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**Ислам,**  
глобальное  
управление  
и новый  
миропорядок

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ИНСТИТУТ АФРИКИ

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Л.Л. ФИТУНИ, И.О. АБРАМОВА

ИСЛАМ,  
ГЛОБАЛЬНОЕ УПРАВЛЕНИЕ  
И НОВЫЙ МИРОПОРЯДОК



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Авторы исследуют роль и место ислама в международном развитии и глобальном управлении в контексте актуальных вопросов межцивилизационного и межконфессионального взаимодействия в современном мире, возникающие при этом вызовы и угрозы, включая проблематику борьбы с экстремизмом и международным терроризмом. В центре внимания авторов – комплексная оценка и прогноз развития «мусульманского сегмента» современного полицентричного мира, конфликт между пространственной экспансией традиционного ислама и неолиберальным миропорядком, феномен «арабской весны», технологии управления массами со стороны различных политических сил, опасность региональной дестабилизации и угрозы глобальной безопасности и интересам России. Книга базируется на научном обобщении результатов многолетних полевых исследований в странах Африки и Азии и интервью с представителями мусульманских диаспор Западной и Восточной Европы, социологических опросов в ряде постсоветских государств.

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## SUMMARY

*Leonid Fituni and Irina Abramova*

### ISLAM, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND A NEW WORLD ORDER

The world is constantly in the process of transformation. For the most part, the changes occurring are latent and become apparent only in more or less distant future periods of time. But quite often transformational processes become very dynamic and large-scale. Their depth is made visible in a relatively short time. Together with the transformations taking place, the world order as well as the political and economic models of the world order are changing. In those processes civilizational, cultural, historical and socio-anthropological factors can play a huge role.

By the end of the first decade of this century, the world was rapidly moving away from the unipolarity of the 1990s. There was a visible reduction in the once indisputable global positions of the "old" actors of the world economy and international relations– the United States and other Western countries. At the same time, the economic and political influence of the "new" players, especially a number of large developing countries – China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa-has greatly increased.

The weight and performance of key regional powers – Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Egypt, etc. – have become a significant factor in the geostrategic balance of power. These countries acquire the role of system-forming nodes in the formation of "force fields" in the polycentric world. The abundance of strong and influential re-

gional centers of power may potentially increase the intensity and frequency of regional conflicts. In addition, there are already signs of an emerging a new bipolarity along the US – China dividing line.

The authors posit that the concepts of "center of power of global significance" and "pole of the world order (world order/world system)" overlap only partly. They are clearly do not reflect the same quality. For example, the EU can clearly claim the role of the first, but not the second. In this sense, the polycentric world order can co-exist at certain stages of history in parallel with the emerging bipolarity. However, the latter will increasingly determine the nature of the world order as it takes root.

A significant part of the book examines the gradual transformation of a disparate set of Muslim nations and economies into an increasingly influential, self-important, although so far amorphous, and internally contradictory center of geo-economic and geopolitical power of the maturing polycentric world. On this specific economic example we further develop the provisions of our previously formulated concept of formation and change of models of world economic development. The first part of the book gives a detailed description of quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the civilizational dimension of this process.

The tendencies of development of the "Muslim segment" of the polycentric world, which became visible in recent decades, and the applied tasks of economic analysis dictated the need to correct and clarify the existing categorical apparatus of the relevant field of the political economy of globalization by distinguishing the term "*Muslim economy*" (civilization-specific form of development of national economies of Muslim countries; a separate integral element of the global economy, whose content, on the one hand, is the economic existence and welfare of the Muslim population of each and every country of the world, and on the other - the economic potential, stability and ability to self-development of the economies of Muslim States) from "*Islamic economy*" (an economy that puts into practice the primacy of *Sharia* law over conventional market rules, procedures and mechanisms). One has to bear in mind that this separation is purely academic and speculative and both remain material conditions for the preservation of the civilizational identity of Muslims.

