Relations in Precapitalist Worlds*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

affect their lives (and deaths) nonetheless. The exchange and spread of such information, items, and inconveniences, and human responses to them, is what shapes history.

What drives history is the human ambition to alter one's condition to match one's hopes. But just what people hoped for, both in the material and spiritual realms, and how they pursued their hopes, depended on the information, ideas, and examples available to them. Thus, webs channeled and coordinated everyday human ambition and action—and still do.¹⁰

Other world historians have made occasional use of the equally heterarchical metaphor of networks, but it remains too early to see if such ideas and concepts will catch on in world historical scholarship.

Collective Learning: A heterarchical approach to world history?

In the final part of this paper, I would like to discuss another essentially heterarchical approach to world history.¹¹ I will argue that this approach may offer another way of grasping human history as a whole, while avoiding the rigidity of excessively hierarchical models of the past.

My own approach to world history ("Big History") is distinctive in so far as I have tried to see world history in the context of even larger histories, including those of the biosphere and the cosmos.¹² One of the many interesting consequences of approaching human history from such large time scales is that it makes it easier to see the unity of human history. At the scale of big history, human history appears as the history of a particular species of animal, and the strategic questions are: what distinguishes the history of this species from the histories of other species? What makes us different from, say, chimps, our closest relatives?

I have argued that the answer is "collective learning". While change in the biological realm is dominated by the rules of natural selection, change in the

¹⁰ J.R. McNeill, and William H. McNeill. (2003). *The Human Web: A Bird's-Eye View of World History*. New York and London: W.W. Norton, pp. 3-4.

¹¹ The notion of collective learning is discussed in more detail in David Christian. (2004). *Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

¹² On Big History, see David Christian. (1991). The Case for "Big History". *The Journal of World History*. Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall): 223-38, republished in Ross E. Dunn, ed. and intro. (2000). *The New World History: A Teacher's Companion*. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin, pp. 575-87; Christian, (2004). See also *Maps of Time*. And see Marnie Hughes-Warrington. (2002). Big History. *Historically Speaking*. November, pp. 16-17, 20; and Fred Spier. (1996). *The Structure of Big History. From the Big Bang until Today*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

domain of human history is dominated by collective learning. By collective learning, I mean the unique human ability to share information with such precision that the learned experience of each individual can be passed on in detail to other humans and stored in the cultural memory of each community. This ability, made available to humans because of their capacity for symbolic language, transformed the relationship of humans to their environment, and set us off on a unique evolutionary path. Many species can learn, of course (beginning with flat worms), but in biology, learning plays a less important role than natural selection because, while it may affect the life history of each individual, and may even shape the ecological relations of entire species, it is not cumulative, so it does not shape the long-term history of entire species. As far as we know, chimps, today, do not behave radically from chimps 100,000 years ago. This is not because chimps are stupid; in fact, they are highly intelligent animals. It is because most of what individual chimps learn dies with them. The amount of information exchanged between individual chimps is so limited, and its storage so precarious, that it has little long-term impact on the history of the species. With humans, however, large amounts of personal knowledge can be shared with others and stored within a community's collective memory. Within this accumulating store of knowledge (that we commonly describe as 'culture') there is much knowledge that is ecologically significant. So, each individual faces the environment equipped not just with their own genetic endowment and the capacity to learn, but also with the accumulated experience of previous generations. The result is a species that can adapt to the environment with extraordinary and unprecedented facility, a species that can adapt so fast that the genetic mechanisms of change through natural selection simply cannot keep up. As Peter Atkins puts it in a recent survey of modern scientific thought: 'our own nominally civilized, cultivated, intelligent, and reflective level of life emerged when organisms stumbled on a way of passing on intricate, unpredictable information to others around them and following them. It did so by inventing language and effectively binding together all human organisms, past, present, and future into a single mega-organism of potentially boundless achievement.'¹³ This capacity to share learned information through language is what makes us different. It explains why we have a history and chimps do not. It explains why our species currently controls something between 25% and 40% of the energy that enters the

¹³ Peter Atkins. (2003). *Galileo's Finger: The Ten Great Ideas of Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 33.

biosphere from the sun. And it explains why our history may be unique not just on planetary scales but even on cosmic scales.¹⁴

If I am right, the idea that collective learning constitutes a new emergent property, unique to our species, offers a powerful paradigm for world historical research, for it tells us what is new about human history. It suggests that the study of human history is essentially about the myriad consequences of this new adaptive mechanism of collective learning. What are the implications of collective learning? How does it work? Why is it faster in some periods and slower in others?

The notion of collective learning has several implications that are directly relevant to our discussion of hierarchy and heterarchy in human history.

1) The first is that humans are much more interdependent than most other animals. Our distinctiveness as animals, and the distinctive features of our history, depend on our capacity to cooperate by sharing information. Indeed, shared information shapes us as individuals, for many important choices are taken for us before we are old enough to make those choices independently. We are prepared by the memories of our ancestors to face the world in particular ways. Of course, to a limited degree this is also true of chimps, but the cultural component in human history is far, far greater. As a result, humans can be said to adapt collectively to an extent that is not true of other animals. Humanity as a whole operates rather like the human brain—it consists of millions of individual organisms that interact with each other but in ways that bear no relationship to the hierarchical structures of an organizational chart. In this sense, human history as a whole is profoundly heterarchical. There is no permanent control position within human history, even if it is true that in particular communities hierarchies of many different kinds have emerged.

2) Having said that, however, the position of particular individuals or communities within networks of collective learning may have very important consequences, and differences in the positions of different individuals within these networks may well be a powerful foundation for the emergence of hierarchies. I will give two illustrations.

In foraging or small-scale societies, access to important knowledge is often controlled by and confined to particular groups. In aboriginal Australia, much knowledge was secret, and confined either to senior men or to senior women. Shamanic religions also presuppose the existence of special forms of knowledge available only to the professional shaman. In such instances,

¹⁴ A claim I have tried to defend in David Christian. (2003). World History in Context. *Journal of World History*. Vol. 14, No. 4, 437-58.

individuals or entire groups are systematically denied access to the full range of knowledge stored through collective learning, and differential access to this store can become the basis for rudimentary hierarchies in the distribution of influence and power. As societies became larger and more complex, unequal distribution of the fruits of collective learning may have played a powerful role in the emergence of patriarchy because males, who were generally less tied to child rearing than women, may have found it easier to occupy strategic positions in networks of information exchange.

A second example of differential access to accumulated information concerns the geography of collective learning. It seems reasonable to assume that the pace of collective learning will depend, at least in part, on the amount and variety of information being exchanged. This suggests that the size and geography of human communities ought to have a significant bearing on long-term rates of innovation. While some communities are remote from the major systems of informational exchange, others are located at important informational crossroads, regions that receive a great variety and volume of new forms of information because they have contacts with many other regions. Access to such information flows can stimulate innovation because it exposes societies to a much wider range of techniques, styles and commercial opportunities. So we might expect to find that regions occupying strategic positions in networks of collective learning have often been significant centers for innovation and accumulation. This line of argument suggests that exploring the position of communities within larger networks of information exchange may provide important insights into processes of state formation and evolution. Historical 'hub regions', or regions at the centre of large information networks, may have included Mesopotamia and Egypt (at the intersection of information flows from Africa, the Mediterranean world, India and the steppelands of central Eurasia) and MesoAmerica (at the center of the most populous region of the Americas and at the intersection of information and commercial flows from north and south America). The notion of collective learning suggests that in such regions the sheer scale of collective learning ought to stimulate innovation, and world history suggests that this was indeed true for many millennia in both regions. Most historians are aware of the importance of the ancient civilizations of Egypt, Sudan and Sumer, in the intellectual history of Eurasia, and they are becoming increasingly aware that the Islamic world, situated at the hub of intellectual exchanges reaching across most of Africa and Eurasia, played a

vital role in preservation and exchanging scientific and technological knowledge for much of the last millennium.¹⁵

This hypothesis also suggests a non-Eurocentric explanation for the rapid increase in the wealth and power of European and Atlantic societies in the last three centuries. As long as the world was divided into several large zones which had no contact with each other, Mesopotamia and Mesoamerica remained strategic zones for information flows; but as soon as the Atlantic was bridged, the topology of global information networks was transformed. Now, Europe became the hub region of the largest system of informational exchange that had ever existed on earth. No wonder the pace of innovation began to accelerate in Europe.¹⁶

3) A third implication of the notion of collective notion concerns the nature of modern democracies. In most agrarian civilizations, rates of innovation remained so low that the power of states depended largely on their capacity to mobilize existing demographic, commercial and military resources, rather than on their capacity to promote the growth of new resources. However, in the modern era, rates of innovation have risen so rapidly that the strategy of promoting future growth can pay political and even military dividends even on relatively short time scales. So, in capitalist societies productivity-raising innovation rather than crude mobilization is the key to wealth and power. This makes it essential for governments to actively promote innovation. However, as we have seen, the notion of collective learning suggests that the pace of innovation is likely to depend, in part, on the variety and volume of available information; yet information is unlikely to accumulate rapidly within excessively rigid or secretive political structures, or, at the other extreme, in situations of political anarchy. So modern capitalist states have learned that their power depends on maintaining a delicate balance between control and negotiation; they must leave open spaces for market competition and for the flow of ideas. (The fact that the Soviet government suppressed the use of xerox machines and resisted the electronic revolution is an interesting reminder of the flip side of this argument.) This, I believe, is one of the most fundamental pressures behind the creation of modern democracies—the power of government in capitalist societies depends on the existence of zones within which information can flow relatively freely, so, however powerful they may be, states

¹⁵ An important study of the role of Islamic societies in diffusing new crops and new agricultural techniques is Andrew M. Watson. *Agricultural Innovation in the Early Islamic World: The Diffusion of Crops and Farming Techniques, 700-1100*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

¹⁶ I have developed this idea in Christian (2004), particularly in chapters 11-13.

have to abstain from using their power in ways that stifle the commercial and informational flows that encourage innovation and growth. On the other hand, the more successfully they maintain this balance, the more powerful they become, which explains the delicate balance of democracy and power within the most successful modern capitalist societies. The notion of collective learning may make it easier to understand the dialectical relationship between hierarchical and heterarchical relationships that underpins modern capitalist democracies, and helps explain their economic, political and even military power.

These are examples of some of the many ways in which the notion of collective learning may encourage world historians to explore the complex dialectic between hierarchical and heterarchical relations that exists in all human societies, and perhaps in all complex entities.

Conclusion: the difficulty of thinking heterarchically

I would like to conclude by asking why historians and other social scientists find it so easy to reach for hierarchical concepts and so hard to handle heterarchical concepts. The reason, I suspect, is simple but deep. Hierarchical concepts are easy to grasp, easy to understand and easy to teach. This is because the explanatory arrows are all neatly lined up and pointing in the same direction. In heterarchical concepts, they the arrows point all over the place, so, even if heterarchical concepts are easy to understand at a very abstract level, they are extremely difficult to handle in detail. Exploring the heterarchical aspects of any complex entity means tracing the direction of many different, often contradictory, causal arrows, so it is a prolonged and difficult empirical task which rarely leads to neat conclusions. The notion of heterarchy may well have been productive in the study of human brains, but it has yet to lead to any easily assimilable conclusions, and the same is true in human history. I conclude, therefore, that we all need Crumley's notion of heterarchy, like a medieval death's head, as a warning of the dangers of believing that all is hierarchy. That way lies error. But the path labelled heterarchy, which leads in the direction of subtler and more accurate understanding of human history, is a more difficult path and few will go down it without a sigh.

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SOCIAL BEHAVIORS ASSOCIATED WITH HEREDITARY COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP

INTRODUCTION

Diverse customs have been recorded in a world sample of 186 communities (Murdock and White, 1969). Many variables have been coded on these communities. Reports are in the Journal "Ethnology" and in a book edited by Barry and Schlegel (1980).

A code reported by Murdock and Wilson (1972) specifies several procedures for succession of the community leader. Hereditary designation is represented by two procedures, son of the former leader and son of a sister of the former leader. The next leader therefore is homoarchically determined prior to the need for a new leader. Several other procedures constitute heterarchical selection of the new leader. The selection methods include formal election, consensus, and selection by some of the community members.

Heterarchical choices are generally preferred by residents of contemporary nations. The homoarchical custom of hereditary designation of the community leader has obvious disadvantages. It is not influenced by the qualifications of the next leader, nor by the situation at the time a new leader is needed. The widespread existence of hereditary community leadership indicates advantages of homoarchical hereditary designation for some communities. Designation of the new leader in advance maximizes stability and continuity of the community leadership. When the new leader is needed, hereditary succession may prevent competition and warfare by rivals.

The world sample of 186 communities includes many communities with homoarchical hereditary leadership and many other communities with heterarchical selection of leadership. The communities vary in many other aspects of social behavior. Identification of social behaviors that are associated with hereditary community leadership may contribute useful knowledge about the difference between homoarchical and heterarchical leadership of communities.

CULTURAL VARIABLES

The diverse communities were compared by using coded information on several cultural customs. Most of the codes are reported in articles in the Journal "Ethnology," which are cited in the text and in the reference list. These

articles are included in a subsequent collection of articles published in that Journal (Barry and Schlegel, 1980).

The measure of local political succession was obtained from a codes described by Murdock and Wilson (1972). Multiple codes were combined into a distinction between hereditary and selected leadership of the community. The original codes do not form an ordinal scale, and some of the codes contain very few communities. Hereditary designation combines two codes. (1) "Succession tends to be hereditary, by a son or other patrilineal kinsman of the predecessor." (2) "Succession tends to be hereditary, by a sister's son or other matrilineal kinsman of the predecessor."

Choice of community leader combines five codes. (1) "Succession is based primarily upon seniority or age, as under gerontocracy." (2) "Succession is based on divination, dreams, or the like." (3) "Succession is not appointive or hereditary but is achieved primarily by informal consensus or the recognition of leadership qualities on the basis of the acquisition of personal influence, wealth, or prestige." (4) "Succession is not appointive or hereditary but is achieved through some formal electoral process, e.g., selection by a council or body of electors." (5) "Succession tends to be hereditary, but passes not to a particular category of kinsman but to a member of a ruling lineage or other privileged group selected for his personal qualifications by some electoral or appointive procedure."

Two remaining codes are (1) "There is no community headman or council" and (2) "Succession to the office of headman, if such or an approximate equivalent exists, is through appointment (not merely acquiescence) by some higher political authority." Communities with either of these two codes are omitted from the comparison because the first indicates no community leadership and the second indicates selection of the leader by a government to which the community is subordinated.

A predictor of homoarchical hereditary leadership is permission of heterosexual intercourse for unmarried females. The codes were reported by Murdock (1967) in the Ethnographic Atlas, which contains a much larger number of societies.. "Yes" combines three codes. (1) Freely permitted and subject to no sanctions. (2) Allowed and not sanctioned unless pregnancy results. (3) Trial marriage. "No" combines the other three codes. (1) Precluded by a very early age of marriage for females. (2) Insistence on virginity. (3) Prohibited but weakly sanctioned and not infrequent in fact.

Two other predictors of hereditary community leadership are population of the community and social classes or castes. They are two of ten codes of cultural complexity, described by Murdock and Provost (1973). Small

population of the focal or typical community indicates low complexity, defined as fewer than 400 persons. Large population is defined as 400 or more persons. Presence of classes or castes indicates high complexity. Three codes for two or more social classes or castes are combined. Absence of classes or castes combines two codes. (1) Egalitarian. (2) "Formal class distinctions are lacking among freemen, but hereditary slavery prevails and/or there are important status differences based on the possession or distribution of wealth."

Codes on ceremonial elements (Murdock and Wilson, 1972) are combined to form two categories. Occurrence of propitiation or violence in ceremonies combines three codes. (1) "Cannibalism, human sacrifice, and/or the ceremonial killing of war captives, widows, or other victims." (2) "Sacrifice (other than human), prayer, laudation, and/or other forms of propitiating spirits, deities, or ghosts of the dead, whatever their specific purpose (e.g., atonement, foretelling the future, pleas for help, thanksgiving)." (3) "Self-torture, self-mutilation, or comparable extreme masochistic behavior, not including fasting or other forms of self-abnegation." No propitiation or violence combines the remaining three codes. (1) "Distribution or exchange of property other than food." (2) "Feasting and/or drinking (other than cannibalistic), including the distribution of food for subsequent consumption." (3) "Music, dancing, games, and/or dramatic performances."

Homoarchical subordination or heterarchical independence of the community is one of ten measures of cultural complexity reported by Murdock and Provost (1973). The community is defined as independent if it is coded as stateless, combining two codes. (1) "Composed of politically organized autonomous local communities." (2) "Political authority is not centralized even on the local level but is dispersed among households or other small component units." The community is defined as subordinated, indicating higher complexity, if one or more administrative levels are recognized above the local community.

An additional distinction between a homoarchical and heterarchical custom is in a code reported by Murdock and Wilson (1972). Homoarchical unilineal kinship combines two codes, paternal and maternal kinship, depending on whether the principal consanguineal kin groups are based on patrilineal descent (patrilineages) or on matrilineal descent (matrilineages). Heterarchical choice of kinship affiliation combines three codes. (1) Bilateral descent, "ancestor-oriented descent groups are absent, and kinsmen are aggregated only by consanguineal and/or affinal ties between individuals, as in personal kindreds or kiths." (2) Ambilineal descent (ramages). (3) Double descent (presence of both patrilineal and matrilineal descent groups).

Among the total sample of 186 communities, 30 communities were omitted from the data analyses because the community has no leader, or because the leader is appointed by a higher government authority, or because the information is insufficient for a code. Relationships of hereditary community leadership with four predictors omitted 37 additional communities because the information was insufficient for coding permission of premarital heterosexual intercourse for females. The analyses were limited to the remaining 119 communities. An advantage of the reduced sample size is that it contains the communities with the best information on the social behaviors that are measured.

STATISTICAL METHODS

Statistical analyses of the findings used SPSS (1994), a package of programs for computers. Multiple regression is used to identify predictors when the dependent variable has quantitative scores. An example is an article by Barry and Yoder (2002), on six predictors of percentage contribution by females to agriculture in the world sample of communities. The multiple regression indicated that high percentage contribution by females is independently predicted by residence that is not patrilocal, by polygynous marriage, by no written language, by indigenous money, by sparse population, and by no milk obtained from domestic animals.

Hereditary leadership is limited to two categories, Yes or No. A log linear analysis therefore related this dependent variable with the predictors. A Z-score for each predictor measures the degree to which it contributes to hereditary leadership. A score of 1.96 or higher indicates a statistically significant predictor effect, independent of the other predictors. Partial correlation of hereditary leadership with each predictor, adjusting for the effects of all the other three predictors, is equivalent to the Z-score as a measure of the degree to which each variable independently predicts whether community leadership is hereditary. In order to simplify the analyses, all of the predictors are limited to two categories, yes or no for the category that predicts hereditary leadership.

The standard Pearsonian correlation coefficients were used because they are valid measures for scores limited to two categories in addition to quantitative scores. Multiple correlation measures the square root of the amount of variance of hereditary leadership that is attributable to the combination of all four predictors. This additional measure of association was obtained from the multiple regression. The multiple correlation is valid for variables limited to two categories in addition to quantitative variables.

Different percentages of communities with hereditary leadership, in two groups of communities, were tested by Chi Square for the relationship of two levels of one variable with two levels of the other variable. The correction for continuity was applied. This correction decreases the Chi Square score and therefore is a more stringent test of statistical significance.

Statistical significance of all differences was tested by the more stringent criterion of two tails. This criterion tests the probability of a chance difference in either direction. The alternative criterion of one tail tests the probability of a chance difference limited to the same direction as was observed.

Table 1

The number (N) and percentage (%) of communities are shown for the total sample followed by the communities classified Yes and No for hereditary leadership. The same measures are also shown for the Yes instead of No category of four predictors of hereditary leadership.

	Total		Hereditary Leadership			
	N	%	N		%	
			Yes	No	Yes	No
Total sample of 119	119	-	55	64	46%	54%
Sexual Freedom	49	41%	33	16	60%	25% ***
Small Population	65	55%	37	28	67%	44% *
Classes or Castes	49	41%	25	24	45%	38%
Propitiation or Violence	49	41%	29	20	53%	31% **

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

FOUR PREDICTORS OF HEREDITARY LEADERSHIP

The relationship of hereditary leadership with each of four predictors is shown in Table 1. Selected leadership is designated as "No" hereditary leadership. The percentages Yes and No for hereditary leadership in the total sample are calculated by dividing the number Yes or No by the total number of 119. The corresponding percentages for each of the four predictors are calculated by dividing the number Yes or No for that predictor by the total number that is above in the same column. For example, 60% Yes for Sexual

Freedom is the number 33 in the same line as 60% divided by 55 in the same column as 33.

The percentage of communities with homoarchical hereditary leadership is higher for the Yes category than for the No category of each of the four predictors. Hereditary leadership therefore is associated with sexual freedom, with small population of the community, with social classes or castes, and with propitiation or violence in ceremonies.

Table 2 shows the correlations among five measures, which are hereditary leadership and the four predictors. The four Z-scores measure the degree to which each predictor contributes independently to the classification of hereditary leadership, controlling for the effects of the correlations of the predictors with each other. A Z-score of 1.96 or above indicates a probability of less than 5% that random chance variation can account for the difference of the Z-score from zero. All of the four Z-scores are above 2.30.

Table 2

Correlations are shown among hereditary leadership and four predictors for 119 communities. In the log linear analysis, the Z-score measures the independent degree of association of each predictor with hereditary leadership. For each predictor, the adjusted correlation with hereditary leadership partials out the correlations of the designated predictor with the other three predictors.

	Sexual Freedom.	Small Popul.	Classes or Castes	Propitiation or Violence
Hereditary	.35 ***	.24 *	.08	.22 *
Sexual Freedom		.18 *	-.11	.10
Small Population			-.35 *	-.03
Classes or Castes				-.08
Z-Score	3.45 **	2.81 **	2.36 *	2.43 *
Adjusted Hereditary	.33 **	.26 **	.23 *	.23 *
	* p < .05	** p < .01	*** p < .001	

The multiple correlation is .48, measuring the degree to which the combination of four predictors is associated with hereditary leadership. This

measure of association is substantially higher than the highest correlation of .35 for the strongest predictor, sexual freedom.

Partial correlation adjusts the correlation of each predictor with hereditary leadership, controlling for the effect of correlations with the other three predictors. The adjusted correlations, in common with the Z-scores, measure the independent association of each predictor with hereditary leadership. Table 2 shows that in common with the Z-scores, the adjusted correlation with hereditary leadership is statistically significant for each predictor.

The adjusted correlation with hereditary leadership for sexual freedom is .33. This is slightly lower than the correlation of .35. The decrease in adjusted correlation is attributable to the positive correlations of sexual freedom with two of the three other predictors. A positive correlation between predictors detracts from the adjusted predictive effect of both. The adjusted correlation of .33 continues to be the highest of the four adjusted correlations.

Table 3

The identification number and name of each community are followed by two letters. C designates presence of social classes or castes. P designates presence of propitiation or violence in ceremonies. N designates Not Present. Numbers 0-3 designate the number of higher government levels. The geographical location is described. On the left, hereditary leadership is associated with sexual freedom and small population. On the right, selected leadership is associated with sexual prohibition and large population.

HEREDITARY LEADERSHIP

SEX. FREE. IN SMALL POP.	
3 Thonga	CP 2 S Africa
104 Maori	CP 1 N New Zealand
29 Fur	CN 3 W Sudan, Africa
28 Azande	CN 2 S Sudan, Africa
111 Palauans	CN 2 E of Philippines
14 Nkundo	CN 1 Central Africa
98 Trobriand.	CN 1 E of New Guinea
105 Marquesa.	CN 1 SE of Hawaii
108 Marshall.	CN 1 S of Hawaii
110 Yapese	CN 1 E of Philippines
131 Haida	CN 0 W Canada
1 Nama Hotte.	NP 1 S Africa
25 Fulani	NP 1 W Africa
60 Gond	NP1 India
61 Toda	NP1 S India
68 Lepcha	NP 1 E India

SELECTED LEADERSHIP

SEX. FREE. IN SMALL POP.	
67 Lolo	CN 0 Central China
94 Kapauku	NN 1 W New Guinea
79 Andaman.	NN 0 East of India
92 Orokaiva	NN 0 E New Guinea
128 Slave	NN 0 NW Canada
129 Kaska	NN 0 NW Canada
157 Bribri	NN 0 Costa Rica
164 Carib	NN 0 NE Venezuela
SEX. PROHIB. IN LARGE POP.	
19 Ashanti	CP 3 W Africa
43 Egyptians	CP 3 S Egypt
63 Uttar Prad.	CP 3 N India
73 Vietnam	CP 3 N Vietnam
114 Chinese	CP 3 E China
50 Basques	CP 2 NE Spain
153 Aztec	CP 2 Mexico City

184 Mapuche	NP 1 Chile	31 Shilluk	CP 1 Sudan, Africa
52 Lapps	NP 0 N Sweden	47 Turks	CN 3 Central Turkey
72 Lamet	NP 0 Laos	76 Siamese	CN 3 S Thailand
118 Ainu	NP 0 Japan	83 Javanese	CN 3 E Java
121 Chukchee	NP 0 NE Russia	116 Koreans	CN 3 N Korea
166 Munduru.	NP 0 Central Brazil	117 Japanese	CN 3 SW Japan
173 Siriono	NP 0 Bolivia	65 Kazak	CN 2 SE Russia
175 Trumai	NN 0 Central Brazil	82 Negri Sem.	CN 2 Malaysia
SEX. PROHIB. IN LARGE POP.			
18 Fon	CP 3 W Africa	106 Samoans	CN 2 NE of New Zealand
24 Songhai	CP 1 W Africa	55 Abkhaz	CN 1 Russian Caucasus
45 Babylon	CP 3 Iraq	107 Gilbertese	CN 1 NE of Australia
26 Hausa	CP 3 W Africa	123 Aleut	CN 1 W Alaska, USA
44 Hebrews	CP 2 S Israel	155 Quiche	NP1 Guatemala
59 Punjabi	CN 3 NE Pakistan	145 Creek	NN 2 SE USA
71 Burmese	CN 3 Central Burma	36 Somali	NN1 Somalia, Africa
183 Abipon	CN 0 N Argentina	143 Omaha	NN1 Central USA
42 Riffians	NP 2 Morocco, Africa	156 Miskito	NN1 E Honduras
		158 Cuna	NN1 E Panama
		96 Manus	NN 0 SW of Hawaii
		176 Timbira	NN 0 E Brazil
		179 Shavante	NN 0 Central Brazil

Negative correlations with the other predictors increase the adjusted correlation. Existence of classes or castes has a negative correlation of -.11 with sexual freedom, -.35 with classes or castes, and -.08 with propitiation or violence in ceremonies. The adjusted correlation of classes or castes with hereditary leadership, .23, therefore is much higher than the unadjusted correlation of .08.

LISTS OF COMMUNITIES

In Table 3, the name of each community is preceded by its serial number, 1-186. The two following letters designate whether social classes or castes are present (C) or not present (N), and whether propitiation or violence in community ceremonies is present (P) or not present (N). The letters C and P are predictors of hereditary leadership. The letter N is a predictor of selected leadership. The number of government levels above the community varies from 3 (3 or more) to 0 (politically independent community). The geographical location usually conforms to the description by Schlegel and Barry (1991). Assistance is provided by maps in the article by Murdock and White (1969).

Communities with hereditary leadership are listed on the left side. Communities with selected leadership are listed on the right side. On both sides, communities with sexual freedom in a small population are followed by communities with sexual prohibition in a large population. Sexual freedom in a

small population is an effective predictor of hereditary leadership. The left side of Table 3 shows that 24 of 33 communities (73%) with hereditary leadership have sexual freedom in a small population, predicting hereditary leadership. The right side of Table 3 shows that only eight of 36 communities with selected leadership (22%) have sexual prohibition in a large population, predicting hereditary leadership. The higher percentage occurrence of sexual freedom and small population in communities with hereditary leadership is statistically highly significant (Chi Square = 15.69, $df=1$, $p < .001$).

In Table 3, the letters CP following the name of the community signify two predictors of hereditary leadership, presence of classes or castes (C) and occurrence of propitiation or violence in ceremonies (P). Nine communities in the left side, with hereditary leadership, have sexual prohibition in a large population, which incorrectly predicts selected leadership. Five of these communities have the letters CP, which correctly predict hereditary leadership. None has the letters NN. Among the 24 communities with hereditary leadership that correctly predict by sexual freedom in a small population, two have the letters CP and one has the letters NN.

The foregoing findings indicate that the letters CP most often correctly predict hereditary leadership when they counteract an incorrect prediction due to sexual prohibition and large population. A corresponding conclusion is that the letters NN most often correctly predict selected leadership when they counteract an incorrect prediction due to sexual freedom in a small population. Eight communities on the right side, with selected leadership, have sexual freedom in a small population, which incorrectly predicts hereditary leadership. Seven of these communities have the letters NN, which correctly predict selected leadership. None of these communities has the letters CP. Among 28 communities with selected leadership that is correctly predicted by sexual prohibition in a large population, eight have the letters NN and eight have the letters CP.

Table 3 also shows that three or more levels of higher government characterize 15 of the 37 communities (41%) with sexual prohibition in a large population. They are listed in the lower right and left sides of the table. Only one of 32 communities (3%) with the opposite sexual freedom in a small population is subordinated to three or more levels of higher government. These differential frequencies are statistically highly significant (Chi Square = 11.47, $df = 1$, $p < .001$). Sexual prohibition in a large population is apparently compatible with political subordination

Political independence, indicated by zero levels of higher government, characterizes only four of the 37 communities (11%) with sexual prohibition in

a large population. Among 32 communities with the opposite sexual freedom in a small population, 15 are independent (47%). The higher frequency of independent communities with sexual freedom and small population is statistically highly significant . (Chi Square = 9.45, df = 1, $p < .01$). Sexual freedom in a small population is apparently compatible with political independence.

Table 4

The identification number and name of each community are followed by the same information as in Table 3. Communities with sexual freedom in a large population, followed by those with sexual prohibition in a small population, are listed on the left if leadership is hereditary and on the right if leadership is selected.

HEREDITARY LEADERSHIP

SEX FREE. IN LARGE POP.

70 Lakher	CP 1 W Burma
75 Khmer	CN 3 NW Cambodia
100 Tikopia	CN 1 E of New Guinea
177 Tupinam.	NP 1 E Brazil
10 Luguru	NP 0 Tanzania, Africa
23 Tallensi	NP 0 Ghana, Africa
69 Garo	NN 2 Assam, E India
144 Huron	NN 2 Ontario, Canada
109 Trukese	NN 0 N of New Guinea

SEX PROHIB. IN SMALL POP.

171 Inca	CP 3 S Peru
7 Bemba	CN 3 Zambia, Africa
21 Wolof	CN 2 Gambia, W Africa
62 Santal	NP 2 E India
32 Mao	NP 0 Ethiopia, E Africa
53 Yurak	NP 0 NW Russia
185 Tehuelche	NP 0 S Argentina
58 Basseri	NN 2 SW Iran
159 Goajiro	NN1 N Colombia, S America
2 Kung	NN 0 SW Africa
91 Aranda	NN 0 Central Australia
125 Montagnais	NN 0 Quebec, Canada
126 Micmac	NN 0 Maine, USA

SELECTED LEADERSHIP

SEX FREE. IN LARGE POP.

84 Balinese	CP 2 E of Java
81 Tanala	CP 1 E Madagascar
16 Tiv	NP 1 S Nigeria, Africa
172 Aymara	NP1 S Peru
161 Callinago	NP 0 Caribbean Sea
34 Masai	NN 0 Tanzania, Africa
78 Nicabarese	NN 0 E of India
95 Kwoma	NN 0 NE New Guinea

SEX PROHIB. IN SMALL POP.

41 Ahaggaren	CN 2 Algeria, N Africa
132 Bellacoola	CN 0 SW Canada
113 Atayal	NP 1 Central Taiwan
140 Gros Vent.	NP1 Mopntana, USA
77 Semang	NP 0 N Malaysia
85 Iban	NP0 Borneo, Malaysia
101 Pentecost	NP0 E of Australia
119 Gilyak	NP 0 E Siberia, Russia
178 Botocudo	NP 0 E Brazil
8 Nyakyusa	NN 2 Tanzania, E Africa
48 Gheg	NN 2 NW Albania
148 Chiricahua	NN 1 Arizona, USA
122 Ingalik	NN 0 SW Alaska, USA
133 Twana	NN 0 NW USA
137 Wadadika	NN 0 E Oregon, USA
138 Klamath	NN 0 SW Oregon, USA
139 Kutenai	NN 0 N Idaho, USA
163 Yanomamo	NN 0 S Venezuela
174 Nambicua.	NN 0 Central Brazil
186 Yahgan	NN 0 S Argentina

The geographical locations identified in Table 3 are very diverse. Comparisons of locations are aided by specification of six major regions of the

world (Murdock, 1967). Hereditary and selected leadership both include communities in each of the six regions. These are sub-Sahara Africa, Circum-Mediterranean, East Eurasia, Insular Pacific, North America, and South America. Among the total of 69 communities listed in Table 3, the most frequent region, East Eurasia, contains 18 communities. East Asia therefore most often contains communities with sexual freedom in a small population or sexual prohibition in a large population. The least frequent regions, Africa and North America, both contain seven communities.