However, if the political, legal and religious aspects of Muslim identity in the modern world have been studied carefully enough in

the works of leading Russian scholars of Islam, the aspect of gaining by a very heterogeneous Muslim world of a new quality, that of an self-important singular center of economic power was practically absent in domestic and foreign literature. The same is true with regard to research of this center's competition with other, old and new actors for a worthy place in it and for guaranteeing the rights of Muslims in the global economic world order. In this book, we have tried to fill this scholarly gap to the best of our ability.

We offer a vision of a self-similar set of Muslim economies, into a community under consolidation, which gradually obtains its individual unique place within the global balance of forces, emerging models of the world order, financial globalization and global governance. This process is still far from entering a mature phase and still farther from being complete. Moreover, most likely, it is doubtful that it will end with the absolute consolidation of the Muslim world and its total homogenization.

In the foreseeable future, it will retain its acute internal contradictions and powerful centrifugal forces, which will probably be used by both external and internal actors. However, no less powerful forces contribute to the gradual consolidation of the Muslim world into an independent center of power in a polycentric world. Among them: the slow but steady growth of the economic importance of Muslim countries, the logic of the modern, "descending" phase of globalization, arising and deepening dividing lines in the world, geostrategic identifiers that reduce identity to simple and understandable: "we" and "they".

Today, one can hardly reliably predict the specific configurations of the future self-organization of the "Muslim pole" of the polycentric world and the nature of its influence on specific issues of the global world order. However, the point of no return has already been passed - the painful and contradictory process of such a center's maturation is unlikely to stop.

Although this study covers various aspects of the sociopolitical development of the Muslim world as a whole, due to our academic specialization, the existing scientific interests and more than twenty years of experience in field research in Islamic societies, we focused our attention primarily on the analysis of fundamental trends of economic and social development in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA).

Since independence structural and macroeconomic imbalances have been an inalienable feature of the socio-economic development there. Both types of disproportions produce a negative impact upon fundamental development trends in the region. Against this background, we analyze the structure and hierarchies of imbalances in the region of the Middle East and North Africa. We argue that broad-range monitoring of fiscal and macroeconomic indicators can facilitate the identification of emerging imbalances and provide ways of overcoming them.

The natural and climatic and resource factors quite rigidly determined the economic profile of the region, which, in turn, predetermines the key structural and macroeconomic imbalances that affect MENA socio-economic development. The historical asymmetry in the development of the MENA states, which for a long time had been parts of the British, French and Ottoman colonial empires, with their economic or strategic roles determined by the overseas rulers, created prerequisites for the subsequent economic differentiation of the countries of the region. Over the years of independence, the uneven development of the initially similar agrarian-Bedouin economies has increased dramatically as a result of the socio-economic policies carried out by the sovereign governments in accordance with the resource capacities of each country. We categorize MENA countries, dividing them into five groups, depending on the nature and determinants of economic development and insist that almost all the current social and economic problems of the region are related to its two fundamental specific characteristics: colossal rental incomes (mainly of oil and gas origin) and relative overpopulation. The book exposes main macroeconomic imbalances of MENA states, demonstrating the asymmetry of intra-regional development and structural distortions of the economic and demographic nature. We identify the existing imbalances on the basis of complex fiscal and macroeconomic data analysis and produce a critique of existing macroeconomic stabilization policies in MENA states and their attempts of the latter to overcome the existing imbalances. The research results in a forecast of the dynamics of financial determinants of macroeconomic stability in the region and the authors' vision of ways to overcome or limit the existing and imminent imbalances. We come to the conclusions that that MENA countries need to accelerate structural reforms in order to

overcome imbalances and to achieve diversification of their economies. Expanding the opportunities for the national private sector and increasing its importance in the non-oil segment of the economy could help to alleviate the employment situation and increase the effective consumer demand.