Table 4 lists the communities with the same predictors of hereditary leadership as in Table 3, but sexual freedom in large populations and sexual prohibition in small populations have opposite instead of consistent associations with hereditary leadership. The 50 communities in Table 4 are divided into 22 with hereditary leadership and 28 with selected leadership. The communities with hereditary leadership are subdivided into nine with sexual freedom in a large population and eight with sexual prohibition in a small population. The communities with selected leadership are divided into eight with sexual freedom in a large population and 20 with sexual prohibition in a small population.

The lower portion of Table 4 contains 33 communities with sexual prohibition in a small population. The upper portion of the table contains 17 communities with sexual freedom in a large population. The larger number of communities with sexual prohibition in a small population is statistically significant (Chi Square = 4.50, $df = 1$, $p < .05$). A possible interpretation is that sexual prohibition in a small population is a more adaptive combination of conditions than sexual freedom in a large population.

Diverse regions are represented in the 50 communities listed in Table 4. The highest frequency is 11 communities in North America. This region therefore contains the most communities with sexual freedom in a large population or sexual prohibition in a small population. The lowest frequency is three in the Circum-Mediterranean.

Tables 3 and 4 show for each community the codes on all four predictors of hereditary leadership. Two predictors, population size and classes or castes, have a high negative correlation of $-.35$ with each other, shown in Table 2. It is unusual for variables that are negatively correlated with each other to predict the same difference between levels of a third variable. Among the 119 communities, 17 have classes or castes in a small population, and 22 have no classes or castes in a large population. The 39 communities with these two conditions are much fewer than the 80 other communities. The 80 communities

combine 32 with classes or castes in a large population and 48 with no classes or castes in a small population.

Communities with small population, located in the upper portion of Tables 3 and 4, most often have no classes or castes, designated by N instead of C. In Table 3, 12 communities with sexual freedom in a small population are coded C, indicating presence of classes or castes. All except one have hereditary leadership. Ten communities in the same table with sexual prohibition in a large population are coded N, indicating no classes or castes. All except one have selected leadership. These findings might account for the fact that hereditary leadership is predicted by the unusual condition of classes or castes in a small population while selected leadership is predicted by the opposite unusual condition of no classes or castes in a large population.

The high degree of predictability of population size together with classes or castes is limited to Table 3, which contains communities with sexual freedom in a small population and communities with sexual prohibition in a large population. Table 4 contains communities with sexual prohibition in a small population and communities with sexual freedom in a large population. In Table 4, hereditary leadership is not predicted by the combination of population size with classes or castes. Leadership is hereditary in three communities and selected in two communities with classes or castes in a small population. Leadership is selected in six communities and hereditary in six communities with no classes or castes in a large population.

THREE MEASURES OF HOMOARCHY OR HETERARCHY

Hereditary leadership of the community is a homoarchical custom. Two other homoarchical customs are subordination of the community to higher government and unilineal kinship. Relationships among these three customs measure to what degree the communities tend to have consistently homoarchical or heterarchical customs. The alternative heterarchical customs are selected leadership, political independence of the community, and choice of kinship affiliation.

Homoarchical subordination of the community is associated with homoarchical unilineal kinship. Among 72 subordinated communities, 68% have unilineal kinship. Among 47 independent communities, 38% have unilineal kinship. The higher proportion of unilineal kinship in subordinated communities is statistically significant (Chi square = 9.06, df = 1, $p < .01$). The correlation coefficient is .29. A compatible combination of conditions appears to be either unilineal kinship in a subordinated community or choice of kinship

affiliation in an independent community. Conversely, a less compatible combination of conditions appears to be either unilineal kinship in an independent community or choice of kinship affiliation in a subordinated community.

Homoarchical hereditary leadership is positively correlated with both other homoarchical customs, but the correlations are small and not statistically significant. Among 55 communities with hereditary leadership, 65% are politically subordinated. Among 64 communities with selected leadership, 56% are politically subordinated. The correlation coefficient is .09. Among 55 communities with hereditary leadership, 62% have unilineal kinship. Among 64 communities with selected leadership, 52% have unilineal kinship. The correlation coefficient is .10.

Table 5

The number of communities and the average scores on several measures of cultural complexity are shown for homoarchically subordinated and heterarchically independent communities. Both types of communities are separately classified Yes or No on homoarchical hereditary leadership and on homoarchical unilineal descent.

	Subordinated Communities				Independent Communities			
	Hereditary		Unilineal		Hereditary		Unilineal	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Number	36	36	49	23	19	28	18	29
Average Score								
Fixity (0-4)	3.3	3.1	3.1	3.5	1.8	2.1	2.7	1.6 *
Agriculture (0-4)	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	1.4	1.4	2.2	0.9 **
Urbanization (0-4)	1.7	2.6 **	2.1	2.2	0.7	0.6	1.1	0.4 **
Land Transport (0-4)	0.7	1.6 **	1.1	1.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3
Total 0-40)	22.1	25.5	23.5	24.6	9.7	9.6	12.7	7.7 **

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

Murdock and Provost (1973) reported ten codes of cultural complexity, each on a scale of 0-4. Four of these codes are shown in Table 5. Fixity of residence ranges from 0 for settlements that are fully nomadic to 4 for sedentary and relatively permanent. Agriculture ranges from 0 for not practiced or confined to nonfood crops to 4 for contribution to more of the society's food

supply than does any other subsistence activity and conducted by intensive techniques such as irrigation, plowing, or artificial fertilization. Urbanization ranges from 0 for a community population of less than 100 persons to 4 for more than 1,000 persons. Land transport ranges from 0 for exclusively human carriers to 4 for automotive vehicles, such as railroads and trucks. Table 5 also shows the total complexity, on a scale of 0-40, which is the sum of the ten codes. The other six codes of cultural complexity are writing and records, technological specialization, money, density of population, level of political integration, and social stratification. None of them showed a statistically significant difference between unilineal kinship and kinship choice, or between hereditary and selected community leadership. Three of these six codes are converted into two categories in prior tables. Level of political integration is subordinated or independent community, in Tables 3 and 4. Urbanization (small population) and social stratification (presence of classes or castes) are predictors of hereditary leadership in Tables 1-4.

Table 5 shows that average cultural complexity is predominantly higher in homoarchically subordinated communities than in heterarchically independent communities. Separate analyses of these two groups of communities are necessary for testing associations of cultural complexity with homoarchically unilineal kinship and with homoarchically hereditary community leadership.

Table 6

The following 20 communities are not coded on hereditary leadership. The identification number and name of each community are followed by two letters that designate no presence (N) or presence of social classes or castes (C) and of ceremonial propitiation or violence (P), a number 0-3 for the number of higher government levels, and the geographical location of the community.

NO CODE ON SEXUAL FREEDOM
 SMALL POPULATION
 39 Kenuzi NN 0 S Egypt, N Africa
 134 Yurok NN - NW California, USA
 LARGE POPULATION
 88 Tobelorese NN 2 NW of New Guinea
 38 Bogo CN 1 Ethiopia, Africa
 27 Massa NP 0 Chad, central Africa

SEX. FREE. IN SMALL POP.

13 Mbuti NN - Angola, SW Africa

SEX. PROHIB. IN SMALL POP.
 12 Ganda CP 3 Uganda, E Africa
 33 Kafa CN 3 Ethiopia, E Africa
 89 Alorese NP 2 E of Java, Indonesia
 46 Rwala Bed. NN 1 S Syria
 64 Burusho CN 1 NW India
 40 Teda CN 0 Chad, N Africa
 99 Siuai NN 0 E of New Guinea
 80 Vedda NN - Sri Lanka, SE of India
 90 Tiwi NN - N Australia
 169 Jivaro NN - Equador, NW S America

9 Hadza NN - N Tanzania, Africa
 124 Copper Es. NN - NW Canada
 170 Amahuaca NP - E Peru
 180 Aweikoma NN - S Brazil
 SEX FREE. IN LARGE POP
 57 Kurd CN 2 NE Iraq
 146 Natchez CP 2 Louisiana, USA
 30 Otoro NN - Sudan, NE Africa
 112 Ifugao CN - N Philippines

SEX. PROHIB. IN LARGE POP.
 37 Amhara CN 3 Ethiopia, E Africa
 54 Russians CN 3 SE of Moscow
 160 Haitians CP 3 Haiti, Caribbean Sea
 51 Irish CP 2 SW Ireland
 17 Ibo NP 0 SE Nigeria, Africa
 93 Kimam NN 0 93 SW New Guinea

Among independent communities, homoarchically unilineal kinship is associated with statistically significantly higher scores on three of the four measures and on total cultural complexity. Homoarchically unilineal kinship may substitute for the function of higher government levels to enable development of cultural complexity. Among homoarchically subordinated communities, heterarchically selected leadership is associated with statistically significantly higher scores on two measures of cultural complexity, urbanization and land transport. Cultural complexity appears to be maximized in communities where homoarchical subordination is combined with heterarchical choice of leadership.

Tables 3 and 4 list all 119 communities with a code on hereditary leadership and on each of the four predictors. The world sample of 186 communities includes 67 that were excluded from the analyses because of missing information. Tables 6 and 7 list these additional communities. The information in these two tables permits assessment of the degree to which the 119 communities are typical of the entire sample of 186 communities. A further potential value of Tables 6 and 7 is that any of the 67 communities can be added to the sample of 119 if a code is substituted for the missing information.

Table 6 lists 30 communities that were not coded on hereditary or selected leadership. The left side contains five communities not coded on sexual permissiveness and eight communities with sexual freedom. The right side contains 17 communities with sexual prohibition.

Table 7

The following communities are coded on hereditary leadership but not on permission of heterosexual intercourse for unmarried females. The identification number and name of each community are followed by the number of higher government levels to which it is subordinated, from none to three or

more, and its location. Community leadership is hereditary for communities listed on the left and is selected for communities listed on the right.

HEREDITARY LEADERSHIP

SELECTED LEADERSHIP

SMALL POPULATION		SMALL POPULATION	
20 Mende	CP 1 Sierra Leone, W Africa	165 Saramacca	NP 2 Surinam, NE S America
6 Suku	CN 3 W Zaire, Africa	115 Manchu	NP 1 NE Manchuria
66 Khalka	CN 3 Outer Mongolia	120 Yukaghir	NP 0 E Central Siberia
5 Mbundu	CN 2 Angola, SW Africa	87 Toradja	NN 1 Celebese, Indonesia
103 Ajie	NP 1 E of Australia	11 Kikuyu	NN 0 Kenya, E Africa
130 Eyak	NN 1 S Alas	150 Havasupai	NN 0 N Arizona, USA
127 Saulteaux	NN 0 Manitoba, SW Canada	162 Warrau	NN 0 N Venezuela, S America
167 Cubeo	NN 0 E Colombia, S America	181 Cayua	NN 0 SW Columbia, S America
LARGE POPULATION		LARGE POPULATION	
4 Lozi	CP 3 Zambia, S Africa	56 Armenians	CP 3 Russian Caucasus
49 Romans	CP 3 W Central Italy	74 Rhade	NP 0 S Central Vietnam
22 Bambara	CP 1 Mali, W Africa	152 Huichol	NP 0 SW Mexico
142 Pawnee	CN 1 Nebraska, USA	35 Konso	NN 1 Ethiopia, E Africa
102 Fijians	NP 2 E of Australia	154 Popoluca	NN 1 SE Mexico
86 Badjau	NP 0 SW of Philippines	97 Lesu	NN 0 NE of New Guinea
15 Banen	NN 1 Cameroon, W Africa	141 Hidatsa	NN 0 N Dakota, USA
135 Pomo	NN 0 N California, USA	147 Comanche	NN 0 Texas, USA
136 Yokuts	NN 0 S California, USA		
149 Zuni	NN 0 New Mexico, USA		
151 Papago	NN 0 S Arizona, USA		
168 Cayapa	NN 0 SW Columbia, S America		

Hereditary or selected community leadership was not coded in 11 communities because "political authority is dispersed among households or other small component units within the community" (Murdock and Provost, 1973). These communities are designated in Table 5 by a dash for government levels above the community. The dash might be regarded as minus sign because the political authority is below instead of above these 11 communities.

Another criterion for exclusion from a code on hereditary leadership is "appointment (not merely acquiescence) by some higher political authority" (Murdock and Wilson, 1972). This is the code for Natchez in the left side and for Ganda, Alorese, Burusho, Siuai Amhara, Russians, Haitians, Kurd, Kimam in the right side. In addition to the principal code of appointment by a higher authority, a secondary code is hereditary for Amhara and informal consensus or recognition of leadership qualities for Siuai and Kimam.

A different criterion for exclusion of a code is "There is no community headman or council" (Murdock and Wilson, 1972). This is the code for Kenuzi and Bogo in the left side and for Kafa, Teda, Irish, Ibo, in the right side.

The information was insufficient for a code on hereditary leadership for only three communities. These are Tobelorese and Massa in the left side, Rwala Bedouin in the right side.

Table 7 contains communities that were omitted from the data analyses because they are not coded on sexual permissiveness. The other three predictors are coded on all the communities. The left side of Table 7 lists 20 communities with hereditary leadership. The right side lists 17 communities with selected leadership. Five additional communities that are not coded on sexual permissiveness are listed in Table 6 because they are also not coded on hereditary leadership.

Table 7 shows that a high proportion of the communities have zero levels of higher government. Political independence characterizes eight of the 20 communities (40%) with hereditary leadership and 11 of the 17 communities (65%) with selected leadership. The next most frequent category is a single level of government above the community. Two or more levels of higher government characterize six (30%) of the 20 communities with hereditary leadership and two (12%) of the 17 communities with selected leadership.

Geographical distribution of the communities excluded from the data analyses, listed in Tables 6 and 7, is generally similar to the 119 communities listed in Tables 3 and 4. An exception is that 17 of the 37 communities (46%) excluded from the data analyses are in North America or South America. The high frequency of these two regions in Tables 6 and 7 might be attributable to the high proportion of communities with less than two levels of higher government in North and South America. Most of the communities that were not coded on hereditary leadership or on sexual freedom, and therefore listed in Tables 6 and 7, have fewer than two levels of higher government.

ANTECEDENTS OF HEREDITARY LEADERSHIP

Hereditary community leadership is a homoarchical custom, designating the successor during the tenure of the leader. Choice of the leader is a heterarchical action when a new leader is needed. Differences in other cultural customs may be expected to be associated with the difference between hereditary designation of the leader and selection of the leader. Accordingly, four customs have been identified as independent variables, which predict whether the dependent variable, hereditary or selected leadership, is a homoarchical designation in advance or a heterarchical choice when a new leader is needed.

Homoarchical presence of social classes or castes is one of the predictors of homoarchical hereditary leadership. Two of the other predictors also may be

interpreted as homoarchival. A small community population is less diverse and therefore is likely to be more cohesive. In community ceremonies, propitiation and violence are intense emotional expressions shared by the members of the community.

One predictor of homoarchival hereditary leadership, permission of premarital heterosexual intercourse for females, confers choice for the young women and for her male sexual partners. Two homoarchival predictors of hereditary leadership, social stratification and small community population, might establish a cultural environment that permits heterarchical choice of sexual partners by youths. Homoarchival hereditary leadership might be associated with homoarchival control of behavior for adults but not for unmarried youths.

The proportion of the variance accounted for by a correlation coefficient is the square of the correlation. The multiple correlation of .48 between the four predictors and hereditary leadership therefore accounts for only 23% of the variance in hereditary leadership. The adjusted percentage is even lower, 21%, obtained from the multiple regression program. The four combined predictors therefore account for less than a quarter of the variance in hereditary leadership. One of the reasons for the low level of predictability is the classification of each variable into two categories. Coded attributes that are extremely different from the alternative code therefore are not differentiated from coded attributes that are extremely similar to the alternative code. Quantitative scores are preferable in this respect.

A more general limitation to the multiple correlation is that the association of the predictors with hereditary leadership does not specify why these customs are associated. Hereditary leadership might be the cause, and one or more of the predictors might be adaptive consequences. A different variable that was not included, such as a harsh environment or an antagonistic neighboring community, might be the cause of both the hereditary leadership and the predictors. The log linear analysis is equivalent, whichever of the variables is designated as the dependent variable.

A justification for choice of hereditary leadership as the dependent variable is that hereditary leadership is a specific decision that can be changed whenever a new leader is needed. The four predictors are customs that are less easily changed because they pertain to the total community organization or to the behavior of many people. Hereditary or selected leadership therefore may be an adaptive adjustment and therefore the most appropriate dependent variable. According to this interpretation, hereditary leadership is generally a more adaptive behavior where premarital heterosexual intercourse is permitted

for females, or where the community population is small, or where social classes or castes exist, or where community ceremonies include propitiation or violence. Conversely, selected leadership is generally a more adaptive behavior where premarital heterosexual intercourse is prohibited for females, or where the community population is large, or with no social classes or castes, or with no propitiation or violence in community ceremonies.

An important feature of the log linear analysis is that each predictor is independently associated with the dependent variable. The association of each predictor with the dependent variable is not attributable to a strong association of the predictor with one or more other predictors. The four predictors therefore have generally lower correlations with each other than with the dependent variable. Since the multiple predictors are all associated with the same dependent variable, the predictors should tend to be positively associated with each other. The positive association with the dependent variable usually is diminished when a predictor's correlations with the other predictors are adjusted by the partial correlation coefficient. The adjusted correlation with the dependent variable is higher than the original correlation for a predictor that is negatively associated with the other predictors. A predictor of this type is social stratification. The high partial correlation, adjusting for the negative correlations with the other predictors, reveals a predictor that is not apparent from its original very low correlation with hereditary leadership.

An advantage of the standard sample of 186 communities is its inclusion of a broad range of cultural variations. Independent tribal communities may differ greatly from communities that are subordinated to higher levels of government. Unilineal kinship and polygyny are frequent customs although they are rare in contemporary nations. The relationships among variables in the standard sample provide useful information about social adaptations although most of the communities have prominent differences from communities in contemporary large nations.

The sample of 186 communities was selected from more than 1,000 societies in the *Ethnographic Atlas* (Murdock, 1967). Coded information on various customs is available on the additional societies. Koratayev, Kazankov, Borinskaya, Khaltourina, and Bondarenko (2004) have added several Siberian tribes to the *Ethnographic Atlas*.

APPLICATION TO CONTEMPORARY NATIONS

The sample of 186 communities predominantly includes small, tribal societies that contain decreasing proportions of the world population of humans. The large number of 119 communities analyzed contains several components of

large contemporary nations. They include Burmese, Egyptians, Turks, Vietnam, Siamese, Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese. They may be of special interest for applying the findings to current social customs. A limitation is that they are generally small villages. The urban communities represented in the world sample are predominantly ancient. Examples are Babylonians, Hebrews, Romans, Kmer of Angkor in 1292, and Aztecs of Tenochtlan in 1520.

Some of the communities in contemporary nations were excluded from the data analyses because of insufficient information. Hereditary leadership was not coded for the Irish (County Clare in 1932) and Russians (peasant village of Viriatino in 1955). Permission of premarital heterosexual intercourse for females was not coded for the Armenians (vicinity of Erevan in Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1843) and Manchu (Aigun district of northern Manchuria, China, in 1915).

The present findings suggest that the optimal cultural condition might be a combination of homoarchic structure with heterarchic freedom of choice. Contemporary large nations have homoarchical subordination of the community combined with heterarchical choice of kinship affiliation. Formal election of community leaders is prevalent in contemporary large nations. This heterarchical custom may be beneficial by counteracting the adverse effect of homoarchical subordination to the large nation. Barry (2003) reported adverse customs associated with political subordination of communities. These customs include more frequent external warfare, more demands for obedience by adolescent boys, prohibition of heterosexual intercourse for adolescent females, less indulgence of young children, and more frequent corporal punishment of boys. The adverse customs are more severe in communities that are subordinated to a larger number of levels of higher government.

The statistically significant positive correlation between homoarchical subordination of the community and homoarchical unilineal kinship is attributable to a large number of independent communities with choice of kinship affiliation. The low correlations of homoarchical hereditary leadership with these two other homoarchical conditions is attributable to selected leadership in a substantial number of communities that are politically subordinated or that have unilineal kinship or that have a combination of both homoarchical conditions. If the world sample included more representatives of contemporary large nations and fewer independent communities, heterarchical selection of leadership and heterarchical choice of kinship affiliation would probably be positively correlated with homoarchical subordination of the community.

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HETERARCHY AND HOMOARCHY IN MAYA VILLAGE POLITICS

Though debates about the social structure and the degree of centralization of authority of Classic Maya polities remain inconclusive (See Potter and King 1995, Fox, Cook, Chase and Chase 1996) there is abundant evidence that local Maya populations have consistently resisted centralized administration in favor of decentralized mechanically repetitive administration. Several years ago John Fox and I (Fox and Cook 1996) used ethnographic examples to argue against a unilinear evolutionary model for the rise of generic centralized states among the ancient Maya. The issues of conflict between centralizing and decentralizing forces in Maya society and its political culture, implied but not fully developed in that earlier work, offer an instructive context for investigating the utility of heterarchical models and thinking in Maya social anthropology. Here I will attempt to mobilize the concepts of heterarchy and homoarchy (Crumley 1987) and of effective scale (Ibid 159-160) as analytical tools to work up an ethnography based interpretation that investigates the roles of “long term counterpoised powers” (Ibid.:163), i.e. social factions, but also ideologies or native models, in local Maya politics, and to understand Maya social history as an ongoing and unresolved negotiation or dialectic between them.

My perspective is a product of the heady formative period of structuralist and dialectical thinking in social anthropology. When I entered graduate school Victor Turner (1969) had just argued provocatively for a natural alternation between periods of structure and therapeutic anti-structure in all societies, even egalitarian ones. In a contemporaneous but more ethnographic take on the structure anti-structure dialectic, Edmund Leach (1964) argued that there were two counterpoised ideological models at play in the politics of highland Burma: *shan*, or feudal hierarchy, and *gumlao*, anarchistic egalitarianism. *Gumsa*, was the compromise between these principals enacted in real social life in communities that slid back and forth on a *shan-gumlao* scale, never actually reaching either pole. This 1970 vintage structuralist dialectical thinking is my intellectual starting point.

I will argue that local Maya communities, and larger Maya polities, behave like their counterparts in highland Burma, moving back and forth between more and less centralized, hierarchical poles. What I hope to do, through examining two case studies, is to delineate the factions and the native

models operating in 20th century Maya village life. Brief descriptions of historical political dynamics in two very different villages are followed by an analysis of what they have in common, and a suggestion of what this may mean about how Maya social heterarchies work and have endured for centuries. In response to Crumley's (1987:159-160) comments on "effective scale" observe that, depending on your period of observation, the dialectical structuring of the dynamic equilibrium that is described below might be mistaken for simple linear evolutionary change, or for degradation or devolution. A few decades or a single human lifetime might demonstrate increasing or decreasing centralization and bureaucracy and organic solidarity. The dynamic but equilibrated cycle emerges fully and convincingly only when centuries of social and political action over the entire Maya region are investigated, and demonstrates that traditional cyclical Maya social and political theory is actually an accurate portrayal of the dynamics of agrarian tribal peasant-based civilization.

Case Study 1- Liberal Modernization and Factional Contention in a Highland Town

Momostenango, a highland Maya, K'ichee' speaking municipality of 40,000 in the 1970s, and close to 70,000 today, is composed of 20-some hamlets and a town center located in Western Guatemala. It has long been accepted by ethnologists working in Guatemala that the towns (*municipios*) are cultural units, often speaking a common dialect and sharing the cult of a patron saint (Tax 1937) and for social research they represent defined, discrete local polities.

Post Classic highland Maya local communities (circa 1200-1500 AD), corresponding to the hamlets or *parajes* of modern times, were constructed by aggregating two or more patrilineal corporate groups, each of which shared an estate and maintained an ancestral shrine complex headed by a lineage elder, into local in-marrying communities, *chinamits* (The Toltec-Maya variant of the famous Aztec *calpul*) each of which maintained the collective cult of a tutelary god under the direction of the head of the most powerful resident lineage. In a process illustrating Vogt's (1969) concept of structural replication, *chinamits* were then organized via intermarriage among their leading families, and via the cult of a more inclusive tutelary god representing the confederacy, into local polities, *amaks* (i.e. simple chiefdoms), each of which was administered from a central nucleated settlement, the *tinamit*. *Amak* patron gods were imported by conquest as a new elite, the younger brothers and younger sons of the K'ichee' nobility at their capital Q'umarca'aj conquered the local *amaks* in the western

highlands and created rural fiefdoms (See Carmack 1973 and Carmack 1995). Ethnohistoric and 20th century ethnographic data (See Cook 1981, Hill and Monaghan 1987, Carmack 1995 and Cook 2000) reveal how the distinctive Maya pattern of ritually legitimized social and political organization was continued in the post-conquest colonial period with the replacement of Toltec patron gods from Tula with Christian saints from Spain.

With the Spanish conquest of *Q'umarca'aj* in 1523 a new Spanish elite provided patron saints to their new vassals, the local elite lineages in the *amaks*. The *amaks* became municipal corporations and *encomiendas* or land grants to the conquerors under the crown, and the indigenous nobility whose ancestors had recently conquered *amaks* were now *caciques*, local chiefs given higher status and local political authority by the Spaniards for the next two centuries.

With independence from Spain and the rise to political power in Guatemala of the creole and mestizo population in the new Guatemalan nation-state at the onset of the 19th century the special protection and prerogatives of the *caciques* rapidly eroded as their places as intermediaries with the national-level power structure and economy were taken by local *ladino* (mestizo) landowners, merchants and regional political bosses (*caudillos*). The *cofradias* or *parcialidades* that corresponded to the older *chinamits* and had survived the conquest and colonial periods relatively intact, now had their economic and ritual functions separated. Economically they were transformed from the very successful autonomous land owning communal enterprises controlled by indigenous *caciques* that had proliferated in the 19th Century (Carmack 1995:80, Rojas Lima 1988: 61-67) into hamlets overseen by the ladino town administration. Their lands were privatized and often fell into ladino hands. The saints were removed from chapels in the scattered *parcialidades* to the church in the town center and their cult institutions called *cofradias* (festival sponsoring and ritual performing sodalities) were now overseen by parish priests and municipal officials and lost their territorial association with the *parcialidades* or hamlets. Ongoing sponsorship by controlling *cacique* families in the hamlets was replaced by rotating sponsorship within a new centralized civil religious hierarchy (see Chance and Taylor 1985). A town government (*cabildo*) dominated by a mestizo (*ladino*) mayor and city council mediated between the nation state and the local town. It loosely oversaw an indigenous government made up of the elders from the rural hamlets and the younger elders-in-training whom they appointed. This indigenous government, called the *auxiliatura*, handled civil law within the indigenous community, controlled the *cofradias*, and effectively mediated between the decentralized rural indigenous hamlets and the Ladino town government, which then mediated

between the indigenous population (a cheap labor pool) and the regional and national powers.

The details of the unfolding of this story in Momostenango contradicts the picture of Maya communities in the early or middle 20th century as homogeneous folk communities united by their ethnic opposition to Ladinos, and by ancestor worship and collective rituals on mountain tops and the cult of a patron saint at a church in the ceremonial center all integrated via a “civil-religious hierarchy” of male elders ranked according to their investment levels in the expensive community ritual. This idealized depiction of a simple linear hierarchical Maya village organization, while it accurately depicts one axis of village social structure, can be very misleading. It may lead us to try to explain recent events like the rapid spread of Pentecostal churches among the Maya, or horrific conflict between Protestants and Catholics in highland Chiapas functionally as a simple and predictable product of the deculturation and destabilization of Maya communities under the onslaught of modernization and evangelization. What emerges from close study of Momostenango in a fuller and richer depiction (See Carmack 1995) is contending Maya elite (*cacique*) families vying for power before and after the conquest, and a new class of prosperous indigenous merchants and their blanket weaving kinsmen and allies in the four wards of the town center contending with the *caciques* for authority, under Spanish, and later ladino overlords, within the indigenous community from the 1700s on.

With Guatemalan independence and the rise to power of regional mestizo political bosses who maintained their own militias, the new class of mercantilist acculturated Maya, a new urban faction, who began to call themselves “*civilizados*,” saw a chance for advancement by serving in a regional *caudillo*’s militia. In the early 20th century, with the *caudillo*’s patronage, they gained control of the indigenous government and thus of the *cofradías*. Thus from the 18th through the 20th centuries new class-based counterpoised powers within the Indigenous sector supplemented the previously existing and still contending *cacique* families in village factionalism.

In the ideological expression of this process, Epigonal-Toltec (Wolf 1959) stories where saints were brought from Spain by *cacique* ancestors, as told in the hamlets by the *cacique* descendants, and well known to many in the town center, were challenged by a foundation myth of local nativistic power where saints were found in local caves, and where the spirits of the mountains had ordained the *cabildo* officials, from the militaristic “*civilizado*” status group, as their representatives and the legitimate leaders of the town (see Cook 2001,A). Thus the counterpoised factions were represented by counterpoised

ideologies, and within the indigenous community by counterpoised societal models, one of which idealized decentralized rural agrarian communes led by elite families, while the other idealized “modern” and centralized towns integrated into a nation state and led by a local meritocracy. *Cofradias* became fiesta-sponsoring sodalities in the municipal church controlled by the newly empowered urban elite. In response to this latter expansion of the power of the urban Maya merchants the *caciques* largely withdrew sponsorship of and participation in the *cofradías* by the 1970’s.

In the 1970’s, though, surviving *cacique* families used the rapidly growing Catholic Action movement, the Guatemalan expression of the international Christian Democratic political movement, to break entirely with the centralized *cofradia* system, now officially interpreted by the Catholic church and the indigenous catechists, as a pagan organization. Acquiring positions as leading catechists, and working with the priest to replace *cofradia*-based festival sponsorship in the urban center with local observances for patron saints in newly built chapels in each major hamlet, with chapel construction underwritten by the local *cacique* lineage, the *cacique* status group made effective use of the reform Catholic movement to reinstate themselves as community leaders, and worked to construct a new polity based on the Christian Democratic party and the reformed church, which would have, had it been successful, marginalized the ladino and the *civilizado* status groups.

As an anthropologist what I find most fascinating about this turn of affairs is that the *caciques* in essence were reinstating their traditional mythical identities as providers of patron saints and churches, and though the migration myth was not explicitly part of this resurgent thematic complex, they were again opposing local nativistic powers (the non-elite *civilizado* families and their animistic complex of local powers and shrines) as their ancestors had when they came into Momostenango as conquerors in the post-classic expansion, and their opposition was symbolically legitimized as representing the true universal church, i.e. an external cosmopolitan entity, in a sort of replay of the various conquests in pre-Hispanic highland Maya history /1/.

From my point of view it could be effectively argued that the last 600 years of Momostecan history represent a dynamic equilibrium within a complex heterarchical system that slides back and forth between two poles, one in which centripetal coalescence around a powerful center is dominant, and where the indigenous municipal government (*auxiliatura*) with its meritocratic hierarchy of *principales* (elder leaders) and *alcaldes* (mayors) mediates between the nation state and the Maya pueblo, and another in which there is centrifugal movement of power and influence to the hamlets, and where the heads of elite

lineages are the leaders of collectivistic local communities and their mediators with the nation state. While it is fair to argue that in the long run the centripetal forces seem to be winning, as marked by the accumulation of capital and infrastructure in the town center, it is still important to note that there are powerful currents and forces that continue to resist this, as marked not only by the dynamics of Catholic Action in the 1960s, and 70's described above, but also by the more recent explosion of local Pentecostal churches in the hamlets in the 1990's at the expense of the more centralized Catholic Church. A further and deeper exploration of the Pentecostal movement among the Maya concludes the argument and takes us briefly to a Yucatec Maya community in the hills of western Belize.

Case Study 2- The Maya Pentecost in a Yucatec Village

In the 1970's British Honduras, with its numerous Yucatec and Kekchi Maya villages, became Belize, an independent country in the British Commonwealth. In the villages, appointed *alcaldes* (mayors) were replaced by elected town councils and chairmen, and land which had been held in common and allocated by the *alcaldes* was largely privatized. By the early 1980's in one small (population of 800) Yucatec speaking village in Western Belize an alliance was formed between an older and very traditional enclave of *milpa* (subsistence oriented corn-plot) farmers who practiced a syncretized Maya-Catholic religion and a younger group of educated upwardly mobile merchants who had a sense of Maya ethnic identity and wished to preserve traditional Maya culture and the Yucatec language. This young, educated and acculturated cohort rapidly mastered the new electoral politics, and gained control of the village government.

During the 1980's the village underwent a major transformation in which 90% of the village families left the Catholic Church, and in a process of typical Maya lineage segmentation formed a series of six small Pentecostal churches, each of which had the form of an endogamous community composed of two intermarrying exogamous minimal lineage segments with a pastor representing one of the lineages (see Fox and Cook 1996). The process of exiting the Catholic Church and creating new churches, or of the splitting of the congregations of Pentecostal communities, continued until each of the major families had a pastor leading at least one of the churches, and converted a small village which had been integrated by one church and a patron saint, an elected town council and village chairman, and shared cooperative public work at the church and cemetery into an assemblage of seven *chinamit*-like /2/ little communities (six Pentecostal churches and the Catholic church).

The pastors of the six Pentecostal churches formed a council that served as the de-facto government for a new community that ignored the officially (nationally) recognized town council and chairman, stopped participating in elections or public works, refused to support the patron saint's festival, organized and built their own separate school and sponsored periodic collective revival meetings.

Comparison of the Two Case Studies

I see an intriguing paradox in a situation where an acculturated elite attempts to preserve traditional culture via using a new electoral political system and western style meritocracy, while the majority of the village abandons the old religion and most of the traditional folklore, but reorganizes the community according to typical Maya social principles of segmentation, construction of traditional little endogamous communities, and reorganization via a council of lineage elders (see Cook 2001, B for a detailed analysis).

In both the K'ichee' and Yucatec cases a new acculturated (*civilizado*) elite rose to power and sought to dominate the role of mediator between the village and the outside world, and in both cases this acculturated and upwardly mobile mercantilist status group formed an alliance with traditionalists and favored retention of a syncretized Cristo-Maya religion. In both cases this maneuver was countered by an attempt by a majority within the indigenous community to reconstruct a decentralized traditional Mayan social structure- In Belize via the Pentecostal churches and council of pastors, in Momos by the reemergence of *cacique* leadership as catechists within Catholic Action and their attempt to replace the ceremonial center and its civil-religious hierarchy with decentralized worship at hamlet level chapels in the 70's, and then by the Pentecostal explosion of the 80's and 90's. In both cases, again sort of paradoxically, the break and the "new" social movements were legitimized mainly in terms of external universalizing religious ideology, and traditional Maya social and political dynamics retained a traditional decentralized community structure at the expense of much traditional, especially religious, cultural content. When the Catholic Action movement encountered massive political repression in the 1980s, many Momostecans, like the Yucatec villagers who were not being politically repressed by a militarized authoritarian Ladino state, continued this decentralizing social movement by turning to Pentecostal churches in the hamlets, largely abandoning the urban ceremonial center and marginalizing the civil-religious hierarchy centered there and its acculturated (*civilizado*) leadership.

Analysis

Hierarchies are systems of ranking, and it is my understanding that homoarchies are very simple ranked systems in which ranking is along a single axis, for example genealogical descent, or age, or wealth while in heterarchies ranking is complex and computed according to several axes simultaneously, or differently in different situations. My approach to heterarchy here is to see it as a complex integration of analytically separable homoarchies. Two homoarchival ranking principles, I believe, provide the most important underlying ideologies enacted in the Momostecan historical events outlined above and in the heterarchical social organization of late 20th century Maya communities.

1) The Genealogical Homoarchy: Descent from the founders confers status as owners of offices and lands.

The *cacique* variant- Our ancestors came from Mexico (were conquerors) and brought the patron saint of the community (*tinamit* and *chinamit* versions), and housed it, and fed it, and spoke to it in their dreams, and followed its instructions in settling the town (or local hamlet). This is the epigonal-Toltec myth which was used by elites to claim legitimacy throughout post-classic Mesoamerica. The *cacique* status group also controlled the colonial land titles which conferred land and office rights on their descendants.

The *civilizado* variant- Our ancestors established the shrines for our families on the hills around the town center, were designated by the year-bearer to perform the new years ceremonies at the shrines, and to establish and occupy the positions in the local government, and recovered the towns miraculous saints from caves at behest of the Holy Earth.

Discussion- This *civilizado* homoarchy relies on the principle of first occupancy which Patricia McAnany traces archaeologically to roots in the formative (cf 1995: 64-110). This principle was augmented among the Maya and in Mesoamerica generally, though, by the epigonal Toltec migration myth during and following late classic and post classic cycles of conquest, when “cadet lineages” left home polities and set out to establish new power bases. Their ancestral cult lost its attachment to the pyramid tombs where the ancestor’s remains and power-validating ghosts were located (Schele and Freidel 1990) and came to be mediated by moveable power objects, the god images (*cabawils*) provided by the ancestors (see Cook 2000: 196-198), and by power bundles of sacred clothing and objects derived from the ancestors.

There has been conflict in the K’ichee’an highlands since the post classic between elite lineages contesting with each other for control of territory and

succession to offices, and between these elites, conquerors with transportable deities with celestial attributes, and conquered local communities, with fixed lineage shrines and support by the mountain spirits and local ancestral ghosts. This conflict is unresolved and persists in variant and contending ancestor-based homoarchival schemes.

2) The Mediativonal Homoarchy: Authority and power derive from the effectiveness of the cultural (social, political, and economic) broker role.

Individuals and factions are ranked and have local influence or power to the extent that they effectively mediate between their local constituency and the external powers. This is both a natural/social role in the economic/political sense and a projective/symbolic/religious role since the supernatural powers, at least the non-ancestral ones, are “external” in a sense, and especially when they are pictured as *ladinos* or *gringos*, as happens with the mountain spirits thought to own nature, and most of the saints.

The *cacique* variant- *Cacique* ancestors were the original brokers during the post-classic colonial periods, as heads of the *tinamits* and *chinamits*, owners/sponsors of the tutelary gods, and collectors/managers of tribute payment and *encomienda* service for the rural communities. After losing power in the liberal modernization period they tried to regain a critical broker role as the leading catechists in Catholic Action, and participation in the local campaigns of the international Christian Democratic Party in the late 20th century.

The *civilizado* variant- Through militia service and patron-client relations with the ladino *caudillo*, the central brokerage role was claimed by the early 20th century ancestors of this group, and cemented by the town center’s leaders’s mid-century dominance of the *auxiliatura* and of the increasingly centralized *cofradías*. Concomitantly and subsequently this faction accumulated wealth and knowledge of the larger world as merchants, and competed with *ladinos* with increasing success to be the economic brokers for the poorer indigenous population. Cooperation with the national military through control of local military commissioners posts and participation as local representatives of the national level militaristic political parties (MLN and PID) were also part of the late 20th century *civilizado* strategy to utilize the brokerage role to validate status and authority claims on this homoarchival axis.

Conclusion

The past 600 years of Maya history, and possibly the past 2000 years of it, express a dialectical struggle between factions that favor either a centralized urban administrative societal model, which is bureaucratized and at least somewhat meritocratic or a decentralized “segmentary” model with mechanical solidarity and loose integration via structural replication at various levels of social scale and confederation via the sharing of allegiance to a patron deity. Over the centuries the pendulum swings slowly between more and less centralized poles, but never comes to rest.

The indigenous Classic period and the 19th –20th century liberal period represent times when centralization and urban bureaucratic hierarchies were clearly dominant within Maya polities (city-states, and municipalities respectively). The colonial period, and the Catholic Action and Pentecostal revolutions of the terminal 20th century represent periods in which centralization was effectively challenged within village level polities. The factions and their divergent idealized community models are supported by different foundation myths, but these involve different takes on two central principles that are agreed upon as critical, though seen differently, by the proponents of both models: genealogical primacy and effective brokerage. Underlying and rationalizing the entire social system and village level historiography and enabling local communities to live effectively, if never comfortably, with unresolved dialectical tensions, is a very old and universal Maya cosmogonic model derived from the solar and agricultural cycle and vegetative metaphors, which rejects unilinear developmental schemes and understands history to repeat itself infinitely /13/. This model and the complex heterarchical societal dynamic equilibria which enact its expectations over centuries long cycles seems to be an adaptation, like the similar system of highland Burma with which this essay opened, and other loosely defined “feudalisms,” to the political ecology of peasant-based agrarian states.

NOTES

/1/ See De Borhegyi 1956 for his masterful early recognition of this enduring Mayan pattern in which celestial cult-bearing conquerors dominate local peasant communities with an earth focused religion.

/2/ The parallels between these churches and pre-hispanic Maya corporate groups (chinamits, calpuls, etc.) are developed extensively in Fox and Cook 1996:815-817, while a more general argument favoring the universality within Maya cultures of such entities is developed in Fox, Cook, Chase and Chase 1996: 798-799. The term ‘chinamit-like’ is used because the structure is retained: two or more intermarrying minimal patrilineage segments

comprise a corporate group with shared property (a church building and other capital) led by a charismatically validated visionary male elder.

/3/ This cosmology is documented and interpreted in Carlsen and Prechtel 1991 and in Cook 2000: 105-184.

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METAPHOR AND HIERARCHY IN MAORI SOCIO-POLITICAL ORGANISATION

Man Be My Metaphor (Dylan Thomas)

Ethnographic analysis of inter-cultural circumstances is by definition characterized by the interpretation and translation of emic concepts and customs into the etic language of anthropology. Over the past three decades it has become increasingly clear that metaphors play a central role in language, thought and action (Lakoff and Johnsson 1980), which implies that ethnographic practices often involve the substitution of anthropological tropes for indigenous metaphors. The relatively new tropological perspective on language suggests furthermore that metaphors not only govern language, but also constitute realities to the extent that they are created and organised through language (Fernandez 1986, Quinn 1991, Rumsey 2004). This insight is particularly significant since many metaphors used in anthropology, such as gender, the self, or hierarchy, are examples of catachresis, that is metaphors which have no adequate referents (Moore 1997: 140). The conclusion to be drawn for the practice of ethnography is therefore that ethnographic representations (re-)construct realities by means of metaphors that may evoke associations that are fundamentally different from the associations that are evoked by the metaphors underlying indigenous languages and practices (e.g. Fox 1980, Salmond 1982, Fernandez 1991, Keen 1995).

In this paper I shall argue that conventional anthropological interpretations of the structure of hierarchy in Maori socio-political organisation are misleading to the extent that they replace indigenous metaphors expressing kinship and leadership. When instead Maori tropes are taken as point of departure for ethnographic analysis, the anthropological model of hierarchy in socio-political organisation is rather different. My contention will be that the ambiguity in Maori hierarchy has long been misunderstood because New Zealand was routinely situated within typologies of leadership developed for the Polynesian region as a whole, as distinct from other culture areas in the Pacific, such as Melanesia and Micronesia. These typologies are based on the models of conical clan and ramage, which are rooted in metaphors suggesting that the segmentary stratification of both kinship and leadership in Polynesia was streamlined in a unilineal manner, either from the top downwards or from

the bottom upwards. Since Maori socio-political organisation is constituted through metaphors of births and growth, however, it seems more appropriate to understand hierarchy as generated from within rather than from the outside, from above or from below. Thus, I aim at making a contribution to the extensive debate on leadership in New Zealand and the Pacific at large (e.g. Feinberg 2002).

Leadership in the Pacific

The comparative analysis of leadership in the Pacific is deeply rooted within the distinction between the so-called culture areas of Polynesia, Melanesia and Micronesia. The idea that some peoples in the Pacific are more alike than others was first introduced by Captain James Cook in the 1770s, but it was not until 1832 that the terms Polynesia, Melanesia and Micronesia were coined by a French Captain named Jules Dumont d'Urville. The distinction between these areas was not simply geographic, but it was largely based on social and cultural criteria, one of which concerned political organisation. Polynesians were believed to share a certain degree of civilization as reflected, among other things, in a chiefly organisation and a hierarchical structure of rank. As such, they were considered to be opposed to the 'tribal' Melanesians who were regarded as much more 'savage' (Dumont d'Urville 1832: 4-5, 11-12).

Although the division between three culture areas in the Pacific continues to guide the study of the region (e.g. Crocombe 2001: 146-7; Lal & Fortune 2000: 63), the widespread distinction between Polynesia and Melanesia in particular has also been the subject of debate since at least 25 years (e.g. Guiart 1981). One of the most interesting contributions to this debate was made by Nicholas Thomas (1989a), who linked the stereotypical characterization of the respective regions to the way they were valued and ranked in relation to each other by Europeans. This must be understood against the background of eighteenth and nineteenth century preoccupations with hierarchy, hereditary leadership, priesthood and power. Obviously, these had also influenced Dumont d'Urville for in his perspective Polynesian forms of hierarchy were associated with aristocracy and bore unequivocally a positive connotation. At the same time, Melanesian tribal organizations were associated with anarchy and disorder, which led him to characterise Melanesian societies in terms of what they were not, in terms of what they were missing, namely a hierarchical socio-political organisation.

These stereotypical characterizations of Polynesia and Melanesia are based on the view that social equality and inequality are to be measured in quantitative terms, as *more* or *less* hierarchical. For that reason, too, the relation

between Polynesia and Melanesia has often been equated with the relation between hierarchy and equality. On the basis of this relation of equivalence anthropologists and others have long characterized different groups in Polynesia and Melanesia in terms of the presence or absence of hierarchy or the centralization of leadership. Polynesian societies used to be characterized in terms of the presence of hierarchy, while supposed forms of egalitarianism in Melanesia were explained in terms of the absence of ostensibly Polynesian features of chieftainship and socio-political stratification. Thus, according to Thomas (1989a: 34), characterization became typology, which also explains why the sophisticated analyses in studies of single societies have never been translated into a multilinear perspective on regional political systems.

The typology of the political systems of Polynesia and Melanesia was developed over the years, but in 1963 it was canonized in a publication by Marshall Sahlins, entitled 'Poor Man, Rich Man, Big Man, Chief'. In this influential article he refined the contrast between Polynesian hierarchy and Melanesian egalitarianism in terms of a characterization of the regions' leaders as 'chiefs' and 'big men'. Following this essay the contrast between Polynesia and Melanesia became soon epitomized with the labels 'ascribed status' versus 'achieved status', in spite of all exceptions and internal variations and combinations to which Sahlins had explicitly drawn attention. In the meantime, this *a priori* categorization of leadership systems has been criticized at great length: not all Polynesian societies can *a priori* be classified as characterized by chiefly leaders, whilst in some Melanesian societies hereditary forms of leadership (co-)exist with the 'big man' type (Douglas 1979, see also Godelier & Strathern 1991). Below I will qualify this typology for New Zealand, but what interests me here is the metaphor used by Sahlins to exemplify the contrast between Polynesia and Melanesia.

Sahlins (1963: 287) described the so-called tribal system characteristic of Melanesia as 'one of politically unintegrated segments', while for Polynesia he used the geometrical metaphor of a pyramid: 'the Polynesian polity is an extensive pyramid of groups capped by the family and following of a paramount chief'. To this he added that the development of Polynesian pyramids was facilitated by the so-called 'ranked lineages', that were found to represent the kinship systems in the region. He mentioned three terms that were commonly used with reference to the Polynesian lineage: 'status lineage', after Goldman (1957), 'ramage', after Firth (1957a [1936]), and 'conical clan', after Kirchhoff 1968 [1955]. In an earlier publication Sahlins (1958: 140, 248) already revealed that Kirchhoff's 'brilliant' discussion of clanship had provided him with a 'lead' in his project of ranking Polynesian societies in a

classification of the degree of stratification. Against that background the similarity between Sahlins' metaphor of 'pyramid' and Kirchhoff's concept of 'conical clan' is unlikely to be a mere coincidence. The notion of the conical clan not only influenced Sahlins typologies of Polynesia, but to some extent it became the prototypical model for socio-political organisation throughout the region (Hage & Harary 1996: 90). In spite of the widespread recognition that the conical clan represents the basic structural form of Polynesian societies it has rarely been discussed, which makes it necessary to elaborate on this important model and metaphor in more detail.

The Conical Clan

Kirchhoff wrote his seminal paper in 1935, but it was not published until 1955 when his graduate students printed it in the first issue of the *Davidson Journal of Anthropology*, that was discontinued after three years. The early date of writing is significant since it reveals that Kirchhoff was still firmly positioned in the evolutionary tradition of anthropology. He departed from a type of society in which the concept of descent was still absent. Blood bonds and marriage were only important within a small nucleus of near relatives, but at the level of community only sentimental ties played a role. In the course of evolutionary development economic activities increased, from hunting and gathering to agriculture, which made more cooperation necessary. Thus, kinship organisations emerged to ensure stability above the level of families.

Kirchhoff described the first type of kinship grouping emerging in the evolution of human society as clans, of which he distinguished two forms: the unilateral exogamous clan and the conical clan. The first was either patrilineal or matrilineal, but in both cases it was egalitarian: 'every member of the clan is, as far as clan membership goes, on an absolutely equal footing with the rest: the nearness of relation to each other or to some ancestor being of no consequence for a person's place in the clan' (Kirchhoff 1968: 375). On the long term Kirchhoff considered this type of clan as inadequate since its absolute egalitarianism made it incapable to intensify internal cooperation that would become necessary following the progression of economic and social differentiation.

The counterpart of this type of kinship group was described as the conical clan, in which members are not on an equal footing but distinguished in terms of 'nearness' of their 'relationship to the common ancestor of the group' (*ibid.* 377). This results in a kinship group 'in which every single member, except brothers and sisters, has a different standing: the concept of the *degree of relationship* leads to *different degrees of membership* in the clan. In other words, some are members to a higher degree than others' (*ibid.*). Kirchhoff

elaborated this organisational principle of the conical clan by pointing out that in these kinship groups leading social, political, economic and religious functions are reserved to those of highest descent, *i.e.* those closest to the ancestor of the clan, who is frequently regarded as a god, or, alternatively, as descended directly from divine, founding ancestors. The closer in descent to the sacred ancestor, the higher the opportunities in the evolving social and economic differentiation. Thus, some members of the clan may almost be gods or divine chiefs, while others further removed from the apex of the hierarchical organisation might even be slaves, although all continue to be considered as relatives. Since clan membership shades off the farther one is away from the top of the clan, Kirchhoff likened this type of kinship group to a 'cone': 'the whole tribes being one such cone, with the legendary ancestor at its top, - but within it are a larger or smaller number of similar cones, the top of each coinciding with or being connected with the top of the whole cone' (*ibid.* 378-9). This geometrical metaphor of a certain type of socio-political organisation later became the prototype for descent groups and political leadership in Polynesia.

Kirchhoff's paper was brief and lucid and therefore his typology of clanship had a tremendous appeal, even though it was recognized at an early stage that the usefulness of his dichotomy is rather limited for comparative research because in practice many kin-based societies only partially fulfil Kirchhoff's criteria for egalitarian or conical clans. Morton Fried (1957: 5), for example, argued that a basic error in Kirchhoff's approach was the reification of the contrast between egalitarian and hierarchical clans in his formulation of ideal types: 'To do as Kirchhoff has done – to attempt to make *all* apparent distinctions between egalitarian and stratified kin groups part of their definition – is to create, at best a tautology, and at worst to make a dogmatic and unacceptable hash of the study of comparative social institutions.'

The stereotypical character of Kirchhoff's classification made it unacceptable in some areas where the kingroup organisation did not neatly fit into his rigid distinction (e.g. Knight 1990), but in Polynesia it became one of the most influential models for the description of socio-political organisation throughout the region. Archaeologists and linguists view the conical clan as a central component of Ancestral Polynesian Society (Kirch 1984, Kirch and Green 2001, Pawley 1982). In his landmark study of evolution in Polynesian chiefdoms, the American archaeologist Patrick Kirch (1984: 31) for example, described the conical clan as 'the organizational basis of Polynesian societies'. In his view, the model of the conical clan was applicable to Polynesia since the principle of genealogical seniority entailed structurally equivalent gradations of rank between older and younger siblings, chiefs and commoners, and higher

and lesser lineages. In conical systems the chief is also believed to encompass the whole, while he himself is nearly always encompassed by a higher-order chief.

Another recent and influential interpretation of the conical clan in Polynesia has been authored by Jonathan Friedman and Michael Rowlands (1977; see also Friedman 1975), who associate it particularly with the circulation of prestige goods. Relations of descent and alliance are combined with network variables in an evolutionary model of social stratification. In this so-called 'prestige-good system' the difference between the clearly articulated regional hierarchies of western Polynesia and the devolved or fragmented polities of eastern Polynesia are attributed to the attenuation of exchange networks in the latter region. A characteristic feature of the economic regime of 'conical systems' was that exchange relations coincided with hierarchical encompassment and the movement of tribute towards the top, from which it was redistributed. This 'integrative' pattern of exchange was opposed to the 'agonistic' type of competitive exchange between political rivals, which was characteristic of the more materially productive devolved regimes, although Thomas (1989b: 93) has since argued that barter and ceremonial exchange were also well developed in devolved polities in eastern Polynesia (see also Gell 1993).

What all representations of the conical clan in Polynesia share is their common ancestry in the published dissertation of Marshall Sahlins on *Social Stratification in Polynesia* (1958). In this book Sahlins specified both the structure of ranking in the conical clan in Polynesia and the higher forms of economic cooperation referred to by Kirchhoff. The criterion of stratification in the descent group was described as 'distance from the senior line of descent from the common ancestor' (Sahlins 1958: 140), while two forms of economic cooperation were associated with the conical clan. First, the regulation of land tenure in which paramount chiefs owned the land but delegated management to lower ranking chiefs, who in turn allotted usufruct rights to commoners. Second, the regulation of production and exchange through a system of redistribution in which goods flowed up and down the hierarchy. To explain different forms of social and political organisation in Polynesia Sahlins adopted an ecological model of adaptive variation, regarding each form as an alternative solution to the problem of distributing surplus production as determined by a particular type of island environment.

The main argument of Sahlins' (1958: 250) early study was that differences in ecological environments explained productivity differences, which, in turn, could be linked to different gradations of stratification and

hierarchy: 'the greater the productivity, the greater the amount of stratification'. This conclusion also led him to distinguish between nominal and nearly despotic authority of chiefs, although the conical clan appeared to be the dominant structure of social and political organisation throughout Polynesia, with the exception of Samoa, Futuna, Uvea, which were characterized by a so-called descent-line system, and a few atolls. The shape of the conical pyramid was widespread, so to speak, only its nodes were somewhat looser or somewhat tighter.

Although Sahlins (1985a: 20) later repealed his earlier characterization of East Polynesian societies, such as Hawai'i, as conical, the geometrical metaphor of cone proved really appealing. It implies an interpretation of hierarchy in which 'the rank of any individual is governed by his or her relative distance from the main line of the descent in the group, the high chief being the direct descendant of the deified founder of the community' (Sahlins 1958: 251). Thus, senior chiefs are always on top, followed by junior descendants and their offspring in succession. Anthropologists and archaeologists who are structurally minded still consider this contribution to Polynesian studies as seminal (see Hage & Harary 1996: 90-124). Interestingly, however, Sahlins wrote about conical clans, as testified by his references to Kirchhoff and the graphic depiction of his model (Sahlins 1958: 143, figure 1), but for convenience sake he used the concept of 'ramage', which he considered 'more descriptive than Kirchhoff's' and because it was 'already widely known' (*ibid.* 140). Since this term is a very different metaphor to describe socio-political organisation than the conical clan, and also because it became the standard concept for the central kingroup in Maori society, it is necessary to discuss it in more detail.

Ramage

The concept of ramage was coined by Raymond Firth in his classic monograph *We, the Tikopia*, originally published in 1936. His interest in the concept was ethnographic rather than theoretical as he noted that in many Polynesian societies the unity of kinship groupings is expressed by 'unilateral recognition of common descent' (1957a: 327). Firth proposed the botanical metaphor of 'ramage' to credit in his view the most important feature of these kingroups: 'the principle of fission and dispersion in the creation of them':

... they have arisen through the branching and re-branching of the family structure, acquiring greater autonomy and independence the further they move away from the parent stem. The tree metaphor is actually used by some native peoples in describing their social organization. Here, very often, great importance is attached to seniority as a principle of social differentiation. One term which might be employed to characterize such kinship groups is 'ramage',

for which there is literary authority, though it has now fallen out of use. This term has the advantage of suggesting immediately by its etymology the branching process by which these groups attain individuality and yet keep their connection with the parent stem. It is also consistent in metaphor with the expression 'genealogical tree.' The process can be correctly described as one of ramification (Firth 1957*a* [1936]: 327-8).

The concept of ramage proved particularly important in the debate about the dynamics of kinship organisations, that in the Pacific was mainly held within the terms of a theory of progressive segmentation. In his doctoral dissertation on the New Zealand Maori, for example, Firth (1959 [1929]: 111-14) had represented the evolution of extended families into sub-tribal groupings, while he also described the subdivision of minor sub-tribes from major sub-tribes, which to some extent implied a historical reconstruction of the formation of Maori tribal organisations. In 1957, however, he rejected the assumption that the segmentary structure of Maori society resulted from progression over time. Instead, he argued that in any explanation of the evolution of Maori tribal organisations their structural dynamics could not be denied, the fact that minor segments could wax while major segments could wane (Firth 1957*b*: 7). A simultaneous development of kinship groupings on both similar and different ranks of the social order he believed was more obvious, and for this purpose the concept of ramage was applied to Maori society.

Although he did not himself use the concept of ramage, the botanical metaphor of the boughs or branches of a tree for the segmentary structure of Polynesian lineages was introduced by Edward Gifford in his famous monograph on *Tongan Society* (1929). Gifford characterized the structure of Tongan lineages (*ha'a*), all patrilineal, as

... a tree with trunk, limbs, branches, and twigs. Here and there a twig develops into a branch...; other twigs sprout forth and die... Or perhaps a limb becomes huge and flourishing..., while the trunk... ceases to flourish. Everything points to the necessity of a line of powerful chiefs for a nucleus about which the lineage groups itself. Without such chiefs it appears to wilt and die and its membership gradually aligns itself with other rising lineages (Gifford 1929: 30).

Gifford also described branching processes in terms of the splitting of 'major lineages' into 'minor ones' and the development of minor lineages into 'incipient major lineages' (*ibid.*), but it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the relevance of his contribution to the interpretation of the evolution of

Polynesian socio-political organisation. What interests me here in particular is the trope of tree.

The image of a tree was a widespread taxonomic device for secular, religious and scientific purposes in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe, including the graphic depiction of a 'pedigree', which originally has been derived from the French *pie de grue* or 'crane's foot'. The conceptual distinction between 'pedigree' and 'genealogy' was first made by Willem Rivers in 1910, who thus created the possibility of the methodological transition from the realm of personal names to the abstract system of genealogical relationships underlying those names (Bouquet 1996). The visual aspect of the genealogical diagram made the underlying metaphor of tree more universally applicable.

It is also important to make explicit the connotations of the trope of tree since its choice as a symbol to metaphorize kinship relations is probably not merely decorative. Bouquet (*ibid.* 59) refers to the homology in Indo-European etymology between the male body and the tree, which are both regarded as self-generative and self-perpetuating. The association between the spine of the male body (assumed to channel the movement of seed) and the trunk of the tree (medium for sap rising from the soil to the branches) leads to the concept of 'axial channel' which enables the tree to rise above time (*ibid.* 59-60). The genealogical diagram, as an anthropological representation of pedigree, accomplishes the same feat: it visualises the underlying structure of genealogical relationships that normally outlives 'ego' and her or his kinship connections.

In Polynesia the trope of tree is not only associated with growth and infinity, but it also evokes the connotation of chieftainship or leadership. In Polynesian mythology, Tane is a deified ancestor who symbolizes trees, forests, birds and insects, but also light since he alone succeeded to create light by separating his parents Rangi, the skyfather, and Papa, the earth mother. It was not a coincidence that he managed to split Heaven from Earth since he occupied an intermediary position as the so-called father of the trees, which are rooted in the earth, but reach up into the sky as well (Schwimmer 1966: 15). Birds also live largely in the realm between earth and sky.

As father of forests and everything that inhabit them or that are constructed from trees, Tane could also be considered chief of chiefs. This may be inferred, among other things, from the fact that the *tapu* of the forest had to be preserved strictly. Thus, it was necessary to seek the aid of ritual specialists in order to propitiate the ancestor of the forest when a tree was felled to make a canoe or to build an ancestral community house. Both ancestral houses and

canoes were major symbols of chiefly authority. Ancestral houses are often named after a founding ancestor and were in the past mainly the house of the chief and his extended family (Van Meijl 1993). Canoes constitute the logical complement of the stump of the tree from which they have been carved. The relationship between canoe, symbol of mobility and rootlessness, and stump, symbol of stability and rootedness, is therefore a metaphor for the relationship between tribe and chief. In order to be kept under control, tribes need a chief, as canoes continue to require a stump to which they can be tied up when ashore (Van Meijl 1994). Being at the root of the tree from which canoes are carved, stumps invariably precede canoes and for that reason, too, they continue to play an essential role in the protection of the canoe.

The primacy of chiefly authority in the trope of tree is equivalent to the position of chiefs at the top in the metaphor of cone for Polynesian lineages. Both tropes imply a similar model of hierarchy in Polynesian socio-political organisation. This model of hierarchy may be described as either a ranked cone or a ramified tree in which a set of structural equivalents, such as older and younger siblings, chiefs and commoners, higher and lesser 'ramages' are all positioned on a continuous scale by means of the fundamental criterion of seniority of descent. The gradation of rank, however, is not simply a continuous progression since a qualitative disjunction is assumed to exist between chief and people, marked, among other things, by differential access to luxury items, by prescribed behaviour, and by distinctive ritual behaviour. The principle of seniority of descent which associates rank with proximity to the founding ancestor links Polynesian chiefs directly with deified ancestors or supernatural progenitors. Polynesian chiefs, then, have on the basis of the metaphors of cone and ramage long been regarded as high above the people or at the root of their 'ramages'. Even though it has always been recognized that Polynesian chiefdoms varied considerably in the degree to which differences in rank were formalized as distinct social strata, the underlying model of hierarchy has assumed to be applicable throughout the Pacific. However, since the metaphor of the model has largely preceded this interpretation, local variations in Polynesian hierarchy have, I argue, frequently been misunderstood. Below I will illustrate this argument with reference to Maori society which I here seek to analyse from the perspective of indigenous metaphors of hierarchy. My argument is that departing from indigenous metaphors of hierarchy might help to explain the ambiguity surrounding the structural hierarchy in some Polynesian societies, notably in that of the New Zealand Maori.

Socio-Political Organisation in Maori society

The Maori settled on the islands of New Zealand approximately 1000 years ago. In the course of time they multiplied and formed a society that was characterized by a complex structure of socio-political organisation. Over the years a *communis opinio* has emerged on a basic outline of Maori socio-political organisation. An ideal type of Maori socio-political organisation was first formulated by the New Zealand economist, later anthropologist, Raymond Firth (1959 [1929]) in his doctoral dissertation. Firth's model of Maori socio-political organisation has become authoritative among both European and Maori scholars (e.g. Ballara 1998, Buck 1949, Metge 1976, Kawharu 1977, Walker 1990 and Winiata 1967). Although some aspects of Firth's views have been criticized, particularly the lack of a historical perspective in his model (e.g. Van Meijl 1995, Webster 1998), his basic outline of Maori socio-political organisation has never been challenged and shall therefore be taken as point of departure for the following synopsis.

Kinship

According to Firth (1959 [1929]: 111) the smallest unit of Maori society was the *whaanau*, which term is commonly glossed as 'extended family'. *Whaanau* ranged through three or four generations and typically consisted of a man, his wife and their unmarried children, some of their married children (usually the sons), and the latter's spouses and children. Extended families often lived in unprotected villages called *kaainga*, which were generally located in close proximity to a tribal or sub-tribal stronghold (*paa*) in which they were allotted a separate section for sleeping, cooking and storing food and to which they moved in off-seasons as well as in times of war (Buck 1949: 137-40, 331-3; cf. Firth 1959 [1929]: 92, 113). Extended families exercised rights to land and its products and the apportionment of food was largely managed at their level. All in all, extended families managed their own social and economic affairs except when those affected village or (sub-)tribal policy (*ibid.* 111).

Firth (1959 [1929]: 111-2) pointed out that over the years many *whaanau* extended into kinship groups of the clan-type. As *whaanau* increased in numbers some groups were assumed to separate themselves after which they developed into autonomous *whaanau* while maintaining close links with their relations. The blood ties between members of different *whaanau* were expressed through the concept of *hapuu*. These kinship groupings occupied a common territory and defined itself by descent from an apical, often eponymous ancestor who had lived several generations ago.

As several *whaanau* constituted a *hapuu*, several *hapuu* made up a group linked together by descent of a relatively remote founder ancestor (Firth 1959 [1929]: 114). Groups at this level were called *iwi*, which also indicates a

relation of common descent. However, Firth (*ibid.* 139) argued that political and economic functions of *iwi* were restricted to an all-embracing over-right to the land within its borders. Its articulation as a kinship grouping stemmed according to him largely from the organisation of lavish feasts. Firth did not elaborate on the distinction between politico-economic and social functions of *iwi*, but the increasing importance of land following the wars of the 1820s and the alienation of land by European settlers probably contributed to his putting *iwi* at the core of his model.

The highest level of the tribal structure was, in the perspective set out by Firth (1959 [1929]: 115-6), formed by the *waka*, the ‘canoe’, consisting of various *iwi* which had emerged from ancestors who had reached the shores of Aotearoa in the same canoe. However, no co-operative form of government existed among them. They were purely based on the belief of common descent from the same ancestor(s). Descent thus was the root principle of the social organisation of Maori society.

Figure 1.

Kingroup terminology

<u>Maori term</u>	-	<u>Kingroup term</u>
<i>Whaanau</i>	-	extended family
<i>Hapuu</i>	-	ramage
<i>Iwi</i>	-	clan
<i>Waka</i>		phratry

Kinship Rules and Terms

Firth further described the dominant principles of the tribal organisation of Maori society as ambilateral affiliation and ambilineal descent. Approximately thirty years after his doctoral research he explained that he had introduced the term ambilateral as against bilateral to indicate that in Maori society affiliation was optative and that use of both parents was not automatic or necessary (Firth 1957b: 5; 1963: 32). He had called Maori *hapuu* ambilateral groups since both mother and father were eligible for kinship affiliation (Firth 1959 [1929]: 112). If the parents were of the same *hapuu*, children had a double qualification for affiliation to the *hapuu*. If the parents were of different *hapuu*, the children could affiliate to two *hapuu*. By the same token, males and females could figure in the same genealogical line. *Hapuu* were frequently composed of persons tracing their descent through a line of mixed male and female links. To describe this optative mechanism ‘for the maintenance of group continuity through the generations by using male or female links without set order’, Firth (1957 b: 6) proposed the term ambilineal.