A significant part of the book is devoted to forecasting the main trends in the political, cultural and ideological development of the Middle East in the medium and long term, taking into account the impact of the factor of international terrorism. While identifying the core component for making optimal solutions possible, we give our vision of the future behavior of key state and non-state actors, trying to predict the fate of the objects of their impact. In preparing the scenarios, the main methods of predictive analytics were used: statistical analysis, intellectual analysis of data, analysis of patterns and models conducted within the framework of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research project “The Phenomenon of the Islamic State” in the context of the development of a modern Eastern society. “ The parts of the book are based on an interpretation of the main conclusions and results of using those methods and methodologies. We postulate that the recent growth of radical Islam in the East and political populism in the West have close root causes. Despite all the differences in the rhetoric and the outward forms, they represent a defensive response on the part of those segments of Eastern and Western societies that have failed to adjust to rigid paradigms of globalization. Intra- and inter-confessional conflicts may become the prevailing form of military threats in the region. Their heralds are already visible in conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and, to a lesser extent, in Lebanon, Bahrain and on the east coast of the Arabian Peninsula. Interstate Shiite-Sunni contradictions have so far been limited by political-ideological confrontation and diplomatic demarches, sometimes accompanied by various embargoes, such as the recent Qatar crisis. Even the physical destruction of the self-proclaimed Islamic pseudo-state in MENA will take some time. Large ISIS units have been squeezed out of Syria and Iraq. However, this does not mean the end of ISIS. The experience of the war with terrorist groups in Libya, Algeria, West Africa, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Southeast Asia shows that even when driven out into the desert or sparsely populated areas, fragmented but linked groups of terrorists continue for quite some time to inflict har-

assing attacks on government forces and objects, to make long sorties and to arrange spectacular acts of terrorism. Most likely, the forces interested in maintaining the problems of international terrorism high on the agenda will not sit idly by but will undertake spectacular and noteworthy actions to keep terrorism issues in the limelight. As a result, the intensity of terrorist attacks in the West may increase, since even limited terrorist attacks in Europe cause more media coverage in the world media than any acts of terrorism in the Middle East. To achieve these goals, new channels and forms of implementation of terrorist attacks will be used, such as terrorist acts involving children, ordinary means of transport, during the course of mass and symbolic political events, elections, etc.

The book reviews the impact of terrorist, extremist and radical indoctrinative manipulations on the socio-political and, in broader sense, life orientation of young people. The issue of the radicalization of children and adolescents is becoming all the more pressing as global communications and information technologies of remote management in the virtual space are making direct influence by interested state and non-state actors on this age segment of the population increasingly easy and effective.

Society finds itself in a cognitive dissonance between the desire to expand and deepen freedoms and rights of the individual and extend them to ever younger age cohorts of the population, on the one hand, and the natural necessity to protect the younger generation with its unformed adult personality from destructive influences infiltrating into the fabric of society under the guise of these very freedoms, personal choice and the "right path". Today the problem is especially acute in the context of drawing children and adolescents into the sphere of influence and activities of radical, extremist and terrorist structures. The authors demonstrate differences between these three types of organizations. In the past 10–15 years, the method of constructing data on the age structure and on other personal characteristics of members of the considered organizations on the basis of extensive data mining in the Internet has been becoming increasingly more widespread. We propose a methodology of investigating the age structure of terrorist organizations and the recruitment of young militants by terrorist organizations. The authors made the first assessments of the prospects of using such methodologies in the field of so-

cial and political anthropology of terrorism at the beginning of this century.

We also analyze specific technologies of involving children and adolescents in extremist and terrorist activities and a gender-differentiated approach to the objects of recruitment. One of the chapters also researches the organization of the educational process in the Islamic State.

The war in Syria and the reluctance of the two anti-terrorist coalitions fighting in this country against the IS / ISIS revealed problems in a number of initial assumptions on which the concept of global governance (GG) has so far been built. The aggravated contradictions between the collective West, on the one hand, and the rising South, increasingly cooperating with a resurgent Russia, on the other, did not contribute to finding joint solutions on a global scale to resolve the ISIS problem.

A significant part of the book is devoted to the little-studied problem of the participation of Muslim countries in the system of global governance and to Islam's stance vis-a-vis the latter. Islam stance, since it is one of the largest world religions, which establishes its own hierarchy of human values for a significant part of the world's population and governs the ethics and morality of social, family and international relations thereof.