In his published doctoral dissertation Firth (1959 [1929]: 112-3) hesitated to follow the custom of labelling the *hapuu* a 'clan', because in anthropology the term is normally reserved for exogamous, unilineal groups, while *hapuu* are ambilineal and practically endogamous. In addition, clans are commonly understood to be made up of several lineages, while *hapuu* are not. In his discussion of Polynesian descent groups in the late 1950s and early 1960s, therefore, Firth no longer defined the Maori *hapuu* at the same level as clan. He introduced the term 'ramage' to distinguish the Maori *hapuu* and other restricted ambilateral kin groups from unilineal descent groups generally referred to as lineages (*ibid.* 1957b: 6; 1963: 32). It is interesting to note here that this concept surreptitiously implied a specific view of hierarchy in Maori society that did not directly correspond with indigenous metaphors. In particular when the model and metaphor of ramage is extended from social organisation to political organisation this is rather problematic, which I will elaborate below.

In contrast to ramage or ramified lineages, clans are units of a higher order at which common descent is still assumed but all genealogical connections cannot necessarily be demonstrated (Fox 1967: 49). Although the concept of clan is generally reserved for unilineal descent groupings, for lack of a better term 'clan' may be used in reference to the Maori concept of *iwi*. The *waka*, a cluster of several 'clans' combined into a single grouping, may accordingly be termed a 'phratry' (*cf.* Keesing 1975: 31).

Chieftainship (or Leadership?)

In Firth's view (1959 [1929]: 106) descent not only structured the social organisation of Maori society, but also its political organisation. Maori political organisation was argued to parallel Maori social organisation. The position of chiefs in the hierarchical order of political organisation in Maori society was constructed as corresponding linearly to the structure of kinship groupings. Chiefs of higher rank were represented as drawing together a multitude of lower ranking chiefs and their followers, until all were encompassed and the aspired unity of the entire political alliance was achieved. While Firth set out the guidelines for this view of Maori political organisation, it was elaborated by the Maori anthropologist Maharaia Winiata (1956). For other Polynesian societies the same parallel between social and political organisation was drawn by Marshall Sahlins (1968: 24), when he refined his interpretation of the conical clan as the model of social organisation for political leadership in Polynesia.

The 'paramount chief' in Maori society was called the *ariki*. In his pedigree the senior lines of all tribal genealogies converged. Hence he was recognised as the head of the *iwi*. Senior *ariki* were in some situations distinguished as head of the *waka*. The chief of the *hapuu* or the *rangatira*

ranked lower than the paramount chief since he descended along junior lines. The head of the extended family was the *kaumaatua* or ‘(respected) elder’, recognised on account of his offspring as well as his age, wisdom and life-experience (Winiata 1967: 25-42).

Figure 2

Kingroup and leadership position

<i>waka</i>	-	senior <i>ariki</i>
<i>iwi</i>	-	<i>ariki</i>
<i>hapuu</i>	-	<i>rangatira</i>
<i>whaanau</i>	-	<i>kaumaatua</i>

Over the years this model of Maori socio-political organisation has become classic, but its association with a specific interpretation of hierarchy as structured from the top downwards or from the root upwards, which has been derived from the influential metaphors of conical clan and ramage have, to my knowledge, never been noted. As a corollary, the important assumption regarding the so-called segmented structure of hierarchy in which either the top or the bottom was viewed as prime junction of the entire society has never been addressed, even though it underlay the development of this model of Maori social and political organisation by Raymond Firth and its further expansion by particularly Peter Buck and Maharaia Winiata. It goes without saying, therefore, that an epistemological reflection on the theoretical implications of this model and its metaphors is long overdue.

Interpreting Maori Metaphors

The main problem with the interpretation of hierarchy in Maori society arises from the translation of vernacular Maori concepts of socio-political organisation. Since Firth it has become accepted to translate the Maori concept of *iwi*, literally ‘bone’ or ‘people’, as ‘tribe’. The term ‘tribe’, however, suggests it constituted the core of Maori society and normally it also implies a coherence that exceeded the affinal ties within *iwi*, at least until well after colonial contact began. It is now widely assumed that the composition of tribes, both in pre- and post-contact years, used to be rather disjunct and flexible. As corporate groups *iwi* are even likely to be a post-colonial development (Ballara 1998).

Since the beginning of this century the translation of two other Maori concepts of social organisation has also been derived from the current translation of *iwi* as ‘tribe’. *Hapuu* is usually glossed as ‘sub-tribe’, even though Firth himself consistently used *hapuu* in the Maori vernacular, while *waka*, or ‘canoe’, is usually represented as ‘super-tribe’. However, both are quite

inaccurate characterizations of the forms of Maori organisations they are supposed to express.

Figure 3

Translations of Maori kingroups

<u>Maori term</u>	<u>Usual translation</u>	<u>Literal translation</u>
<i>Whaanau</i>	extended family	‘to give birth’
<i>Hapuu</i>	sub-tribe	‘pregnancy’
<i>Iwi</i>	tribe	‘bone(s)’; ‘people’
<i>Waka</i>	super-tribe	‘canoe’

Waka invariably appear to have operated as loosely structured confederations of tribes, between which the link was probably more sentimental than political (Van Meijl 1995). As early as 1949 Buck (1949: 336) even suggested that *waka* are likely to have been galvanized by post-colonial developments as well. Against this background the concept of ‘super-tribe’ seems a gross exaggeration of the symbolic meaning of *waka* in social and political practices.

The term ‘sub-tribe’ is also a misleading translation of *hapuu* as it suggests that it concerns a mere sub-group of a larger encompassing ‘tribe’ (Metge 1986: 37). However, the *hapuu* is likely to have been the central unit of social action in Maori society as nineteenth century ethnography shows that members of the same *hapuu* did not only live in or around a common fortified village, but also that they worked together for most purposes, both economic and ceremonial (Best 1941 [1924], I: 338ff.; Firth 1959 [1929]: 113). The central position of *hapuu* in Maori society is reflected in the literal meaning of *hapuu* as ‘pregnancy’, which primarily represents the idea of birth from a common ancestor (Buck 1949: 333). At the same time, however, the literal meaning of ‘pregnancy’ also expresses a ‘genesis from within’ and thus indicates the precedence of the *hapuu* over other groups (cf. Schwimmer 1978: 211; 1990).

In this context, it is interesting that other vernacular Maori concepts of social organisation are also based on metaphors of birth and growth, which is relevant for the interpretation of the inter-relationships between the various groupings. The literal meaning of the concept of *whaanau*, for example, is ‘to give birth’, while *iwi* should be translated literally as ‘bone(s)’ or ‘people’. In consequence of the original meaning of these vernacular concepts it may be argued that *hapuu* probably ‘carried’ a responsibility for all their members, including all *whaanau* members who were affiliated to it. The literal meanings

of ‘pregnancy’ (*hapuu*) and ‘to give birth’ (*whaanau*) clarify in other words the centrality or precedence of *hapuu* in the social organisation of Maori society.

Indeed, departing from the metaphors associated with the vernacular concepts used to express various kinship clusters in Maori society generates a different structure of the socio-political hierarchy. It is not necessarily anchored at the top, as in the conical clan, or rooted at the bottom, as in the metaphor of ramage, but instead it is constructed from a central point in the middle from which it develops outwardly. People are conceived in *hapuu*, born in *whaanau*, which in turn engender *iwi* or related ‘people’, who collectively travel on the same *waka* or ‘canoe’.

This model of Maori social organisation is paralleled by a similar model of political organisation that in the vernacular is also mainly expressed through metaphors related to birth and growth. Thus, it is interesting to note that the concept of *ariki* in Proto-Oceanic language meant literally ‘little one’ or ‘the little person’, while it referred specifically to the first-born son of the A-raha, literally ‘great one’ or ‘the big person’ (Pawley 1982: 40). The concept of *rangatira*, on the other hand, is according to Williams (1971 [1844]) derived from *ranga*, literally ‘to raise’, ‘to cast up’, ‘to set in motion’ or ‘to perform’; and *tira*, meaning a ‘file (of men)’, a ‘row’ or a ‘company of travellers’. *Rangatira*, then, is the only exception to the use of birth metaphors for positions in Maori socio-political organisations. Its literal meaning, however, is not less significant since it reflects the organising tasks of so-called secondary ‘chiefs’ and thus simultaneously exemplifies that status in Maori society was not only ascribed by birth, but also had to be achieved (see further below). The literal meaning of *rangatira* is also consistent with ethnohistorical evidence which suggests that *rangatira* not only held authority and control, but also had responsibilities, duties and obligations. For that reason, too, it has already been suggested in another context that the received translation of ‘chief’ is not correct, and that the term could perhaps better be translated as ‘leader’ (Waitangi Tribunal 1998: 214). The etymology of the third type of leader in Maori society is again directly related to the metaphors of birth and growth underlying most other terms: *kaumaatuu* literally means ‘grown up’, ‘adult’, ‘old man or woman’. Hence, *kaumatua* were traditionally not junior chiefs but they were distinguished in extended families as *pater familias*.

My argument now is that these metaphors clarify why in the office of Maori chiefs no autocratic power resided, compared to the absolute rule of chiefs in other Polynesian societies, such as Hawai’i, Fiji, Tonga and the Society Islands. In those countries the chief was a kind of ‘stranger-king’ who stood outside or above society (Sahlins 1985a: 73-103), while Maori chiefs

were first and foremost seen as representatives of the people or simply as leaders of tribal communities in external affairs (Sahlins 1985*b*). The balanced authority of Maori chiefs and leaders has long been misunderstood since the metaphors of conical clan and ramage were underlying the interpretation of hierarchy in New Zealand. The structure of hierarchy in Maori society is, however, relatively ambiguous and its dynamics are far from unilineal /1/.

Ambiguity and Maori Hierarchy

In Maori ideology one of the main principles of organisation was primogeniture, usually in the male line. It guided the hierarchical ranking of kinship groupings, for example, as segments of the tribal organisation were ranked according to the position of the patriarch in relation to his brothers. As the older always ranked above the younger, so the descendants of the older ranked above those of the younger. By the same token, senior chiefs had a higher status than junior chiefs. This structure of hierarchy was not unlike other Polynesian societies, but in New Zealand it was qualified in various ways.

Although in Maori society senior descent was undoubtedly the most important precondition for leadership, the optative kinship system, in which affiliation and descent could pass through ambilateral and ambilineal lines, offered ample opportunities to manipulate genealogies. It provided those of junior rank with avenues to climb the ladder of leaders of senior ranking descent groups and overcome their inherited inferiority. Thus leadership in Maori society cannot simply be characterized as based on ascription (Mahuika 1977). For ascribed rank to be translated into effective political influence, high ranking chiefs had to demonstrate personal skills: lower ranking chiefs could outdo them.

Achievement also complemented the principles of birth and sex in the establishment of social grades in traditional Maori society. Those of chiefly descent were termed *rangatira*, in this context meaning 'aristocrats' /2/. Those of junior rank or whose ancestors had diminished their prestige were regarded as 'commoners' (*ware* or *tuutuuaa*). The social differentiation between those of chiefly descent and men of lower rank, however, was not marked in a salient way. The aristocrats were set off from the rest of society predominantly to direct and guide, rather than to rule. The organizing tasks of aristocrats and chiefs is reflected in the original meaning of *rangatira* as mentioned above: 'to set in motion - a file of men'. The restricted authority of aristocrats over the so-called commoners can in part also be explained by the genealogical connections between them, entailing the usual rights and mutual obligations of kin (Winiata 1967: 29). They also implied that all commoners could claim to be related, in some degree, to the ones of chiefly rank. Best [1941, I: 346] even remarked that

during his long contact with the Tuhoe people he never met a Maori who would admit that he belonged to the class of commoners /3/.

Slaves no doubt held the lowest status of all. Most slaves were captives in times of war and very often their capture was undertaken to solve a labour problem. Although the physical condition of slaves was not abysmal, they were under the control of the chiefs (Winiata 1967: 29-30). As such, it was the worst fate that could befall one. Slaves were outcasts and they did not even enter into the social grades of a tribe. The stigma attached to slavery was very severe. However, slavery in pre-European Maori society should not be exaggerated as slaves were apparently few in number (Vayda 1960: 107).

In summary, then, it can be said that, on the one hand, the socio-political organisation in traditional Maori society was distinctly hierarchical. Both in the order of kinship and in the political organisation, lower levels of the hierarchical structure were encompassed in higher ranking segments which supposedly re-united the kinship groupings of a more junior status and their respective chiefs. The culmination of all dimensions of socio-political organisation in the ultimate position of paramount chief, made him a potentially powerful figure in tribal politics.

All ethnographic and historical analyses of Maori political organisation have shown, on the other hand, that the power of paramount chiefs was relatively limited (Winiata 1967). Chiefs not only had to achieve and actualize the potentiality for power ascribed to them by birth, but the authority of chiefs also came more from the group than from the chiefs' position in the hierarchical structure. In New Zealand the authority of tribes was vested in chiefs, but the *mana* common to kinship groups and their land was only represented by a chief insofar as it extended back into the land and his tribe (Johansen 1954: 90-1). For that reason, too, the structural authority of paramount chiefs was countered by a subaltern view portraying them simply as tribal representatives in order to ensure that chiefs would not become detached from their tribal communities. This anti-hierarchical ideology, in turn, was reinforced by the fact that in the structural hierarchy of Maori socio-political organisation all lower ranking kinship groupings and their respective chiefs retained their autonomy (Walker 1987: 155-6). Thus, there can be no doubt that Maori chiefs were far from absolute rulers. The concept of *rangatiratanga*, often (mis-)translated as 'chieftainship', would indeed be rendered more accurately as 'authority' (Waitangi Tribunal 1988: 174).

The ambivalent relationship between chiefs and tribes has been expressed poignantly in a saying about the metaphors of stump and the canoe: *ko te tumu herenga waka*, 'it is the stump to which the canoe is tied' (see also Van Meijl

1994). As canoes are valued more highly than stumps, tribes, too, are commonly valued more highly than chiefs, and the aphorism is usually cited to emphasize that the chief is merely an extension of the tribe. Thus the high status of chiefs above tribes in the hierarchical organisation of Maori society, is inverted in an anti-hierarchical ideology. The analogy between chief and stump implies that the structural status of chiefs ranks unequivocally above that of tribal communities, but Maori interpretations of the aphorism illustrate that the superior ranking of chiefs coexists with a representation of the relationship between chiefs and tribes as one in which tribes are believed to be in full command of their chiefly representatives. Not infrequently the relationship between chiefs and tribes is even viewed as an asymmetrical alliance in which tribes command their chiefs. The popular interpretation of the dictum of the stump and the canoe illustrates this insofar as it opposes the superior ranking of chiefs.

In view of the co-existence of a structural hierarchy with an anti-hierarchical ideology the socio-political organisation of Maori society could be described, following Dumont (1980: 239), as characterized by 'the encompassing of the contrary' /4/. The socio-political structure of Maori society is segmented into an hierarchy of tribal groupings and chiefs, the senior ones of which structurally encompass the lower ranking units and chiefs. In contradistinction to the metaphor of conical clan and its pyramidal model of hierarchical stratification, however, lower ranking units retain, to some extent, their independence in spite of their encompassment at higher levels. The relative autonomy of lower ranking tribes and chiefs within the encompassing hierarchy, in turn, allows the development of an anti-hierarchical ideology in which junior chiefs and their communities rather than senior chiefs are in command. The ideology of egalitarianism functions to balance the structural asymmetry between chiefs and tribes, although hierarchical values ultimately prevail over the anti-hierarchical ideology. Tribal communities may be able to put some reciprocal restraints on the power of chiefs, but the anti-hierarchical ideology which is developed at the lower levels of the hierarchical organisation is not structurally anchored. Contrary viewpoints may be developed but remain encompassed, so to speak, and therefore Dumont's view of hierarchy provides an adequate description of Maori socio-political organisation.

Dumont has elaborated his axiom of 'the encompassing of the contrary' exclusively with reference to relationships of opposition, e.g purity-impurity, priest-king, status-power, male-female, left-right. His concept of encompassment might therefore not at first sight concur with the part-whole relationship between lower and higher ranking tribes and chiefs in Maori

society, in which the lower echelons remain independent in some situations. For that reason, it is important to point out that Dumont (*ibid.* 240) has described the phrase ‘the contrary’ ambiguously as either ‘distinct from the set’ or ‘in opposition to it’, thus leaving open the possibility of a mere distinction between elements and ensemble. This interpretation makes it also suitable for the analysis of the inherently ambiguous form of Maori hierarchy. In Maori society inferior levels of the hierarchical organisation were normally distinguished as autonomous units, but in line with the anti-hierarchical ideology they could also be opposed to their superior levels, for example, in the exceptional circumstances of warfare or severe economic competition. Thus, autonomy in one context could coexist with opposition in another.

Dumont’s model of hierarchy as a form of encompassment of the contrary appears appropriate since it provides a metaphor that describes the ambivalent relationship between lower and higher ranking kingroups in Maori society, as well as between junior and senior chiefs, more adequately than the metaphors of conical clan and ramage. The problem with these latter metaphors is their assumption of a unilineal relationship between top and bottom, or, alternatively, between root and stem, in spite of the branches. A unilineal analysis of Maori socio-political organisation, however, only partially represents internal relationships between lower and higher ranking kingroups and chiefs. After all, in practice internal relationships are not only streamlined from the top of the cone or the root of the stem, but at the same time they are countered by oppositional streams from the bottom of the cone back towards the top or from the top of the tree back to the stump. And these contradicting tendencies are to be taken into account in order to explain the inherent ambiguity in Maori hierarchy.

Another reason why Dumont’s model of hierarchy as encompassment of the contrary is suitable for the analysis of Maori socio-political organisation is intertwined with the similarity between his metaphor and the Maori metaphors on the basis of which hierarchy is structured. Encompassment and pregnancy are both constructed around the notion of envelopment. In addition, it seems obvious that ‘pregnancy’ is not infinitive and therefore logically followed by ‘birth’, and consecutively, by ‘bones’ or ‘people’, who, in turn, may become pregnant again. The circularity that is an inherent part of Maori metaphors of birth and growth concerning Maori social and political organisation evokes not only the association of continuity but also of communication between people that is not only one-sided. Contrasting views do have a chance to emerge and be expressed, even though they may be absorbed or encompassed. Their mere

existence, however, makes for internal relationships that are intrinsically and perpetually ambiguous.

The interpretation of Maori hierarchy as ambiguous, as circular, as encompassing the contrary, is also reflected in the conception of unity or *kotahitanga*, literally ‘oneness’, that was constructed to keep the confederated ‘canoes’ together (Metge 1976: 71). After all, the Maori conception of unity does not necessarily involve the blotting out of all differences, which is exemplified in the constitution of kinship groupings. In the step-by-step model of social organisation different *whaanau* united in one *hapuu* apropos other *hapuu*, while different *hapuu* converged in one tribe apropos other tribes, up to the echelon of the *waka*, but within the all-encompassing tribal confederation each group retained its own autonomy. Likewise lower ranking chiefs were outstripped by senior chiefs, but never at the expense of their autonomous rule over their own kinship groups. Metge (*ibid.* xii-xiii) has therefore argued that in the Maori worldview ‘unity and diversity do not necessarily contradict and at best involve each other: unity discovered in diversity, diversity transcended in unity’.

The coexistence of unity in the higher ranks and diversity in the lower ranks of the hierarchical structure of organisation is also expressed in the metaphor *rautahi*, “‘an hundred” (*rau*) and “one” (*tahi*)’, ‘many yet also one’. The notion of *rautahi* is often cited as a charter, not only for internal relationships within Maori tribes or even within Maoridom at large, but also between all Maoris and Europeans within New Zealand (*ibid.* xii). In this sense the Maori conception of unity is strikingly similar to Dumont’s conception of hierarchy in terms of encompassment of the contrary. In Maori society lower segments of the kinship organisation are not simply included at higher levels, as according to the classical models of segmentary stratification based on the metaphors of cone or ramage. Maori kinship units, instead, are included in the confederated canoes, while they remain simultaneously excluded and develop an anti-hierarchical ideology to substantiate their claims to autonomy. By the same token, junior chiefs never lose their independence over certain matters directly related to their kingroup, not even to paramount chiefs.

Concluding Remarks


In this paper I have demonstrated that hierarchy in Maori society has long been misunderstood since it was analysed as a Polynesian society that on the basis of a typology of leadership was contrasted with Melanesian societies. The stereotype of leadership in Polynesia was expressed through the metaphor of conical clan or ramage, in which seniority of descent classified senior chiefs at the top of the cone or the root of the tree. These metaphors, however, did not

leave sufficient space to take into account that hierarchy in Maori society is rather ambiguous, that lower ranking groups and chiefs retain their autonomy and may therefore develop views that sometimes oppose higher ranking groups or paramount chiefs. This ambiguity may be done justice in anthropological analysis when the analysis of socio-political organisation departs not from etic metaphors that are embedded in academic discourses, but from metaphors that are associated with indigenous concepts expressing kinship and leadership. Then it appears that the dynamics of Maori socio-political organisation are not initiated at the top or the bottom, but in the middle. Chiefs did not stand at any side, neither above nor below, but as ‘first-born’ or ‘little ones’ they were encompassed by their surrounding communities. As Oppenheim (1973: 105) phrased it, chiefs ‘did not stand at the apex of a hierarchy of command but rather in the position of *primus inter pares*’. For that reason, too, leader would be a better term than chief. Their position was similar to the leader of a Maori ‘culture group’ performing traditional Maori arts. Normally they are part of the group. Only to ensure a simultaneous rhythm of the group or to speak out on their behalf occasionally a cultural leader may briefly step aside. Another apt metaphor to express this delicate relationship may be provided by the Russian nesting dolls, the *matriosjkas*. The *ariki*, the ‘little one’, is best represented by the smallest puppet inside since without the surrounding larger puppets the tiniest has no right of existence.

NOTES

/1/ A similar argument has been made by Glenn Petersen (1999) for the Caroline Islands, but he develops his point in a very different manner, that is without reference to Dumont and his notion of encompassment. His interpretation of the conical clan in Micronesia was, moreover, criticized by Hage (2000)

/2/ *Rangatira* is a relational term. On the one hand, *rangatira* is to be understood in relation to *ariki* and *kaumaatua*, both being leaders on an upper and a lower level respectively (1). On the other hand, *rangatira* must be conceived of as the class of aristocrats in a dominant relationship to the ‘commoners’ (2).



/3/ Likewise, the arch-missionary Samuel Marsden observed that Maori society only comprised two classes, rangatira and slaves (Elder 1932: 118). See also Goldman (1970: 42-3).

/4/ The Maori form of hierarchy has also been recognized as one of 'encompassment' by Schrempp (1985: 26). See also Marcus (1989: 191).

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ALTERNATIVE CIVILIZATIONS: HETERARCHIES, CORPORATE POLITIES, AND ORTHODOXIES

Within the last decade or two, archaeologists have realized that the most “complex” of ancient societies were not always the most hierarchical ones. Recently in fact, early-state hierarchies have been said to be “simplifications” of *heterarchical* complexity (Brumfiel 1995). Simplification, in this sense, was the organization of unranked people and places into legitimized dominant-subordinate relationships. Hierarchy simplified social relationships by making them predictable. It reduced the diversity of cultural practices, political interests, and identities into a narrower range of behavior, governance, and ethnicity.

We contend that such simplifications of heterarchies are at the heart of all civilizations past and present. Yet, we further contend that such simplifications—like civilizations themselves—are not merely top-down political phenomena. They did not just happen because a politician willed them into being. No, such simplifications were—and always are—*cultural* constructions, cultural orders, orthodoxies, “ideological projects,” or “hegemonies” that, following Antonio Gramsci (1971), were collective “negotiations” of the divergent practices and dispositions of multiple groups. That is, what the non-elite did or did not do mattered greatly, more than students of ancient civilizations typically acknowledge. Of course, the dominant-subordinate relationships so constructed were never complete, but were shot through with dissension, compromise, and hidden resistance.

Take, for instance, the prehispanic Aztec empire. Aztec hegemony between AD 1300-1519, according to Elizabeth Brumfiel (1991), was very clearly contingent on the diverse and gendered cultural practices of ordinary imperial subjects. That is, domestic practices—specifically cooking and weaving—were active means whereby Indian women accommodated and resisted Aztec power.

Or take, as another instance, the African-American slaves of southern plantations. More than the Aztec women, these slaves were subjected to severe controls over bodily movements and basic physiological functions. Nonetheless, they created spaces within plantations wherein they actively

constructed non-European culinary, architectural, sexual, and technological traditions, albeit hidden from the eyes of their oppressors (Singleton 1995). These constructions, like the resistant or compliant actions of Aztec-Indian women, were important constitutive elements of the histories of Mexico and the United States, respectively. The demography, economy, and polity of each respective nation-state today cannot be understood in its entirety without some reference to these “unofficial” histories (see Pauketat and Loren 2005).

There is little reason to believe that the histories of ancient civilizations in the Americas were any less complex and contingent than the Aztec and African-American examples, meaning that archaeologists need to examine closely the unofficial social and cultural histories of ancient civilizations if we hope to identify and explain the commonalities of the civilizing process. For our present purposes, we begin to examine the histories of what we might think of as North America’s “alternative” civilizations: three well-known, pre-Columbian archaeological complexes—Poverty Point, Chaco Canyon, and Cahokia (Figure 1). In their own way, each of these very different and historically unrelated complexes points to our principal conclusion: the construction of order and orthodoxy from heterarchical complexity—that is, simplification—was a process of collective compromise and negotiation of diverse routine practices and cultural dispositions. As Poverty Point, Chaco, and Cahokia bear out, these compromises and negotiations were experiential, *lived* by all people through traditional routines and practices memorialized during great collective gatherings at central sites.

Others have labeled each of these “corporate polities,” using the words of so-called dual-processual theory (Blanton et al. 1996). However, we recognize that all polities were, in varying ways, corporate, and seek instead to understand *how* corporation, in a sense, was lived and memorialized such that polities resulted as an aspect of the civilizing process. We shall begin with the ancient complex of Poverty Point and then turn to Chaco Canyon before examining in greater detail the largest of all North American archaeological phenomena, Cahokia.

NORTH AMERICAN CASE STUDIES

Poverty Point, Louisiana

The Poverty Point site and a series of other mounded centers in or adjacent to northeastern Louisiana are said to have been associated with a distinctive “Archaic” period culture between about 1600-1300 BC (Gibson 2000). At one time or another, various researchers thought that the site of Poverty Point and its various outlier complexes constituted anomalous

chiefdom-level phenomena. A two- and possibly three-tiered settlement hierarchy seems evident, centered on large sites surrounded by smaller habitation sites. At the same time, other archaeologists see the Poverty Point site and its outliers as indicative of an unusual egalitarian society, an exceptionally successful hunter-gatherer adaptation to a lush environment. The tension between these two views is interesting, and we think is telling of an ancient tension between (or ambiguity regarding) polity and community.

The largest type-site, Poverty Point itself, is unique in North America—a concentric series of loaf-shaped ridge mounds surrounding a central open ground itself approximately 500 meters across. Behind the site's concentric mounds was a 21 meter-high tumulus thought to have been constructed in the shape of a bird. Other large mounds were situated in the distance. With its open isles between the ridge mounds and its open plaza-like center, the Poverty Point site has all the hallmarks of a grand amphitheatre. Some have speculated that lodges atop the ridge mound and their inhabitants may have been ranked, with higher status groups located closer to the central open plaza. This possibility is especially noteworthy given the types of artifacts and production debris that litter the ridge mounds.

In fact, a defining feature of Poverty Point and other Poverty Point-culture sites is the prevalence of chipped-stone and groundstone ornaments, tools, containers, and magico-ritual objects made from exotic novaculite, quartz crystal, chert, quartzite, galena, copper, hematite, slate, steatite, and greenstone, along with a variety of other locally derived materials. These materials, originating from as far away as the lower Ohio Valley, the Ouachita Mountains in Arkansas, and the south Appalachians in Alabama and Georgia, were made into zoomorphs, beads, pendants, plummets, stone bowls, and abstract forms at the Poverty Point site and its outliers. The bird of prey embodied by the large mound at Poverty Point also seems depicted in other media at the site. There are some hints of object segregation on the ridge mounds, and some hints that craft debris, including microlithic tools, was not uniformly distributed across the site.

Yet, while there is ample evidence of the consumption of exotic raw materials at and around Poverty Point, evidence that finished Poverty Point products were widely redistributed is not apparent. The microlithic tools, for instance, are testimony to pervasive lapidary practices in the making of stone ornaments and fetishes on site. These tools and the objects made using them, apparently, were not only made by local Poverty Point people but were, importantly, retained by or circulated within these same Poverty Point communities (Pauketat 2003).

More important for our present point, especially given the amphitheatre layout of Poverty Point, is the fact that the predominant forms of material culture at Poverty-Point-era sites are the most mundane: the baked-clay objects thought to have been made for use in food preparation through stone-boiling. The common explanation of these objects has been that, given the lithic-poor coastal plain in which the Poverty Point people of northeastern Louisiana found themselves, residents had to manufacture cooking stones for cooking purposes. Most importantly, however, these objects are not only prevalent at central sites, but they were sometimes decorated with abstract, zoomorphic, or botanical imagery. Poverty Point people made and decorated them, we deduce, to be seen. The objects were meaningful and the people used them, we infer, in the cooking of foods for ritual feasts held in the amphitheatre-like spaces of Poverty Point and its outliers.

Chaco Canyon, New Mexico

In order to explore the implications of this further, let us turn to northwestern New Mexico, to a unique “Puebloan” cultural complex dating to about AD 900-1130. In an arid environmental setting quite unlike the lush Mississippi valley, there appeared a series of large town sites with a characteristic construction style and occupational history. Centered in Chaco Canyon, these sites included a series of more than a dozen of the largest “Great Houses” known in the American Southwest. The population of Chaco Canyon has been estimated at only between 2000 to 4000 people, but the layout of the Canyon suggests a dispersed “cityscape” to Steve Lekson (1999). Certainly, the layout of some of the largest multi-storied Great Houses, here Pueblo Bonito, bears some surface resemblances in its amphi-theatre-like layout to the more ancient and historically unrelated Poverty Point site. The entire array of Great Houses in the canyon, however, was arranged with respect to a central axis and astronomical alignments (Farmer 1999).

So, perhaps we might envision the Chacoan phenomenon as an analogous albeit exaggerated version of Poverty Point culture to the extent that Chaco Canyon’s elaborate Great Houses—their sacred inner “Great Kivas,” labor-intensive masonry constructions, and extensive storage rooms—are at the center of an expansive web of “outliers” connected by roads, trails, and signal stations. Chaco culture covered the entire American Southwest. This expansiveness itself has proven to be problematic, some seeing Chaco Canyon as the epi-center of a veritable Puebloan civilization and other, more-conservative-minded archaeologists seeing Chaco Canyon as merely one local expression of a pan-regional Puebloan “communalism” without hierarchy. Again, the tension

between archaeological interpretations of this apparent laterally extensive and yet regionally centralized phenomenon may well be indicative of a singular pre-Columbian “political community” where polity and community were nearly inseparable at the scale of the cultural region.

That all people determined the historical shape of this greater political community is recognizable as the different construction histories and configurations of the Great Houses in and beyond Chaco Canyon. Perhaps like Poverty Point, the complete array of Chacoan-style architectural traits is found in Chaco Canyon proper, but outlier sites—although identifiable as “Chacoan”—had different plans, construction histories, and functions. That is, the larger cultural order was composed of diverse local histories. Chacoan-ness was apparently being interpreted differently in every locality. Is this unique to the American Southwest? Or is this the same phenomenon—the civilizing process—that Appadurai (1996) also argues underlies globalization today?

At Chaco, we can gain some insight into how “localization” can be seen as part of the civilizing process by looking to the elaborately crafted objects made from exotic raw materials or, as commonly, exotic raw materials or exotic animals found amidst the Great Houses, Great Kivas, and walled mounds of Chaco Canyon proper, some with seemingly high-status burials (Lekson 1999).

Some have inferred that a prestige-goods economy might have been the means whereby these few high-status individuals in Chaco Canyon mobilized labor for the periodic Great House or Great Kiva constructions. However, most archaeologists emphasize the public, communal dimension of this anomalous Puebloan social experiment that is clearly difficult to ignore. Certainly, among the construction debris in the platform mounds in front of Pueblo Bonito is evidence of communal feasts, indicating episodes of substantial community-wide and probably region-wide construction events and labor coordination in the canyon (Lekson 1999). Clearly, people from across the Southwest attended and participated in these events. The potential for politicizing traditions, constructing new identities, and inventing new traditions in such liminal ritual contexts seems great. Again like Poverty Point, the communal seems difficult to dissociate from the political.

Cahokia, Illinois

We might examine that potential best by turning to our final case, the Cahokian phenomenon in the central Mississippi valley. Here, at the largest settlement complex in North America, we see that the institutions of governance did not evolve slowly (Pauketat 2004). There is little indication of a significant population density or institutionalized hierarchy before AD 1050.

Instead, we have established that the founding moment of Cahokia at around AD 1050 was explosive, collaborative, and all-inclusive such that the monumental spaces of Cahokia were built by and, over the succeeding century and a half, experienced by many different status-based, kin-based, and gendered groups.

This is readily evident in the central spaces of Cahokia. A constructed 19-hectare plaza occupied the center of a series of lesser and contiguous pyramid-and-plaza groups, thought by some to represent distinctive kin, ethnic, or clan groupings who attached themselves to the great center. In the central plaza, or in the lesser plazas, there is evidence of theatrical performances attended by thousands of people at and shortly after AD 1050.

For instance, there were giant all-inclusive feasts of thousands of people, seen in the refuse of the so-called sub-Mound 51 pit (Pauketat et al. 2002). In this pit were the stratified remains of several late-summer or early autumn feasts. Extrapolating from excavated samples, we know that hundreds to thousands of white-tailed deer, hundreds to thousands of pumpkins, squash, and berries, and a variety of large fish and bird delicacies were consumed in thousands of pots, probably discarded at the end of each feast. With the refuse of such feasts is mixed an assemblage of political-religious paraphernalia such as shell-bead necklaces and crystals, aromatic ritual red cedar wood, human bones (perhaps those of ancestors), and the densest deposit of nicotine-rich tobacco seeds known in North America. The paraphernalia, human bones, and perhaps even tobacco were probably kept in storage buildings and temples located atop the earthen pyramids. From the homes atop the mound summits, elites presumably watched the rituals and monitored the daily lives of the site's 10,000 or so residents.

At the same time, between AD 1050 and 1200, there were a series of public highly ritualized mortuary events that included the burials of principal people along with mass executions. Among the executions in the single best documented of 10 mortuary mounds, known as Mound 72, excavators found the remains of more than 100 women buried in 4 rectangular pits (Pauketat 2004). In the largest of pits were found the remains of 53 women whose bones, not incidentally, have distinctive carbon and nitrogen isotopic signatures. Unlike the principals, these women had been raised on a diet relatively rich in maize but poor in meat, which in the Cahokia region included the largest terrestrial animal, the white-tailed deer. Along with other so-called "ritual" killings—such as these young-adult men and women—one gets the distinct impression that executions were public if not highly theatrical affairs, occurring just a few

hundred meters away from the plaza feasts previously described (Emerson and Pauketat 2002).

Who were these sacrificial victims? Recently discovered farming villages 10 to 30 kilometers away from Cahokia shed light on the identity of the executed victims of Cahokia and on the political history of the greater Cahokia region. Contemporary with the theatrical feasts and death rites of Cahokia, this series of outlying farming villages was founded at AD 1050. Judging from pottery styles, house-construction practices, and the organization of settlement spaces, these sites were comprised of re-settled local and immigrant farmers. A high density of farming tools and spindle whorls, the highest known in the greater Cahokia region, is associated with these settlements (Alt 1999, 2001).

Indeed, recent isotopic studies of cook-pot residues strongly suggest that these re-settled farmers intensively cultivated maize. Interestingly, in the courtyards of some villages, such as this one 15 km away from Cahokia, the everyday practices of the resettled and immigrant farmers appear variously to emulate, avoid, or hybridize Cahokian practices. And yet these were the people who had probably helped construct the unprecedented earthen pyramids, plazas, and pole-and-thatch architecture of Cahokia in the decades following 1050. Quite possibly, women from these villages may have been taken for the grime death rituals of Cahokia.

The scale of monument-building and the periodicity of pyramid construction, well-documented in the sequential construction fills of a number of pyramids are testimony to the participation of masses of people now building earthen pyramids in ways unlike preceding periods in the eastern Woodlands. Indeed, one might say that the monuments of Cahokia, its residential areas, its outlying settlements, even its artifacts betray *organized diversity*, a re-imagining of community as polity, and an invention or re-invention of traditions (Pauketat 2004).

What we mean by organized diversity may be seen in the layout of the central administrative-residential complex, the sprawling array of pyramids and residential areas that extends for several kilometers along an oxbow lake well beyond the city limits of Cahokia. Just a few kilometers to the west are two multiple pyramid-and-plaza groups and neighborhoods coeval with those of Cahokia, suggestive of heterarchical complexity at the top of the region's settlement hierarchy, and bespeaking an agglomerative mode of the social-demographic coming-together process that formed Cahokia at AD 1050. We have argued elsewhere that this process can hardly be explained as an internal-evolutionary development; rather, the apparent "hybridity" of the central landscape and the many outliers is testimony to the fact that the agency of

farmers, complicit or resistant, mattered in the ever-negotiated construction of a composite Cahokian cultural order or, in Gramsci's terms, hegemony (in the sense of Alt 2001; Pauketat 2004).

CONCLUSIONS

Cahokia is the largest and most hierarchical of our three North American cases. However, even in its large scale and high degree of centrality, we may observe three historical qualities also seen at Poverty Point and Chaco Canyon. First is the evidence of heterarchy and organized diversity. The site of Cahokia, and the nearby residential sprawl, is vast and consists of multiple pyramid-and-plaza modules that replicate the appearance of others. There are large residential complexes within the 30 square kilometers or so of the central political-administrative complex. There are other lesser towns scattered beyond in the region's 500-plus-square kilometers.

The same is easily noted for Chaco Canyon, with its array of contiguous but diverse Great Houses scattered along a 2-to-3 kilometer wide band that covers some 50 square kilometers. The same may have also characterized Poverty Point and its outliers, although less clear than the other two. In the case of Cahokia, we infer that the sprawling complex of pyramid-and-plaza and residential spaces is actually indicative of a complex heterarchical array of people and places that extended even into the distant rural countryside, where farmers were nonetheless active participants—willingly or not—of the Cahokian behemoth.

The second historical quality of the three case studies is the fact that each North American complex appears to have been a conflation of polity and community, an active promotion—which is to say *politicization*—of community by community members, a theatrical and monumental memorialization of some collective or corporate memories that were probably perceived to be consistent with ancient traditions—bird symbolism in a great mound at Poverty Point, a distinctive masonry construction at Chaco, or ancestor veneration at Cahokia.

Members of the public were actively engaged in celebrating the past, which is the third historical quality: communal participation in centralizing, legitimizing, and essentially *simplifying* social relations. This process was repetitive, public, and theatrical. In every case, large-scale cooking and feasting was all-important at central sites—baked-clay cooking objects at Poverty Point, food remains and construction debris at Chaco, and great feasts with political-religious accoutrements and tobacco-smoking at Cahokia.

Of course, in so celebrating, the peoples of each case study quite clearly changed history. The net effect of such active participative promotion was an expansive regional or pan-regional phenomenon that exceeds the scale of many chiefdoms, city-states, and some formative territorial states worldwide. The net effect may or may not have been perceived as hierarchy by certain participants at some point in time. That is, there may have been an ancient uncertainty over the interpretation of what was going on at Poverty Point, Chaco, and Cahokia just as there is today among archaeologists interpreting each North American complex.

Whether or not Poverty Point, Chaco Canyon, and Cahokia were hierarchical societies just like, say, early states in other parts of the world, they were certainly hierarchies-in-the-making. They were undergoing the process of simplification, even if fully simplified hierarchical societies were never realized. In some ways, horizontal scale for instance, the North American cases were much more expansive than other Old and New World chiefdoms, most city-states, and some early territorial states. And yet each of the three expansive developments, centered on apparent proto-cityscapes, was already highly centralized relative to what had come before. Adding in the signatures of cultural pluralism, particularly in the greater Cahokia region, and our designation of each North American case as an instance of “organized diversity” seems appropriate. The construction of order and orthodoxy from heterarchical complexity—that is, simplification—was a large-scale collective compromise or negotiation of diversity. Diverse routine practices and cultural dispositions were articulated through monumental constructions, craft productions, and ritual theatrics to become an ideological project with a momentum that we label civilization in the aggregate.

As a final note, we observe that population densities for Poverty Point and Chaco Canyon were not as great as most other formative civilizations around the world, although Cahokia’s population density—some 10,000 people at Cahokia proper and uncounted thousands more in other sectors of the sprawling central political-administrative complex—is similar to various early cities around the world, from Monte Alban to Uruk and An-Yang. Thus, while we might think of each North American case as an alternative civilization, in some ways unlike anything else in the world, we might more profitably understand each North American case study for what it teaches us about civilizations-in-the-making.

Civilization-making, in the sense that we mean here, involved urbanizing forces, and those urbanizing forces, especially at places such as Chaco Canyon, did not necessarily entail huge populations. Nor were they simple consequences

of political or hierarchical change. Rather, it seems that diverse people came together, memorialized new ideas, and invented new traditions, albeit traditions that were doubtless based on the memories or ancestral practices of some portion of the populace.

North American urbanization, that is, might be better understood as the active negotiation of the tensions between heterarchy and hierarchy, in which diverse people—through central projects and common experiences—generated cultural orders, corporate polities, and orthodoxies. There was nothing quite like Poverty Point, Chaco, or Cahokia in any other part of the world. However, what remains to be seen is whether or not every formative civilization was shot through with heterarchy in other ways, such that simplification was, and is, always a participatory process implicating the non-elite members of society alongside the elite in the construction of hierarchy and civilization.

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EXERTION OF POWER IN CLASSICAL AND HELLENISTIC THRACE

Thracians were divided into a large number of tribes. Being of a certain tribe determined the fate of every Thracian man or woman far more than was the case among the Greeks or Romans. The tribes were the original centres of larger Thracian kingdoms (Odrysian, Getic, Triballian etc.) and Thracian world cannot be understood without understanding the structure of Thracian tribes. The fate of Thrace was also shaped by its neighbours, Scythians in the East, Illyrians and Brygi in the West, and, most notably, by the Greeks and their colonies.

The first Greek towns were founded in the originally Thracian area of Thasos and Samothrace and in the Chalcidice. The Chalcidians were the most active and the peninsula with three long promontories east of Thessaloniki is still called Chalkidiki after them. The most important of the first Chalcidian colonies was Torone in Sithonia (middle finger of Chalcidice); its cemetery started already in the Submycenaean period. No other of the small Chalcidicean towns in the area has yielded such early material, but some of them may have existed since late 9th to 8th century, as shown by find of subProtogeometric skyphoi and Attic Middle Geometric pottery in the area. Methone on the west coast of Thessaloniki bay was founded by rivals of the Chalcidians, the Eretrians, who were in 733 BC expelled by the Corinthians from Korkyra (Corfu). Other colonies of Eretria were mainly on the western "finger" of Chalcidice (Mende, Scione). In the middle of the 7th century BC colonists from the island Andros together with already existing Chalcidicean towns founded other settlements in the east of Chalcidice.

The only colonies founded without any participation of the Euboeans were Potidaea and Olynthus, founded around 600 by Corinth. Some Greek Geometric (Euboean, Thessalian and Attic) pottery is known from the area of Thessaloniki, and Greek 7th century B.C. pottery arrived as far north as to Koprivlen in SW Bulgaria (see map fig. 16). Stageira, the city of Aristoteles, was apparently a later foundation. The Euboean pottery and its derivatives, the skyphoi with pendant semicircles, found their way even further inland; the northernmost of them have been recorded from Chauchitsa on the Dorian Lake.

East of Chalcidice the Thracian coast with neighbouring islands was colonized from the Aegean islands and from eastern Greece. Around 680 BC

Parians occupied Thasos, which apparently had since the beginnings of 7th century an earlier Aeolian settlement. Thasians founded several towns later on the nearby coast, particularly Neapolis on the site of modern Kavalla, and Oisyme. These could not be established without fights with local Thracians, as described by the Parian poet Archilochos. Chians founded Maroneia and Aeolians Ainos on the important land route to the Black Sea. Clazomenians first founded Abdera, the birthplace of the philosopher Democritos, but soon they were driven away by the Thracians. Only the second attempt to found a settlement there was successful; it was realized by the inhabitants of Teos in Asia Minor in the 6th century BC who fled from their home city under pressure from Persia. The necropolis of the first Greek Abdera has revealed an unusual number of burials of children and young people; it is therefore supposed that the first Abderans left the city rather because of malaria than because of the hostility of their Thracian neighbours.

Samothrace, island with famous mysteries colonized by the Greeks at the beginning of 7th century B.C., had also its *peraia*, a strip of land on the coast; Zone (former identified as Messambria) is the best known of its daughter cities. The earlier settlement of Samothrace was also Thracian; close to the modern Greek town of Chora an earlier Thracian fort was examined, with characteristic Early Iron Age pottery. The cult language used in Samothracian mysteries until the Classical period was a Thracian dialect. Zone (previously identified as Mesembria) yielded East Greek pottery from c. 600 on. On Thracian Chersonesos, the peninsula forming the western bank of the Dardanelles, there were more colonies on the east coast and only two Milesian settlements facing the Aegean Sea: Cardia and Limnai.

According to historical tradition Greek colonization of the Thracian Black Sea coast started after the attacks of Cimmerians and Scythians ended, i.e. around 650 B.C., but few cities have yielded pottery earlier than 600 B.C. The most active colonists here were the Milesians. The first Milesian colony on the Black Sea Thracian shore was Histria (also Istria, Istros or Istropolis) called after the ancient name of the Danube (Istros) by whose mouth it lay. Histria reached her Golden Age in the 6th century, and it soon developed also its *chora*, in which some places became satellite towns with mixed Graeco-Getic population; Tariverde and Barboși may be named as good examples of this class. As in other parts of the world not all Greek colonization attempts in the Black Sea region were successful in the long term. An emporium (trade center) on the island Berezan was founded by the mouth of the Dnieper at the same time as Histria and Orgame. It was probably called Borysthenes, and preceded the later more important Olbia. After the first century of its existence Berezan

lost its importance to Olbia. The only serious rival of the eastern Greeks in the colonization of Hellespont and Black Sea were the Megarians. Megarian settlements in the Propontis were traditionally dated high, but their position in more distant and less favourable places than Aeolian and Milesian towns shows that they were settled after the latter.

The foundation of another Milesian settlement called Olbia (close to modern Odessa) was dated by Eusebios to 654 B.C.; it may have started from a slightly earlier settled colony Berezanĵ (called Borysthenes, as was also the Greek name for Dnieper). The city came later under a kind of Scythian protectorate, and resisted even the Macedonian army of Zopyrion, one of the generals of Alexander the Great. On the right bank of the Tyras river (modern Dniester) there was another Greek settlement bearing the name of the river. Apollonia Pontica, on the place of modern Sozopol, was founded in 610 B.C. Odessos (modern Varna) shortly before 559 B.C. on a small hill, dominating a good harbour. New investigations at Tomoi, modern Constanta, have confirmed that it was founded in early 6th century B.C. Tomoi (Tomi in Latin) was the place of exile of Ovid. The date of foundation of Krounoi, later called Dionysopolis, which lies north of Odessos and south of Tomoi, is not recorded in literary sources and early layers have not yet been excavated. Greek towns had their small territories, and influenced also their Thracian neighbours, though they never had enough power to interfere in the political situation in central Thrace.

The beginnings of the greatest Thracian empire in the 5th century, the tribal union led by the Odrysians, fell to the end of Persian power in Europe, which the Athenians did not manage to replace fully. The founder of the empire Teres was commander of a cavalry unit in Persian army during the Graeco-Persian wars. He died in his 92nd year shortly after mid-5th century B.C. Plutarchus wrote about him that he tried not to differ from his *hetairoi* when not in battle and it might be his personal modesty that helped the long survival of his government. The greatest Greek historian Thucydides in whose veins circulated Thracian blood (his mother was a Thracian princess), told of Teres' empire in short that it was larger than the remaining parts of Thrace (II,29).

The peak of the Thracian Golden Age belonged to the time of rule of the Odrysian king Kotys I (383/2-359 B.C.) and his immediate successors. The Odrysian empire under Kotys I represented the apogee of Thracian political power: it competed with Macedonia and in coastal areas with the second Athenian confederation (founded 378/7 B.C.). Greek towns paid him taxes; coins struck in these towns for Thracian kings were probably part of their tribute. After the murder of Kotys his son Kersobleptes did not manage to keep

all of his father's empire; he ruled only over south-eastern Thrace. His coins were minted at Kypsela. The area west of the Marica up to Abdera was under the rule of Amadokos II, son or grandson of Medokos, and of his son Teres II; they struck their coins at Maroneia. On the lower Mesta (Nestos) and west of it a third Odrysian king Berisades ruled after 357/6 B.C. His sons succeeded him in this area; the most important of them was Katriporis, an ally of the Athenians in their war with Philip II.

Kersobleptes fought with the Athenians on the Chersonese till 357 B.C., when they agreed on peace terms and a division of the spheres of interest. The main danger for the weakened Odrysian empire came from the Macedonian king Philip II. He managed to build up his country to be the main power in the Balkans. Between 358 - 342/1 B.C. also the Odrysian kingdoms came under his supremacy. He used in his effort both military power and gifts, on which Thucydides commented that through them it is possible to attain more with the Thracians than through war. Philip was famous by a story told about him that there was no fortress, which he could not conquer by means of one donkey loaded with gold.

But the flourishing of Thracian culture did not end either after the conquest of most of Thrace by Philip II in 342/1 B.C., nor during his successors Alexander the Great (336-323 B.C.). In 335 B.C. Alexander campaigned in northern Thrace and had to fight the Triballi again, until their king Syrmos acknowledged Macedonian supremacy. Alexander also met a delegation of Celts there who at that time just advanced to the Balkans. Military troops from various parts of Thrace (including Triballian warriors) took part in Alexander's campaign against the Persian empire in 334 B.C., but in Thrace itself local rulers and the aristocracy kept their autonomy. Even Lysimachus (till 281 B.C.) had to respect the local rulers, like Seuthes II. In 281 B.C. his empire broke into pieces. The Golden Age of "Classical" Thrace ended with the attack of the Celts and the establishment of Celtic "kingdom" in south-east Thrace with its capital Tylis, in 277 B.C. The Balkan Celts (others settled by the Danube, north of it and west of the Triballi, and founded there a kingdom of the Scordisci, while another small group settled around Serdica, modern Sophia) exploited their Thracian and Greek neighbours by high taxes similarly as did the Galatians in Asia Minor.

Thracian tribal kingdoms, again split into smaller units, had enough military power to resist successfully Hellenistic rulers and in 2nd – 1st century B.C. even the approaching Romans. When Roman general Manlius Vulso returned across Thrace from the campaign against Seleukos in 188 B.C., his army was attacked by bands of Thracian tribes Astoi, Kainoi, Maduateans,

Korelli and Trausi. Similar attacks by Thracian tribes against Philip V forced him to an offensive against central Thrace. He fought against the Odrysians, Dentheleti and Maedi and also regained Philippopolis (modern Plovdiv). His contemporary was Odrysian king Seuthes IV, whose successor became in 171 B.C. (or even slightly earlier) his son Kotys. Kotys was an ally of Philip's successor Perseus (179-169 B.C.), who dared to make war against Rome, in which he was finally defeated and killed.

During the Macedonian war the Romans gained the support of the king of the Sapaiani Abroupolis, who in 179 B.C. occupied the golden mines on Mt. Pangaion. In 172 B.C. also the Maedi attacked the Macedonians, but Odrysian Kotys remained loyal to Perseus until the death of the latter in 169 B.C. In 168 B.C. followed the battle of Pydna, which marked the final end of the Macedonian kingdom. It was divided into four zones with republican autonomy, and after a revolt against Rome in 148 B.C. changed into Roman province. Two years later the same happened in Greece and Thracian kings became direct neighbours of the Roman empire.

There are four or five different models of government (exertion of power) in Classical and Hellenistic Thrace:

1) Greek *poleis*. Athenian constitution and politics are well-known, while other minor cities and federations had mainly less democratic rules, in which the smaller group of noblemen had more influence than their less rich compatriots. But generally they ruled over some of their neighbours, as leaders of a federation as a city, and the acts of their leaders had to be approved by the constitutional bodies.

2) Macedonian kingdom and those of the diadochs. In Macedonian tradition the king was the chief of his *hetairoi*, his position could be challenged inside this group, as could be his succession. His decisions did not need particular approval, but his authority depended on his military success.

3) Odrysian and Triballean kingdoms. As we know most notable from Xenophon, these kingdoms were rather loose federations, with many subregulae, who could act independently, at least to some extent. This tradition could not be changed even by Lysimachus, whose Thracian empire had to respect the traditions.

4) The "democratic" Thracians. These had no central government, but a loose confederacy of small landlords; the aristocrats with their clients handled in small local affairs independently; main decisions for the group were made in their gatherings.

5) The warfare democracy: the Celts. Celtic warriors under military leadership lived in the *Gefolgschaft* system of *družine* (leader and his men). The

leader has his legitimate power only on the condition of military success – otherwise he usually lost it, and sometimes even committed suicide (like Brennos after Delphi).

Thrace is a good example of a situation, in which all five models of behaviour are known as existing in one period, some of them simultaneously. Some of them can be found near to Thrace proper. The kingdoms of the Geti in the north and the Scythians and Sarmatians in North Pontic are examples similar to that of the more primitively organized confederations of local noblemen.

There is one important distinction also in the official propaganda between less stable and stabilized kingdoms. In less developed stages, the king is characterized mainly as warrior or hunter. When some degree of more sophisticate kingship exists, the propaganda changes to more peaceful, depicting peace negotiations, and its aim becomes to safeguard power by stressing the mythical background of the ruler, his relations to divine forces, like at the time of Ateas in Scythia or with the Odrysians under Kotys. In Early Hellenistic empires, the diadochs presented themselves as superhuman heirs of divine Alexander, while the cities, though loosing much of their previous importance, stressed in their propaganda the civic virtues as superior to those of non-citizens. One of the means of propaganda of the city was entrusting civic dignity to its benefactor or ally. The inner autonomy of the cities, however, was respected by Hellenistic rulers; the *polis* autonomous ruling system proved its efficiency even in the structure of the Hellenistic empires. The structure remained roughly the same until the Roman conquest and only the formation of the Roman provinces of Thracia and Moesia changed the core structure of autonomous tribes and their rulers and priests.

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BENIN KINGDOM (13TH – 19TH CENTURIES): A SUPERCOMPLEX NON-STATE SOCIETY

Introduction

The overwhelming majority of modern theories of the state consider this phenomenon as a specialized and centralized institution for governing a society, to what its right to exercise coercive authority – legitimized violence is often added as the state's critical characteristic feature (see, *e.g.*, “summarizing” definitions in anthropological encyclopedias, text-books, and general publications of the last decade: Earle 1994:945; Claessen 1996; Marcus and Feinman 1998:4; Ember and Ember 1999:226–9, 242; Abélès 2000; Kradin 2004:268). We may argue safely that these two characteristics – political centralization and specialization of administration, form the backbone of the theory of the state in general. If these characteristics are sufficient, is another point dwelt on below.

However, on the contrary to the postulate of political anthropology's Founding Fathers, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940/1987:5), political centralization cannot be regarded as a specifically state's feature as it is applicable more or less to all the forms of complex homoarchic (organized “vertically”) societies including chiefdoms first and foremost (see Earle 1987; Kradin 1995; Beliaev *et al.* 2001). Even more so, in current research of the state-level polities “... there is a clear movement away from a view of states as highly centralized, omnipotent entities toward a heterogeneous model that recognizes variability in state/urban organization and explores the limits of state power within the broader society” (Stein, G. J. 1998:10). Good examples of such movement have recently been provided by Blanton (1998) and Kristiansen (1998).

One of the most influential modern concepts dethroning centralization and hierarchization as the universal teleological aim of cultural process crowned by state formation is that of heterarchy introduced by Carole Crumley who defines the heterarchy “... as the relation of elements to one another when they are unranked or when they possess the potential for being ranked in a number of different ways” (1995:3; see also 1979:144; 1987:158; 2001:25).

Respectively, homoarchy may be coined as “the relation of elements to one another when they are rigidly ranked one way only, and thus possess no (or at least very limited) potential for being unranked or ranked in another or a number of different ways at least without cardinal reshaping of the whole socio-political order.” Homoarchy must not be identified with hierarchy (as well as heterarchy must not be mixed up with egalitarianism [Brumfiel 1995:129]). Hierarchy is an attribute of any social system while on the other hand, in any society both “vertical” and “horizontal” social links may be observed (Berreman 1981; Smith, M. E. 1985; Ehrenreich *et al.* 1995:1–5, 87–100, 116–20, 125–31; Blanton 1998; Bondarenko and Korotayev 2000b). More so: sometimes it seems too difficult to designate a society as “homoarchic” or “heterarchic” even at the most general level of analysis, like in the cases of the late-ancient Germans (see, *e.g.*, Gurevich 1999:45–57) and early-medieval “Barbarian kingdoms” in which one can observe monarchy and quite rigid social hierarchy combined with (at least at the beginning) democratic institutions and procedures (like selection of the king), not less significant for the whole socio-political system’s operation. Hence, the questions which rise are if in a given social system there is only one hierarchy or there many of them? and in the latter case, are the hierarchies ranked rigidly or not: do, say, two individuals find themselves ranked towards each other the same way in any social context or not?

Every hierarchy in a society is underpinned by a specific set of values. A society may be considered as homoarchic when there is one value which is central to all the hierarchies and not only integrates but also arranges in a definite pyramidal order all the other, secondary to it, values and hierarchies they underpin. Under such circumstances this value “encompasses” all the rest and makes the society “holistic” (Dumont 1966/1980), that is homoarchic when the whole unequivocally dominates parts as the supreme expression of that all-embracing and all-penetrable value. Although Dumont’s vision of “purity” as the value (or idea) encompassing the holistic society in India is criticized nowadays (Mosko 1994b:24–50; Quigley 1999), his theoretical contribution’s validity is nevertheless testified, for example, by the 20th century totalitarian societies in which, *e.g.*, the idea of communism clearly did play precisely the role Dumont attributes to that of purity in the case of India. On the contrary, when “there is a multiplicity of ‘hierarchical’ or asymmetrical oppositions, none of which are reducible to any of the others or to a single master opposition or value”, “the... case immediately departs from the Dumontian formulation” (Mosko 1994a:214) – the society does not fit the homoarchic (or hierarchic in the Dumontian sense) model.

So, I hope that the idea of homoarchy may serve as a useful counterpart for that of heterarchy. Besides, also very importantly, I believe it is legitimate to apply both notions, heterarchy and homoarchy, not to power relations only) but within a broader framework of social relations and structure in general.

In the meantime, specialization resulting in professionalization is precisely the feature which is typical of the state only, not occasionally in specialization of the administrative apparatus scholars usually see the brink between the state and all the non-state forms of socio-political organization, again including homoarchic ones like the chiefdom and complex chiefdom (see Wright 1977:381–5; Earle 1978:1–7; Godiner 1991; Belkov 1995:171–5; Spencer 1998; Blanton *et al.* 1999:112; Johnson and Earle 2000:245–329; Bondarenko 2001:244–5). So, I shall agree with Charles Spencer's (1998:5) elegantly simple dictum based on Henry Wright's seminal publication of 1977: specifically chiefdoms are "societies with centralized but not internally specialized authority", and states are "societies with centralized and also internally specialized authority" (see also Earle 1987:289). "A state administration, from this perspective, is inherently bureaucratic" (Spencer 2003:11185; see also Cohen 1978).

Indeed, what makes the administrative apparatus specialized? It becomes so when it is "filled" with professional (*i.e.*, permanent and full-time) administrators thus forming bureaucracy. Max Weber elaborated the most authoritative concept of bureaucracy and his ideas form an implicit or explicit background for most of influential modern theories of the state. Though not all the famous Weber's ten features of bureaucracy could apply to preindustrial states mainly because his definition is based on executive and decision-making functions only (Morony 1987:9–10), and although it is stressed sometimes (recently, *e.g.*, by Claessen and Oosten [1996:5–6; Claessen 2003:162], Kristiansen [1998:45, 46], Johnson and Earle [2000:248], Chabal, Feinman, Skalník [2004:28], Christian [2004:273–4]; and Kradin [2004:179]) that bureaucracy can be poorly developed in early states, it must be admitted that it still has to present as such if a given society is attributed as a state. In the meantime, even most complex among all complex chiefdoms, like Cahokia (Pauketat 1994; Milner 1998), the Powhatan paramountcy (Potter 1993; Rountree and Turner III 1998), or Hawaii (Earle 1978; 1997) notwithstanding their political sophistication, could not boast of having professional administrators at all. The existence of specialized administration was also improbable in Benin of the First (*Ogisos*) dynasty time, in the 10th–12th centuries (see Bondarenko 2001:108–17) attributed by me as complex chiefdom elsewhere (Bondarenko 2000b:102–3; 2001:133–5; 2004:340).

Benin Administration and the Concept of Bureaucracy

So, it looks reasonable to examine the list of the bureaucrats' characteristic features Weber singled out. Do they fit titled chiefs – administrators of the 13th – 19th centuries Benin Kingdom¹? (For a more detailed analysis see Bondarenko 2001:212–50; 2002). Weber (1922/1947:333–4) wrote about bureaucrats:

(1) They are personally free and subject to authority only with respect to their impersonal official obligations; (2) They are organized in a clearly defined hierarchy of offices; (3) Each office has a clearly defined sphere of competence in the legal sense; (4) The office is filled by a free contractual relationship. Thus, in principle, there is free selection; (5) Candidates... are appointed, not elected; (6) They are remunerated by fixed salaries... (7) The office is treated as a sole, or at least the primary, occupation of the incumbent; (8) It constitutes a career... (9) The official works entirely separated from ownership of the means of administration and without appropriation of his position; (10) He is subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the office.

Are there any grounds to regard Benin titled chiefs bureaucrats *i.e.*, professional administrators?²

Every Benin chief belonged to one of two broad categories: his title was either hereditary (what is impossible if he is really a bureaucrat – see Weber's point 9) or not. There were rather few hereditary titles in the Benin Kingdom: those of the most aristocratic title-holders congregation members – the *Uzama N'Ihinron* (the “kingmakers”), ranked highest among all the chiefs (initially there were six and from the middle of the 15th century seven of them), and of several other, less important dignitaries. The *Uzama N'Ihinron* was established

Notes

¹ Chronological problems are among most intricate in the study of Benin history. None of the dates prior to the European written sources appearance in the late 15th – 16th centuries and the majority of dates after that is more than conventional. In particular, on debates around the date of almost the most important event in Benin history, the change of the First dynasty by the Second (what entailed serious socio-anthropological consequences) see Bondarenko 2003:74–7.

² For general descriptions and detailed analyses of the Benin titles system see: Read 1904; Egharevba 1956; 1960:78–80; Bradbury 1957:35–44; Roesse 1988; 1993; Eweka, E. B. 1992; Bondarenko 1993:158–65; 1995:231–57; 2001:212–29; Roesse and Bondarenko 2003:318–31. The last of these publication also see for comprehensive account of Benin history from the earliest times till the kingdom's conquest by the British in 1897, while the book by Bradbury remains unsurpassed in the field of the Bini historical ethnography.

in the 13th century by the first ruler of the Second Dynasty – Eweka I and the majority of other hereditary titles appeared in the time of *Oba* (supreme ruler) Ewuare in the mid-15th century.

Non-hereditary title-holders were considered as “appointed by the *Oba*” and fell into two major groups, besides some other, secondary by their significance in the administrative mechanism. The first of those two categories was called *Eghaevbo N'Ogbe* (the “palace chiefs”). This institution was established by the fourth supreme ruler, Ewedo within the framework of his anti-*Uzama* actions in the mid-13th century. The *Eghaevbo N'Ogbe* were divided into three “palace societies”. Each of these societies, in its turn, also fell into three groups imitating the Bini's traditional age-sets system. The kingmakers were really pushed to the background but eventually those were not the *Obas* but the palace chiefs who came to the fore. The significance of the *Eghaevbo N'Ogbe* was great. This association members received their might due not only to their official titles and rights but also, maybe even first of all owe to their proximity to the supreme ruler. One of their main tasks was to serve mediators between the *Oba* and the people, for the prohibition to communicate with his subjects freely seems to be among the supreme ruler's taboos already at least in the beginning of the 17th century. Hence, the palace chiefs could rather easily “regulate” the information flows to and from the palace in their own interests. From the European written sources of the 17th – 19th centuries one can see that these chiefs really did it, and also see, what a considerable might the *Eghaevbo N'Ogbe* under the leadership of *Uwangu* concentrated in their hands that time. Eventually, in the 17th century the palace chiefs, and not the supreme ruler's lineage or the *Uzama* members furthermore, played the decisive role in selection of the descendent to the throne.

Another major category of non-hereditary title-holders, the *Eghaevbo N'Ore* (the “town chiefs”) was established later, in the mid-15th century by Ewuare, already as a counterbalance to the palace chiefs though basically they were ranked lower than the *Eghaevbo N'Ogbe*. They struggled actively with the latter for the influence on the *Obas* and also fought for power with the supreme rulers themselves. All in all, the town chiefs were a success. The *Eghaevbo N'Ore*'s struggle for power was led by the head of this category of title-holders, the *Iyase* (whose own title was introduced much earlier, in the mid-13th century by *Oba* Ewedo). In the course of time, he became the most powerful and influential figure in the Benin administrative system and society. Since the *Eghaevbo N'Ore*'s introduction the antagonism of the *Iyases* to the *Obas*, as Kochakova remarks (1986:244), “runs all through the whole space of the Benin

history". Even the supplanting of the British colonial administration could not cease their rivalry.