The content of sections of the book does not pretend to an exhaustive coverage of the entire complex range of relationships, contradictions and collisions arising in this process. We deliberately focused on disclosing the specifics of the involvement of Muslim state and non-state actors in the systems and processes of global governance selectively and focused on those aspects of the interaction of Islam and global governance in which this religion or Muslim countries has, in our opinion, a particularly significant impact in shaping new features of the global world order and the balance of power in the poly-centric world. These include: the problem of international terrorism, global governance in the financial and economic sphere, in relation to Islamic finance, and areas where the role of Islamic countries in the government is still very small, but which is of key importance for the fate of progress in these states – global governance in science , research and technology development.

The significance of the Muslim states' participation in the development and implementation of common approaches and rules in

countering international terrorism and Islamist extremism is self-evident. However, the search for real practical and mutually acceptable ways to fulfill this task often encounters historical, civilizational and geopolitical barriers, and the influence of the Islamic world in formulating global governance approaches in this area is not always comparable to the role objectively should belong to Muslim countries as the most direct victims and participants in global war on terror.

In contrast to the situation with participation in the global governance on the issues related to international terrorism, GG in the sphere of the Islamic finance is one of the few areas of the world economy, which is governed without visible and unequivocal domination by the leading Western powers, and where the voice and legal practice of the world of Islam are likewise decisive for all other state and non-state actors.

In the Muslim world as a whole and in individual states in particular, there is no single consolidated position on global governance. Moreover, a large part of politically active Muslims completely reject and do not even consider such a question to be legitimate. At the same time, at the level of states, governments, political, intellectual and business elites, there are dominant approaches to issues that are essentially issues of global governance that are common to different Muslim countries. In the strict sense, the sources and ideological foundation of the Islamic concept of World Order are the Qur'an and Sunnah. Therefore, from the point of view of religiously-oriented politicians of Muslim countries, the foundations of a global society should be based on an ideology built on these primary sources. How is the harshness of this formula reconciled with the realities of the modern world, in which Islam is not the only and, despite the steadily growing number of followers, not even the quantitatively dominant religion?

The fact is that the Islamic concept of world order essentially recognizes the existence of a single international community, which embraces other religions too. This is supported by the fact that many *ayahs* of the Qur'an are addressed to humanity as a single community, with place for Jews and Christians in it. What further opens ways for accepting some of the principles of the global governance is that the Qur'an asserts the existence of a single and absolute truth that transcends the world. However, it should be remembered that Islam

as a religion and ethical-philosophical construction proceeds from the fact that the true universalism of mankind is ensured through the affirmation of the indivisible oneness concept of *tawhid* (Monotheism) in all spheres of life. It is as a result of the assertion and the triumph of these principles that a single global human community will emerge, based on a “balanced” world order ensuring progress, justice and the good of peoples.

More difficult is the question of whether the formulas of modern Islamic theorists on a balanced world order belong only to the “people of the Book” (which can be directly derived from the Qur'an and Sunnah) or apply equally to representatives of non-Abrahamic religions and atheists.

According to the Muslim faith, the main means of forming the Islamic world order is *jihad*. In contrast to the widespread opinion in the West that this term means military and subversive actions, in the Quran “*jihad*” means the application of strenuous efforts to spread faith in Allah and “*affirming His Word to the highest word over this world*”. The fundamental sources of Islamic law indicate, that the use of force, in this connection is permissible only for self-defense and in the case of a ban on the preaching of Islam.

The next two parts of the book are devoted to the outwardly opposite, but essentially interrelated experiments on social engineering in the Arab world: experience and results of artificially accelerating the process of modernizing societies within the neoliberal model of the world order and attempts at social construction by ISIS within the framework of its “global Caliphate”.

For the states of MENA, the current millennium has been marked by two major upheavals of fundamental nature: the cataclysm of the Arab Spring and the merger of the radical part of political Islam with the post-industrial forms of international terrorism.

Both fateful phenomena naturally stemmed from complex cultural-ideological, political and socio-economic processes that had led to changes in the global world order. The two political phenomena were parallel in time and space and took place under colossal reciprocal influence and interpenetration. With the outbreak of the Libyan crisis, when the forces of international terrorism were mobilized to complete the objectives of the “democratic revolution”, the convergence of these two processes became evident.