So, the *Eghaevbo N'Ogbe* and *Eghaevbo N'Ore*, whose behavior was very far from that "ordered" to them by Weber (in point 10) were the principal associations of non-hereditary chiefs in the Benin Kingdom. However, the *Obas* appointed chiefs just formally, for first, to be distinct, the supreme ruler appointed only the lineage out of which its members (officially not involved into the administrative system) selected a concrete person for granting the title. Second, due to the strength of the tradition and real might of the palace and town chiefs, titles were held within the same extended families (*egbes*) for hundreds of years (though officially every lawful Bini man could claim for a non-hereditary title).

Thus in reality there was no free choice of administrators and their appointment by higher authorities. In practice, administrators were not appointed at all as well as there was no free selection of them on the societal level; they were elected within definite lineages and extended families. Only their more or less formal investiture was the *Oba's* privilege and duty (compare with Weber's points 5 and 4). The sovereign's power over distant chiefdoms' rulers could be rather weak (Bradbury 1957:33; 1973:178) and it may be reasonable to suppose (especially if one trusts the folk-lore evidence [Sidahome 1964:49–50, 163]) that during the last turbulent centuries of the Benin Kingdom's existence the *Obas* only blindly confirmed the candidatures proposed to him and this procedure in its essence transformed into a mere *pro forma*, the performing of an ancient ritual ("anti-point 9" of Weber).

The chiefs were not simple officials at the supreme ruler's service. On the one hand, the *Obas* regularly established ties of relationship with them (what contradicts Weber's point 1) marrying the titled chiefs' daughters and giving their own daughters in marriage to the chiefs. On the other hand, the chiefs constantly preserved close connections with the kinship organization and fulfilled different non-administrative functions ascribed to them as kin units members (hence, the Benin realities did not fit point 7 of Weber). In the central bodies' activities they also participated as representatives of their titled lineages, not as individuals. Titled chiefs exercised control over communities through local leaders. It was unreal to dig titled chiefs up from their native social units and to send them to govern "alien" communities (*iyas*)³. Under the

³ I accept the "general" definition of community given by Murdock and Wilson (1972:255) who wrote:

We assume that there is and must be a unit of significant social interaction beyond the family. It follows that it is possible to identify this unit as the community for each

conditions when all the levels of socio-political complexity were penetrated by communal in their essence ties and relations which dominated at all of them, the division of the country into merely administrative units (including by means of transforming into administrative units communities and chiefdoms) was impossible.

The supreme chiefs always were first and foremost not post- but title-holders. A chief could be deprived from his post by the *Oba*'s command, but the title, once given rested with the chief till the end of his life. The native historian, ethnographer, and courtier Jacob Egharevba openly argued (1949:24) that the supreme ruler "...could... suspend any titled chief from his post, but the chief must still hold his title for life" (see also Egharevba 1956:6; Igbafe 1979:4). The chiefs received all their privileges in accordance with titles and were not rewarded just for posts they held. The post was an unavoidable enclosure to the title. For example, in reality the post could demand from the "*Oba*'s wardrobe keeper" not cleaning and airing of his robes at all, but attending to certain duties by no means connected with such a kind of activities. These duties were not clearly defined and separated from those of other chiefs as well as all the categories of titled chiefs comprised officials of all kinds – priests, war leaders, etc. (compare with what Weber wrote in point 3).

Henri Claessen and Peter Skalník (1978:576) distinguish two major types of functionaries in early states: "(a) general functionaries, whose activities embrace a number of types of governmental function; (b) special functionaries, whose governmental activities are restricted to only one aspect of government administration". Their sample's analysis allowed to formulate the regularities as follows: "In early states general functionaries are found mostly on the regional level..." and "In early states specialist functionaries are usually found at the top level of the administrative apparatus" (Claessen and Skalník 1978:579, 580). Basing on the aforesaid we can argue without hesitation that in Benin general functionaries the top administrative level was dominated by general functionaries absolutely. There was a dim notion of higher and lower titles and more or less important duties among the Bini and for some functionaries these

society. The main criteria for determining the community are: (1) it is the maximal number of people who normally reside together in face-to-face association; (2) the members interact with some regularity; (3) it is a significant focus of social identity for the members. ... In general, we chose the unit that seemed to be the focus of the most significant regular interaction and identification.

Their "specific" approach to defining the community in the political context "as the lowest level of political integration" is also taken into account (Murdock and Wilson 1972:256).

or those of their numerous and diverse duties were regarded as principal or primary. For example, in the *Uzama N'Thinron* the *Ezomo* title holders' main role was that of a general, and *Eholo N'Ire*'s cardinal task was priestly. However, even many other members of this most aristocratic chiefs grade had no one dominant function besides the function which was common for all the *Uzama* members: in earlier times to select and later only to inaugurate every new *Oba*. There was no fixed hierarchy neither within the supreme chiefs' congregations (most often, only their heads were definitely known) nor within these or those spheres of activities – administrative, priestly and so on (compare with point 2 of Weber).

The material well-being of the supreme chiefs (at least prior to the period of active trade with Europeans [Ryder 1969]) was based on receiving of a share of what had been produced in their communities. It was not dependent crucially either on their share in tribute once or twice a year collected by them for the *Oba* or on the sovereign's "presents" chiefs used to get from time to time. In fact, those undefined share in tribute and occasional monarch's gifts stood for fixed salaries which have never been due to them at all (nothing in common with Weber's point 6).

As titles belonged to the same lineages for centuries, there was no free competition for titles in the society. Then, there were no opportunities for making a career, for chiefs held first and foremost titles, and titles besides lack of their well-defined hierarchy, were not subjected to their changing by a person. Having once got a title, he could not only lose it by the *Oba*'s command but also receive another one, in addition to, or exchange for the previous one (compare to Weber's point 8).

So, our attempt to apply the Weber's features of bureaucracy to the Benin Kingdom of the 13th – 19th centuries reveals that *none* of them, including the most significant – independence of the kin organization, was characteristic of her titled chiefs. In fact, even the sovereign did not completely desert the communal organization (Bondarenko 1995:203–31; 2001:193–211). The "communal spirit" revealed itself in his support (including economic) by the populace, and his subjects not at all perceived the supreme ruler as a power alien for the community. "He who owns you / Is among you here" are the lines of a medieval verse devoted to a new *Oba*'s enthronization (Elimimian 1986:105). Just the fact that the *Oba*'s power was considered as continuation and strengthening of the legitimate community heads' authority at a new level, guaranteed the continuity of fundamental features of political organization at a change of rulers on the throne or of the general apportionment of forces in the

upper strata. In its turn, the community provided the society with socio-economic firmness.

Indeed, though it is evident that the *Oba* shared many non-bureaucratic features of titled chiefs the analysis will not be complete if some more attention to the sovereign as supreme administrator is not paid. In the situation when the basic unit in society was not the individual but the collectivity, and kin relations were the background of the whole system of government up to its highest level (Bradbury 1957:31), a new *Oba* came to power as a representative of his kin group first and foremost. The claims of the royal clan (*egbe umogun*) for supreme power besides “proofs” by different myths (see Talbot 1926:III, 961–2; Beier 1980:19–20), were substantiated in the idea of its members’ descent from the father of the Second dynasty’s founder Oranmiyan – Oduduwa, a deity and the first supreme ruler (*Oni*) of the sacred Yoruba town of Ife (called Uhe by the Bini). In the meantime, there also was another source of the dynasty’s legitimacy: “As the descendant of a deified Yoruba king, the *Oba* rules by divine right. Yet he is also an Edo,⁴ ruling with the permission of a council of ‘kingmaker’ chiefs whose authority predates his own” (Gallagher 1983:21). Both in official ideology and common people’s consciousness the two sources of the dynasty’s legitimacy were equally important and mutually complementary: “The tradition indicates that neither of these loci of legitimacy is alone sufficient. Although the dual mandate was a source of continuing political conflict for the *Oba*, it was also the ultimate source of his power” (Ibid.).

Rather numerous (Bradbury 1957:27–30) royal clan though privileged, had typical for the Bini extended families structure and mechanisms of functioning what revealed itself especially vividly in the rules of succession and their changes in the course of history (see Bondarenko 1995:194–203; 2001:194–7). Due to this the *Oba* (typically not the senior in kin at the moment of accession to the throne) if he was a weak ruler, could even “become the prisoner of his own hierarchic, ambitious household” (Ryder 1969:6).

However, the *Oba* was invariably officially recognized as omnipotent and the possessor of all (land, people, etc.) in his realm (e.g., Dapper 1668/1975:168; 1671:491; Thomas 1910:I, 91; Ajisafe 1945:25, 75, 95; Bradbury 1957:44; Akenzua 1974:3; Jones 1983:40). However, neither the first nor the second was so in reality (as European visitors understood clearly [Van

⁴ Oranmiyan’s wife, the mother of the first *Oba* Eweka I, is said to be Bini. Bini is the biggest Edo-speaking ethnic group; the names “Bini” and “Edo” are quite often used as synonyms what is of course inexact.

Nyendael 1705:430; Smith, W. 1744:228; Gallwey 1893:129]). Particularly, land was held by communities while slaves were only prisoners of war and criminals (e.g.: Dennett 1910:199; Ajisafe 1945:75–6; Egharevba 1949:65–6, 77; Ogbobine 1974:17; Nwankwo 1987:48). The phrases like “all the land in Benin belongs to the *Oba* and all her inhabitants are his slaves” reflected attitude to him as to the guarantee of the country and populace’s prosperity. This formula also served a means for expressing the idea of all Benin citizens’ supracommunal unity symbolized and personalized by the sovereign.

As for the *Oba*’s essence as political figure and his true role in government (with what I am concerned now), power was divided between him on the one hand, and titled chiefs of all the categories on the other. The supreme ruler was always considered as a member of all the ruling bodies (Dapper 1668/1975:167–9; Talbot 1926:III, 581–90; Egharevba 1949:29–33; 1960:78–82; Bradbury 1957:35–9) including the titled chiefs council participated by members of twenty-one grade of administrators (Ajisafe 1945:18; Egharevba 1949:29; 1960:78–80; Bradbury 1957:43–4; Igbafe 1979:10–1). Notwithstanding this, the distribution of power between the sovereign and the chiefs was historically dynamic and had dialectics of its own. The “profane functions – sacral duties” dichotomy was crucial at this point.

The institution of the *Oba* appeared as a combination of profane functions and sacral duties in one person, and the struggle between the *Oba* and the chiefs took the form of constant and gradually successful attempts of the latter to limit the sovereign’s profane power by means of inflicting on him new binding taboos and hence *volens nolens* increasing his sacrality inversely proportional for “lists” of royal taboos see, e.g., Adams 1823:111–3; Talbot 1926:III, 736–7). The final act ran high in the early 17th century when the chiefs succeeded in depriving the *Oba* of the right to command the army in person (Egharevba 1960:32–3, 34; for the whole story see Bondarenko 2000e). Relations of the Europeans who visited the Benin court in the late 16th – 19th centuries are full of vivid stories and surprised or contemptuous remarks testifying to the “king”’s complete impotence at the face of his “noblemen” and relatives (Ingram 1588/1904:298; Van Nyendael 1705:449; Gallwey 1892/1969:345, 346; 1893:129; Bindloss 1898/1968:205; Boisragon 1898:165; Leonard 1906:372; Egharevba 1952:14⁵).

This became possible due to the specifics of the Bini’s consciousness in general and political consciousness in particular. In their minds, the true ruler is not the one who holds real (in our rational modern view) control levers but the

⁵ The episode Egharevba relates happened in the 1890s.

one who is endowed with sacral power. Actually, *Obas* themselves did a lot to increase the level of their sacralization, especially *Oba* Ewuare of the mid-15th century. By no means did the *Oba* become powerless: in the Benin society and culture context, sacral power was a specific kind of real power which allowed to limit effectively behavioral alternatives of the subjects (Bondarenko 1995:227–30). By the very fact of his presence on the throne the *Oba* went on playing the exceptionally important and “practical” role of the all-Benin unity’s symbol and thus did promote significantly integration of socio-political segments into a whole – centralization in its socio-territorial aspect. Characteristically, as a “barbarian”, “foreigner” (“*ete*”) in Benin was considered not any ethnically non-Bini but only the one “who does not know the law (of the country. – *D.B.*) and does not recognize the *Oba*” (Melzian 1937:43). This critical role of the *Oba* became especially clear in the colonial times when after an attempt to abolish the institution immediately after the fall of Benin in 1897, the British had to restore it in 1914 as far as it had become evident that “if they were to secure even the grudging co-operation of the Bini they must restore the monarchy” (Igbofe 1975:175; see also Zotova 1979:105–14; Nevadomsky 1993:66–7). However, it must be stressed for the sake of confusion avoidance, that what was sacralized were not concrete *Obas* as personalities but the very power and institution of the supreme ruler (Nkanta and Arinze n.d.:5).

In general relations between the rulers (all-Benin authorities) and the ruled (communalists) were those of mutual necessity and complementary. Sargent (1986) has defined the relations between the supreme authorities and the community as exploitative (and called the former “bureaucracy”) but in reality in Benin there were no conditions for such relations’ appearance (Bondarenko 1995:257–64, 273–4; criticism at Sargent’s inadequate attempt to use Marxist categories in the analysis of Benin, see: Manning 1986; Wilks 1986). Power was not separated from the people in the Morgan – Engels’s sense (Bradbury 1969:21; Bondarenko 1993:165) what above all signifies that the all-Benin institutions formation, recruitment of administrators into them, and the way they exercised power were taking place in accordance with the community-kinship traditions, by means of the mechanisms determined by them. Not only heads of communities and chiefdoms through which titled chiefs coordinated relations between the Kingdom’s parts and the whole, but also titled chiefs themselves did not become bureaucrats. They remained chiefs with all the mechanisms of coming to, and exercising of power, rights, privileges, duties, etc. typical of them.

Massive ideological pillars for this objective situation were also provided (see Bondarenko 2000a; 2000e; 2001:186–8). At this point it is significant to

note that it would be unreasonable to speak about imposition of ideology “from above” or self-deceiving of those at the social bottom: at least until the start of active trade with Europeans in the late 15th century Benin was characterized by mental continuity – principal identity of all the social groups’ Weltanschauung (Bondarenko 1995:90–1, 165, 254–5) what also witnesses to lack of unbridgeable gulf between the rulers and the ruled. People felt their complicity to power, its institutions and holders. As a result, “a passion for legality and order” as a typical feature of African kingdoms (Armstrong 1960:38) characterized Benin among others. Owe to this Benin history of the *Obas* period did not see revolts of the masses against central power except uprisings in subjugated lands (and possibly just one episode in Benin City in the 14th or 15th century [see Bondarenko 2001:176–7]).

Such a trend of the Bini political culture kept easily within the framework of their general mental and behavioral paradigm. Every Bini was responsible for realization of the Bini’s “national idea”: indefatigable vigil about permanent reestablishment of *status quo* in all spheres including political; first of all, by supporting proper relations between the living and the ancestors for the sake of subsequent existence of Benin and the whole universe (see Bondarenko 1995:73–89, 258–61; 1997:111, 119–22). In this respect, really in Benin “everyone is the priest for himself”⁶ (Van Nyendael 1705:448). However, unit

⁶ Just due to this in the situation when ancestors’ cult was the central form of religion in Benin both at the local and uppermost levels of complexity, priesthood was never organized in a distinct, economically and politically influential corporation (Roth 1903/1968:50; Sharevskaja 1957:205; Dike 1959:13; Kochakova 1986:145–6, 151; Bondarenko 1995:270) like in supercomplex societies which religious systems, especially on the highest complexity level, concentrated on anthropomorphic deities or God (Egypt, Mesopotamia, medieval Europe, Aztecs, etc.; the most remarkable exception is the Islamic world where those called “people of religion” cannot be regarded as priests proper). Though people for whom priestly responsibilities were primary could have existed since the First dynasty time (Egharevba 1960:2), Benin priests performed either cults minor in their importance (see Roese and Reichel 1990:390–1, 393–4) or assisted the *Oba* at his the supreme priests duties’ performance (e.g., Talbot 1926:II, 308; Egharevba 1949:30; 1956:11; 1960:11, 79–82; Bradbury 1957:34, 40, 54, 55; 1959:191; Palau Marti 1960:79–80; Omijeh 1971:118; Ayeni 1975:38–47; Blackmun 1984:II, 366–9 *et al.*; Imoagene 1990:22). In Benin people did not need professional mediators between them and venerated ancestors: the cult was personal, kin in nature and presupposed no supreme or esoteric knowledge inaccessible to all. In this society there was also no ideology, popular or official, for imposing of which professional priests could be instrumental. The hierarchy of mediators between a person and ancestors was not spiritual but purely social: a common Bini venerated the ancestors of his own, the head of a family or community – of all the respective units members, finally the *Oba* appeared in the role of the supreme priest as he,

leaders from the extended family level up to the “national” one bore higher responsibility than commoners did, as their deeds unavoidably were not individual acts but those in their units’ names. The widest, all-embracing unit (and actually cult group) was Benin society as a whole. The *Oba*, perceived as the father of all the Bini, was the supreme mediator in the alive – ancestors’ relations. Performing rites of the group ancestors’ cult (*erha*) was regarded as the most important of the leader’s tasks. Hence, those valuable people caring of *bien public* deserved just gratitude and help, not preventing from fulfilling their duty. Encroachment on the authority (*ase*) was thus incredible (see Bondarenko 1994:6–9; 1995:182, 260, 276–7).

For the Bini, universe was divided into mutually penetrable domains of people on the one hand, and ancestors’ spirits and deities on the other. But this was one world fastened by power, its institutions and holders; each on the respective level. In fact, for the Bini, they existed precisely for the sake of integrating the universe (see Bondarenko 1995:24–89, 182–3; 1997; 2000a:192). This is why power, both the substance and its implementation in political institutions including that of the supreme ruler first and foremost, was surrounded with a halo of sacrality. Rooted and actively exercised in the community but also elevated to the rank of all-Benin ideology, the essentially kin ancestor worship could be only a thin pillar for the rise of bureaucracy.⁷

Resuming the analysis provided in the present section, I feel quite safe to argue that Benin was politically centralized but her administrative system was not specialized. On the contrary to the First (*Ogisos*) dynasty, the Second dynasty rulers of the 13th – 19th centuries turned out capable to establish true supremacy of the central political institutions over the society *i.e.*, to make their domination over it effective. But in essentially communal Benin society even those who governed it on the top level were not professional administrators – “bureaucrats”. Thus, in accordance with the practically generally accepted idea of intimate connection between the state and bureaucracy, Benin cannot and should not be considered as a state.

the father of all the country’s citizens, performed rites of the cult of royal ancestors, hence the all now living Bini’s forefathers. (However, it must be noted that one of the changes that accompanied extension of communal matrix through chiefdom to the all-Benin level was that the sovereign could well be not the senior in his lineage. In this case his political seniority in the country looked more significant than his not this high position in his own kin group).

In this respect, an instructive example is provided by ancient China. Bureaucracy did not form there until ancestor worship was overshadowed by other religious cults and practices (rituals associated with the “Mandate of Heaven” and some others) in the Warring States era of the 5th – 3rd centuries BC (Baum 2004).

Benin Socio-political Organization and the Concept of Supra-kin-based Society

In the meantime, by the 13th century Benin had historically passed and culturally no doubt superceded the complex chiefdom at the level of which it was in the 10th–12th centuries though such traits of the preceding period as *e.g.*, ethnic heterogeneity and non-participation of the supra-simple-chiefdom elite in subsistence production were inherited and strengthened further (see Bondarenko 2000b:106–12; 2001:232–43; 2004:344–8). At the same number of complexity levels (two above local community) and socio-economic background (extended-family-based community and slash-and-burn hoe agriculture), Benin of the *Obas* demonstrated incomparably higher degree of integration, unity, and centralization. In her social complexity level, economic parameters, governmental apparatus' hierarchicity, and the spiritual sphere the Benin Kingdom was an equivalent of early states. Nevertheless, the society was still based on the homoarchic “matrix” of the Bini community which consisted of extended families.

The community was characterized by a tangle of kin and neighbor ties dominated by kinship and by explicit social and administrative homoarchicity expressed particularly in unreserved superiority of the seniors over the juniors in any social interaction both in the family and (as an outcome of this [Sidahome 1964:128]) the community (Egharevba 1949:67–70; Bradbury 1957:23–5; 1973:149–209; Roese and Rees 1994:543–5; Bondarenko 2001:39–55). The age-grade system – *otu* (see Thomas 1910:I, 11–2; Talbot 1926:III, 547–9; Bradbury 1957:15, 32, 34, 49–50; 1973:170–5; Igbafe 1979:13–5), was a proper means for permanent reproduction of the homoarchic *status quo* effectively preventing autocracy in the community (as a group of persons – senior age-grade members had the right and duty to participate in its government) at one time. The principle of gerontocracy dominated in administration at the community and even more so extended family levels (Bradbury 1969; Sargent 1986; Kochakova 1991). The seniors' power rested upon the idea of their maximal proximity to the group's ancestors who were thought of as true collective landowners (Talbot 1926:II, 37–8, 308; III, 737; Nwankwo 1987:47, 50) and on whose will people's well-being was believed to depend crucially.

By mentioning the communal matrix, the kin character of central for the society religious beliefs (and at the same time ideology), etc. we come to one more aspect of the problem of the state which is more or less consciously evicted from many contemporary definitions due to the wide-spread approach

to the state as merely a specific set of political institutions.⁸ This aspect, intrinsically interdependent with the problem of bureaucracy, is coming to the fore of the non-kin, territorial relations in the society. Although at dawn of the 20th century Schurtz (1902) and ultimately British structuralists and American Boasians demonstrated in their fieldwork-based researches as far back as in the middle of the last century that Morgan (as well as Maine [1861; 1880] before and Engels⁹ [1884/1985] after him) had postulated the opposition between kinship and territoriality too rigidly (Evans-Pritchard 1940:198 ff.; Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940/1987:XIV–XX, 6–7, 10–1; Lowie 1948:10–2, 317–8; Schapera 1956; Middleton and Tait 1958:5; Mair 1965:99–100),¹⁰ I believe that

⁸ As well as to cultures in comparison with which the state is defined; e.g., Earle (1991:14) postulates unequivocally that “... chiefdoms must be understood as political systems”.

⁹ In the Marxist theory the transition from kin to territorial ties has begun to serve as an essential precondition for social classes formation prior to what the rise of the state was declared impossible, as the state was seen as political organization predestined for guaranteeing the exploitative class’ dominance in society. Particularly, Engels (1884/1985:198–9) wrote:

As far as the state arose due to the need to keep in check the opposite of classes; as far as at the same time it arose in the very clashes of those classes, according to the general rule it is the state of the most powerful, economically dominant class which with the help of the state becomes the politically dominant class as well, and thus acquires new means for suppression and exploitation of the oppressed class.

Most rigidly this postulate was formulated by Lenin: “The state appears where and when the division of society into classes appears” (1917/1974:67). In fact, hardly not the main point of a Marxist social scientist’s departure from the camp of “orthodoxes” to that of “creative Marxists” was his or her desire to reconcile this dogma with historical and ethnographic facts or even to overcome it. Particularly, in the West this led to the appearance of “structural Marxism” with its tendency “... to reverse the causal relationship between base and superstructure...” (Sanderson 2003:180), while in the Soviet Union the meaningless euphemism for the Early State, *ranneklassovoe obshchestvo* (“early-class society”) was invented (see Bondarenko 1991). On the absence of social classes in the Marxist sense in Benin see: Kalous 1970; Kochakova 1986; Bondarenko 1995a.

¹⁰ These mid-20th century anthropologists provided conclusive arguments for importance of territorial ties in primitive (non-state) cultures. As a result, already in 1965 Lewis had good reasons to argue that “The fundamentally territorial character of social and political association in general is indeed usually taken for granted, and has been assumed to apply as much to segmentary lineage societies as to other types of society” (Lewis 1965:96). On the other hand, historians and anthropologists also showed that the typically non- and originally pre-state institutions of kinship could preserve some importance in state societies including medieval European (e.g., Bloch 1939–1940/1961:141 ff.; Lewis 1965:99–101; Genicot 1968; Duby 1970; Claessen and Skalník 1978:22, 589, 641; Korotayev and Obolonkov 1989). In fact, it has eventually turned out that the “kin vs. territory” problem is

the criterion as such still deserves attention. I consider it reasonable to distinguish the state in two respects: as a system of political institutions and as a type of society to which this political form becomes adequate. The latter normally is a broader notion, for on the one hand, it supplements political characteristics by and combines them with social (and through them economic) while on the other hand, most frequently¹¹ the political system of the state kind ripens out earlier than the respective social system based on the territorial division of the citizens and composition of the polity¹². If we attempt at characterizing a society (or “culture” in the American cultural anthropologists’ thesaurus) as a whole, we must recognize the political system as only one of its subsystems and hence label the society/culture according to its more general feature – the societal type, and this should be so not with respect to the state only but with regards to any society.¹³

that of measure and not of almost complete presence or absence although the general socio-historical tendency is really towards gradual substitution of kin-based institutions by territory-based ones. Fried (1960/1970:692–3) was very accurate indeed postulating that the state is organized on not a non-kin but “supra-kin” basis.

¹¹ But not always: the area giving probably the most important (in the historical long-run) exceptions to the rule is Europe, in some parts of which unilineal descent groups disappeared at early stages of history being substituted by nuclear family and neighbor (territorial) community. For example, in Greece it happened by the Dark Age time (Andreev 1976:74–8; Frolov 1988:79–80; on *genos* as not sib or clan in anthropological terms [Lowie 1920; Ember and Ember 1999:349, 353] see: Smith, R. C. 1985:53), in Latium before Rome was founded and royal authority in it established in the 8th century BC (e.g., Dozhdev 2004; see here also criticism on the concept of *gens* as clan) and in Scandinavia by the close of the Bronze Age after in this sense transitory period (from about 2600 BC) of the lineage and extended family dominance (Earle 1997:25–6, 163; Anderson, C. E. 1999:14–5). This paved the way to the territorial organization’s formation prior to that of well-developed bureaucratic apparatus (Kristiansen 1998:45, 46).

¹² As Allen Johnson and Timothy Earle (2000:304) put it,

Whereas chiefdoms vest leadership in generalized regional institutions, in states the increased scope of integration requires specialized regional institutions to perform the tasks of control and management. ... Along with this increasing elaboration of the ruling apparatus comes increasing stratification. Elites are now unrelated by kinship to the populations they govern...

¹³ In particular, on understanding of societal forms, including the state, which involves both political and socio-economic characteristics, such significant for the development of anthropological thought theories as those of evolutionists (from Maine to Engels), of the French sociological (Durkheim, Mauss) and British structuralist (Evans-Pritchard, Fortes, Mair, etc.) schools, of substantivists in economic anthropology beginning with Polanyi, are based (see Earle 1994:947). Famous and still influential neoevolutionist concepts (Sahlins 1960; Service 1962/1971; 1975; Fried 1967; Carneiro 1970) also derive, more or less openly, from this premise. In the meantime, for instance, the Archaic State

I shall not argue either, following Maine (1861; 1880), Morgan (1877), and Engels (1884/1985), that the state in full sense begins when division by territory supplants that by kin practically completely, or in accordance with Claessen and Skalník, that the “inchoate” but nevertheless state may be “... associated with dominant kinship, family and community ties in the field of politics...” (1978:589) but will rather take an intermediate position. Bearing in mind the older idea that in the state “territory” dominates over “kinship” on the one hand, and taking into account the mentioned above achievements of the 20th century anthropologists and historians, I shall say that the state in its full sense may be fixed in the situation when territorial ties clearly (though not absolutely) dominate over those of kinship on the supra-local levels of society’s complexity. This threshold is lower than that established particularly by Morgan but higher than the one sufficient for Claessen and Skalník. In fact, in my view, “the completed state” corresponds only to “the transitional early state” in the latter scholars’ scheme “... in which the administrative apparatus was dominated by appointed officials, where kinship affected only certain marginal aspects of government...” (Ibid.). As for the state in the narrower – merely political sense, “the limited state”, I would regard as such the societies which have at least reached the level of “the typical early state” of Claessen and Skalník (Ibid.) – “... the kind of state in which ties of kinship were [still only] counterbalanced by those of locality, ... [but] where non-kin officials and title-

concept elaborated recently by a group of archaeologists headed by Gary Feinman and Joyce Marcus does limit the notion of the state to a kind of political organization as the state is seen by them merely “... as a political or governmental unit...” (Marcus and Feinman 1998:4). The same is true with the Early State concept (Claessen and Skalník 1978). Having eventually been developed into a truly organic combination of evolutionist and structuralist postulates (Claessen 2000), it nevertheless also reduces the notion of the state to its political aspect (see Kradin 1991:283; Bondarenko 1998a:19; 2001:243–4; Bondarenko and Korotayev 2000b:14–5) what could give reason to some of its adherents to designate Benin as an early state (e.g., Kochakova 1986; 1996; Shifferd 1987) precisely due to the fact that this concept not only reduces the state to a specific system of political institutions but also rightly recognizes that as a rule the political subsystem develops towards the state more rapidly than the socio-economic one. However, characterization of Benin as belonging to the highest type of the early state – “transitional” is improper in any case (see below). Besides, it must not but be noted that though the Early State concept is still most well-known and best developed in its initial modification, its main proponent, Henri Claessen in one of his latest publications (2003:161) declares openly that “A state is a specific kind of *social* organization, expressing a specific type of social order in a society” (my emphasis). Precisely this vision (which also naturally presupposes the political aspect of social system’s embracing) co-insides completely with that of the present author’s.

holders [already] played a leading role in government administration...”¹⁴ Note, that even highly developed pre-state cultures, like complex chiefdoms are normally characterized as essentially kin-based societies (see Earle 1997:5).

In the meantime, what I see as a true and verifiable criterion of territorial (*i.e.*, the state in its broader, full sense) organization is the possibility for rulers to recarve arbitrarily traditional, determined by kin grouping, division of the country's territory into parts. Provided it is possible (for instance, if the central authority can unite them with others or cut into parts), one can argue that even if those social entities preserved their initial internal form, they were nothing more than administrative (and taxpaying) units in the wider context of the whole state polity administered by functionaries either appointed or confirmed outside the community – in the political center. Characteristically in states communalists are not only imposed different obligations but also given the right to sell communal land, what would undoubtedly undermine the society's background if it had really been community-based. The 3rd – 2nd millennia BC Near East gives especially vivid examples of the aforesaid (see, *e.g.*, Butinov 1967; Zak 1975:242–65; Maisels 1987:345–6; Baines and Yoffee 1998:225–7). Generally speaking, in a state the supreme power does not develop the community matrix further on but rather “on the contrary begins to restructure society” in its own image (Beliaev 2000:194) what results in “the encompassment of the local sphere by the state” (Tanabe 1996:154).

Nothing of the kind can be traced in Benin. The transition from complex chiefdom to the polity of a new sort with the Second dynasty's consolidation

¹⁴ For “the inchoate early state” which I cannot regard as state in any sense at all, Claessen and Skalník (1978:589) postulate not only kinship ties domination but also “a limited existence of full-time specialists...” that are thus “rare” in such societies (1978:23), *i.e.*, do not form the objectively absolutely necessary and hence non-removable core of the government. At this point, it is also worth noting Aidan Southall's (2000:150) remark: “Claessen and Skalník (1978) distinguished inchoate, typical and transitional early states... The segmentary state conforms most nearly to the inchoate state, but Claessen considered the segmentary state as I defined it not a state at all”. Hence, in my turn, I would not label the societies Southall means as states even more so. In fact, the cultures fitting Southall's segmentary state model (1956; 1988; 1999) might be regarded as typological predecessors of societies like Benin. In Benin ritual suzerainty of the sovereign also exceeded his abilities to control the country's periphery in practical terms (see Bondarenko 2001:183–184) but the crucial difference between say, “Southall's” Alur and Benin was that within the former component units could exercise legitimate force and even secede from the wider polity to join another while in the Benin case all this was impossible, at least within “Benin proper” – the political and ethno-cultural core of the Benin “Empire” of the mid-15th – 19th centuries. The degree of centralization in Benin was significantly, qualitatively higher than in the Alur society.

led to significant strengthening of centripetal tendencies but nevertheless did not result in socio-political homogenization. Benin remained a "multipolity", that is a polity within which structural elements of different socio-political types and complexity levels coexisted and interacted (see Korotayev 2000:195). Undoubtedly, this situation's lasting for all the many centuries of the *Obas* Benin history testifies to the fact that such polystratumness was the society's essential feature and not a manifestation of its as if "transitional character"

In the previous period chiefdoms and autonomous communities¹⁵ coexisted within the complex chiefdom (though strictly speaking, the theory presupposes that a complex chiefdom consists of simple chiefdoms only, the historical realities of Benin do not contradict but specifies it). In the time of the *Obas* the same components – chiefdoms and autonomous communities (as before, equal to each other in terms of rights and obligations towards the supreme authorities of the time) formed parts of society of another type. Communities (including autonomous) and chiefdoms preserved all the initial characteristics of their internal organization and went on obeying the all-Benin authorities. The more powerful all-Benin political institutions were becoming the more effective their control over the relations between chiefdoms and communities was (Bradbury 1973:149, 171). Nonetheless, the all-Benin authority did not intervene in the communities and chiefdoms' internal affairs and reminded of itself only when the interests of the whole country (associated with those of the political center) were infringed, like in the cases of dependencies' attempts to break away in the "imperial" period of Benin history (mid-15th – 19th centuries). What is especially noteworthy is that in no case those units internal composition could be changed (Bondarenko 1995:183–93; 2001:257–64).

Thus, the political center had substantially limited possibilities for exercising coercive authority because violence from its side could not be considered as legitimate if it were aimed directly at the society's component units. In the meantime, the *Oba* was recognized as not merely the supreme judge but also the only legitimate law-giver, as it was supposed that only he could relate the ancestors' will without even slight corruption (Ajisafe 1945:17; Egharevba 1949:11, 24; 1960:11, 81; Eweka, E. B. 1989:34). However, though for the Bini the ancestors were the ultimate source of laws, in reality the regulations were rooted in communal norms and traditions. Due to this new laws met no insurmountable barriers in their path from the *Oba*'s palace to

¹⁵ *I.e.*, the communities which did not form parts of any chiefdom within the Benin Kingdom.

communalists' houses.

In the period under consideration the country consisted not only of chiefdoms and autonomous local communities as before but also of units of a new type. This was a group of communities under the leadership of a paramount chief, like chiefdoms, but the genesis of that socio-political unit was completely different. Such units started to appear from the reign of the first *Oba* in the result of the supreme ruler's grants of communities to all-Benin chiefs and royal relatives (Egharevba 1956:31; Bradbury 1957:33; 1973:177). While chiefdom heads were more powerful farther from the capital their estates were due to their personal enterprise, the *Oba* himself granted "pseudochiefdom" heads more prerogatives more distant from Benin City the territory lay (Bradbury 1973:150; Imoagene 1990:28). The pseudochiefdom heads were to compensate the central power's insufficient strength in the country's outskirts. Such units' number especially increased in the time of Benin's active expansion (mid-15th – early 17th centuries).

Characteristically, the *Obas* could grant titled chiefs only those communities which did not form parts of traditional Bini chiefdoms. Those chiefs actually never resettled there and remained members of their native lineages and communities. The *Obas* could not subdivide a chiefdom or grant it as a whole to a titled chief. Thus, the pseudochiefdoms of titled chiefs could be compiled exclusively of neighboring autonomous communities. The titled chief who was posed above them carried out in respect to those communities and their members all the same functions as the head of a chiefdom though these responsibilities were secondary for them compared to the duties inflicted on them by high all-Benin titles. Their obligations to the supreme authority were also just the same: collecting tribute, attracting communalists to corvée labor, recruiting of soldiers, etc. Pseudochiefdoms, chiefdoms, and autonomous communities heads – all were subordinated directly to the *Oba* and were regarded as equals in this respect (Egharevba 1949:79; Bradbury 1973:177). The *Obas* could not subdivide or change the self-administrative system of a community or chiefdom. No chiefdom and only an autonomous community as a whole (not a part of it) could be granted to a titled chief.

So, none of the territorial units the Benin Kingdom comprised can be called administrative in the proper sense. The community and not the central authority remained the true focus of the society throughout the whole Benin history (Bondarenko 1995; 2001).

Charles Maisels (1987; 1990) emphasized that in what he calls "city-states", opposite to territorial "village-states" (see also Trigger 1993), not broad descent groups (such as sibs/clans) but lineage-based extended families

(households)¹⁶ were the basic mode of social organization. Though city-state both as concept and term seems to me unacceptable at least with respect to Benin (Bondarenko 1995:95), the latter definitely was a society of the very type Maisels and Trigger designated that way¹⁷. However, there is significant difference between two subtypes of cultures falling under this category. The first of them is represented by the societies in which typical household and community were based on nuclear families (*e.g.*, Greek *poleis*) while the second subtype, and Benin is a good example at this point, is formed by those early urban societies in which community comprised households each of which was an extended family with lineages (not sibs/clans) as their cores. Particularly, I have shown elsewhere that in Benin not nuclear but extended family (organized as household integrating a number of patrilineal kindred nuclear families) was the economic and socio-cultural background of the community (Bondarenko 1995:136–9; Bondarenko and Korotayev 2000a:174–6). Indeed, what unites both of the subtypes is that their core social institution is household-based community of this or that type¹⁸ but while the nuclear-family-based community is essentially and unavoidably non-kin, the extended-family-based one preserves in itself unilineal descent ties.

A useful division can be established within the extended-family households either: between those integrating monogamous and polygynous kindred nuclear families. In Benin polygyny was a norm supported by public morality and recognized as a sign of man's might and wealth (Dapper 1668/1975:162; Gallwey 1893:129; Thomas 1910:I, 15; Talbot 1926:III, 429; Ajisafe 1945:40; Mercier 1962:299–303; Ogieriakhi 1965; Ahanmisi 1992; Eweka, I. 1998:161–2). This fact is significant: theoretical research has revealed that general polygyny is a rather strong predictor of social homoarchicity at both local and supralocal levels of complexity (Bondarenko and Korotayev 2000a; Korotayev and Bondarenko 2000).

¹⁶ Maisels denotes sibs/clans as “lineages” or “conical clans” (*e.g.*, Chinese) while lineages proper he calls “minimal lineages”.

¹⁷ In fact, Trigger (1993) explicitly discusses Benin together with neighboring historically and culturally related to her “Yoruba city-states”.

¹⁸ Characteristically, Dmitri Dozhdev, criticizing the traditional glance at institutional evolution of early Rome in light of the sib/clan theory, writes in introduction to his article (2004:389) as follows:

The below picture of the formation of the Roman state, the suggested legal evaluations and the attempt to find out a continuous line that determines its specific features as a version of the political development are based on the recognition of the civil community (*civitas*) as the phenomenological and conceptual kernel of the problem. Rome was founded in the urban epoch.

Operating with Mesopotamian evidence only, Maisels argues that kin ties within “minimal lineage” are secondary to non-kin within the entire household (extended family). However, this is not the whole story. First, it should be underlined that sib/clan does not form the core economic unit in any society either, as it is delocalized: for example, married women from patrilineal sibs normally participate incomparably more actively in economic activities of their husbands’, not fathers and brothers’ groups. Hence, clan communities reveal an interlacing of kin and territorial ties, too. Then, lineage (a group of unilineal relatives of several generations) as Maisels (1987:348) recognizes, is the “core” of the household and, let me stress it one more time, is kin group. Only male relatives become both the lineage and household members by birth while all the rest come to the household by means of establishing some (most often marital) relations with them, and only the lineage male members are eligible for heading the household and nuclear families within it being ranked along age lines, social in their essence. So, every extended family demonstrates a mixture of kin and territorial ties by definition but precisely the former integrate and shape the whole. Again, in order to understand an archaic society, first, we should concentrate on community rather than on its components, and second, we must recognize that the problem we are facing is not of the “presence or absence” but of the “more or less” sort.

This more or less criterion is still critically important if we look at the extended-family community formed by a number of households (as far as the community consisting of only one extended family and hence identical to it, as the typical, basic socio-economic unit is a rare case in the preindustrial world¹⁹, incredible specifically in Benin where one-family communities could be observed but very infrequently [Egharevba 1949:11]). We can draw a line between two variants of extended-family communities. The first is that in which extended families within community do not hold kinship relations with each other (as, for instance, among the Bambara and Songhay of Western Africa [Paque 1954:53–4; Rouch 1954:43]). In such a situation territorial ties did predominate over kin at the community level. The second variant is represented by Benin (again, among other cultures including African [*e.g.*, McCulloch *et al.* 1954:160; Ksenofontova 1970]) where extended families within community preserved kin ties, and thus the latter dominated in the community as a whole though in the interfamily relations they were intertwined with corporate ties of

¹⁹ Among such rare cases are medieval Thailand, Laos, and the Malabar Coast of India (Alaev 2000:129).

neighborhood.²⁰ The bigger the community the higher role of it as a whole was, compared to that of a family as its constituent part (Bradbury 1957:31).

As has been noted above, the Bini community was of the homoarchic type as it united kindred extended families organized just this way: with the only significant hierarchy within which senior males unavoidably dominated in any social context. Community was the basic, substantial institution not socio-politically only but culturally and economically as well (Bradbury 1957:15; 1973:149). Historically, its formation in the late 1st millennium BC – early 1st millennium AD turned out the initial step on the way to the Benin Kingdom's appearance (see Bondarenko and Roese 1998; Bondarenko 2001:25–39). Anthropologically, community served the model, a kind of pattern according to which the supra-communal levels were built up homoarchically too, though the transition to higher levels of socio-political organization was accompanied by significant changes. The complex society's integrity was guaranteed by principally the same various mechanisms as that of the community; ideologically, this part was played by ancestors' cult first and foremost which ascribed legitimacy to political institutions (see Bondarenko 1995:176–81). Collectivist, hierarchy-oriented dominant features of communalists' thinking, consciousness, *Weltanschauung* were adequate to, and critically supportive for the terms and conditions of life in that society.²¹ Precisely the community was not only the focus of the Benin complex society by which it was “modeled”, but also the core of the whole universe in the Bini's outlook (see Bondarenko 1995:24–89; 1997).

Thus, in Benin not the supra-communal institutions were reshaping the community (what is typical of states) but *vice versa*: they were becoming similar to it. What follows from all the aforesaid is the community's key role in determination of the character of the mental-cultural, socio-economic, and governmental subsystems of the society. The explanation for many truly and already pseudo-, quasicommunal traits and features of the 13th – 19th centuries Benin society is contained in the aforesaid, too. As the fundamental, basic institution, the community fastened all the levels of its hierarchical structure from birth till death of the Kingdom. In particular, the position of titled chiefs and the sovereign himself clearly witnesses to the kin communal principles'

²⁰ In the ancient world, for instance Sumer gave examples of communities of both types: with kin and with non-kin extended families forming them (Chipirova 1988:7).

²¹ Treating multiple in Benin art compositions with *Oba* in the center flanked by dignitaries depicted smaller than the sovereign is as “a classic hierarchical composition”, Herbert Cole (1981:12) rightly pointed out “... its great value in Benin thought, not only as a socio-political statement, but as a spiritual, mythic, and psychological metaphor as well”.

primary importance for the shaping of political system and institutions.

Conclusion

It looks like the character of a complex society may be predetermined by the specifics of its local (substratum) institution – the community to a greater extent than by the ways of the local and supra-local levels interaction in the process of which the relations of higher order nevertheless do originate. This is not an absolutely strict regulation at all but my (in collaboration with Andrey Korotayev) quantitative cross-cultural research has nevertheless revealed the following. When a community itself is homoarchic (as in the majority of cases when it consists of extended families), a basically communal complex society can well turn out not less homoarchic than even a pre-industrial state which in principle cannot be built up by a community matrix as no community type permits administering by professionals²². As for Benin, the homoarchic extended-family-based community is still alive even today being the most adequate social framework for agricultural production in the tropical forest zone (Kochakova 1970:18–25; Bondarenko 2000d)²³. A heterarchic community-matrix-based complex society with higher probability can appear in the milieu of the small-family (neighbor) communities, also heterarchic in their nature

²² Indeed, this does not mean the community's disappearance (see above). The same is true with such other basically non-state social units as, for example, lineages. However, within the state structure they, being in essence non-bureaucratic (as well as communities), cannot and do not form the matrix for the uppermost level institutions' building up as lineage norms (loyalty to lineage members) are incompatible with state norms (Fallers 1956:12 f, 277 f; see also, *e.g.*, Lewis' [1965:100] compressed but instructive characteristics of the Zulu and Southeast Chinese socio-political systems). As for communities, they usually decay only in the process of the wider society's transition to capitalism (as well as early institutions of kinship [Parsons 1960; 1966]). Examples of the community's disappearance in agricultural societies are seldom, Egypt from the Middle Kingdom on being the most prominent one (Diakonoff *et al.* 1989:I, 143; Diakonoff and Jakobson 1998:26–27). However, even there "it is possible... that the ancient Egyptian peasantry, which for the most part seems to have continued to live in traditional villages long after the Old Kingdom, may have preserved significant aspects of communal social life..." (Trigger 1985:59). Besides, "... probably in some respect whole Egypt was considered as a community with the pharao as its leader, and as not a neighbor [community] but a kin one..." (Diakonoff and Jakobson 1998:27; see also McNeill 1963:72).

²³ Just its stability permits extrapolation of ethnographic evidence on earlier periods of the Bini social history with high degree of plausibility. Robert Bradbury, the greatest classic of ethnographic and historical anthropological Benin studies, especially made this point (Bradbury 1964).

(Bondarenko and Korotayev 2000a; see also Blanton 1995; Bondarenko 1998b; 2000c)²⁴.

In the meantime, the way of the Benin Kingdom's formation was through "likening" of the supra-communal socio-political institutions to the homoarchic community of extended families. The judicial system (see Dapper 1671:492; Talbot 1926:III, table 19; Egharevba 1949:11; 1960:35; Bradbury 1957:32–3, 41–2; Sidahome 1964:127), the system of imposing and collecting tribute (*e.g.*, Van Nyendael 1705:452–3; Astley 1746:103; Bradbury 1957:42–3; Agbontaen 1995:122–3), etc. – all corresponded to the homoarchic character of the society. Any interaction with supra-familial authorities a common Bini had to realize through the head of his kin unit. However, the head of a family could apply directly to his community leader only. This leader, in his turn, could apply exclusively to the respective chiefdom's head (if the given community was not autonomous), and only the latter (alongside with the autonomous community leader) had the right to solicit the titled chiefs who could make the case known to the supreme ruler. Millar resumes in her juvenile but knowledgeable and qualified book (1997:48–9):

With the Oba at the top [of social pyramid], everyone in Benin had a rank. To do certain things, you had to have the correct rank. Some ranks led. Some followed. ... Top to bottom, Edo [*i.e.*, Bini] chiefs, men, wives, children, and even slaves were arranged into an enormous system of ranks.

So, to sum up, Benin cannot be considered as a state in terms of either Marxism (see also Kochakova 1986:9, 11), including "structural Marxism", or (neo)evolutionism, or structuralism; even the existence of the monarchy does not presuppose the state character of society (Oosten 1996; Quigley 1995; Wilkinson 1999; Skalník 2002). The 13th–19th centuries Benin form of socio-political organization can be defined as "megacommunity," and its structure can be depicted as four concentric circles which in their totality represent an upset cone: the extended family, community, chiefdom, and megacommunity (kingdom). No doubt, this is not a co-incidence but a display of their interdependence that "objective" socio-political structure was paralleled by "subjective" Bini's vision of the world. The universe was perceived by the Bini as hierarchically structured entity, also a system of four circles: the human

²⁴ The most vivid example of complex society based on the neighbor community matrix is given by the ancient Greek *polis*. It also shows that no state can be based on the community matrix of any kind: just because no community permits the existence of bureaucracy, the *polis* was lack of it either, and hence was not state (*e.g.*, Berent 2000; Marcus and Feinman [1998:8] remark correctly that "... many Aegean specialists do not believe the *polis* was a state at all...")

being – terrestrial space – the world of spirits and supreme deities – the world on the whole.²⁵ Community was perceived by the Bini as the socio-cultural focus of society and hence the core of the whole world, as for them their society literally was the hub of the universe.

Megacommunal institutions towered above communities and chiefdoms, established their dominance over them but in the essentially communal Benin society with lack of pronounced priority of territorial ties over kin ones, even those who governed at the supreme level could not become professional administrators. The Benin megacommunity's specificity is in organization on rather a vast territory of a complex, "many-tier" society predominantly on the basis of transformed kin principle supplemented by a "grain" of territorial one. This basis was inherited from the community, within which extended families preserved kin relations not only within themselves but with each other as well, supplementing them by relations of neighborhood.²⁶

Indeed, "extensive socio-political systems can be legitimized in kinship terms..." (Claessen 2000:150). Even Stalin in the industrialized, territory-based, and heavily bureaucratized Soviet Union was unofficially but routinely used to be called "father of the peoples" by the propaganda. In Benin political relations were "naturally" perceived and expressed in kin terms. The spirits of royal ancestors "spread" their authority on all the *Oba*'s subjects though only the

²⁵ Besides, every person was believed to have four soles that demonstrated different degree of separateness from his or her physical membrane (Bradbury 1973:271–82).

²⁶ As a megacommunity I shall also designate, for instance, the Bamum Kingdom of the late 16th/early 17th – 19th centuries in present-day Cameroon which as a whole represented an extension up to the supercomplex level of the lineage principles and organization forms, so the society acquired the shape of "maximal lineage" (Tardits 1980). Outside Africa megacommunities may be recognized in Indian societies of the late 1st millennium BC – first centuries AD. Naturally, differing in many respects from the Benin pattern, they nevertheless fit the main distinctive feature of megacommunity as social type: integration of a supercomplex (exceeding the complex chiefdom level) society on community (and hence non-state) basis. In particular, Samozvantsev (2001) describes those societies as permeated by communal orders notwithstanding the difference in socio-political organization forms. "The principle of communality", he argues, was the most important factor of social organization in India during that period. In the south of India this situation lasted much longer, till the time of the Vijayanagara Empire – the mid-14th century (Palat 1987; Stein, B. 1989). A number of other examples of supercomplex societies in which "the supracommunal political structure was shaped according to the community type" (similar to the Bini type) is provided by the 1st millennium AD Southeast Asia – by such societies as e.g., Funan and possibly (see Mudar 1999) Dvaravati (Rebrikova 1987:159–63). Apart from all the rest, these examples show that megacommunity may be seen among not only "city-based" societies like Benin, but among "territorial" ones as well.

sovereign and his relatives were their descendents. However, in Benin kinship was not only an ideology; it was much more than this – the true, “objective” socio-cultural background of this supercomplex society.

The megacommunity was a specific type of complex homoarchic socio-political organization. On the one hand, the Benin megacommunity gives an historical example of positive (non-destructive) transformation of the complex chiefdom. It has repeatedly been argued (*e.g.*, Webb 1975; Peebles and Kus 1977; Wright 1977; Carneiro 1981; Cohen 1981; Smith, M. E. 1985; Spencer 1987; Earle 1991; Anderson, D. 1994) that a typical fortune of a chiefdom (including complex) is eventual disintegration into its initial components while only some of them turn out able to transform into states. The fate of all but one numerous Bini chiefdoms of the mid – late 1st – early 2nd millennia confirmed this regularity (Obayemi 1976:242; Darling 1984:I, 119–24, 130–42), and only Benin showed that becoming a state is not the unique possibility for a chiefdom-based polity to escape disintegration by making an evolutionary step forward.

On the other hand, this type of organization was alternative to statehood, for it is clear that in many significant respects (economic, social, cultural) Benin was not less developed than the majority of the societies labeled as “transitional early” (Claessen and Skalník 1978:23, 589–93, 641) or “archaic” (Feinman and Marcus 1998) states. In particular, the Benin megacommunity was not inferior to many states – societies in which bureaucracy presents, including the so-called “transitional early states” characterized by the Early State concept adepts as ones in which territorial (“social”) ties dominate over kin (Claessen and Skalník 1978:23, 589), and as one of which Benin is even sometimes attributed (Kochakova 1994), erroneously, as I believe I have managed to show above.

Thus, alternativity exists not only between heterarchic and homoarchic societies but also within the respective types. In particular, the early state, homoarchic by the very definition given by the concept’s Founding Fathers – Claessen and Skalník²⁷, “competes” not only with a variety of complex

²⁷ The definition they give is the following one:

The early state is a centralized socio-political organization for the regulation of social relations in a complex, stratified society divided into at least two basic strata, or emergent social classes – viz. the rulers and the ruled – , whose relations are characterized by political dominance of the former and tributary obligations of the latter, legitimized by a common ideology of which reciprocity is the basic principle (Claessen and Skalník 1978:640; see also pp. 533–96, 637–50).

Note that the homoarchic character of the early state is also stressed *e.g.*, in its such heavily criticized but still influential “classical” concepts as those of Elman Service (1962/1971; 1975), Morton Fried (1960/1970; 1967), and Robert Carneiro (1970),

decentralized heterarchic socio-political systems (for examples see, *e.g.*, contributions in Ehrenreich *et al.* 1995; Korotayev 1995; 1996; Thevenot 1996:Ch. 7; Possehl 1998; Schoenfelder 2003), but also with some forms of socio-political organization like megacommunity, not less complex, not less centralized, and not less homoarchic than the early state itself.

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notwithstanding the significant difference in those scholars' general theoretical premises: seeing the state power as basically either consensual or coercive.

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ALTERNATIVITY OF STATE FORMATION PROCESS: THE EARLY STATE VS. STATE ANALOGUES

THE PROBLEM SETTING

We know many historical and ethnographic cases of polities which differ from the early state significantly in political organization and power as well as administrative structure, but are similar to the state in size and complexity (Beliaev *et al.* 2002; Bondarenko 1995, 2000a, 2000b, 2001; Bondarenko and Korotayev 2000; Bondarenko and Sledzevski 2000; Crumley 1995, 2001; Girenko 1995; Grinin 1997, 2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d; 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2004a; Grinin, Carneiro, Bondarenko, Kradin, and Korotayev 2004; Korotayev 1995, 2000a, 2000b; Kradin *et al.* 2000; Kradin, Bondarenko, and Barfield 2003; Kradin and Lynsha 1995; McIntoch 1999a, 1999b; Popov 1995a, 1995b, 2000; Possehl 1998; Schaedel 1995 etc.).

Later I shall give some examples of such societies. But now let me point out that it is recognized universally enough (see, *e.g.* Claessen 1978, 2000, 2002) that to form a state a pre-state society must possess a certain set of minimum characteristics with respect to territory, population, complexity, sociopolitical differentiation and ability to accumulate surplus. Pre-state societies, however, after reaching a certain size and level of sociocultural complexity (at which the transition to the state is already possible), may continue to develop without building political forms of an early state for a long time. So they can significantly outgrow the respective levels of those indices – but without forming a state. In particular, a culture may have a high level of social stratification but lack a state system. How then should such societies be classified? Still as pre-state cultures, or as something else?

Some of such societies can be characterized by the term *heterarchy* (see *e.g.*, Crumley 1995, 2001; see also McIntosh 1999b). But among such societies there are many hierarchical polities as well as those of some other types.

So I am convinced that the most productive path to follow is to recognize them just as **early state analogues** (Grinin 1997, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2004a, 2004b; Bondarenko, Grinin, and Korotayev 2002). That is the way because, on the one hand, if compared with doubtlessly pre-state societies, such as, for example, simple chiefdoms, tribes, independent simple communities, big-men systems etc., they are not only bigger in size but much more complex as well. On the other hand, their size and complexity were comparable to those of early states and they dealt with problems of comparable scale and essence. That is why they may, in a certain sense, be regarded as being at the same level of sociocultural and/or political development as the early state societies. The latter, certainly, differ significantly from their analogues, but not so much in the development level as in some peculiarities of political organization and in ‘the mechanics’ of administration (for details see Grinin 2002b, 2002c, 2003c, 2004a).

However, despite the differences in the mechanics of regulation of sociopolitical life, similar functions were still performed in both types of societies. I mean such functions as:

- establishment of political and ideological unity and cohesion within enlarged society (or a group of closely related societies) directed at solving common problems;
- ensuring security from external threat and providing conditions for expansion; and so on.

Later I shall give some examples of early state analogues. However, before doing this, I should provide some additional explanations.

EARLY STATE ANALOGUES:

SIZE AND SOME CHARACTERISTICS

First of all, of course, analogues are quite different from each other. The introduction of dissimilar societies under the single common title ‘**early state analogues**’ has been done with the purpose to contrast other alternatives of the development of complex post-primitive societies with the state one.

Naturally, analogues had very difficult fortune. Some of them turned out to be incapable to get transformed into states at all. Other analogues do become states – but after reaching quite a high level of development and complexity that is fairly comparable with those of many state societies.

Next the size of the analogues should be mentioned. This issue becomes of a rather great importance because of the following relationship: the bigger is the population of a polity, the more complex its structure is (all other conditions being similar), because a higher population and a larger territory may require the new levels of hierarchy and administration (see, *e.g.* Carneiro 1967;

Feinman 1998; Johnson and Earle 2000: 2, 181). But since we compare early state analogues with the early state proper, first it should be established what is considered to be the minimum size required for an early state.

To begin with, there is no uniformity of opinion on this subject and as Feinman said 'less agreement than one might expect exist in the scholarly literature concerning the size and scale of archaic state' (Feinman 1998: 97; see also Chabal *et al.* 2004: 55). However, something like the following pattern tends to be traced:

simple chiefdom – population of thousands;
complex chiefdom – population of tens of thousands;
state – population of hundreds of thousands or millions
(Johnson and Earle 2000: 246, 304; see also Vasilyev 1983: 45).

Then they produce an elegant and perfect line of levels of cultural evolution: the family – the local group – the Big Man collectivity – the chiefdom – the archaic state – the nation-state (Johnson and Earle 2000: 245).

In general, such a line could be a fruitful method of constructing evolutionary patterns for a certain purpose. But it is a mistake to regard it as a universal pattern. Such an approach only distorts a view on our problem because it completely ignores states with population from several thousand to a hundred thousand though just in this size interval the similarity between early states and early state analogues can be seen best of all. There were a great number of such states (about a hundred – one hundred and fifty) in the ancient and medieval times and one can also find such states even in the modern times (*e.g.* Nauru, Kiribati, etc.). I want to point out that there even exists an opinion, *e.g.* D'jakonov (2000: 34) that the pristine states must have been small in size at any time and anywhere and must have incorporated one single territorial community or several interconnected communities. D'jakonov cites some interesting facts regarding the assumed population numbers of Mesopotamian city-states in the 3rd millennium B.C. In the 28th –27th centuries B.C. the population of the Ur city-state encompassed 6,000 people, of which two thirds resided in the city of Ur itself. In the 27th–26th centuries B.C. the population of the Shuruppak could amount to 15,000–20,000 people. There is also a point of view expressed by Claessen which I am inclined to consider as the right one in general. He supposes that for a polity to become a state it must have a population of not less than several thousand people. And he adds that the population of the smallest Tahiti states counted not less than 5,000. **But this, certainly, is the lowest limit for an early state.**

In this respect, therefore, the early states counting from several thousand to 100–200 thousand people are of special interest for the researchers of state

formation process. There were a number of such states in different parts of the world especially among the city-states of ancient Greece; Northern Italy in the 13–14th centuries (Batkin 1970: 252; Bernadskaya 1970: 329; Luzzatto 1954: 283; Rutenberg 1987: 74, 112; Skazkin *et al.* 1970: 208, 261). Presumably, the population of 40,000–50,000 people could live in the early state that existed around 100 B.C.–A.D. 250 at Monte Albán in the Valley of Oaxaca, Mexico (Kowalewski *et al.* 1995: 96). Of course, one can easily give many other examples.

Thus, the differences in population numbers and, respectively, in the complexity of organization of early states may conventionally be reflected in the following graduation:

a small early state – from several thousand to several dozen thousand people;

a medium early state – from several dozen thousand to several hundred thousand people;

a large early state – from several hundred thousand to 2–3 million people;

a huge early state – more than 3 million people.

Respectively the early state analogues must be classified as **small early state analogues, medium early state analogues and large early state analogues**. It goes without saying that all three of them considerably differ from each other.

For every type of early state there is a type of early state analogue, which is comparable in size, complexity and functions (see Table 1 below).

The watershed between the states and the analogues runs within the polity size of several hundred thousand people. **For the analogues, this size is, probably, the final limit beyond which such a polity either breaks down or transforms into a state.** That is why large state analogues are very rare. The only case of such analogues among the examples given further, are the large nomadic polities as, for instance, Hsiung-Nu which Kradin denotes as ‘supercomplex chiefdoms’ (2000a, 2000b, 2001a, 2001b). He estimates their population up to 1,500,000 people (Kradin 2001a: 127). Thus, such analogues only correspond to relatively smaller varieties of large states. Analogues of huge early states do not appear to exist.

TABLE 1

The relation between the sizes of early states and their analogues

<u>Polity size</u>	<u>Type of early state and examples</u>	<u>Type of early state analogue and examples</u>
Several thousand to several dozen thousand people	A small early state (Ur in the 28 th –27 th centuries B.C.)	An analogue of a small early state (Iceland in the 11 th century A. D.)
Several dozen thousand to several hundred thousand people	A medium early state (Hawaii in 19 th century)	An analogue of a medium early state (Aedui, Arverni, and Helvetii of Gaul before Caesar)
Several hundred thousand to 2–3 million people	A large early state (Poland in the 11 th –14 th centuries)	An analogue of a large early state (Hsiung-Nu in 200 B.C. – A.D. 48)
> 3,000,000	A huge early state (Rome in the 2 nd century B.C.; the Inca state)	Analogues of huge early states do not appear to exist

EARLY STATE ANALOGUES: CLASSIFICATION

All the analogues, no doubt, differ from early states in their peculiarities of political organization and administration. However, this distinction is manifested in each analogue type in a different way. For example, the separation of the power from the population in self-governing communities is rather weak; while confederations exhibit the weakness of power centralization, etc. That is why I did my best to classify the early state analogues according to peculiarities of their political forms, although this principle is hard to keep to consistently. The following types and sub-types of the analogues can be distinguished:

First, one could single out some self-governing communities and territories, such as:

a) Urban communities, especially the ones with developed commercial structure. As examples of self-governing townships the following can be cited: some temple-civil communities of ancient Arabia (Korotayev 2000b: 266; Korotayev *et al.* 2000: 23); some towns of Gaul where the number of ‘true towns’ reached 1,000 (Shkunaev 1989: 143), some of them with the population

of several dozen thousand (Shkunaev 1989: 134); certain Greek *poleis*, for example, Delphs (see Gluskina 1983: 45, 71. For details also see Grinin 2003b: 8–9; 2004b).

b) Large enough self-governing settlers' territories, *e.g.* Iceland in 10th–13th century A.D.

Iceland was sectioned into territorial areas and dozens of legal-administrative districts, with *Althing* (the people's assembly) and *Lögretta* (a kind of senate) as supreme organs of administration. The level of electoral procedures and conventions was high, the proof of which being the decisions adopted from time to time by the *Althing* by voting. Thus, in A.D. 1000 it was decided to change the religion and adopt Christianity. At the same time toleration was preserved: it was allowed to secretly worship pagan gods and eat horseflesh, the basic food for the population. It was also decided to divide big land possessions of the nobility and distribute them among the farmers; this process was completed in the middle of the 11th century (Olgeirsson 1957: 179–191). However, in the 12th century the wealth and social inequality again became so strong that it started influencing the transformation of the basic institutions of the Icelandic society (Gurevich 1972: 8, 9). In the 13th century the population grew up to 70,000–80,000 people (Filatov 1965: 343).

c) Territories inhabited by large groups of déclassé persons of various descent ('outlaws'), that had their own bodies of self-government and constituted an organized and formidable military force like, for example, the Cossacks of the Don or Zaporozhye (Korotayev *et al.* 2000: 19; Rozner 1970).

Second, some large tribal 'confederations' with a supreme chieftain exercising power strong enough (*e.g.*, 'kings', khans, etc.), such as:

a) More or less stable tribal unions, ethnically uniform or having a firm monoethnic main body. German tribal unions of the period of the Great Migration of the Peoples in the 4th–6th centuries A.D. (Salian Franks, Visigoths, Ostrogoths, etc.) that counted from 80,000 to 150,000 of population (Bessmertny 1972: 40; Le Goff 1992: 33; Neusyhin 1968; Udaltsova 1967: 654) or Slavic union in Bohemia and Moravia under Samon in 7th century (Lozny 1995: 86–87) may serve as examples.

b) Very large polities that emerged as a result of successful wars (like the Huns 'empire' under Attila in the 5th century A.D. or the Avars 'empire' in the 6th–7th centuries A.D. [Korsunsky and Gunter 1984: 105–116; Smirnov 1966: 324; Tikhanova 1958]), usually rather unstable and ethnically heterogeneous.

c) The unions that can be defined as a transitional type between the analogues described in items 'a' and 'b' are the ones under the leadership of this or that outstanding chieftain and consisting of ethnically close peoples but rather

unstable and usually breaking apart after their leader's death or even during his life. For example, in the 1st century B.C. and the 2nd century A.D. the Germans had large unions: Ariovistus's union of the Suebi, Maroboduus's union of the Marcomanni, Arminius's union of the Cherusci and others (Neusyhin 1968: 601–602; Oosten 1996).

Third, large tribal unions and confederations without royal power like a) Saxons of Saxony (Kolesnitskij 1963; [Kolesnitskij] 1969a); Aedui, Arverni and Helvetii in Gaul (Shkunaev 1989: 140). At the same time it should be specifically pointed out that the processes of social and proprietary differentiation had gone quite far within them, going ahead of political development.

The Saxons (of Saxony), before they were conquered by Charles (the end of the 8th century A.D.), had had no royal power but their tribal units were headed by dukes. General military command was in the hands of a duke who was chosen by lot (Kolesnitskij 1963: 186). Politically, all the territory was organized as a kind of federation of separate provinces. Common issues were discussed and tackled at a congress of representatives of the provinces (Kolesnitskij 1963: 186).