Despite the external differences, the Arab Spring with its unnatural liberal-traditionalist anti-government coalitions and jihadist terror, which employed the latest technologies of social engineering, are interrelated manifestations of the aggravating contradictions in Arab societies, greatly exacerbated by the manipulative intervention of external forces.

During the events of the Arab Spring, which gained external support from the West and ultra-conservative monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula, terrorism mastered new forms of self-organization and adaptation to emerging trends of social development that corresponded to the new vector of cultural and ideological processes in the region.

A large number of studies have been devoted to the analysis of specific manifestations and consequences of the Arab Spring in the sphere of politics, economy and public relations, including a number of works by the author of this paper.

The Arab Spring and the ensuing escalation of armed violence in the region have become the most powerful factors determining the current trends of political, ideological, cultural, and economic dynamics in the region in the last decade. Their complex interweaving has led to the current situation of a structural paradox in the MENA region: a protracted general stagnation amid strong situational variability at the local level.

The overall stagnation has not been unhinged neither by the explosion of the Arab Spring nor by the barbaric excesses of international terrorism, as it lies in the mainstream of the fundamental processes of the cultural and ideological evolution of the MENA region.

The paradox of the situation became particularly evident by the end of the 2010s. The whole society – the authorities and all opposing forces: pro-Western and liberal groups, "systemic" representatives of political Islam and non-systemic "radical-moderate" Muslim leaders, religious and political extremists – in fact all of them put forward the same slogans that were considered to be "the dictates of the time": (a) the fight against corruption; b) the need for political and economic reforms; c) the establishment of social justice and the prospect of a new life.

From the point of view of the opposition, the first two points were to be implemented immediately, while the latter could be achieved after its coming to power, gradually, in the future. From the point of view of the authorities, all three points were already being implemented, and the pace and sequence of concrete steps for their imple-

mentation were determined by objective conditions: the situation in the country and security considerations.

The paradoxical coincidence of the demands of the opposing parties, which have opposing social bases and ideas about the correct path of development, was due to the fact that the three aforementioned demands reflected the objective imperatives at the current stage of development of virtually all states of the Middle East. They were a concentrated expression of the fundamental cultural and ideological trends in the region.

If we consider them in relation to and in the context of the region's specific phenomenon of the transformation of local cultural and civilizational features, radical ideologies and practices of international terrorism into something new – a pseudo-state entity that is theocratic in form and terrorist in content, the fact cannot be overlooked that the revolutionary and pseudo-revolutionary processes in the Arab world were not the primary source but only a powerful catalyst for the explosion of militant Islamism.

Amid the subversion and erosion of traditional prerogatives and exclusive rights of a sovereign state under the influence of globalization, there emerged a para-state formation called the Islamic State (IS/ISIS). Largely due to the successful expansion of IS/ISIS, international terrorism in the form of Islamist jihadism has moved to the level of transcontinental management of its activities.

ISIS in the Arab world and the transcontinental propagation of terrorism have become negative manifestations of the natural growth of political *self-awareness*, *self-esteem* and *self-identification* of a part of the Muslim population. An additional impetus to the growth of all three of the above "selves" in fact was given by the Arab Spring. It freed destructive impulses that had been dormant in restrained and patient Muslim societies.

The Arab Spring showed both dissatisfied Muslims in the MENA region and their co-religionists in the European diaspora, who had for a long time endured silently, that the existing order can be changed by force in defiance of the traditions and behavioural stereotypes of the older generation.

Western policies and the accompanying global media campaign encouraged such approaches in every possible way, pushing the target audience towards radicalization.

In these conditions, the unprecedented phenomenon of extremely rigid theocratic statehood in the form of ISIS sought to become a Muslim civilizational response to the concept of civil society proposed by Western civilization. The ideologists of the terrorist state argue that, unlike the individualism of Western society with its liberal values, the value framework of ISIS rests on the fraternal collectivism of the Muslim Ummah and social justice that is allegedly immanent to "true Islam". It is important to understand that social justice is an inherent earthly good not just in radical Islam but in the ideology of Islam in general. It is a collective good, common for the whole Ummah, and through it for an individual.