The Saxon society, excluding slaves, was divided into three strata: the tribal nobility (*aethelings*, *nobiles*), the free (*liberi*) and the semi-free (*liti*). At the same time, the legal status of the *nobiles* and the *liberi* differed sharply, which was legally affirmed in *Lex Saxonum*. In the first twenty articles of this code the *nobiles* appeared as the sole bearers of legal standards and rules ([Kolesnitskij] 1969a: 479; 1969b; Neusyhin 1968: 608).

Gaul, by the Caesar's conquest, was a very rich territory with large population – 5 to 10 or even more million people (Brodel 1995: 61–62) – with numerous towns, trades and well-developed commerce. The population of certain tribal units and confederations was very great (up to 2–4 hundred thousand [see *e.g.*, Shkunaev 1988: 503]). Social differentiation was considerable (Clark and Piggott 1970: 310–328). According to Caesar, the common people lived like slaves (Le Roux 2000: 125). At the same time the Gallic nobles had, each of them, up to several hundred – and even several thousand (up to ten thousand) – clients to form cavalry troops as a substitute for levies and in this way to confront the majority of Gallic commoners (Bessmertny 1972: 17; Caesar 1993: 9). In the aristocratic *civitas* a distinct military unity was observed, while the mechanisms of making political or other decisions were realized through one of several elected magistrates (Shkunaev 1989: 139, 144).

b) Confederations of societies, at times making quite stable and strong (from the military point of view) political formations as, for instance, tribal confederations of the Iroquois (Fenton 1978; Morgan 1983; Vorobyov 2000), the Tuareg (Pertshyts 1968) or the Pechenegs (Marey 2000).

c) Autonomous rural territories forming a federation or a confederation of politically independent rural communities, as, for example, it is observed among many highlanders (Korotayev 1995).

Highland Dagestan in the Caucasus may be cited as an example (Aglarov 1988). The communities, *jama'ats*, that formed federations, were themselves, at times, large enough settlements – some of them up to 1,500 and more households (*ibid*: 207) – and had a multilevel system (up to five levels) of self-government (*ibid*: 186). As to a federation (sometimes including 13 or more settlements), it was a political unit of an even more complex constitution and uniting dozens thousand people. Family groups (*toukhouns*) were unequal socially and in rank (*ibid*: 131). Another example is the village groups in southeastern Nigeria, sometimes including dozens of villages with total population of dozens of thousands (up to 75,000). Each village group had its own name, internal organization, and a central market (McIntosh 1999a: 9).

d) Some *heterarchies* (Crumley 1995, 2001; McIntosh 1999b) which can be quite complex, and they are found all over the world.

Fourth, superlarge nomadic amalgamations, such as Hsiung-Nu (which superfluously resembled large states), termed by Kradin (1992, 2000a, 2000b, 2001a, 2001b) as ‘nomadic empires’ and referred to as supercomplex chiefdoms. According to Kradin, the ‘nomadic empires’ of Inner Asia counted up to 1,000,000–1,500,000 of population (2001a: 127; 2001b: 79).

In my opinion, Scythia in the 6th–5th centuries B.C. may also be denoted a supercomplex chiefdom (for detail see Grinin 2003 c: 142, 165).

Fifth, polities whose structure can be hardly described because of scarce data but, on the other hand, there are important reasons to regard them as neither pre-state nor state ones with respect to their scale and culture. The Indus, or Harappan civilization could serve here as an example.

Several dozens thousand of citizens or perhaps even more could live in the biggest cities like Mohenjo-daro (Bongard-Levin and Il'yin 1969: 92; Jacobson 2000: 394). There was a class and social stratification within the Indus civilization (Bongard-Levin and Il'yin 1969: 111; Possehl 1998: 287). Crafts and trades were highly developed (Bongard-Levin and Il'yin 1969: 101–103; Possehl 1998: 289). But there is a reason to believe that the political system was segmented and decentralized, lacking a 'king'. Also there is no evidence for a central government, or bureaucracy, implying that older 'tribal' organizations wielded political power within regional contexts. But whole civilization held in place through a strong Harappan ideology, which crossed the segmented, regional political boundaries, reaching into every Harappan family. There are other forms of solidarity as trade (Albedil 1991: 56; Bongard-Levin and Il'yin 1969: 102–103; Possehl 1998: 289). Also it is possible to imagine strong temporary alliances among a number of groups (Possehl 1998: 288) though the actual form of organization for the mature Harappan is obviously not well understood (Possehl 1998: 290).

Mature Harappan culture included such units as a writing system, a system of weights and measures, and a host of artifact categories like ceramics, beads, figurines, and metal objects. And also some architectural standards are apparent.

CONCLUSION

Thus, major dissimilarities between early states and their analogues are not in size and complexity level – they are in the peculiarities of political organization, and in the methods of government – therefore, to distinguish an early state from its analogues some other criteria are required than the ones used for distinguishing early state and true pre-state societies. I have singled out and analyzed four of such features to distinguish early state and its analogues:

1. Specific properties (attributes) of supreme power.
2. New principles of government.
3. Non-traditional and new forms of regulating social life.
4. Redistribution of power.

For detailed explanation for these theses see Grinin 2002b, 2003c, 2004 a.

New researches have detected such directions of sociocultural evolution, which do not lead to state formation at all, whereas within certain evolutionary patterns transition to statehood takes place on levels of complexity far exceeding the ones indicated by conventional evolutionist schemes. So the concept of *analogues of the early state* may be useful for explaining such cases.

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DISCOURSES OF LEGITIMACY: HONOR AND AUTHORITY IN THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT OF 1626

The proceedings against the Duke of Buckingham in the Parliament of 1626, culminating in the introduction of articles of impeachment to remove him from his public offices, revealed the escalating tension between honor and authority in early Stuart England.¹ It also marked a critical moment in the developing crisis of legitimacy that was to engulf the kingdom in civil war and revolution a decade and a half later.

Buckingham, born plain George Villiers, was the scion of a minor gentry family. Promoted as a pliant favorite at the court of James I, he secured the aging King's affections and within a few years had become not only the most powerful political figure in the realm but, as England's only duke, its senior nobleman in point of honor and precedence.² This bred intense resentment among older titled families, while Buckingham's control of royal patronage and the abuses to which it led made him unpopular with the general public as well. For some years there was little outlet for this sentiment beyond private grumbling and anonymous satires.³ With the calling of Parliament in 1621, however, Buckingham was publicly challenged as "the only author of all grievances and oppressions whatsoever."⁴ Using the lever of an investigation into the abuse of royal monopolies, Parliament was able to revive its long-dormant power of judicial impeachment. Buckingham's position was undermined to the extent that the King had to intercede personally for him in the House of Lords. He escaped punishment, but the Lord Chancellor, Sir Francis Bacon, was impeached and imprisoned in his stead.⁵

Buckingham was able to repair his standing in 1624 when he led a war party in Parliament against Spain, but the next two years brought a renewal of opposition. When war came, it was, disastrously, against both Spain and France, and Buckingham, as Lord Admiral, was held responsible for a series of humiliating reverses. Under ordinary circumstances, his power would have been eclipsed when James died in 1625, but he had forged a close bond with the heir apparent as well, and when the latter succeeded as Charles I the favorite's position was if anything strengthened.⁶ From the temporary companion of an elderly monarch he had become a *valido*, the chief minister and chief confidant of a new king likely to reign for decades. What had been sufferable in the short term was far less acceptable over a long one, and the popular rumor that

Buckingham had hastened James' death reflected widespread fears of usurpation and tyranny. Finally, Buckingham had rashly associated himself with the rising Arminian party in the Anglican church, whose partisans not only challenged its long-established doctrinal consensus but, in courting royal favor, supported a divine right autocracy at odds with widely accepted views of limited monarchy. This last episode had coincided with the opening of a new parliament in February 1626.⁷

The attacks on Buckingham in 1626 came from several sources and reflected multiple concerns, but their common theme was the usurpation of honor. Honor was not only the essence of the aristocratic code but the linchpin of the extended hierarchical relations that depended on it and the networks of political, economic, and artistic patronage that grew out of it. Honor justified the hereditary principle as divine right supported the monarchical one, and the crown, as the fountain of honor, was its ultimate repository and guardian. The perversion of honor thus affected the wellsprings of legitimacy that underlay the entire social and constitutional order. As a masculine ideal, it had suffered under the gynocracy of the last two Tudor sovereigns, and the resulting tensions, barely contained within the Elizabethan cult of chivalry, had come to the fore in the career of Elizabeth's own favorite, the Earl of Essex. Essex's career had ended on the scaffold, but his espousal of an aristocratic conciliarism that traded acceptance of modern bureaucratic government for the assured place of the senior peerage around the throne, combined with his staunch defense of Protestant interests, had made him a retrospective hero. Buckingham, in contrast, lacked both the pedigree and the prowess of his predecessor. He revived rather than allayed gender anxieties; his relations with James were considered corrupt, and his emotional hold on Charles seemed no less sinister. To many, he exhibited the classic symptoms of the would-be tyrant: popery--the espousal of claims to unfettered authority associated with or on behalf of the Roman pontiff--; effeminacy; debauchery. One by one, he had cast off or alienated noblemen who had tried to make their peace with him. By 1626, his best hope of avoiding prosecution in the House of Lords was to pack it with sycophants and to exclude opponents, such as the earls of Arundel and Bristol, by preemptive imprisonment.

The attack on Buckingham began in the House of Commons, where formal indictment powers lay.⁸ A hitherto obscure member of Parliament, Dr. Samuel Turner, launched a comprehensive and carefully prepared charge against him in March. Turner was a stalking-horse for his patron, the influential Earl of Pembroke. His speech was immediately circulated in printed copies, and

formed the basis for the articles of impeachment brought against the favorite in May.⁹

Turner's charges included Buckingham's alleged popery, his mismanagement of the war effort, his monopolization of office, his wasting of the King's treasure, and his sale of honors and preferments in church and state. Among the specific allegations was the "dishonor" of his not having accompanied the fleet on its failed venture against the Spanish port of Cadiz, the site of one of Essex's greatest triumphs. In a culture of honor where valor at arms was esteemed above all else, it was hard to imagine a more studied insult. That it was delivered by a commoner made it all the more telling.

When the House of Commons presented its formal bill of impeachment against Buckingham in May, however, it showed tender regard for both the honor and privilege of the upper house. Christopher Sherland of Northampton, delivering his portion of the bill, begged excuse for raising the subject of honor, which belonged properly to the Lords' "higher sphere." Honor, he declared, was "above all estimation," "a sublime spiritual inheritance" and "an immediate beam of virtue" emanating from the person in whom it was recognized and the deeds for which he was known. Adopting the divine right rhetoric dear to James and Charles, Sherland noted that if kings might be styled gods as Scripture suggested, then "by a good analogy" their peers were to be esteemed "the principalities, powers, and dominions that encompass more nearly the divine Majesty and attend his throne." Like liberty in the commonwealth, honor was inherent in its possessor; and, like liberty, it could, in the words of Magna Carta, neither be bought nor sold. Nothing could abuse honor more than to turn it into a commodity, as Buckingham had, and no man of honor could be more abused than to be compelled to purchase that which his own merit might well declare to be his birthright. Sherland ironically linked Buckingham's imputed Arminianism, with its assertion of free will in matters of grace, to the imposed burden of buying a title:

[It] seems very strange . . . that this great man, who is taken notice to be the principal patron and supporter of a semi-pelagian, semi-popish faction, dangerous to the Church and state, lately set on foot among us that, among other things, hold a modified freedom of will in divine things and a power and liberty in a man to receive or refuse divine grace offered; that this man, I say, should be so incongruous and so far depart from his principles as to deny a man freedom of will in moral things and impose a necessity of receiving the grace of a king in a title of honor whether he would or no.¹⁰

Honor, liberty, and true religion: all, in Sherland's argument, stood or fell together. Honor was the attestation of virtue; but virtue also coincided with broad acres and ancient lineage, all of which together made up honor's substance. Virtue could reside in anyone of gentle birth ("honesty" or transparency of character and sincerity in dealing was the best that could be expected of the lower orders), but honor represented its full maturity and flowering, including its necessary and inevitable recognition by the sovereign. It was, consequently, transgenerational, an inheritance no less than goods and estates. John Pym, in his part of the Commons' relation, elaborated on this theme, which went to the heart of the baronage as a corporate entity in the commonwealth. The Lords were "this High Court of peers," whose very function as receivers and judges of a bill of impeachment made them the ultimate protectors of the realm under the King himself:

He will not trouble us with recital how ancient, how famous, this degree of barons has been in the western monarchies; he will only say the baronage of England has upheld that dignity and does concern it in a greater height than any other nation.

The Lords are great judges, a court of last resort. They are great commanders of state, not only for the present but as lawmakers, counselors for the time to come. And this not by delegacy and commission but by birth and inheritance.¹¹

Here, from the Commons' spokesmen, was the vindication of the Lords' office as a pillar of the ancient constitution. Institutionally, relations between the two houses involved a continual process of negotiation and accommodation between bodies of different social status and function in which slights and jars were a constant hazard. It is difficult, too, to read Pym's description without thinking forward to the moment, only twenty-three years later, when a House of Commons so largely shaped by his leadership would abolish the upper house at the end of the English civil war as "useless and dangerous."¹² In 1626, however, the description of the Lords' function was sincere in context if fulsome in address. Honor *was* the cardinal point of elite values, and the Lords were the living embodiment of it. They shared in the supposedly immemorial antiquity of Parliament, not only notionally but in their very bloodlines. This was why James' revival of the noble titles of ancient families had appeared a welcome restoration of honor after the demographic attritions of the peerage in late Tudor times.¹³ It was also why the subsequent sales of honor, crudely managed by the Villiers clan, were so profoundly threatening. The advancement of the unworthy and the substitution of cash on the barrel for virtue, merit, and service

not only devalued ancient peerages but the honor of gentle status as such, whose place in the social hierarchy was guaranteed by the stability of the system as a whole and cemented by patron-client relationships. Of all the charges against Buckingham, therefore--corruption, extortion, incompetence, mismanagement, monopolization, and even the sensational thirteenth article, delivered by Christopher Wandesford, that the Duke had hastened James' death by illicitly medicating him--the gravest was that he had debased honor.

The awkwardness of the Commons addressing the "higher sphere" of the Lords on the subject of honor was finessed by having the presentation of the indictment reported in the upper house by the Lords who had received it in joint conference with the lower; thus, Sherland's speech was related by the Earl of Devonshire, and Pym's by the Earl of Clare. In this way, not only were the peers spared a direct lecture on their dignity by their social inferiors, but the words of the Commons' speakers were transmuted in being repeated and personated by the Lords themselves. This dance of parliamentary etiquette illustrated the proper way of delivering compliment in the bicameral legislature of a hierarchical system; as a political act in itself, it symbolically restored the proper relation of rank violated by Buckingham and his minions.¹⁴

The climax of the Commons' presentation was an oration by Sir John Eliot, member for St. Germans, Vice Admiral of Devon, and Buckingham's erstwhile client. Unlike the Duke's other temporary allies in the Parliament of 1624, Eliot's association with him preceded his parliamentary service, and he owed both his knighthood and his royal office to him. Such ties of obligation were not easily cast off, and his defection was all the more striking for its vehemence and bitterness. Eliot had been the first to denounce Buckingham in the lower house, and remained his most relentless antagonist. In summing up the Commons' case, he offered a portrayal of the favorite as a classical tyrant: "His profuse expenses, his superfluous feasts, his magnificent buildings, his riots, his excesses, what are these but a chronicle of his immense exhausts out of the crown revenues? . . . Of all the precedents I can find none so near resembles him as does Sejanus . . . [his] pride, his high ambition . . . his salaciousness, his neglect of counsels . . . And does not this man do the like in his whole practice?"¹⁵ Never before, perhaps, had a commoner delivered so strident an attack on a peer of the realm. And never before had his fellow peers listened so patiently to such a denunciation.¹⁶

Eliot's subsequent career and ultimate martyrdom--he was briefly imprisoned by Charles after his speech, spent six months in Gatehouse prison for rejecting the King's Forced Loan in 1627, and died in the Tower in 1632 after refusing to acknowledge any jurisdiction over his conduct in Parliament

but that of his colleagues in the Commons--made him an icon of Whig historiography, although recent commentators have portrayed a more complex personality. What is of particular interest in the context of the attack on Buckingham in 1626, however, is his desertion of a former patron. It may be that his disaffection stemmed at least in part from his failure to advance in the Duke's inner circle. In this he would have differed from other members of Buckingham's parliamentary allies in 1624 only in the prior closeness of his association with him and the violence with which he severed his ties. Never before had so powerful a minister so directly organized a group in the Commons, only to abandon them as swiftly when his immediate purpose had been accomplished. Some of them had been barred from service in 1626 by the device of being pricked for sheriff, but Eliot, who had labored to reconcile the Duke with the Commons in 1625, was still presumably considered reliable. In assuming the role of "patriot" leader in 1626, he could be seen as vindicating his absent colleagues as well as his own honor, for, having been closer to Buckingham than any of them, he may have felt the need to more openly repudiate him. In doing so, however, he broke the cardinal rule of obligation and fidelity that bound all patron-client relationships. Sir Francis Bacon, for example, had paid a high price for deserting the Earl of Essex in 1601, and the ostracism he experienced at his fall in 1621 may have been the ultimate measure of it. Yet the fact that Eliot was not reprehended for his conduct but was rather entrusted with the most important role in presenting the Commons' bill of impeachment, that of the final summation, was a testimony not only to his rhetorical merits but to the depth of antipathy to Buckingham. If Eliot was self-consciously performing the office of a tribune in his denunciation of the Duke, he was also, by all ordinary standards, practicing that of a turncoat.

Whatever residual guilt or embarrassment Eliot may have suffered over abandoning his former patron, his words showed no sign of it. Rather, they bore all the subtextual marks of a conversion narrative. Beguiled by Buckingham as by Satan's wiles, he had accepted his friendship and favor. Arguably, he had been one of his "party"--that many-headed hydra, which, as he asserted in his indictment, had monopolized not only this office or that, but had consumed the "whole body of the land." In likening him to Sejanus, he had offered a classical, secular exemplar of wickedness, for the honor of representing the Antichrist belonged, in Reformed ideology, to the Church of Rome. As Eliot's rhetoric suggested, however, the image of the tyrant merged with that of the universal deceiver: "This only is conceived by us the knights, citizens, and burgesses of the Commons House of Parliament: that by him came all our evils. In him we find the causes, on him must be the remedies."¹⁷

In exposing Buckingham as the source of all evils, Eliot testified to his own salvation. In associating his own testimony with colleagues, he freed them from the taint of their alliance with the Duke in 1624. Eliot's personal catharsis was that of the House itself, and on that level he was its most appropriate spokesman.

If Eliot was vindicating both a personal and a collective honor in his attack on Buckingham, he was also, at least inferentially, aspersing a greater honor than any. It was a point that Charles was not slow to take, for if the favorite were Sejanus, then, the King said, "[Eliot] must intend me for Tiberius."¹⁸ Charles added that, since Buckingham had been promoted by James, his father's honor and judgment were implicated no less than his own. No sooner, then, had the Commons presented their case when the King descended upon the upper house to declare himself a "witness" to clear the Duke of all charges against him, and to announce the arrest of Eliot and a colleague, Sir Dudley Digges. It was the second time a king of England had intervened in the House of Lords on Buckingham's behalf. Whereas James had not directly prejudged the case against him in 1621, however, Charles had made it an issue of his personal honor, the honor that trumped everyone else's.

The Commons' consternation was intense. The effect of the King's preemptive maneuver was to throw them on the defensive as they protested the breach of the immunity they claimed against the arrest of their members as well as the interruption of their legal proceedings. The Lords, for their part, had been preoccupied with the cases of Bristol and Arundel, and they returned to these. Bristol had demanded a hearing on his case, and Charles, having granted him one, had imposed an obligation on the Lords. The detention of Arundel, who as Earl Marshal was the formal steward of English honor, disturbed them even more, and on June 2, taking a leaf from the Commons' playbook, they resolved to conduct no further business until he had been released and permitted to take his seat among them. At the same time, these matters also furnished a pretext for deferring action on the Commons' indictment against Buckingham, thereby avoiding a direct constitutional confrontation with the King. One might argue that in even agreeing to hear the Commons' case against the Duke from their *rapporteurs* after Charles had pronounced it baseless, the Lords had taken a principled and (for some) personally risky stand on behalf of parliamentary authority. Nonetheless, they had no practical recourse against Buckingham as long as the King shielded him, and in returning to the grievances of Bristol and Arundel they chose the better part of valor. The privileges of the upper house were more easily defended than those of the nation.¹⁹

Digges and Eliot were released from the Tower after nine days; Arundel returned to the Lords on June 8. The Commons, meanwhile, despairing of an issue in the Lords to their indictment and fearing an imminent dissolution of Parliament, prepared a remonstrance against Buckingham. In it, they accused him not only of hastening the death of James but of seeking to eliminate parliaments. In the near term at least, it was a self-fulfilling prophecy. Two days later, Charles dissolved his second Parliament.²⁰

The failure of the two houses to prosecute their impeachment seemed to justify Buckingham's boast that he was "Parliament-proof." Indeed this was true, as long as he had the unwavering support of Charles. The Lords and members of Parliament itself had to rest content with having charged the Duke, and, with the Commons' remonstrance, in having delivered a kind of verdict. Neither legally nor politically, however, was it an efficacious response to the threat he seemed to pose. Christopher Sherland, in presenting his portion of the bill of impeachment, had suggested that liberty was the Commons' sphere of interest just as honor was that of the Lords, and that both, as constitutive elements of a limited monarchy, stood or fell together. Both liberty and honor were impossible where one man was elevated beyond the law, and consequently beyond the proper bounds of a hierarchical order.

In the absence of Parliament, popular discourse took on the task of delegitimizing the Duke, in the vernacular as well as the political sense. The rise of the Villiers clan had been accompanied by a steady drumbeat of scurrilous verse, most of it of a graphically sexual character.²¹ It gathered force anew after the dissolution of 1626. One poem that commented directly on the breakup of Parliament used the Jacobean simile of the proper relationship of unity and harmony between a "husbandly" king and his "wifely" estates. Buckingham had come between this sanctified relationship on behalf of Spain, sedition, sodomy, and the Devil:

An art sprung from a blacker seed, / Then that which he poured in that
[reed?] / Whom we call Guido Fawkes / Who if he had fired his vessel / Of
sulfur standing on bare trestle / In his sepulchred walks: / Could not have so
dispersed our state / Nor opened Spain so wide a gate / As hath his graceless
grace.²¹

The "black" (devilish and sodomizing) seed of the Italianized "Guido" Fawkes--Guy Fawkes, the conspirator whose attempt to blow up the houses of Parliament in 1605 in the presence of James I, was emblematic of Catholic treachery for Englishmen--is compact of sulfur, gunpowder, and deviant

sexuality, representing simultaneously a plot to poison and explode the body politic. Yet it is less threatening than the wiles of Buckingham, who would destroy Parliament as such while (and by) bugging his second king, thus opening the realm to both literal and symbolic assault from the rear. The Duke vaunts the honorific address he commands ("Your Grace"), while lacking precisely the qualities it implies, the honor of the true nobleman and the saving grace of God's elect.

Such invective was the obverse of the elaborate courtesy rituals of hierarchical recognition and honor. It deconstructed through ridicule the circumspect terms in which elite relations were transacted. Unlike local festivals of misrule in which the lower orders reversed and mimicked everyday authority roles, such ridicule did not reinforce the system of status and command but undermined it. Its presence as a significant factor in English public life may be traced back to the Marprelate tracts of the late 1580s when the abuse that had been channeled by Protestant reformers against the papal Antichrist was redirected at the established church. In a deeper sense, however, it was a legacy of the Reformation as such, in which contested authority on the deepest level--that of divine order and judgment--created a world of binary opposition in which authority was defined not as a straightforward relation between the licensed purveyors of command and the obedient subjects of it, but as a perpetual unmasking of false authority that its true source might be known. No one doubted--as yet--that the Protestant kingship, lawfully exercised, represented God's will and rule in England; but that made its eclipse by an apparently all-powerful favorite and his popishly inclined clan all the more encompassing a threat. Corruption, apostasy, and sedition formed a seamless progression of evil whose ultimate patron was Lucifer, and whose implication for England was the loss of its ancient liberties and the withdrawal of divine favor.

Over the next two years, the situation worsened. Abroad, England lurched from defeat to defeat, and its own shores were menaced. At home, Charles, still counseled by Buckingham, imposed an extraordinary Forced Loan that provoked widespread resistance, detention without habeas corpus, coercive military billeting, and, by 1628, a full-blown constitutional crisis. Parliament was summoned again that year, but warned that any attempt against Buckingham would mean an immediate and perhaps irreparable breach with the King. "This," said one member, "is the crisis of Parliaments, by which we shall know whether they live or die."²² The sentiment was broadly shared. For two months both houses were engrossed in drafting first a bill and then a petition affirming the subject's liberties and denouncing their recent abuse. No mention

of Buckingham was made. When, however, Charles replied evasively to the petition, the pent-up frustration of the Commons was released. Buckingham was denounced anew as “the grievance of grievances,” and a remonstrance was presented to the King naming him as “the principal cause” of all the “evils and dangers” with which the kingdom was beset.²³ Charles responded by proroguing Parliament--an outright dissolution might have been impolitic at that juncture--but the public took matters into its own hands. A London mob slew Buckingham’s astrologer, and, on August 23, the Duke himself was assassinated by another disaffected client, John Felton, who cited the remonstrance in defense of his act and was celebrated as a public avenger. Like the ghost of Essex, he remained a symbol of patriotism in England for well over a century.²⁴

The fate of Buckingham illustrated the consequences that awaited anyone who violated England’s honor code and the constitutional balance with which it was inextricably connected. Yet Charles invoked that same code in defending his own actions. At each turn he insisted that his own honor was at stake, an honor apparently indistinguishable from that of his feckless Lord Admiral. The result was to pit the King’s honor against the kingdom’s, for, as the remonstrance declared, in leaving it defenseless against its foes Buckingham had “dishonored” both state and realm. This was not a winning hand. Buckingham’s death presented Charles with the opportunity to take new counsel and begin his reign afresh. Instead, he withdrew ever more deeply into a self-congratulatory court culture, and, disdaining Parliament, governed by prerogative authority alone. When the inevitable political crisis came, his continuing rigidity led the country into civil war and revolution. In 1649, it cost him his head. Charles insisted to the end that in defending his own honor he was defending the kingdom’s as well. That men of good will might legitimately have thought they were not in all circumstances identical, and that the claim of honor was not in itself a sufficient warrant for authority, appears never to have occurred to him.

NOTES

1. On the concept of honor, see Mervyn James, “English Politics and the Concept of Honour, 1485-1642,” in James, *Society, Politics, and Culture: Studies in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 308-415, and Richard McCoy, “Old English Honour in an Evil Time: Aristocratic Principle in the 1620s,” in John Morrill, Paul Slack, and Daniel Woolf, eds., *Public Duty and Private Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England: Essays Presented to G. E. Aylmer* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 121-150.

2. Roger Lockyer, *Buckingham: The Life and Career of George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham, 1592-1628* (London: Longman, 1981), supersedes earlier studies, although it is rather too sympathetic to its subject. On the European context of Buckingham's career, see J. H. Elliott and L. W. B. Brockliss, eds., *The World of the Favourite* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999).

3. A large literature has developed on this subject recently: Alastair Bellany, "'Rayling Rhymes and Vaunting Verse': Libellous Politics in Early Stuart England, 1603-1628," in Kevin Sharpe and Peter Lake, eds., *Culture and Politics in Early Stuart England* (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1993): 285-310; Thomas Cogswell, "Underground Verse and the Transformation of Early Stuart Political Culture," in Susan D. Amussen and Mark Kishlansky, eds., *Political Culture and Cultural Politics in Early Modern England* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995): 277-300; Adam Fox, "Ballads, Libels and Popular Ridicule in Jacobean England," *Past and Present* 145 (1994): 47-83; idem., "Rumour, News, and Popular Political Opposition in Elizabethan and Stuart England," *Historical Journal* 40 (1997): 597-620.

4. Lockyer, 100-101.

5. On the revival of impeachment in 1621, see Robert Zaller, *The Parliament of 1621: A Study in Constitutional Conflict* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), chapter 2; Colin G. C. Tite, *Impeachment and Judicature in Parliamentary Judicature in Early Stuart England* (London: Athlone Press of the University of London, 1974), chapters 4 and 5; J. Stoddart Flemion, "Slow Process, Due Process, and the High Court of Parliament: A Reinterpretation of the Revival of Judicature in the House of Lords in 1621," *Historical Journal* 17 (1974): 3-16. For the Lords' general resumption of judicature, see Allen Horstman, "A New *Curia Regis*: The Judicature of the House of Lords in the 1620s," *Historical Journal* 25 (1982): 411-422; James S. Hart, *Justice upon Petition: The House of Lords and the Reformation of Justice, 1621-1675* (London: HarperCollinsAcademic, 1991).

6. A suggestive discussion of Charles' relationship to Buckingham is Kevin Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), 4-5.

7. Nicholas Tyacke, *Anti-Calvinism: The Rise of English Arminianism, c. 1590-1640* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), chapter 7; Barbara Donagan, "The York House Conference Revisited: Laymen, Calvinism and Arminianism," *Historical Research* 44 (1991): 312-330; Lockyer, 308-310.

8. Tite, op. cit., passim.

9. William B. Bidwell and Maija Jansson, eds., *Proceedings in Parliament 1626*, 4 vols. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991-1996), 2: 261-262, 268; 1: 463-477.

10. Ibid., 1: 445-451, at 448.

11. Ibid., 448.

12. Samuel R. Gardiner, ed., *Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625-1660*, 3rd ed., revised (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1979 [1889]), 387-388.

13. Lawrence Stone, *The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558-1641* (Oxford: Oxford University, 1965); for James' commercialization of the peerage, see K. S. van Eerde, "The Sale of the Peerage in Early Stuart England, *Journal of Modern History* 29 (1957): 137-147; idem., "The Jacobean Baronets," ibid., 33 (1961): 21-37.

14. On compliment as an element of the status system, see Kevin Sharpe, *Criticism and Compliment: The Politics of Literature in the Age of Charles I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

15. *Proceedings in Parliament 1626*, 3: 220-224.

16. For Eliot, see John Forster, *Sir John Eliot: A Biography, 1590-1632 [recte 1592]*, 2 vols. (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts and Green, 1864); Harold Hulme, *The Life of Sir John Eliot* (New York: New York University Press, 1957); J. N. Ball, "The Parliamentary Career of Sir John Eliot" (D. Phil. Thesis, Oxford University, 1953).

17. *Proceedings in Parliament 1626*, 3: 222, 223.

18. Forster, 1: 552.

19. Buckingham's impeachment was never formally dropped. On its course, see Tite, chapter 7; J. N. Ball, "The Impeachment of the Duke of Buckingham in 1626," in *Melanges Antonio Marongiu: Studies Presented to the International Commission for the the History of Representative and Parliamentary Institutions* 25 (Palermo, 1968); Conrad Russell, *Politics and English Parliaments, 1621-1629* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), chapter 5. On the dissolution, see Jess Stoddart Flemion, "The Dissolution of Parliament in 1626: A Reevaluation," *English Historical Review* 87 (1972): 784-790.

20. Frederick W. Fairholt, ed., *Poems and Songs Relating to George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham . . .* (London, 1850). Many more satires on Buckingham remain unpublished in manuscript repositories.

21. Cited in James Holstun, *Ehud's Dagger: Class Struggle in the English Revolution* (London and New York: Verso, 2000), 158-159.

22. Robert C. Johnson, Mary Frear Keeler, Maija Jansson, and William B. Bidwell, eds., *Commons Debates 1628*, 6 vols. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977-1983), 1: 58.

23. Ibid., 4: 311-317.

24. Holstun, 143-191 passim.

CONTENTS

Carole L. Crumley	CONTEXTUAL CONSTRAINTS ON STATE STRUCTURE	3
Olga Yu.Artemova	ON SOME FORMS OF HIERARCHICAL SYSTEMS	23
David Christian	HIERARCHY AND HETERARCHY IN WORLD HISTORY	34
Herbert Barry	SOCIAL BEHAVIORS ASSOCIATED WITH HEREDITARY COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP	46
Garrett Cook	HETERARCHY AND HOMOARCHY IN MAYA VILLAGE POLITICS	67
Toon van Meijl	METAPHOR AND HIERARCHY IN MAORI SOCIO-POLITICAL ORGANISATION	79
Timothy R. Pauketat, Thomas E. Emerson	ALTERNATIVE CIVILIZATIONS: HETERARCHIES, CORPORATE POLITIES, AND ORTHODOXIES	107
Jan Bouzek	EXERTION OF POWER IN CLASSICAL AND HELLENISTIC THRACE	118
Dmitri M. Bondarenko	BENIN KINGDOM (13TH – 19TH CENTURIES): A SUPERCOMPLEX NON-STATE SOCIETY	125
Leonid E. Grinin	ALTERNATIVITY OF STATE FORMATION PROCESS: THE EARLY STATE VS. STATE ANALOGUES	167
Robert Zaller	DISCOURSES OF LEGITIMACY: HONOR AND AUTHORITY IN THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT OF 1626	184