All collective values, even the collective aspect of belief in the Almighty, are related to earthly life and disappear with its end. Individual values, as opposed to Western ideological messages, belong to unearthly life, but they are eternal and should fall to every righteous Muslim. These individual values include the ascent to the Almighty, *houris*, paradisiacal pleasures and eternal grace. Thus, "true" Muslim values, both collective and individual, are not just non-identical to Western ones. They are not even their opposites. They are simply of a different order.

With this in mind, despite extreme manifestations of irreconcilability towards the enemies, which in our eyes indicates barbarism and savagery, the declared fundamental ideological platform of ISIS is a state of social justice based on the tenets of Islam, where all are equal before Allah. Islam is an open religion, and ISIS is a networked state, a "state without borders", an allegedly ideal state for faithful Muslims, a community of communities, but not a pyramidally constructed social structure typical for most civilized states created according to the Western model.

Despite the defeats and retreats in its citadel – Syria and Iraq, ISIS continues to retain supporters and even recruit new ones in various parts of the world. Network technologies, supported by ideological clamps, allow ISIS to spread territorially (towards Africa, Central Asia, Indonesia, to attract new supporters in Europe). All this could not but raise concerns.

Neither the Arab Spring nor the pseudo-state projects of militant Islamism have managed to overcome the general socio-political stagnation in the region. The fundamental problems associated with its

demographic structure, social stratification, income distribution and belated modernization that have existed for many decades remain unresolved.

The current cultural and ideological processes show that pro-Western liberal and democratic forces in the Middle East have lost the competition with traditionalists and nationalists. Radical Islam and the associated extremist and terrorist groups are retreating mainly due to the effective counteraction of external forces. The level of violence and conflict in the region is decreasing extremely slowly and mainly due to a reduction in the number of extremely barbarous manifestations of terrorism. There is an ongoing shift in focus when justifying the causes of armed conflicts: from their political and ideological motives (struggle for democracy, against dictatorship) to inter-confessional and interethnic reasons. In Iraq, Syria and Yemen, we find quite vivid confirmation of the aforementioned trend toward a gradual shift in emphasis when explaining the causes of conflict.

From the point of view of the development of ideological and cultural trends in the region and in Muslim diasporas, the clear and straightforward solutions to public and personal problems offered by radical Islam will long remain attractive to many. In this sense, as a general conclusion, we dare say that the recent growth of radical Islam in the East and the spread of political populism in the West have similar root causes. Despite all differences in rhetoric and external forms, they largely represent the defensive response on that part of eastern and western society that does not have time or is unable to fit into the rigid paradigms imposed by globalization.

In the final part of the book, the authors explore the social dynamics of the Muslim diasporas in Europe. Estimates of the number of Muslims in Europe vary depending on the methodology of counting and determining who should be included in the count. Political and ideological considerations, political correctness and unwillingness of politicians to appear in an unfavourable light have a considerable influence on the final published indicators. Based on official and semi-official data from the European Union and national sources, it turns out that out of almost half a billion people in Western and Central Europe (28 EU member states plus Norway and Switzerland) there are 15 to 20 million Muslims. However, if one refers to the figures

reported by Muslim associations, the number may go up to around 25 million.

Our field studies and numerous indepth interviews peersueded us that in many of countries a process of diaspora's consolidation into semi-autonomous societal structures, generally resistant to integration into European civil society, is on the way. We tried to identify and describe stages of social exclusion and self-isolation of Muslim communities and the associated threats and challenges.

In the authors' view, the book, on the whole, reflects the complex socio-economic processes and the highly ambiguous dynamics of the development of the countries of North Africa and the Near and Middle East over the past decade and the transformations associated with the changing place of Islam in the polycentric world. In this volume the authors summarized, systematized and presented in logical integrity many provisions, forecasts, conclusions and recommendations contained in their numerous articles, analytical reports and speeches at expert meetings on various aspects of the development of the world of Islam, global governance and the new world order.

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